Tag Archives: Standard of review

Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000245

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Section 654 required the court to stay the punishment for one of his two criminal threat convictions. The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that the defendant had sufficient time to reflect and renew his intent between his act of sending the first set of text messages giving rise to count 2 and his act of sending the second set of text messages giving rise to count 3. Therefore, we modify the judgment to stay the punishment for one of the counts.

First Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Section 654 protects against multiple punishment, not multiple conviction. To avoid double punishment, a sentencing court applying section 654 will impose the sentence for one offense while staying the imposition of the sentence on the other offense.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 336

People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 367

Second Holding:

Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an act or omission may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a single physical act. If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single intent and objective or multiple intents and objectives.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311–312

People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 367

Third Holding:

Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. The court’s express or implied findings in support of its determination that section 654 does not apply will be upheld on appeal if substantial evidence supports them. The applicability of section 654 to settled facts presents a question of law.

Authority:

People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 715, 737

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

Fourth Holding:

Where there is a basis for identifying the specific factual basis for a verdict, a trial court cannot find otherwise in applying section 654. However, in the absence of some circumstance foreclosing its sentencing discretion a trial court may base its decision under section 654 on any of the facts that are in evidence at trial, without regard to the verdicts. Indeed, a court may even rely on facts underlying verdicts of acquittal in making sentencing choices.

Authority:

People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339-1340

Fifth Holding:

If multiple offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. However, a course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and punishment. This is particularly so where the offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy already undertaken.

Authority:

People v. Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 680

People v. Gaynor (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 794, 800 [even if a course of conduct is directed to one objective, it may give rise to multiple violations and punishment if it is divisible in time]

People v. Goode (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 484, 492 [If the offenses were committed on different occasions, they may be punished separately]

People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935

People v. Louie (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 388, 399 [If the separation in time afforded the defendant an opportunity to reflect and to renew the defendant’s intent before committing the next crime, a new and separate crime is committed.]

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case: 000244

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by imposing a probation condition that required the defendant to submit to searches of her computers, recordable media, and electronic devices. The electronic search condition is not reasonably related to criminality. Because we conclude the electronic search condition is unreasonable under the Lent test, we do not consider whether it is unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction in part and remand with instructions to strike the electronic search condition and consider whether a more narrowly tailored or alternative condition would be reasonable.

First Holding:

In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily valid. Generally, a condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Second Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

Third Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. Specifically, we review a probation condition for an indication that the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000241

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for having a nonfunctioning rear license plate light. The detaining officer prolonged the stop without the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify detouring from the traffic stop’s mission. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment, and we remand the matter to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and with directions to the trial court to enter a new order granting his suppression motion.

First Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.

Authority:

PEN 1538.5

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043

Second Holding:

A traffic stop that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a relatively brief encounter for police investigation of the traffic violation.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Third Holding:

The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Fourth Holding:

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. The temporary detention may also include a criminal history check, which is done by consulting an in-car computer terminal or radioing dispatch. And although not specifically compelled by law, certain other steps customarily taken as matters of good police practice are no less intimately related to the citation process: for example, the officer will usually discuss the violation with the motorist and listen to any explanation the latter may wish to offer. These tasks are included within the officer’s mission during a traffic stop because they serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Fifth Holding:

An officer may also require a lawfully stopped driver to exit the vehicle for officer safety to complete his traffic stop mission. On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from the traffic stop’s mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. While an officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Duty of counsel, Immigration, Standard of review

Case: 000240

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant entered the United States in 1991 and obtained permanent residency in the mid-2000s. She was convicted by plea in 2009 of grand theft and was ordered to serve one year in the county jail as a condition of probation. At the time of her plea, she was advised under section 1016.5 that conviction may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion of admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization. There was no indication that her then-attorney discussed immigration consequences with her. She was not aware that a jail term of 364 days instead of 365 days would have made a difference regarding her immigration status.

Because service of at least 365 days in custody constitutes an aggravated felony, in 2010 she was notified by immigration authorities that she was subject to removal. She conceded removability and was deported. In 2023, someone she had kept in contact with over the years suggested she contact the public defender. She did, and a petition to vacate her conviction was filed under section 1473.7 Based on our independent review, we conclude the defendant has shown prejudicial error based on the totality of the circumstances. It was error to deny the defendant’s petition under section 1473.7 to vacate her conviction because prejudicial error impaired her ability to understand the immigration consequences of her plea.

First Holding:

Section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have served their sentences to vacate a conviction if they can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their conviction is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging their ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. If the required showings are made, the court must vacate the conviction or sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(a)(1), (e)(1)

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316

Second Holding:

Appeals from section 1473.7 hearings are subject to independent review. Under this standard, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. We give deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on the credibility of witnesses the superior court heard and observed. But when the trial court’s findings derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, the trial court and the reviewing court are in the same position, and no deference is owed.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319-320

Third Holding:

Subject to statutory exceptions, a motion to vacate based on immigration consequences shall be deemed timely filed at any time in which the individual filing the motion is no longer in criminal custody. The exceptions state the motion may be deemed untimely filed if it was not filed with reasonable diligence after the later of several events: receipt of a notice to appear in immigration court, notice from immigration authorities asserting adverse consequences from the conviction or sentence, or notice of a final removal order.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(b)(1) and (b)(2)

Fourth Holding:

The statutory exceptions to timeliness do not apply here. Because the defendant was given notice of immigration consequences before the 2017 effective date of section 1473.7, the test is: What event in her life that occurred after section 1473.7 became effective would have given her a reason to look for the existence of new legal grounds for relief or, at a minimum, put her on notice of the need to investigate? We assess the reasonableness of the petitioner’s diligence from that point forward. In so doing, we must take into account the totality of the circumstances. The record does not suggest some event occurred between the time the legislation became effective in 2017 and her contact with her attorney in 2023 that put her on notice. We conclude the motion was timely.

Authority:

People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 762, 765-766

Fifth Holding:

Relief pursuant to section 1473.7 requires that the defendant show prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. Because the defendant’s conviction of theft with a one-year sentence constituted an aggravated felony, she was subject to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States and was also ineligible for cancellation of removal, a form of discretionary relief allowing some deportable aliens to remain in the country.

Authority:

8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)

8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)

8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C)

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 15

Sixth Holding:

A defendant seeking section 1473.7 relief must demonstrate that the error is prejudicial, meaning a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences. This might be based either on the desire to go to trial or on the hope or expectation of negotiating a different bargain without immigration consequences. Relief is available if the defendant establishes he or she would have rejected the existing bargain to accept or attempt to negotiate another.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529

People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 559

Seventh Holding:

Her ignorance of the immigration consequences of her conviction and sentence was an error that damaged her ability to meaningfully understand and knowingly accept those consequences. A showing of ineffective assistance of counsel was not required because the motion was based on the inadequate advisement by the trial court that the conviction may have immigration consequences and the defendant’s own error in not knowing that her plea would subject her to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States. There was no indication her attorney considered the immigration consequences of her plea even though a social worker had expressed concern and the defendant had expressed concern to probation. This failure impeded the defendant’s ability to understand the consequences of her plea.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(a)(1)

People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 960–961

Eighth Holding:

Defense counsel has a duty to advise criminal defendant clients of the immigration consequences.

Authority:

PEN 1016.2

PEN 1016.3

Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 371

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 17-18

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000232

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that his mental illnesses were not a significant factor in the commission of the underlying offenses.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted provisions to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with certain mental health disorders. Pretrial diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. The statute expressly promotes increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1001.35

PEN 1001.36

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Second Holding:

Section 1001.36 provides that a defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if the defendant has been diagnosed with a specified mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert, and the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.

If the defendant is eligible, the court also must determine whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we review a trial court’s factual findings in support of its ruling for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Fourth Holding:

The trial court failed to apply the presumption that, given the timely diagnoses of mental health disorders, the mental condition contributed to his behavior. The burden then was on the prosecution to rebut the presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence tha there was no causal connection.

Authority:

People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490

Fifth Holding:

However, while eligibility and suitability are preconditions, mental health diversion remains discretionary even if they are met. Because of the existence of this residual discretion, the proper remedy is to remand with instructions for the trial court to consider both eligibility and suitability, along with making relevant findings, in accordance with the current law.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888

Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000230

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing on the recall of his sentence under section 1172.75, the court failed to recalculate his custody credits upon resentencing. We direct the trial court to correct the custody credits in the resentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Everyone sentenced to prison for criminal conduct is entitled to credit against his term for all actual days of confinement solely attributable to the same conduct. When a defendant is imprisoned and later resentenced, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29-30, 37

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike a prior felony conviction for abuse of discretion. It is the defendant’s burden on appeal to show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. Absent such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review. In addition, we will not reverse a trial court’s sentencing decision merely because reasonable people might disagree. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371, 376-377

Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review

Case: 000219

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in instructing the jury that implied malice murder can be based on an act that was reasonably foreseeable to cause death rather than highly likely to cause death. The prosecutor erred by making arguments to the jury on the same point. The defendant’s convictions on the counts of murder are reversed. The charges may be retried on remand. [The defendant was convicted as a result of the death of three occupants of a vehicle he crashed into while he was driving under the influence.]

First Holding:

Malice may be implied when a defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life. The trial court erred here by requiring only that death be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of appellant’s act, rather than a highly probable one. Similarly, the prosecutor erred by arguing to the jury that it need not find that appellant’s act of driving impaired created a strong probability of death.

Authority:

People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219

Second Holding:

When the trial court misinstructs the jury on an element of a charged crime, we consider prejudice under the standard of Chapman. Under that standard, we reverse the judgment unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942

Amelioration, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case: 000211

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Earlier, the defendant pleaded guilty to the first degree murder and admitted a firearm enhancement, admitting that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury and death to another person, who is not an accomplice. The trial court denied his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. He has not, at this juncture, made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 in light of the record of conviction. Out of an abundance of caution, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended petition should the defendant, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted SB 1437 to modify accomplice liability for murder and the felony-murder rule. It eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. Section 1172.6 is the new law’s procedure allowing people convicted of murder under the old law to petition for an order vacating their convictions and resentencing them on remaining counts if they could not now be convicted because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189 by SB 1437.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563, 569–570

People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1164

Second Holding:

Regarding the prima facie stage, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if the factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. A court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563

Third Holding:

In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. The preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea is part of the record of conviction that may be consulted at the prima facie stage. When, as here, the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea. It also includes the petitioner’s express admissions at the plea colloquy.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 564, 568-569

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 927

Fourth Holding:

We review the denial of a petition at the prima facie stage de novo.

Authority:

People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 447

Fifth Holding:

As in Patton, and out of an abundance of caution, we will grant the defendant’s request to remand the matter to permit him to plead additional facts. We therefore will order a remand to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended petition should the defendant, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569-570

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000210

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing. The trial court abused its discretion when declining to fully strike the firearm enhancement or strike it and impose a lesser firearm enhancement. The trial court errantly focused only on the defendant’s past and present danger to public safety, and not whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety in the future. The trial court erred in deciding whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety because, as the record of the sentencing hearing indicates, it focused solely on defendant’s past conduct and the circumstances of the murder. In the context of section 1385, the key question is forward looking—whether striking the enhancement would likely endanger public safety. Thus, even if the trial court struck the enhancement, the defendant would still be serving an indeterminate 15-to-life term with parole eligibility subject to the Parole Board and Governor’s review. The trial court must consider this future-looking issue for purposes of public safety.

First Holding:

A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard. A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have abused it.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694 [reminding that a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion]

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022,Penal Code section 1385 was amended to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. It reads, in part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so …. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Endanger public safety means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” Subparagraphs (A) to (I) list nine distinct mitigating circumstances, including, as is relevant here, subparagraph (C) where the application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. Subparagraph (C) states in this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674

Third Holding:

Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. For a defendant facing a lengthy indeterminate sentence, the inquiry should also take into account that the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time. This future review will act as a safety valve against a release that would endanger the public and is relevant to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger public safety.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

 

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fifth Amendment, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000206

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The true findings on the gang enhancements and gang-related firearm enhancements are vacated. The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded. On remand, the People may retry the enhancement allegations under the law as amended by AB 333. If the People do not retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of a retrial, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Several years after the defendant was sentenced, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1(a)(1), based on the defendant’s exceptional conduct while incarcerated. The trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced him to 40 years to life, despite the recommendation by both parties that the sentence be reduced to a determinate term less than half that 40-year minimum. The trial court erred in not examining the impact of AB 333, which amended the gang activity statutes significantly. When the defendant’s sentence was recalled, the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and the defendant regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of AB 333’s ameliorative changes to section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161–162

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312 [the application of law to undisputed facts is a question of law subject to de novo review]

Second Holding:

The evidence adduced at the defendant’s trial was insufficient to establish that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang beyond enhancing its reputation. Accordingly, we must vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements under section 186.22(b)(1), as well as the true findings on the gang-related firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(b), (c), (d), and (e)(1).

Authority:

People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232, 239–240

People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206, fn. 11

Third Holding:

Because we do not reverse based on the insufficiency of the evidence required to prove a violation of the statute as it read at the time of trial, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution will not bar a retrial. Where, as here, evidence is not introduced at trial because the law at that time would have rendered it irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is proper and the reviewing court does not treat the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669-670

Fourth Holding:

Whether the People decide not to retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of such a retrial, the defendant is entitled to a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]

Discretion, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000202

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court’s finding that the People provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in his commission of the offenses was not supported by substantial evidence. We remand to the trial court for a new diversion eligibility hearing under section 1001.36. If the court determines that defendant is eligible for diversion, it may grant his application. If the court determines defendant is ineligible, defendant’s convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to authorize trial courts to grant pretrial mental health diversion to defendants with qualifying mental disorders. To be eligible for mental health diversion, a defendant must have been diagnosed within the past five years with a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the defendant’s mental disorder must be a significant factor in the commission of the offense. There is a presumption that a defendant’s mental disorder diagnosis, if the diagnosis occurred within the past five years, was a significant factor in the commission of the offense. Once a presumption is established, it is the People’s burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to overcome it.

Authority:

PEN 1001.35

PEN 1001.36

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 678

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 400

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for mental health diversion for an abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere speculation.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851

Third Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s finding that a fact has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the question before us is whether the record contains evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the disputed fact was true. We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence. Those inferences must be drawn from evidence rather than speculation

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401-402

People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851

Fourth Holding:

The absence of evidence proving that defendant’s mental disorder was a factor in the commission of the offenses is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s mental disorder was not a factor in the commission of the offenses.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 404

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000201

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially erred when it sentenced the defendant to an upper term sentence without affording him a jury trial on aggravating factors. The trial court did not obtain defendant’s personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors. Defendant’s trial counsel stipulated to a court trial on defendant’s behalf, but defendant did not personally stipulate to a court trial or waive the jury trial right. The court found the pleaded aggravating circumstances to be true after a court trial, in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to a jury. We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found true that the defendant’s prior performance on post release community supervision was unsatisfactory. Because defendant was entitled to a jury trial at a minimum on this aggravating factor, we must remand the matter for a full resentencing to afford defendant that right.

First Holding:

A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt the truthfulness of every aggravating circumstance used to increase the penalty for the crime. Any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. Any waiver of this jury trial right must be an express waiver by the defendant and counsel in open court.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 16

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 288-289

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838-840, 842

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 4

Second Holding:

The error is prejudicial unless we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. Lack of a jury trial is not harmless if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24