Tag Archives: PEN 1385

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001108

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The record is ambiguous whether the trial court misunderstood its discretion to dismiss or strike an enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

First Holding:

Section 1385 governs a trial court’s discretion to dismiss various elements of an action or sentence. Under section 1385(a), the trial court may in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. This authority includes the power to dismiss or strike a sentencing enhancement.

Section 1385(b)(1) states that, if the court has the authority pursuant to subdivision (a) to strike or dismiss an enhancement, the court may instead strike the additional punishment for that enhancement in the furtherance of justice. In other words, striking an enhancement is different from striking the punishment for the enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209

People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1010

Second Holding:

Prior to 2022, section 1385 did not provide direction as to how courts should exercise that discretion” to dismiss or strike enhancements. Effective January 1, 2022, SB 81 amended section 1385 to specify mitigating circumstances courts must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements in furtherance of justice.

SB 81 added subdivision (c) to section 1385, which now provides, in part:

(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the enumerated mitigating circumstances are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

As relevant here, the enumerated mitigating circumstances include that the current offense is connected to mental illness and the current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)(2)(A) through (I) [a list of nine mitigating circumstances to be given great weight)

People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 238

People v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 246

Third Holding:

Under section 1385(c), absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

That is, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice. If a trial court dismisses an enhancement pursuant to section 1385(c), then both the enhancement and its punishment must be dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.428(c)(3)

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029

Fourth Holding:

We review a court’s sentencing choices for abuse of discretion. A defendant is entitled to a sentencing decision made in the exercise of informed discretion. We presume the court knows and applies the applicable law, absent evidence to the contrary. Where the record affirmatively discloses that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to impose sentence with full awareness of its discretion. Additionally, a record that is, at best, ambiguous about whether the court understood its sentencing discretion warrants remand.

(Gary note: The opinion then discusses how it concludes that the record is ambiguous on whether the court understood the scope of it discretion.)

Authority:

People v. Nielsen (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 816, 823

People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944

People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229 [Remand is unnecessary if the record is silent concerning whether the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion. Error may not be presumed from a silent record.]

People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 852–853

Fifth Holding:

The proper remedy is a remand for resentencing. Remand would be unnecessary if the record clearly indicated that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware of its discretion. But we cannot conclude that the record here so clearly indicates such a result. That is, the record does not demonstrate with unusual clarity that remand would be an idle act.

Authority:

People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432

Sixth Holding:

The presence of a mitigating circumstance enumerated in section 1385(c)(2) does not dictate that an enhancement should be dismissed. Instead, the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement.

This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033

People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157

Seventh Holding:

The defendant further argues that the court erred in limiting his conduct credit to 15% under section 2933.1 We reject the People’s contention that the defendant forfeited his claim of conduct credit error by failing to object below.

To the extent his claim could be forfeited, we would exercise our discretion to consider it because it involves a pure question of law presented by undisputed facts and to forestall a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel. However, given our disposition, we do not reach the merits of the defendant’s challenge to his conduct credit award.

Authority:

People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 106

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7

People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001010

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In resentencing the defendant, the court abused its discretion in not giving proper consideration to whether to strike prior strike convictions. Remanded for proper consideration.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.

Effective January 1, 2024, a trial court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.

Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading.

In resentencing the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, the resentencing court shall consider if the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, and whether those circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Second Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

Section 1385(c)(2) further provides that, in exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. Accordingly, if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, then the court need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296

Third Holding:

A court’s decision not to strike a prior serious felony enhancement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 585

People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242–243 [a trial court’s exercise of discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice]

Fourth Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,1029

Fifth Holding:

A trial court has discretion under the Three Strikes law to dismiss or vacate prior conviction allegations or findings in the furtherance of justice. In exercising its discretion, the court may give no weight whatsoever to factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes scheme.

Instead, preponderant weight must be accorded to factors intrinsic to the scheme, such the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and the prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects. In considering these intrinsic factors the court must determine whether the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.

While the purpose of the Three Strikes law was to ensure longer prison sentences, the “overarching consideration” and “underlying purpose” in striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1385(a)

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530-531

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 498–500

Sixth Holding:

Abuse of discretion in failing to strike a prior conviction occurs in limited circumstances: where the trial court is not aware of its discretion; where the trial court considers impermissible factors; or where applying the Three Strikes law would produce an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd result under the specific facts of a particular case.

A reviewing court’s disagreement with the trial court’s weighing of proper factors (as distinct from the trial court’s reliance on improper factors in the weighing process) does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

We conclude from this record that the trial court failed to balance the appropriate factors set forth in Williams, that is, the defendant’s personal background, character, and prospects, and the specifics of his criminal history, the characteristics of the present offense for which he was being resentenced, or if a shorter sentence would accommodate risks to public safety.

Significantly, courts have reversed the denial of dismissal of prior strikes in instances where the prior strikes were far more serious than the defendant’s.

(Gary note: I have left out the appellate court’s recitation of facts peculiar to this defendant and the facts in this case, but court determined that the lower court had not given proper consideration of those factors. It remanded for a proper consideration.)

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378-379

People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029

People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140–1141 [defendant’s three previous strikes were two robberies and assault with a knife]

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000906

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court struck the one-year prior but otherwise declined to reduce the defendant’s sentence. The trial court did not apply the correct standard of law and therefore abused its discretion. We reverse the order.

First Holding:

SB 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess. amended section 667.5b) to allow courts to impose one-year prior prison term enhancements only for specified sexually violent offenses. Thereafter, SB 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made the amendment retroactive to final cases and added what is now section 1172.75.

Section 1172.75 sets forth the process for recalling sentences and resentencing. If a judgment includes a qualifying enhancement, the trial court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. Resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed inclusive of the enhancements unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.

At resentencing, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

At a hearing under section 1172.75, the resentencing court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2)

Third Holding:

As relevant here, SB 81 (2021–2022) effected a change in law by adding subdivision (c) to section 1385. That subdivision provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.

Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

Fourth Holding:

Section 1385(c) sets forth several mitigating circumstances for consideration. Two of them are relevant in this case. Under section 1385(c), absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice.

This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1038

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s sentencing decision under section 1172.75 for abuse of discretion and ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

We similarly review a trial court’s decision not to dismiss a sentencing enhancement for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857

Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

Sixth Holding:

We reject the Attorney General’s argument that the defendant forfeited this contention because he failed to raise it below. The defendant did not have to ask the trial court to apply the correct standard of law to preserve a claim on appeal that the trial court applied an incorrect one. Rather, a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions based on the sentencing court’s informed discretion, including one informed by the correct law. In any event, we may review any question of law involved in any ruling or order that affects the defendant’s substantial rights, even if the defendant did not object below.

(Gary note: The court proceeded to analyze the trial court’s treatment or lack thereof of facts specific to this defendant that demonstrated the abuse of discretion.)

Authority:

PEN 1259

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000893

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the judge to stay the section 12022.1 enhancement under section 1385(b)(1). An enhancement may be stricken or imposed, unless there is some other legal reason it must be stayed rather than imposed.

First Holding:

Ordinarily, an enhancement must be either imposed or stricken in furtherance of justice under section 1385. Section 1385(b)(1) adds that, if the court has the authority pursuant to subdivision (a) to strike or dismiss an enhancement, the court may instead strike the additional punishment for that enhancement in the furtherance of justice in compliance with subdivision (a).

The trial court has no authority to stay an enhancement, rather than strike it—not, at least, when the only basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice.

There are exceptions to this rule that permit courts to stay the punishment imposed for an enhancement, for example section 654 and rule 4.447 of the California Rules of Court. These exceptions are not discretionary; they are limited to the situation in which an enhancement that otherwise would have to be either imposed or stricken is barred by an overriding statutory prohibition. In that situation—and that situation only—the trial court can and should stay the enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1385(b)(1)

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364

Second Holding:

According to the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the trial court here relied on section 1385(b)(1) when it purported to stay the section 12022.1 enhancement. It does not appear that any overriding statute prohibits imposition of the enhancement in this case.

As a result, the court lacked the authority to stay the enhancement. In general, we presume a trial court knew and followed the law. Based on the statutory provision cited by the court, we conclude the court intended to strike the punishment for the enhancement rather than imposing an unauthorized stayed sentence.

The minute order from the sentencing hearing supports this conclusion by indicating that the court struck the enhancement, though it suggests the court did so at a prior hearing, which is not supported by the transcript. We will modify the judgment accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case 000886

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

1n 1991, for a crime committed in 1989, the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). When his case came up for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2025, the court believed its only discretion was to impose less than the upper term on the determinate portion of his sentence. Defense counsel agreed. This was error. The court also erred in its calculation of credit for time served. And the restitution fine must be struck.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required trial courts to impose a sentence enhancement of one additional year for each of a defendant’s prior prison or jail terms. Section 1172.75(a) now provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under section 667.5(b) is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(b) and (c) mandate that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identify eligible individuals whose sentences include now-invalidated section 667.5 enhancements, and that the trial court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

While conducting the resentencing, section 1172.75(d)(2), provides the express instruction that the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Second Holding:

Section 190.2(a) provides that where there has been a finding of certain enumerated special circumstances in connection with a defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder, the penalty is death or LWOP. Section 1385 previously provided the trial court with the discretion to strike or dismiss the special circumstances.

Although the statute only authorizes such relief upon motion of the court or application of the prosecution, the defendant nevertheless has the right to invite the court to exercise its power by an application to strike a count.

Failure by a defendant to make such a request under section 1385 results in forfeiture of the issue. In the interests of justice, and in consideration of defendant’s alternative argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)

PEN 1385

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141, 1144

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6

Third Holding:

Contrary to Section 1385, however, section 1385.1 provides that a judge shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance which is admitted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or is found by a jury or court as provided in Sections 190.1 to 190.5, inclusive. The section was enacted as of June 6, 1990, via voter initiative Proposition 115. The dispute here centers around whether section 1385.1 serves as a bar to the trial court’s discretion to strike section 190.2 special circumstances when the court is resentencing a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75 for a pre-June 6, 1990, crime.

Authority:

PEN 1385.1

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Fourth Holding:

Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. However, defendant argues pursuant to McDavid that the trial court necessarily abused its discretion when it failed to strike his special circumstances because it was unaware that it had any discretion to do so.

We therefore examine whether the trial court had any discretion in this regard, which is a question of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.

Authority:

People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023

Fifth Holding:

The Nguyen court noted that section 1385.1 operates only prospectively, therefore, a trial court may dismiss a special circumstance allegation attached to any murders committed before June 6, 1990, the date that section 1385.1 became effective. Nguyen specifically relied upon Tapia.

In Tapia, Proposition 115 took effect while the defendant was in the process of being prosecuted for first degree murder. The defendant challenged the trial court’s decision to conduct voir dire pursuant to the new Proposition 115 procedures.

In examining whether Proposition 115’s provisions could be applied to crimes committed prior to its effective date after consideration of ex post facto concerns, the Supreme Court separated the provisions into four separate categories depending on their impact upon defendants.

Relevant to this inquiry, the high court expressly categorized section 1385.1 as falling within the category of provisions that change the legal consequences of criminal behavior to the detriment of defendants and therefore cannot be applied to crimes committed before the measure’s effective date.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 286-287, 297

Sixth Holding:

The mandate in section 1172.75(d)(2), that the trial court apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” evidences a legislative intent that defendants are to be treated with more leniency, not less, when being resentenced pursuant to this statute. Because the trial court clearly expressed more than once its belief that it did not have any discretion with respect to the LWOP sentence on Count 1, we deem the court to have abused its discretion and reverse.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2)

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023 [A court acting while unaware of the full scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it.]

Seventh Holding:

The court court failed to award the defendant 2 days of credit for time served, and we modify the judgment accordingly.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority, but it seems obvious that the court has the power to modify the credit for time served to the correct number. I have cited authority the court could have relied on. The issue does not seem so much a matter of the trial court refusing to award credit; rather, it was a mathematical error. I speculate that perhaps the court did not award credit for the first day in custody. Counting days is different than determining the number of days between dates. From January 1 through January 31 is 31 days, counting. But if you subtract January 1 from January 31, you will realize only 30 days.  For credit for time served, the correct number is the counting number–31 in my example.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Eighth Holding:

As part of defendant’s original 1991 sentencing, the court ordered him to pay $10,000 to the state Restitution Fund pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4 (formerly Govt. Code sec. 13967(a).) In light of section 1465.9, which compels that restitution fines older than 10 years be vacated, we vacate that fine. In Salstrom, the court determined that the reference to 10 years is from the date the restitution fine was originally ordered.

Resentencing does not reset the 10-year limitation. Applying section 1465.9 to reduce defendant’s sentence as part of a section 1172.75 resentencing hearing gives effect to both statutes.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652-653 [detailing the history of the restitution statutes]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 599-601, review granted on unrelated issues, March 11, 2026, S295038

Mejia v. Reed (2000) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 [when two codes are to be construed, they must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof]