Category Archives: Duty of the court

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Fines and fees

Case: 000192

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment contains a clerical error regarding the imposed fines. The defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence on some counts and a determinate sentence of others. Two different forms are used–one is the abstract for the indeterminate sentence, the other for the determinate sentence. Though the court imposed only one restitution fine and one parole revocation restitution fine, both fines appear on both forms. While not necessarily improper, it can lead to an ambiguity. In an abundance of caution, and because we agree the duplicate reference could possibly lead to confusion, we direct the clerk of the court issue an amended determinate abstract of judgment, leaving the restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine reflected only on the indeterminate abstract of judgment, form CR-292.

First Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. The abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction and it cannot add to or modify the judgment which it purports to digest or summarize. Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts that have properly assumed jurisdiction can order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Caudillo (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 122, 126

Second Holding:

A trial court must accurately set forth all fines and fees in the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200 [If the abstract does not specify the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections cannot fulfill its statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the appropriate agency]

Third Holding:

The court has authority to order correction of abstracts of judgment to avoid ambiguity.

Authority:

People v. Frey (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 139, 142 [finding ambiguity between the court’s order and the statement on the abstract of judgment form required correction]

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000185

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.75 petition for resentencing asked the trial court to strike certain sentencing enhancements that were no longer valid under current law and to exercise its discretion to strike other enhancements and prior strike convictions. The trial court held a resentencing hearing, struck the invalid enhancements, but declined to further reduce defendant’s sentence. We reverse for some certain conceded errors in the pronouncement of sentence, including with respect to custody credits, but otherwise affirm.

First Holding:

A trial court conducting a resentencing under section 1172.75 has discretion to dismiss a “strike” allegation under the Three Strikes law. There was no abuse of discretion here.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

Second Holding:

The trial court calculated certain elements of the defendant’s sentence by subtracting the one-year prior prison term enhancements from his original sentence as opposed to the later sentence imposed on remand following a determination that it was error to sentence on two–rather than just one–of the counts because of Penal Code section 654. There was some further ambiguity in the sentence imposed at the section 1172.75 hearing. The matter must be remanded to the trial court to strike the prior prison term enhancements on Counts Two and Three, to clarify the sentence on Count Three remains stayed, and to clarify the status of the prior serious felony enhancement on Count Two.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 834, 838-839

Third Holding:

The trial court improperly delegated calculation of his custody credits to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Authority:

PC 2900.1

PC 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23-24

Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

000184

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A jury found the defendant guilty of felony reckless evasion of a police officer. There were evidentiary conflicts. Under the highly deferential substantial evidence review standard, we conclude the conflicting trial evidence nonetheless supports his conviction. These evidentiary conflicts were sufficient, however, to raise a substantial question about whether all the elements of reckless evasion were present, warranting an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple evasion. We conclude failure to give this instruction was prejudicial error.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment with the direction that if the People do not timely elect to retry the defendant for reckless evasion, then the judgment shall be modified to reflect a conviction for simple evasion and the trial court shall resentence the defendant.

First Holding:

It is undisputed that misdemeanor simple evasion (Veh. Code, sec. 2800.1) is a lesser included offense of felony reckless evasion (Veh. Code, sec. 2800.2) and that the only distinction between the two crimes is that the greater offense requires proof of the additional element that the defendant drove the pursued vehicle in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. The greater offense’s additional element can be established by proving that during the evasion the defendant committed three or more violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under section 12810.

Authority:

VEH 2800.1

VEH 2800.2

People v. Springfield (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1680

People v. Diaz (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1486

Second Holding:

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a convictionIf the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.

Authority:

People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 819–820

People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638, 639

Third Holding:

California law has long provided that even absent a request, and over any party’s objection, a trial court must instruct a criminal jury on any lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense, if there is substantial evidence that only the lesser crime was committed. This venerable instructional rule ensures that the jury may consider all supportable crimes necessarily included within the charge itself, thus encouraging the most accurate verdict permitted by the pleadings and the evidence. The rule prevents either party, whether by design or inadvertence, from forcing an all-or-nothing choice between conviction of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete acquittal on the other.

Thus, a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support. In this context, substantial evidence is not any evidence, no matter how weak; it is evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive. If there is no proof, other than an unexplainable rejection of the prosecution’s evidence, that the offense was less than that charged, such instructions shall not be given. Although we concluded above that substantial evidence supports the finding that the defendant committed at least three qualifying Vehicle Code violations during the pursuit, there is also substantial evidence that he did not commit at least three qualifying violations. Accordingly, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte regarding this lesser included offense.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239–240

People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154

People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1263

People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1063

Fourth Holding:

We apply the generally applicable California test for harmless error under which we deem an error harmless unless it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error. Other than in cases involving the unique relationship between murder and voluntary manslaughter, the general rule is that the failure to instruct on other forms of lesser included offenses in noncapital cases is an error of state law. A reasonable probability in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility. In assessing prejudice, we consider both the magnitude of the error and the closeness of the case. Applying this standard, we find the error here prejudicial.

Authority:

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 251

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 944

People v. Vasquez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 786, 798

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case: 000181

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court employed an incorrect standard of review for determining whether the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under Penal Code section 1172.6 should be denied. Reversed and remanded for another new hearing.

First Holding:

SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The legislation amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.

It also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. If the trial court finds that a petitioning defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

PEN 188(a)

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986,

Second Holding:

On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court reviews the superior court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.

Authority:

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066

Third Holding:

For the trial court to properly conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant here was guilty of murder under the law as amended, the People had to prove he was the actual killer, or that he directly aided and abetted the murder and thus possessed malice aforethought. Felony murder is not at issue in this case.

Authority:

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710 [sec. 1172.6 relief is unavailable if the defendant was the actual killer]

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848 [SB 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought], [abrogated on another ground as stated in People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 836]

Fourth Holding:

It was an error for the trial court to conclude that the court had to determine whether the People could prove they could obtain a conviction of the defendant based on basic accomplice liability or whether he acted with reckless disregard for the life of the victim. The correct standard for the trial court at defendant’s section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing was whether the prosecution has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty of murder under California law as amended.

The trial court’s reference to whether defendant acted with reckless disregard for life is inapposite, because that aspect is relevant only in the context of whether a defendant was a major participant in the commission of a different felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life–i.e., it is relevant only to felony murder, which is not at issue in this case. Further, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would convict the defendant as he was charged. But at the section 1172.6 hearing, it is the trial court that is the fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

Authority:

People v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 632

Discretion, Duty of the court

Case: 000174

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After reviewing the petition and the parties’ briefing, we conclude that, at a pretrial hearing in May 2024, the court erred in denying petitioner’s request for a bail review hearing after petitioner showed changed circumstances entitling him to such a review. Therefore, we grant the petition and direct the trial court to hold a new bail review hearing. The court held that circumstances had changed between the former bail hearing and the current because a Court of Appeal published an opinion disagreeing with another appellate court’s conclusion that pretrial detention is the only option if bail is set at a level the defendant can reasonably afford but is not sufficient to protect the state’s compelling interests. In failing to address the conflict between the two opinions, the court abused its discretion.

First Holding:

Under section 1289, after a defendant has been admitted to bail upon an indictment or information, the court in which the charge is pending may, upon good cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount of bail. Such good cause must be founded on changed circumstances relating to the defendant or the proceedings.

Authority:

PEN 1289

In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 430

Second Holding:

If the court properly determines nonfinancial conditions are insufficient to protect the state’s interests, but that imposing a money bail condition (alone or in combination with nonfinancial conditions) would adequately protect the public and the victims and ensure the arrestee’s presence in court, the court must consider the individual arrestee’s ability to pay and set bail at a level the arrestee can reasonably afford. If money bail set at a level the defendant can reasonably afford is not sufficient to protect the state’s compelling interests, then the trial court’s only option is to order pretrial detention, assuming the evidentiary record is sufficient to support the findings necessary to justify such an order.

Authority:

In re Brown (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 296

In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135

Third Holding:

The appellate court held that circumstances had changed between the former bail hearing and the current because a Court of Appeal published an opinion disagreeing with another appellate court’s conclusion that pretrial detention is the only option if bail is set at a level the defendant can reasonably afford but is not sufficient to protect the state’s compelling interests. In failing to address the conflict between the two opinions, the court abused its discretion. The Kowalczyk court had disagreed with the Brown court’s earlier conclusion that a pretrial detention order is the only option when a bail amount the defendant can afford is insufficient to protect the public and ensure the defendant’s presence in court. The Kowalczyk court concluded that under Humphrey, if a court makes the findings necessary to support a detention, the court may set bail in an amount higher than a defendant can afford.

Authority:

In re Kowalczyk (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 667

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000172

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Following the defendant’s resentencing, the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the additional days of credit for time served since the original sentence was imposed.

First Holding:

A sentencing court must award credits for all days in custody up to and including the day of sentencing. At resentencing, the trial court must calculate the actual time the defendant has already served and credit that time against the subsequent sentence.

Authority:

People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects the trial court’s calculation of custody credits. The abstract of judgment must be amended to include an additional [more than 4,000 days] for the period the defendant remained in custody between his [after 2010] original sentencing and his [before 2025] resentencing.

[GARY NOTE: There was no authority indicated in the opinion for the correction of the abstract. The error is so obvious that it hardly seems necessary to provide authority. Nonetheless, there is authority the court could have cited. The appellate court may direct the trial court to correct clerical errors in an abstract of judgment. I have set forth some of the authorities the court could have cited.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000168

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In 2024, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent the trial court a letter providing it with authority to resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.1 in light of the court’s newfound discretion to dismiss prior serious felony enhancements. The court appointed defendant counsel and set the matter for a hearing. After the hearing, the court stated it was not going to exerciseits discretion, that it was leaving the sentence in play as originally sentenced, and it denied the motion.

The trial court erred in denying recall and resentencing without finding that the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18(c), as required to overcome the presumption in favor of recall and resentencing provided for in section 1172.1(b)(2). The trial court failed to understand the proper scope of its discretion in light of the mandated presumption in favor of recall and resentencing. Thus, it abused its discretion in rendering its order denying relief. We deem it appropriate, here, to remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the CDCR’s recommendation pursuant to section 1172.1.

First Holding:

A court may at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary [of CDCR] or the Board of Parole Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in state prison recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Second Holding:

Where such a resentencing request is made, there is now a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in 1170.18(c).

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(b)(2)

People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040

Third Holding:

“Unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is defined as an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv). Those offenses—known as super strikes—include, among others, any homicide and any serious or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.

Authority:

PEN 1170.18(c)

People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351

Fourth Holding:

Where the CDCR recommends recall and resentencing, the court is also now required to hold a hearing (unless the parties otherwise stipulate), state on the record its reasons for its decision, provide notice to the defendant, and appoint counsel for the defendant. Furthermore, when recalling and resentencing pursuant to its provisions, the court shall apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(a)(6)–(8), (b)(1)

People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040

People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1078

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s resentencing determination for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. An abuse of discretion is shown when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

People v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 231

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156–158 [court abused its discretion in granting motion for new trial based on erroneous legal standards]

In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159–160, 167 [juvenile court abused discretion in applying incorrect standard in disqualifying minor’s counsel]

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000167

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in calculating the presentence custody credits. He actually served more time than the court calculated. We award him the additional days he is entitled to and direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment and minute order to reflect the correct award.

Holding:

Upon conviction, a criminal defendant is entitled to credit for actual time served. This time includes confinement from the date of arrest to the date when the sentence commences. Generally, a term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual custody. When a defendant is convicted of a violent felony as defined by section 667.5(c), however, work time is accrued at a rate of no more than 15 percent. Any miscalculation of credits results in an unauthorized sentence, and an unauthorized sentence may be corrected upon discovery.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a)

PEN 4019(a)(1)

PEN 4019(f)

PEN 2933.1(a)

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000165

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in reimposing an unenforceable restitution order and in failing to update the defendant’s custody credits. Though the court did not orally reimpose the fine or recalculate credit for time served, the amended abstract of judgment reflects the fine and the credits he received at the defendant’s original sentencing.

First Holding:

The restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4(b) Must be vacated because it is over 10 years old.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. The defendant is entitled to an updated abstract that accurately reflects the amount of custody credits earned.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review

Case: 000144

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on simple battery as a lesser included offense of the sexual battery count. Thus, we reverse the misdemeanor sexual-battery conviction and remand for the People to elect whether to retry that charge or accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of simple battery. In either case, the defendant shall be fully resentenced.

First Holding:

The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on all lesser included offenses if there is substantial evidence from which a jury can reasonably conclude the defendant committed the lesser, uncharged offense, but not the greater. Thus, even though the defendant did not request an instruction on simple battery below, the claim is preserved for appeal.

Authority:

People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 29, 33, fn. 6

Second Holding:

We review de novo whether a trial court erred by not instructing on a lesser included offense, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine whether substantial evidence supported the instruction.

Authority:

People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 30

Third Holding:

It is a crime to touch an intimate part of another person, if the touching is done against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse. Simple battery is defined as any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. The least touching may constitute battery, and a touching is unlawful if it is harmful or offensive. It is undisputed that simple battery is a lesser included offense of sexual battery. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that there was substantial evidence on which a reasonable juror could have relied to determine that he committed simple battery only.

Authority:

PEN 243.4(e)(1)

PEN 242

People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404

People v. Yonko (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1010

Fourth Holding:

Generally, a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence is state law error that requires reversal if a different result was reasonably probable under Watson. A reasonable juror could have believed everything the victim said said but still harbored a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s purpose in touching her was sexual. The prejudice stemming from such an error is the risk that the jury ignored its instructions and convicted the defendant of an offense for which the prosecution did not carry its burden. The jury might have been convinced that the defendant was guilty of some lesser included offense and, as a result, been tempted to convict of a greater offense rather than acquit. Nor did the jury make any other findings establishing that it necessarily concluded the defendant had such a purpose. Particularly given that the jury was willing to convict him of lesser included offenses on other counts, we perceive nothing in the record dispelling the risk that because it was not instructed on simple battery, it convicted him of sexual battery rather than acquitting him.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196, 200, 201

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260

Fifth Holding:

The People must elect whether to retry that charge or accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of simple battery. In either case, the defendant shall be fully resentenced.

Authority:

People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000129

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court must correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court never imposed fines or fees other than restitution to the Victim’s Compensation Board, and must recalculate his actual custody credits.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the court waived the imposition of a restitution fine and the parole revocation fine and other fines and fees.  [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, but the law is clear that it has the authority to do so, and I have listed some authorities below.]

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

As the People did not object in the court below, the People have forfeited the issue of the propriety of the trial court order waiving the restitution and other fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

Third Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing. [GARY NOTE: the court did not cite authority for remanding for the court to determine custody credits, but the law is clear, per the authorities I have set forth below.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case: 000128

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We find that the nature of the required program is impermissibly vague in the condition of probation that the defendant “enter into and continue such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as directed by the probation officer or as specifically ordered as a term of probation, and shall not leave or terminate such programs without the permission of the probation officer.”

First Holding:

Applying de novo review, we address each challenge to a probation condition separately.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Second Holding:

It is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer. Although a probation condition need not be set forth with mathematical certainty, the language used must have reasonable specificity. Here, such specificity is lacking. The program choices for the probation officer are open-ended, ranging from education to psychological and psychiatric to drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation. This is too vague to pass muster, and we cannot interpret it more narrowly in light of other probation conditions, the probation report, or the trial court’s commentary. Without meaningful guidance from the record, the open-ended program condition cannot be saved by permitting the probation department to provide the necessary specificity.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358