Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Case: 000144

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on simple battery as a lesser included offense of the sexual battery count. Thus, we reverse the misdemeanor sexual-battery conviction and remand for the People to elect whether to retry that charge or accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of simple battery. In either case, the defendant shall be fully resentenced.

First Holding:

The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on all lesser included offenses if there is substantial evidence from which a jury can reasonably conclude the defendant committed the lesser, uncharged offense, but not the greater. Thus, even though the defendant did not request an instruction on simple battery below, the claim is preserved for appeal.

Authority:

People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 29, 33, fn. 6

Second Holding:

We review de novo whether a trial court erred by not instructing on a lesser included offense, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine whether substantial evidence supported the instruction.

Authority:

People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 30

Third Holding:

It is a crime to touch an intimate part of another person, if the touching is done against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse. Simple battery is defined as any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. The least touching may constitute battery, and a touching is unlawful if it is harmful or offensive. It is undisputed that simple battery is a lesser included offense of sexual battery. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that there was substantial evidence on which a reasonable juror could have relied to determine that he committed simple battery only.

Authority:

PEN 243.4(e)(1)

PEN 242

People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404

People v. Yonko (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1010

Fourth Holding:

Generally, a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence is state law error that requires reversal if a different result was reasonably probable under Watson. A reasonable juror could have believed everything the victim said said but still harbored a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s purpose in touching her was sexual. The prejudice stemming from such an error is the risk that the jury ignored its instructions and convicted the defendant of an offense for which the prosecution did not carry its burden. The jury might have been convinced that the defendant was guilty of some lesser included offense and, as a result, been tempted to convict of a greater offense rather than acquit. Nor did the jury make any other findings establishing that it necessarily concluded the defendant had such a purpose. Particularly given that the jury was willing to convict him of lesser included offenses on other counts, we perceive nothing in the record dispelling the risk that because it was not instructed on simple battery, it convicted him of sexual battery rather than acquitting him.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196, 200, 201

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260

Fifth Holding:

The People must elect whether to retry that charge or accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of simple battery. In either case, the defendant shall be fully resentenced.

Authority:

People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681

Case: 000129

Error and/or relief

The trial court must correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court never imposed fines or fees other than restitution to the Victim’s Compensation Board, and must recalculate his actual custody credits.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the court waived the imposition of a restitution fine and the parole revocation fine and other fines and fees.  [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, but the law is clear that it has the authority to do so, and I have listed some authorities below.]

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

As the People did not object in the court below, the People have forfeited the issue of the propriety of the trial court order waiving the restitution and other fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

Third Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing. [GARY NOTE: the court did not cite authority for remanding for the court to determine custody credits, but the law is clear, per the authorities I have set forth below.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Case: 000128

Error and/or relief

We find that the nature of the required program is impermissibly vague in the condition of probation that the defendant “enter into and continue such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as directed by the probation officer or as specifically ordered as a term of probation, and shall not leave or terminate such programs without the permission of the probation officer.”

First Holding:

Applying de novo review, we address each challenge to a probation condition separately.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Second Holding:

It is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer. Although a probation condition need not be set forth with mathematical certainty, the language used must have reasonable specificity. Here, such specificity is lacking. The program choices for the probation officer are open-ended, ranging from education to psychological and psychiatric to drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation. This is too vague to pass muster, and we cannot interpret it more narrowly in light of other probation conditions, the probation report, or the trial court’s commentary. Without meaningful guidance from the record, the open-ended program condition cannot be saved by permitting the probation department to provide the necessary specificity.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358

Case: 000126

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously used the defendant’s 2012 prior conviction to sentence him under the Three Strikes law without first determining whether that gang-enhanced felony could have been obtained after amendments enacted by AB 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699).

First Holding:

Where a defendant has previously suffered a conviction under the prior version of Penal Code section 186.22, the changes made in AB 333 apply to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576

Second Holding:

By treating the defendant’s 2012 conviction as a prior strike conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence that is unauthorized by law under Fletcher. The defendant’s argument is therefore not forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 7 [forfeiture principles do not apply to legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751 [The unauthorized sentence rule is an exception to the forfeiture doctrine. It permits a challenge to an unauthorized sentence on appeal even if the defendant failed to object below.]

Case: 000125

Error and/or relief

It appears the trial court, in finding that the defendant is guilty of murder under current law, misunderstood that its role as independent fact finder entailed weighing witness credibility. We therefore remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6(d). At that evidentiary hearing, the defendant may again raise any contention regarding witness credibility, which the trial court must then rule on in deciding whether the defendant is guilty of murder under current law.

First Holding:

The trial court’s role at the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 is to act as an independent fact finder and determine, in the first instance, whether the petitioner committed murder under the law as amended by SB 1437.

Authority:

People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123

Second Holding:

The statute’s plain language shows the People are required to establish the defendant is guilty under current law as a matter of fact and beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial and determine whether that proof leaves it with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. Unlike the prima facie stage where the trial court should not decide unresolved factual issues that involve credibility determinations or weighing of evidence, the court should decide such issues after issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 294-296

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51