Tag Archives: Protective orders

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 001150

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court had no jurisdiction to issue a post-sentence protective order on a person who was neither a victim nor a percipient witness.

First Holding:

Although the defendant did not object to the protective orders, sentences entered in excess of a trial court’s jurisdiction may be challenged for the first time on appeal. We therefore address the defendant’s objection to the protective orders issued under section 136.2.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382

Second Holding:

Section 136.2 does not authorize post-sentence protective orders based on his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Section 136.2(a) provides that, upon a good cause belief that a victim or witness was harmed, intimidated, or dissuaded, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue an order restraining the defendant from, among other things, communicating with a specified witness or a victim except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.

Section 136.2(i) also provides that when a criminal defendant has been convicted of certain specified offenses, at the time of sentencing a trial court shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim that may extend up to 10 years. Subdivision (i)(2) also permits similar orders concerning percipient witnesses that have been harassed.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

Third Holding:

Prior to 2011, section 136.2 permitted protective orders only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings and did not authorize such orders after the defendant was sentenced.

Authority:

People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382

People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118

Fourth Holding:

The legislative history reveals that the Legislature added subdivision (i) to section 136.2 in express reliance on the decisions holding that subdivision (a) does not authorize post-sentencing restraining orders. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature understood that subdivision (a) of section 136.2 does not authorize post-sentence protective orders and that the section authorizes such orders only under subdivision (i).

Authority:

Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill 723 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 18, 2011, p. 6

Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill 723 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 2, 2011, p. 2

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.2(i) authorizes post-sentence protective orders when a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in section 13700 or in section 6211 of the Family Code; a violation of section 236.1(a), (b), or (c) prohibiting human trafficking; section 261; section 261.5; former section 262; section 266h(a); section 266i(a); a violation of section 186.22; or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to section 290(c).

The defendant’s conviction does not fall within any of those categories, and the protective order was unauthorized. The protective orders against the defendant are stricken.

Authority:

PEN 136.2(i)

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 001148

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court improperly imposed a fine and penalty assessments of $3200 without specifying how that sum was reached. Remanded for the court to determine the fine under section 290.3. The court also failed to award sufficient credit for time served. And the court improperly issued a protective order pertaining to someone who was neither a victim of nor a witness to the crime.

First Holding:

The reporter’s transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that the trial court imposed a restitution fine of $1,000 and the $3,200 penalty assessment. The court did not explain how this penalty assessment had been calculated. A restitution fine is not subject to penalty assessments.

The probation report recommended that, under section 290.3, the defendnat be ordered to pay a fine of $3,200 including penalty assessment. The probation report did not explain how the figure of $3,200 had been reached.

The court’s minutes show a restitution fine of $1,000 and a fine of $3,200 pursuant to Section 290.3. The abstract of judgment states that appellant shall pay a $3200 fine pursuant to PC 290.3.

Under section 290.3(a) the maximum fine was $300 because this was appellant’s first conviction of an offense specified in section 290(c).

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(e)

PEN 290.3(a)

PEN 290(c)

Second Holding:

On a $300 fine imposed under section 290.3, the maximum penalty assessments total $930. The penalty assessments are:

(1) a 100 percent state penalty assessment under 1464(a)(1) equal to $300;

(2) a 70 percent additional penalty under Government Code section 76000(a)(1)) equal to $210;

(3) a 20 percent state surcharge under section 1465.7) equal to $60;

(4) a 50 percent state court construction penalty under Government Code section 70372 equal to $150;

(5) a 20 percent additional penalty for emergency medical services under Government Code section 76000.5 equal to $60;

(6) a 10 percent additional DNA penalty under Government Code section 76104.6(a)(1)) equal to $30; and

(7) a 40 percent additional state-only DNA penalty under Government Code section 76104.7(a) equal to $120.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1457-1458 [the penalty assessments on a $300 fine imposed pursuant to section 290.3(a) should have totaled $930]

People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928 [though in Hamed, the GOV 76104.7(a) assessment was at 30 percent, before the section was amended to increase it to 40%]

Third Holding:

The abstract of judgment should detail the amounts of and statutory basis for the base fine and each of the penalty assessments imposed. Although we recognize that a detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not authorize shortcuts. All fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of judgment. If the abstract does not specify the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation cannot fulfill its statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the appropriate agency.

Accordingly, the matter must be remanded to the trial court for recalculation of the section 290.3(a) fine and penalty assessments.

(Gary note: The court also concluded that the defendant was entitled to be present at the hearing on the recalculation, to allow the defendant to present a challenge on his ability to pay. The court did not cite any specific authority for that directive, but I’m guessing it probably had a case like People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 in mind.)

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1459

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200

Fourth Holding:

A sentencing court must award credits for all days in custody up to and including the day of sentencing. In addition to actual credit, which accumulates from time spent in custody, detainees in local institutions are usually able to earn credit against their eventual sentence for good behavior and work performed. The parties agree that the credits awarded by the court were short by 3 days. On remand, the court should recalculate the presentence custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Crenshaw (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1169, 1181

Fifth Holding:

At the time of sentencing, the trial court issued a protective order directing appellant to not contact Person A.

Section 136.2 covers protective orders. Section 136.2(i)(1) provides that, if a defendant has been convicted of [the court describes the crime committed here], the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. Person A was not a victim of the [specified crime].

Section 136.2(i)(2) authorizes the issuance of an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed by the defendant. Person A was not a percipient witness to the crime.

Thus, we direct the trial court to strike the protective order as to Person A.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

Sixth Holding:

The defendant did not object to the no-contact order. As a general rule, an appellant waives issues on appeal that he or she did not initially raise in the trial court. But there are exceptions to this rule for unauthorized sentences and sentencing decisions that are in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue a protective order during sentencing, we will consider the defendant’s claim on the merits.

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382

Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case 001145

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing a post-sentencing protective order and in doubling the middle term when the strike had been dismissed as part of the plea agreement.

First Holding:

A court may issue a protective order to protect a witness or victim during the pendency of a criminal case. Generally, protective orders issued under section 136.2 are limited in duration and may not extend beyond the court’s jurisdiction. It was therefore error for the court to impose a protective order to extend past sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382

Second Holding:

The issue of the propriety of the issuance of a protect order may be raised on appeal despite a lack of objection.

(Gary note: The court cited Ponce, but did not elaborate on its holding. I have set forth the Ponce actual holding.)

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381 (As a general rule, an appellant waives issues on appeal that he or she did not initially raise in the trial court. (People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.) But there are exceptions to this rule for unauthorized sentences and sentencing decisions that are in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue a three-year protective order during sentencing, we will consider Ponce’s claim on the merits.)

Third Holding:

It was error to impose a second-strike punishment, because the defendant did not admit the prior strike. The strike prior allegation was dismissed when the defendant was sentenced.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for this holding, most likely because it is so obvious. I have listed the two statutes pertaining to the Three Strikes law for your convenience.

(Section 667 was amended by the Legislature in 1994 to add the Strikes alternative sentencing scheme in addition to the already-existing section 664(a) enhancement on serious felony convictions for each prior conviction of a serious felony brought and tried separately.

(Section 1170.12 was added by initiative (Proposition 184) later in 1994. Somewhat confusingly, perhaps, both statutes co-exist. Both were amended in 2012 by Proposition 36.)

Authority:

PEN 667(b)-(j)

PEN 1170.12

Duty of the court, Gary Musings, Sentencing

Case 001127

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Whether or not the court had the right to issue a protective order during the proceedings prior to entry of judgment, the court failed to terminate the protective order following the judgment. Remanded for that purpose.

First Holding:

The trial court issued a pretrial criminal protective order on behalf of the victim after the defendant entered his plea. The trial court did not make any findings on the record but ordered no contact with the victim and a 100-yard stay away order There were no objections from counsel. According to the criminal protect order, the orders remain in effect until further court order.

The court had no authority to issue a protective order under section 136.2(a) after sentencing, and it did not issue one. But the order that it made after the guilty plea stated it was to remain in effect until further order of the court, which the court never made. We therefore remand to the trial court to issue a proper notice of termination of protective order so that proper authorities will know that the order has expired.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 227, 236

Second Holding:

Section 136.2 is limited to the pendency of a criminal action because section 136.2 is aimed at protecting only victims or witnesses.

Authority:

PEN 136.2(a)

People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118

People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159 superseded in statute as stated in Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948, 960, related to the issuance of restraining orders in domestic violence cases

(Gary Musings:

(This case had an interesting twist. The attorney filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. A Wende brief is filed when appointed counsel determines that there are no arguable issues to raise in the appeal. After setting forth the statements of the case and facts sufficient to guide the Court of Appeal, the brief asks the appellate court to independently review the entire record to determine whether there are issues that counsel should brief. The defendant is given an opportunity to submit a supplemental brief in which the defendant argues whatever the defendant believes to be an issue.

(The Wende brief process is available only in appointed appeals, and applies only to the first appeal of right–essentially to the direct appeal from the conviction initiated within the timeframe for the filing of a notice of appeal following entry of judgment. Wende was California’s ultimate answer to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. In essence, I assume there was concern that appointed counsel may have less incentive to go the whole mile for the client.

(Keep in mind we’re talking about conditions more than 60 years ago, around the time Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. While I am certain that there were many attorneys who diligently sacrificed many hours for their indigent client, I also assume that there must have been concern that maybe not all attorneys put in as much effort on appointed cases as they would for their wealthy clients. The independent review of the record by the court was designed to protect the indigent defendants from inadequate effort.

(There’s probably much more to it than I stated, and perhaps I even have missed the mark on why Anders came about. But regardless of what was written, I suspect there was some wink wink nod nod behind the scenes recognizing that some cases demonstrated a tad bit of underrepresentation. Maybe I’m wrong. It doesn’t change the quirk in this case, however.

(By the way, the same concern–whatever it might have been–does not arise with retained counsel. Presumably retained attorneys have a financial incentive to do as much as they possibly can for their clients.

(All that is background–accurate or not–for the twist in this case. The defendant’s supplemental brief essentially was a challenge to his guilty plea. Thus, a certificate of probable cause would normally be required, under section 1237.5 and Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b). Had appointed counsel attempted to raise the arguments the defendant raised on his own, the court would not have been permitted to address the issues, because there is no latitude when an issue requires a certificate of probable cause and one has not been issued.

(But in this case, the court concluded that Wende requires it to conduct a full review of the record and to address with reasons all of the issues presented by the defendant in a supplemental brief. Specifically, in People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, the Supreme Court imposed a judicial principle that when an indigent defendant submits a supplemental brief following counsel’s filing of a Wende brief, the appellate court must address all of the issues raised and state reasons for its conclusions on their merits.

(In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the lack of a certificate of probable cause was not a bar to its review of the issues raised by the defendant himself in a supplemental brief, in compliance with Wende and Kelly.

(Keep in mind that this is NOT a published opinion, and thus cannot be cited to compel an appellate court to ignore the absence of a certificate of probable cause when reviewing a defendant’s post-Wende supplemental brief. But Wende and Kelly were published opinions, and there’s no reason that I am aware of that counsel could not urge the court to grant a petition for rehearing if the court declined to address the defendant’s supplemental brief issues because of a lack of a certificate of probable cause.)

Authority (the middle two only in Gary Musings):

People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335

Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738

People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106

Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 001045

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to decline to award conduct credit on two of the counts, because their offenses were not ineligible for conduct credit at the time they were committed. Further, it was error to issue a no-visitation order on behalf of a person who is no longer a minor.

First Holding:

As a result of amendments to the One Strike Law in 2006 (section 667.61) persons serving an indeterminate sentence under that section are not entitled to credit for time served beyond the actual days they were in custody. There is no reduction for good behavior or performing work.

Although section 667.61 as amended makes no mention of conduct credit, the amendment deleted a previous reference that limited the conduct credit to 15% of the sentence imposed. The legislative history does make it abundantly clear that the intent was to eliminate conduct credit for such persons.

Authority:

Penal Code section 667.61

People v. Dearborne (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250, 267-268

People v. Adams (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 170, 182

Second Holding:

The amendment cannot be applied retroactively. Both the federal and the California Constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. The federal and California ex post facto clauses do not just bar retroactively increased prison terms. They also prohibit any law that retroactively disadvantages the offender by increasing the punishment for crimes committed before the law’s enactment.

Consequently, the ex post facto clauses prohibit any law that constricts the inmate’s opportunity to earn early release and thereby makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment. As it is unclear whether the offenses described in two of the counts were committed before or after the amendment’s effective z People (September 20, 2006, as urgency legislation), conduct credit cannot be denied on those counts.

Authority:

U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 9

People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1306

Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 35-36

People v. Flores (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1182 [agreeing that a change in law ending the defendant’s ability to earn good conduct credit violated the proscription against ex post facto laws]

Third Holding:

It is the prosecution’s responsibility to prove to the jury that the charged offenses occurred on or after the effective date of the statute providing for the defendant’s punishment. Consequently, when the evidence at trial does not establish that fact, the defendant is entitled to be sentenced under the formerly applicable statutes.

Authority:

People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, 256, 261 [Verdicts cannot be deemed sufficient to establish the z People of the offenses unless the evidence leaves no reasonable doubt that the underlying charges pertained to events occurred on or after the z People of the punishment’s enactment]

Fourth Holding:

Under section 1202.5, if a defendant is sentenced to prison for committing a lewd act under section 288, and the victim is a child under the age of 18 years, the court shall prohibit all visitation between the defendant and the child victim.

As this section authorizes prohibitions against visitation with a child victim, it has been interpreted to apply only to victims who are under the age of 18 at the time of the contemplated visitation. Here, the victim was in her 20s at the time of sentencing, and the court therefore lacked authority to include her in the no-visitation order.

Authority:

PEN 1202.05

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1323