Tag Archives: Standard of review

Case 001175

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court should have vacated the restitution fine, which was imposed more than 10 years earlier.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AAB 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) modified section 1465.9. Section 1465.9(d) now provides, in pertinent part, that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. There is no language in section 1465.9 limiting its relief in cases of resentencing.

As the application of amended section 1465.9 involves statutory construction, it is subject to de novo review.

Authority:

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626 [holding that analogous language in section 1465.9(a) mandates vacation of a portion of a judgment for the purpose of striking the unpaid balance of the relevant assessment]

Case 001173

Error and/or relief

In light of the recent Supreme Court’s clarification on aiding and abetting,the matter is remanded for reconsideration of the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6.

First Holding:

Morris held that liability under section 189(e)(2) requires that the non-killer aid, abet, or assist the actual killer in the commission of the killing itself, not merely the underlying felony. We now conclude that the record of conviction does not conclusively establish that the defendant aided and abetted the actual killer in the killing itself.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671

Second Holding:

SB 1437 amended the substantive law on accomplice liability for murder by narrowing the felony-murder rule and eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a theory of liability for murder. SB 1437 added section 189(e), providing felony murder liability only if the defendant was the actual killer, was not the actual killer but, with intent to kill, aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder, or was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957

Third Holding:

A defendant convicted under the prior felony murder law can petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if he could not now be convicted of murder because of the changes made by SB 1437.

Upon receipt of a petition that contains all required information, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested. The court must also direct the prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit the petitioner to reply. If the court determines the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, it must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing.

The prima facie inquiry is limited. The court takes the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and refrains from factfinding. The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708–709

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960, 971-972

Fourth Holding:

Dismissal at the prima facie showing stage requires that the record of conviction conclusively establish the jury made findings on all elements necessary to convict under the current law. If the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing on his entitlement to relief.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(c)

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450

Fifth Holding:

Whether the record of conviction shows the petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law is a legal question that we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

Sixth Holding:

A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:

(1) The person was the actual killer.

(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.

3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2(d).

Authority:

PEN 189(e)

Seventh Holding:

In Morris, the Supreme Court held that the language in section 189(e)(2) requiring that a defendant who was not the actual killer must have aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder means that he must have aided, abetted, or assisted the killing itself. It was not referring to aiding, abetting, or assisting the qualifying felony during which the murder occurred.

Because of the clarification by Morris, the jury’s true finding on the felony murder special circumstance did not necessarily establish the defendant’s liability under section 189(e)(2). Although we cannot rule out that the defendant was the actual killer, or an aider and abettor under a still valid theory of felony murder, we cannot reach such conclusions without an evidentiary hearing. Thus, it was error to deny the petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678, 681-686

Case 001172

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to deny the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage based on its reliance on the recitations of fact in the appellate opinion on the defendant’s original conviction.

First Holding:

SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

The legislation amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986

Second Holding:

SB 1437 also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. As amended in 2021 by SB 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 1172.6 makes eligible for resentencing persons convicted of murder pursuant to any theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648

Third Holding:

Under section 1172.6, a defendant must file a petition in the sentencing court claiming that:

(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.

(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960

Fourth Holding:

Where the petition complies with the requirements of section 1172.6(a), and after the parties have had the opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause, and, thereafter, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(c), (d)

Fifth Holding:

While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.

In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may neither engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion nor make credibility determinations. At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only if the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658

Sixth Holding:

We review de novo the denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200

Seventh Holding:

The parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. The record of conviction includes jury instructions, charging documents, and verdict forms. Although the trial court may consider the procedural history of a prior appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing, it cannot consider the factual summary of a prior appellate opinion at any stage of the section 1172.6 petition process.

Authority:

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731-732

People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1188

People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 929

Eighth Holding:

Section 1172.6(a)(3), does not render categorically ineligible for relief petitioners who could have raised on direct appeal a challenge to imputed malice based on a claim of instructional ambiguity.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648-649

Case 001169

Error and/or relief

The court erred in discharging a juror during deliberations without conducting an adequate hearing to determine whether the juror could continue to deliberate in a fair and impartial manner.

First Holding:

The right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury is part of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. A sitting juror’s actual bias, which would have supported a challenge for cause, renders the juror unable to perform his or her duty and thus subject to discharge and substitution. Actual bias in this context is defined as the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1312

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 589

People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 581

Second Holding:

Under section 1089, if at any time, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears the court may order the juror discharged. When a court is informed of allegations which, if proven true, would constitute good cause for a juror’s removal, a hearing is required.

Grounds for investigation or discharge of a juror may be established by his or her statements or conduct, including events which occur during jury deliberations and are reported by fellow panelists.

Authority:

PEN 1089

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 588

Third Holding:

A distinction must be made between a juror who cannot fairly deliberate because of bias and one who, in good faith, disagrees with the others and holds his or her ground. A trial court’s inquiry into possible grounds for discharge of a deliberating juror should be as limited in scope as possible, to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations.

The inquiry should focus upon the conduct of the jurors, rather than upon the content of the deliberations. Additionally, the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court’s instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists.

Authority:

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

Fourth Holding:

We review the trial court’s decision to discharge a juror under section 1089 for an abuse of discretion under the heightened demonstrable reality test, which entails a more comprehensive and less deferential review than the substantial evidence test.

This test requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that [good cause for removing the juror is established. In determining whether the juror’s inability to perform his or her duty appears in the record as a demonstrable reality we do not reweigh the evidence.

Under the demonstrable reality standard, the record must give us confidence that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by the evidence on which it actually relied. In making that determination, we consider both the evidence itself and the reasons the court articulated for its conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450-451

Fifth Holding:

The defendant did not forfeit his claim by failing to request additional inquiry because the court has a duty to investigate when it possesses information that might constitute good cause to remove a juror even if the defendant objects to such an inquiry.

Authority:

People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506

Sixth Holding:

The court did not adequately investigate the reasons for the jurors statements. The information provided by the juror required the judge to conduct further inquiry on the conduct in question. The juror stated that he did not think he could be fair to either side because of the conduct of the jury he described to the judge in general terms, without specifics. The court’s inquiry did not go far enough to determine reliably that the juror was, in fact unable to continue deliberating in a fair and impartial manner. When a juror’s answer is ambivalent, the court is not entitled to presume the worst.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 694, 701

Seventh Holding:

The erroneous discharge of the juror requires reversal. However, this reversal does not create a double jeopardy bar to retrial.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 454

Case 001161

Error and/or relief

The electronic search condition is overbroad and we remand for the trial court to modify the condition to more closely meet the rehabilitative goal of preventing the defendant from engaging in fraudulent car purchases and sales.

First Holding:

The Legislature has placed in trial judges a broad discretion in the sentencing process, including the determination as to whether probation is appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof. Under this grant of discretion, a trial court may impose any reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(j)

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Second Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. Specifically, we review a probation condition for an indication that the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.

We review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

People v. Salvador (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 57, 62–63

Third Holding:

In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily-valid. A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it:

(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted;

(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal; and

(3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.

This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Fourth Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.

The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153

Fifth Holding:

The defendant asserts that the electronic search condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it is not sufficiently tailored to the rehabilitative purposes of his probation. The Attorney General responds that the defendant forfeited this challenge by failing to raise it in the trial court, and that he has also not adequately briefed the issue in this court. But the Attorney General concedes that the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad. Because of this concession, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the defendant’s constitutional challenges.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.]

Sixth Holding:

Vagueness considers whether a condition is sufficiently precise to give the probationer fair warning of what conduct is required or prohibited. The rule of fair warning consists of the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders, protections that are embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. A probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.

Authority:

U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 7

In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 260

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

Seventh Holding:

When the electronic search condition is evaluated with context and common sense, and given the meanings that would appear to a reasonable objective reader–as probation conditions must be interpreted–it is clear what is being asked of the defendant. Put simply, the defendant must permit a warrantless search of all of his electronic devices. A probation condition should not be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language. The search condition, while broad, provides fair warning to the defendant as to its scope and avoids the potential for arbitrary enforcement. Thus, the condition is not unconstitutionally vague.

Authority:

People v. Rinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1129

People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 501

Eighth Holding:

The condition is unconstitutionally overbroad, and on remand should be tailored to meet the rehabilitative purposes of the defendant’s probation. A probation condition imposing limits on constitutional rights must be closely tailored to its legitimate objective to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

As written, the electronic search condition permits the search of all of the defendant’s electronic devices, applications, and communications with anyone for any purpose, including his medical records, which are wholly unrelated to his criminality. Thus, the condition is overbroad. However, the condition can be remedied by modifying it to be limited to searches of the defendant’s electronic devices that are reasonably likely to reveal if he is involved in the purchase or sale of cars for a business purpose. We remand for that tailoring.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 727, 729 [finding electronic search condition requiring probationer to submit to search of any computers and all other electronic devices belonging to him overly broad and remanding to trial court to impose a valid condition more narrowly tailored to the states’ interests]

In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 298 [holding probation condition requiring juvenile to provide probation officer with access to electronic passwords unconstitutionally overbroad and remanding for trial court to limit authorization of warrantless searches of cell phone data and electronic accounts to media of communication reasonably likely to reveal whether he is boasting about drug use or otherwise involved with drugs]