Error and/or relief
There was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of attempted dissuasion of a witness. We reverse the attempted dissuasion of a witness conviction, and remand for resentencing. In this case, the indictment was filed in 2012, and the dissuading charge pertained to conduct that occured in 2016.
[GARY NOTE: THE STATUTE WAS AMENDED EFFECTIVE 1/1/2026, AND POST-COMPLAINT-FILING DISSUASION BY ITSELF IS NOW PUNISHABLE. I have chosen to post this victory anyway, because there are likely still cases in which the conduct occurred prior to 1/1/2026, and ex post facto prohibitions would preclude application of the amended law.]
First Holding:
Section 136.1(b)(2) makes it a crime to attempt to dissuade a victim or witness from causing a complaint to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.
Authority:
People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 986
[Gary note: remember that the statute has since been amended to outlaw the conduct that was not previously covered under section 136.1(b)(2).]
Second Holding:
The issue before the Supreme Court in Reynoza was whether section 136.1(b)(2) [Gary note: referring to the version in effect prior to the 1/1/26 amendment] required proof of an attempt to dissuade a witness from causing a charging document to be sought and prosecuted or whether the statute also independently applies where a defendant dissuades a witness only from assisting in the prosecution of a case after the charging document has already been filed.
Put another way, can the statute support a disjunctive interpretation—in which the statute independently applies where a defendant dissuades a witness from assisting in the prosecution of a case after the charging document has already been filed—or whether a conjunctive interpretation precludes a conviction under such circumstances.
The court concluded that because section 136.1(b)(2) is equally susceptible to both the conjunctive and disjunctive constructions, the rule of lenity points to an interpretation more favorable to the defendant. As a result, the statute must be read in the conjunctive construction, which does not permit a conviction to be based solely on proof of dissuasion from assisting in the prosecution of an already-filed charging document.
Consequently, because the defendant’s conduct in Reynoza amounted to, at most, dissuasion after a complaint was filed, the conviction had to be reversed. Therefore, where criminal charges have already been filed, postcharging dissuasion alone does not constitute an offense under section 136.1(b)(2).
[Gary note: Did I adequately mention that the ambiguity has been cleared up by the Legislature, effective 1/1/26, and now it is clear that section 136.1(b)(2) applies even if the only attempted dissuasion occurred after the charging document has been filed? Thus, Reynoza’s conclusion applies to only those cases in which the attempt at dissuasion occurred prior to 1/1/26.]
Authority:
People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 986, 987, 989, 1013
Third Holding:
[Gary note: to demonstrate the significance of choice of words, I have set forth the original language that was interpreted in Reynoza and the amended version. The only difference is the change from “and” to “or.” I have added *** on both sides of the affected word to highlight it better. Goes to show sometimes it’s just all in the wrist.]
Authority:
PEN 136.1(b)(2) PRIOR TO AMENDMENT 1/1/26: “Causing a complaint, indictment, information, or probation or parole violation to be sought and prosecuted, *** and *** assisting in the prosecution thereof.”
PEN 136.1(b)(2) AS AMENDED EFFECTIVE 1/1/26: “Causing a complaint, indictment, information, or probation or parole violation to be sought and prosecuted, *** or *** assisting in the prosecution thereof.”
