Category Archives: Appellate Principles

Appellate Principles, Jurisdiction

Case 001149

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief:

This was a writ of habeas corpus to permit the defendant to rely on the In re Benoit principle of constructive timely filing of a notice of appeal. The petition was granted, and the defendant was allowed to proceed with his appeal.

First Holding:

Petitioner seeks permission to file a belated notice of appeal under the doctrine of constructive filing. The People have voiced no opposition. Granted.

Authority:

In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72

Second Holding (Gary Musings):

GARY Musings: the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth holdings and their authorities are provided by me and did not appear in the opinion, but are important enough to mention in the context of the filing of a notice of appeal.

What I have set forth in this summary is virtually a direct copy-and-paste from my summary in case 000229. The summary for Case 000085 contains a more thorough discussion of the Benoit rule regarding what would otherwise be untimely filings of the notice of appeal.

Where a defendant is incarcerated and has requested his attorney to file a notice of appeal within the time to file a notice, the court may deem the otherwise late notice of appeal to have been constructively filed timely. The Attorney General’s concession on behalf of the People is deemed to constitute an agreement that the requested relief ought to be granted without further proceedings

Authority:

In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72, 81–82

People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740, fn. 7

Third Holding:

In felony cases, a notice of appeal and any statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed. Except as provided in rule 8.66 [which deals with when catastrophes happen], no court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 8.308

Fourth Holding:

In misdemeanor cases, the notice of appeal under this article must be filed within 30 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 8.393

Fifth Holding:

As used in rule 8.304(a)(1) regarding the filing of a notice of appeal in the superior court in a felony case, “felony case” means any criminal action in which a felony is charged, regardless of the outcome. A felony is “charged” when an information or indictment accusing the defendant of a felony is filed or a complaint accusing the defendant of a felony is certified to the superior court under Penal Code section 859a. A felony case includes an action in which the defendant is charged with: (A) A felony and a misdemeanor or infraction, but is convicted of only the misdemeanor or infraction; (B) A felony, but is convicted of only a lesser offense; or (C) An offense filed as a felony but punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor, and the offense is thereafter deemed a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b).

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(2)

Sixth Holding:

An untimely notice of appeal divests the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Authority:

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119

People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094 [An untimely notice of appeal is wholly ineffectual. The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured by nunc pro tunc order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief, but must dismiss the appeal on motion or on its own motion.]

Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case 001145

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing a post-sentencing protective order and in doubling the middle term when the strike had been dismissed as part of the plea agreement.

First Holding:

A court may issue a protective order to protect a witness or victim during the pendency of a criminal case. Generally, protective orders issued under section 136.2 are limited in duration and may not extend beyond the court’s jurisdiction. It was therefore error for the court to impose a protective order to extend past sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382

Second Holding:

The issue of the propriety of the issuance of a protect order may be raised on appeal despite a lack of objection.

(Gary note: The court cited Ponce, but did not elaborate on its holding. I have set forth the Ponce actual holding.)

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381 (As a general rule, an appellant waives issues on appeal that he or she did not initially raise in the trial court. (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.) But there are exceptions to this rule for unauthorized sentences and sentencing decisions that are in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue a three-year protective order during sentencing, we will consider Ponce’s claim on the merits.)

Third Holding:

It was error to impose a second-strike punishment, because the defendant did not admit the prior strike. The strike prior allegation was dismissed when the defendant was sentenced.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for this holding, most likely because it is so obvious. I have listed the two statutes pertaining to the Three Strikes law for your convenience.

(Section 667 was amended by the Legislature in 1994 to add the Strikes alternative sentencing scheme in addition to the already-existing section 664(a) enhancement on serious felony convictions for each prior conviction of a serious felony brought and tried separately.

(Section 1170.12 was added by initiative (Proposition 184) later in 1994. Somewhat confusingly, perhaps, both statutes co-exist. Both were amended in 2012 by Proposition 36.)

Authority:

PEN 667(b)-(j)

PEN 1170.12

Appellate Principles, Sentencing, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 001140

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The evidence was insufficient to support an order requiring the defendant to submit to HIV/AIDS testing.

First Holding:

The trial court erred in ordering the defendant to submit to a blood test for HIV/AIDS pursuant to section 1202.1 because there was insufficient evidence of probable cause to require the testing. The conduct was contact by the defendant’s hands only, but there was no indication in the record that the touching would transmit bodily fluids.

Authority:

PEN 1202.1

Second Holding:

Defendant did not object below to the HIV/AIDS testing order. In general, absent an objection in the trial court, a defendant forfeits appeal of any deficiency in the statutorily required finding supporting an HIV testing order pursuant to section 1202.1. However, as the People point out, because mandatory HIV/AIDS testing is strictly limited by statute and Penal Code section 1202.1 conditions a testing order upon a finding of probable cause, a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence even in the absence of an objection.

Authority:

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1117,

People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1123

Third Holding:

Section 1202.1 requires the trial court to order every person who is convicted of a sexual offense listed in subdivision (e) to submit to a blood test for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).

The term “sexual offense” includes lewd or lascivious conduct with a child in violation of Section 288, but the statute provides that testing shall be ordered only if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim. The statute directs a court ordering such testing to note its finding on the court docket and minute order if one is prepared.

Authority:

PEN 1202.1

Fourth Holding:

A remand is warranted. Section 1202.1 is part of a broader statutory scheme of health and safety legislation intended to combat the further spread of HIV infection and promote prompt medical treatment for those already infected. Given the significant public policy considerations at issue, we conclude it would be inappropriate simply to strike the testing order without remanding for further proceedings to determine whether the prosecution has additional evidence that may establish the requisite probable cause. It would be unfair to both the victim and the public to permit evasion of the legislative directive if evidence exists to support a testing order.

Accordingly, we will vacate the HIV/AIDS testing order but remand the matter to permit a further hearing on the issue if the prosecution so requests.

Authority:

People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1128-1129

Appellate Principles, Jury trial

Case 001134

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The record must be amended to delete the term “or firearm” with respect to the jury’s true finding under section 667.61(e)(3).

Holding:

The jury answered “true” to the question of whether the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon or firearm within the meaning of section 667.61(e)(3). The jury instruction CALCRIM 3145 is limited to only the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon. It does not refer to firearms. The prosecutor’s closing argument expressly informed the jury that the prosecution was relying on [specific nonfirearm items] to be the dangerous or deadly weapon for purposes of section 667.61(e)(3). There was absolutely no evidence that a firearm was used in the commission of the crime.

These considerations lead to two conclusions. First, the jury’s verdict could not be based on the defendant using a firearm. Second, the verdict form’s use of the term firearm for purposes of count 3 conformed only to the general language of section 667.61(e)(3) and did not conform to either the evidence presented or the arguments and theories of the prosecution. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that inclusion of the term firearm for purposes of count 3 and section 667.61(e)(3) was a clerical error.

Courts have the inherent power and discretion to correct clerical errors so that court records accurately reflect the true facts. This includes clerical errors that appear in a jury’s verdict form.

For accuracy’s sake and for the record to clearly reflect the true state of the facts, we will exercise our discretion and direct the trial court to strike the phrase “or firearm” the verdict form.

Authority:

People v. Alanis (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1467,1473–1474

People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 370

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 001111

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate defendant’s restitution fine, and remand this matter for the trial court to recalculate defendant’s custody credits and issue an amended abstract of judgment. The argument regarding imposition of the upper term is forfeited for lack of objection in the trial court.

First Holding:

Under California’s determinate sentencing law as it currently stands, excluding properly proven prior convictions or a defense stipulation, a jury finding is now required for all facts actually relied on to impose an upper term and a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapmanstandard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Second Holding:

A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices if the party did not object to the sentence at trial. The rule applies to cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.

Authority:

People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406

Third Holding:

Strong policy reasons support this forfeiture rule. It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal

Authority:

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114

People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 239–240

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46

Fourth Holding:

Even constitutional claims may be forfeited if the issue is not raised below, and discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.

Absent a substantive change in the law that applies retroactively or an extenuating circumstance such as the futility of objecting under the then-governing substantive law, neither of which is at issue here, the policy reasons underlying the forfeiture doctrine fully support its application where a defendant remains silent in the trial court during resentencing and then seeks to obtain appellate relief based on an asserted sentencing error that could have been raised at the time of sentencing.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880–881, 887-888, fn. 7

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431–432

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 698–699

People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7–8

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal]

Fifth Holding:

The restitution fine imposed in 2002 must be vacated under section 1465.9(d), which provides that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626–627

Sixth Holding:

When a prison term already in progress is modified as the result of an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.

We remand for the court to determine the appropriate credit for time served.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

People v. Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557 [trial court best positioned to ensure custody credits correctly calculated]

(Gary note: The court quoted Buckhalter language that did not involve determination of credit for time served up to the original date of sentence. Thus, it is not uncommon to see language citing Buckhalter to mention the actual days in custody, with no mention of conduct time earned under section 4019 prior to the original sentencing. Buckhalter was concerned only with the time between the original sentencing and the resentencing.

(If you are looking for authority regarding recitation of the conduct credits earned prior to the initial sentencing, you may wish to review Sek, which the Court of Appeal did not cite in this case. I do think, however, that it would be valuable to examine the authority Sek relied on for its conclusion that the court must calculate the defendant’s conduct credit earned prior to his original sentencing.)

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673