Category Archives: Duty of the court

Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity

Case 000861

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court did not declare on the record that either of the minor’s two aggravated assault offenses was a felony or a misdemeanor, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702

Section 730.6 requires that the restitution fines imposed must be stricken.

The precommitment credits must be corrected.

First Holding:

Section 702 provides, in part, that when a minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.

Section 702 requires the juvenile court to declare on the record at a hearing ‘before or at the time of disposition its choice whether to treat an alleged wobbler as a misdemeanor or as a felony. Neither the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level period of confinement may substitute for the required declaration.

Authority:

WIC 702

In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712

Second Holding:

A section 702 error is not harmless unless the record shows that the juvenile court was aware of, and exercised its discretion as to each wobbler alleged against the minor. The key issue under this standard is whether the juvenile court was aware of its discretion under section 702.

Authority:

In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712, 717

Third Holding:

This section 702 error was not harmless. Signed minute orders in the two assault cases stated, “Pursuant to Juvenile Court Rule 5.795(a), the court finds the offense to be a Felony as to count 1.”

This language tracks recommendations in a memorandum probation filed for disposition. However, rule 5.795(a) states that for any wobbler, the court must consider which description applies and expressly declare on the record that it has made such consideration and must state its determination as to whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.

The court’s failure to comply with the very rule cited undermines any inference that it was aware of its discretion.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.795(a)

Fourth Holding:

The juvenile court imposed three $200 restitution fines. Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) amended section 730.6 to remove the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine.  The relevant portion of the statute now provides: “The court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in section 602.”

Appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefit of this amendment.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(a)(2)

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745-746

Fifth Holding:

The court erred in calculating the credit for time served, awarding the minor less than half the more than 450 days the minor was entitled to. A minor is entitled to credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in custody before the disposition hearing.

When a juvenile court elects to aggregate a minor’s period of physical confinement on multiple petitions the court must also aggregate the predisposition custody credits attributable to those multiple petitions.

Authority:

In re A.M. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1085-1086

Sixth Holding:

Section 628.2(c) provides that a minor shall be entitled to have one day credited against the minor’s maximum term of confinement for each day, or fraction thereof, that the minor serves on electronic monitoring. The provision of custody credits pursuant to this subdivision shall apply to custody credits earned beginning January 1, 2023.

Because the minor was on electronic monitoring after January 1, 2023, he is entitled to credits for that time.

Authority:

WIC 628.2(c)

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000856

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This is an appeal from a hearing on the petition for resentencing under section 1172.75. Because the trial court did not orally pronounce sentence on defendant’s conviction, impose the mandatory parole revocation fine, or calculate credits for time served, we remand the matter for full resentencing. On remand, the trial court is directed to orally impose judgment; determine what the amount of the restitution fine would have been so it can impose, then stay, the parole revocation fine in a proper amount, and calculate credit for time served.

First Holding:

Our review of the record reveals the court did not orally pronounce judgment. Accordingly, we must remand the matter for a full resentencing. The failure to pronounce sentence on a count is an unauthorized sentence and subject to correction on remand, as is the failure to impose a parole revocation fine required by section 1202.45. Because an unauthorized sentence is a narrow exception to the general requirement that only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal, we raise the issue even though neither party has addressed it.

Authority:

People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1411 fn. 6

People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1255

People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26

Second Holding:

Because the trial court’s recall of defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 1172.75(c) vacated that sentence, the trial court was required to conduct a full resentencing. While the court struck defendant’s now-invalid section 667.5(b) enhancements and ruled on his Romero motion, it did not orally pronounce judgment on defendant for his conviction for possessing cocaine. Nor did it orally reimpose the restitution fine or parole revocation fine or calculate actual custody credits. Because the trial court’s failure to orally pronounce judgment resulted in an unauthorized sentence, we remand for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360-361

Third Holding:

While the term of imprisonment, parole revocation fine, and actual custody credits are nevertheless listed in the minute order and abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement of judgment controls over both.

Authority:

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Fourth Holding:

A trial court has a duty in both felony and misdemeanor cases to pronounce sentence on every conviction.

Authority:

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994

Fifth Holding:

Add Section 1465.9 bars reimposition of the restitution fine upon defendant. Because the restitution fine was originally imposed on defendant more than 10 years ago, the fine is uncollectable and unenforceable by operation of law.
blurb here

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 332

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601 [resentencing does not restart sec. 1465.9’s 10-year clock], review granted on a different issue Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Sixth Holding:

Although section 1465.9(d) imposed a 10-year limit on the enforcement and collection of the restitution fine, it did not provide relief with respect to the parole revocation fine. Under section 1202.45 and Kopp that fine remains mandatory and must be set in the same amount as the court would have set for defendant’s restitution fine even though the restitution fine itself may no longer be reimposed.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23-24

Seventh Holding:

Finally, at resentencing, the trial court is required to credit the defendant with all actual days he had spent in custody up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Discretion, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000849

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing held under section 1172.75, the resentencing court erred by (1) imposing consecutive sentences on the defendant’s attempted murder and felon in possession of a firearm counts because the court was unaware of its discretion to impose concurrent terms, (2) not recalculating custody credits, and (3) reimposing a restitution fine under section 1202.4.

First Holding:

When the Three Strikes law applies, sentences for current qualifying offenses must be ordered to run consecutively to each other if the current offenses occur on separate occasions and do not arise from the same set of operative facts.

Conversely, where a sentencing court determines that two or more current felony convictions were either committed on the same occasion or arise from the same set of operative facts, consecutive sentencing is not required under the three strikes law, but is permissible in the trial court’s sound discretion.

Authority:

PEN 667(c)(6)

People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 45

People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 233

Second Holding:

When the record shows the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court, and a court that is unaware of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.

Authority:

People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228

Third Holding:

The attempted murder and felon in possession of a firearm counts were based on the defendant’s possession and use of the same firearm. There is no suggestion that the defendant possessed more than one gun when he committed the offenses.

Because the attempted murder and felon in possession of a firearm counts arose from the same set of operative facts, the resentencing court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences. Remand for resentencing is appropriate as the court was unaware of its discretion, and there is no indication that had it been aware of its discretion, it would nevertheless have imposed consecutive terms.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1567

People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 600

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Fourth Holding:

When a felony sentence is modified during the term of imprisonment, the trial court must recalculate and credit the actual time defendant had served on his sentence prior to the modification. Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. On remand, the resentencing court must recalculate the defendant’s custody credits for actual time served.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23

Fifth Holding:

The restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4 must be vacated under section 1465.9. Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to add subdivision (d), which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Because the defendant’s restitution fine was imposed more than 10 years ago, any balance is unenforceable and uncollectable by operation of law. The fine must be vacated

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Amelioration, Discretion, Duty of the court, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000842

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In the prior appeal, the appellate court reversed the denial of the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 and ordered the trial court to grant the petition. On remand, the trial court granted the motion and redesignated the offense as three counts, and imposed the upper term.

It was error to resurrect and redesignate for sentencing counts that were dismissed in the original plea negotiations. It was also error to impose the upper term on circumstances in aggravation that were not submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

When the trial court granted the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, his judgment became nonfinal and was subject to the retroactive application of AB 333. AB 333 made changes to the law on gang enhancements and narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang.

The defendant’s admission under the former law does not satisfy the elements now required under the current law. The stipulation at the preliminary hearing that the [named gang] was an ongoing street gang that engages in a pattern of criminal activity pursuant to section 186.22(f) is insufficient under any standard to prove either the gang enhancement or the gang offense under current law.

Authority:

People v. Trent (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 251, 262–263 [once petition for resentencing under sec. 1172.6 is granted, judgment is no longer final]

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 393 [AB 333 is retroactive to nonfinal judgments]

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505, 526–527

Second Holding:

When a murder or attempted murder conviction is set aside under section 1172.6, the petitioner’s conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the murder or attempted murder was charged generically, and the target offense was not charged.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(e)

Third Holding:

Section 1172.6 does not define what constitutes an underlying felony or target offense, but our high court in Arellano held that the meaning of these terms is clear—an underlying felony refers to the felony underlying a felony-murder theory, and the target offense refers to the offense the natural and probable consequence of which was murder.

Authority:

People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457

People v. Lara (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1005 [the trial court erred by resurrecting counts dismissed in the parties’ plea agreement on resentencing]

Fourth Holding:

Application of the trial court’s resentencing discretion under section 1172.6(e) here is circumscribed by the prosecution’s exercise of charging discretion in the original proceeding. Here, that limitation is the district attorney’s election to dismiss all charges involving [victim 1] as well as the substantive gang count in return for the defendant’s plea to a single count of attempted second degree murder of [victim 2].

Authority:

People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 476 [deeming it unlikely the Legislature intended to allow the prosecution to effectively revisit its charging decisions  every time a petitioner succeeds in setting aside a  conviction under section 1172.6]

People v. Lara (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1026

Fifth Holding:

There is no dispute that there is no qualifying felony for which the prosecutor could have proceeded under a theory of felony murder in this case.

Thus when resentencing the defendant, the trial court was required to redesignate his offense as a target offense—the offense of which the natural and probable consequence was the attempted murder.

In this case, conviction for attempted murder of [victim 2] was properly redesignated as assault with a semiautomatic firearm on [victim 2]. We conclude that the trial court erred by resurrecting counts stemming from conduct that the district attorney plainly chose to dismiss as part of the negotiated settlement.

These dismissed counts cannot form the predicate for relief for the defendant’s petition for resentencing. Because the defendant did not plead to any other offenses than the attempted murder of [victim 2], the target offense underlying the attempted murder of one named person is not two assaults with a firearm on two persons. Courts may not impose uncharged and unproven sentence allegations or enhancements when resentencing a successful petitioner under section 1172.6e).

Authority:

People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 475, 477

People v. Lara (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1027

Sixth Holding:

Though not applicable here, had the prosecution alleged and proved a target offense in addition to the attempted murder, on successful petition under section 1172.6, the court would be limited to sentencing the defendant on the charged target offenses that were proved. The trial court under section 1172.6(d)(3) would not have been otherwise entitled to resentence the defendant on charges that could have been [but were not] established by the evidence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(d)(3)

People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 470

Seventh Holding:

The trial court erred by imposing an upper term for the count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm on [victim 2] without holding a jury trial as requested.

Under section 1170(b), when a statute specifies three possible terms, the trial court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, unless circumstances in aggravation that justify an upper term sentence have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

However, a trial court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

Eighth Holding:

After the defendant’s resentencing, the California Supreme Court decided Wiley. Relying on Erlinger, our high court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury determination on aggravating factors related to a defendant’s criminal history, such as whether a defendant’s convictions were of increasing seriousness under rule 4.421(b)(2), and whether the defendant’s prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory under rule 4.421(b)(5).

Wiley concluded that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. 

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082, 1086

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834 [virtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea]

Ninth Holding:

where a defendant was deprived of a jury trial on aggravating factors used at sentencing, we must apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Chapman.

Under this standard, we must reverse the judgment unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Tenth Holding:

The trial court relied on the defendant’s rap sheet to determine that the crimes were of increasing seriousness and were numerous under rule 4.421(b)(2). According to defendant’s rap sheet, he had a juvenile adjudication in 2007 [for specified offenses], 2010 juvenile adjudications for [different offenses] and a 2014 conviction for [a different offense].  

Based on these series of offenses, a rational jury could have disagreed as to whether it demonstrated criminal conduct of increasing seriousness. Likewise, a rational jury could have also found that the defendant’s prior convictions were not particularly numerous. The failure to submit these aggravating factors to the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is entitled to reversal of the upper term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082, 1089

People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 848

 

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000838

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because the court did not follow the required procedures for adjudicating the petition brought under section 1170.91, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We also direct the superior court to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

We interpret the requirements of section 1170.91 de novo.

Authority:

People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 237

Second Holding:

Section 1170.91(b)(1) provides that a person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea, who is, or was, a member of the United States military and who may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the person’s military service may petition for a recall of sentence, before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in the case, to request resentencing if the circumstance of suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the person’s military service was not considered as a factor in mitigation at the time of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170.91

Third Holding:

If the trial court finds the defendant satisfies the criteria for relief, the court may, in the interest of justice, do either of the following: (1) reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence; or (2) vacate the conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading, and then resentence the defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment with the concurrence of both the defendant and the prosecution.

Authority:

PEN 1170.91(b)(3)(A)–(B)

Fourth Holding:

Upon receiving a section 1170.91 petition for resentencing, the trial court must hold a public hearing to determine whether the defendant satisfies the statutory criteria for relief. The prosecution, the defense, and any victim must be given at least 15 days’ notice of the hearing. At that hearing, the prosecution shall have an opportunity to be heard on the defendant’s eligibility and suitability for resentencing. The trial court erred by denying the defendant’s petition for resentencing without holding a properly noticed public hearing as required by section 1170.91(b)(3).

Authority:

PEN 1170.91(b)(3)

People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 239

Fifth Holding:

Though the original version of section 1170.91 limited its application to those serving a determinate sentence, the Legislature amended the section in 2022 to remove the limitation.

Authority:

People v. Sherman (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 325, 330 [In 2022, the Legislature amended

again. The 2022 amendment expanded subdivisions (a) and (b) to include those serving indeterminate sentences]

People v. Harrison (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1154 [same]

Sixth Holding:

There is a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. It states that the defendant was convicted of grand theft of a vehicle pursuant to section 487h(a), when in fact he was convicted of the lesser included offense of unlawful driving of a vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 10851(a).

If not already done, the abstract of judgment must be amended to correct this error.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185