Tag Archives: Vicarious liability

Amelioration, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case: 000211

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Earlier, the defendant pleaded guilty to the first degree murder and admitted a firearm enhancement, admitting that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury and death to another person, who is not an accomplice. The trial court denied his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. He has not, at this juncture, made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 in light of the record of conviction. Out of an abundance of caution, we remand the matter to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended petition should the defendant, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted SB 1437 to modify accomplice liability for murder and the felony-murder rule. It eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. Section 1172.6 is the new law’s procedure allowing people convicted of murder under the old law to petition for an order vacating their convictions and resentencing them on remaining counts if they could not now be convicted because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189 by SB 1437.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563, 569–570

People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1164

Second Holding:

Regarding the prima facie stage, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if the factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. A court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563

Third Holding:

In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. The preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea is part of the record of conviction that may be consulted at the prima facie stage. When, as here, the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea. It also includes the petitioner’s express admissions at the plea colloquy.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 564, 568-569

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 927

Fourth Holding:

We review the denial of a petition at the prima facie stage de novo.

Authority:

People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 447

Fifth Holding:

As in Patton, and out of an abundance of caution, we will grant the defendant’s request to remand the matter to permit him to plead additional facts. We therefore will order a remand to the trial court with directions for that court to consider an amended petition should the defendant, within 30 days of that remand, seek to file one.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569-570

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case: 000181

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court employed an incorrect standard of review for determining whether the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under Penal Code section 1172.6 should be denied. Reversed and remanded for another new hearing.

First Holding:

SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The legislation amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.

It also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. If the trial court finds that a petitioning defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

PEN 188(a)

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986,

Second Holding:

On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court reviews the superior court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.

Authority:

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066

Third Holding:

For the trial court to properly conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant here was guilty of murder under the law as amended, the People had to prove he was the actual killer, or that he directly aided and abetted the murder and thus possessed malice aforethought. Felony murder is not at issue in this case.

Authority:

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710 [sec. 1172.6 relief is unavailable if the defendant was the actual killer]

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848 [SB 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought], [abrogated on another ground as stated in People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 836]

Fourth Holding:

It was an error for the trial court to conclude that the court had to determine whether the People could prove they could obtain a conviction of the defendant based on basic accomplice liability or whether he acted with reckless disregard for the life of the victim. The correct standard for the trial court at defendant’s section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing was whether the prosecution has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty of murder under California law as amended.

The trial court’s reference to whether defendant acted with reckless disregard for life is inapposite, because that aspect is relevant only in the context of whether a defendant was a major participant in the commission of a different felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life–i.e., it is relevant only to felony murder, which is not at issue in this case. Further, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury would convict the defendant as he was charged. But at the section 1172.6 hearing, it is the trial court that is the fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

Authority:

People v. Harris (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 623, 632

Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case: 000131

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

[GARY NOTE: No relief was granted, because the errors were all found to be harmless in light of the rest of the evidence. The gold here rests in the relative clarity in which the principles of implied malice were set out by the court.] The trial court instructed the jury incorrectly on implied malice and aiding and abetting implied malice murder. However, we find the error harmless beyond reasonable doubt. If anything, the defect in CALCRIM No. 401 only made it harder for the jury to find defendant guilty. It would have been easier for the jury to find that defendant knew that the co-defendants intended to commit a life-endangering act than to find defendant knew they intended to commit murder, a life-ending act.

First Holding:

Implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another—no more, and no less. Implied malice contains an objective or physical component and a subjective or mental component.

Authority:

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143

People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 106

Second Holding:

To be liable for an implied malice murder, a direct aider and abettor must aid the perpetrator in committing a life endangering act that proximately causes death.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990-991

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712-713

Third Holding:

Instructions regarding the elements of the crime affect the substantial rights of the defendant, thus requiring no objection for appellate review.

Authority:

People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503

Fourth Holding:

Defendant’s jury was incorrectly instructed under CALCRIM No. 401 to determine whether defendant aided and abetted the perpetrators’ commission of a crime, not an act. Direct aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea. In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689,

People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122

Fifth Holding:

The instruction given was thus an erroneous aiding and abetting instruction for purposes of this case. We review the error under the Chapman harmless error standard.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 714-715

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Abstracts and Minutes, Jury trial, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case: 000111

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the judgment of conviction as to defendant A. We reverse defendant B’s count 1 felony murder conviction, and otherwise affirm his judgment. The People concede both abstracts of judgment must be amended; we agree and remand with directions. The People concede and we agree the abstracts of judgment erroneously state that the convictions in counts 2, 4, and 6 are for first degree robbery. Both defendants were charged with second degree robbery, and the juries were instructed only on that theory. There are several other errors in the abstracts of judgment that must be corrected.

First Holding:

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the sufficiency of the evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record independently for substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.

Authority:

People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302

People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60

Second Holding:

Defendant A [the actual killer] contends there was no evidence he aided and abetted Defendant B in the count 6 robbery and count 7 assault. A person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts. A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. Mere presence at the scene of a crime or knowledge of, but failure to prevent the crime, are not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting its commission. However, factors which may be considered to determine aiding and abetting include presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.

Authority:

People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117

People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 851

People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409

Third Holding:

Section 189(e) provides that a participant in a specified felony is liable for murder for a death during the commission of the offense only if one of the following is proven: (1) The person was the actual killer. (2) The person, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer. (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

PEN 189(e)

Fourth Holding:

There are several factors courts should consider in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life: What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used? Reckless indifference and the element of major participant significantly overlap, for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615

Fifth Holding:

Defendant B was not the actual killer, but was convicted on the basis of felony murder (item (3)). We need not decide whether, under the circumstances of this case, defendant was a major participant because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support that he exhibited reckless indifference to human life. The actus reus for the felony-murder aider and abettor special circumstance requires more than simply being an aider and abettor of the underlying felony under section 31. The special circumstance requires that the defendant be a major participant in the underlying felony.

Likewise, the mens rea requirement for the felony-murder aider and abettor special circumstance is different from that required for first degree felony murder. The special circumstance requires that the defendant have reckless indifference to human life. A defendant’s knowing participation in a robbery with others who are armed is insufficient, without more, to prove the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any armed crime is insufficient, because a defendant must knowingly create a grave risk of death through the defendant’s own actions. Reckless indifference encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of the defendant’s actions. Reckless indifference to human life has both a subjective and an objective element.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615-617

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 794, 807-810

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677

Sixth Holding:

In committing the count 1 felony robbery, Defendant A entered the convenience store alone, and therefore Defendant B had no opportunity to restrain him, or to aid the victim. The evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant B was aware, when they left the third convenience store, that Defendant A had killed the victim. This factor weighs against a finding of reckless indifference. Defendant B had no meaningful opportunity to aid the victim before the shooting.

However contemptible the court may find a defendant’s conduct following a killing, the governing standard is not satisfied by evidence that the defendant was generally indifferent to the fact that someone has been killed. It requires evidence that, at the time of the shooting, the defendant acted with indifference toward the grave risk that someone could be killed. Though the former may be evidence of the latter, it is insufficient, standing alone, to support murder liability. While it is true a defendant’s willingness to engage in an armed robbery with individuals known to him to use lethal force may give rise to the inference that the defendant disregarded a grave risk of death, no evidence was presented at trial that Defendant A was known to have a propensity for violence, let alone evidence indicating that Defendant B was aware of such a propensity.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 894-895

Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157

Seventh Holding:

The abstracts of judgment contain several errors that must be corrected. The abstracts of judgment erroneously state that the convictions in three counts are for first degree robbery. The verdict forms do not specify the degree of the robberies. But under California law, upon the failure of the jury or the court to determine the degree of the crime of which the defendant is guilty, it shall be deemed to be of the lesser degree. Therefore, we conclude that the robberies in the three counts are in the second degree.

The jury convicted both defendants of being a felon in possession of a firearm and not a “convicted felon and narcotic” as stated in the abstracts of judgment. As to Defendant A, the abstract of judgment shows the court imposed a consecutive full term of three years for one of the counts. However, the court orally stated, “Under [that count], the court is going to use one-third the midterm for that charge of one year, and that will run consecutive to the determinate terms under [two other counts].” Given this discrepancy, the oral pronouncement of judgment controls.

Authority:

PEN 1157

People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1222, fn. 14.

Amelioration, Sentencing, Vicarious liability

Case 000064

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude that the failure to appoint counsel and hold a prima facie hearing on the first and second degree murder convictions was harmless, but the same cannot be said with respect to his attempted murder conviction. We thus reverse the denial of the petition as to that count and remand for further proceedings, in line with People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549. Custody credits must be updated.

First Holding:

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.); Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, expanded the scope of potential relief by applying Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes to individuals convicted of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.

Authority:

SB 1437

SB 775

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719

Second Holding:

The instructions that guided the verdicts did not include all the elements of direct aiding and abetting liability for attempted murder. First, the instructions did not require the jury to find that the defendant had the specific intent to kill. the failure to identify a specific target crime while instructing with CALJIC No. 3.02 broadened the reach of the natural and probable consequences doctrine to include liability for aiding and abetting other unspecified criminal behavior. Indeed, the Prettyman court explained that omitting the element of the instruction identifying the target crime is error because it impermissibly allows the jury to convict the defendant of murder based on its belief that the defendant intended to assist and/or encourage unspecified nefarious conduct of which murder was a natural and probable consequence.

Authority:

People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 [a defendant who is guilty of attempted murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory must have the specific intent to kill]

People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 268

Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [reversible error in failing to identify a target offense if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution]

Third Holding:

When a sentence is modified while defendant is serving the sentence, the trial court must update defendant’s actual custody credits up to that point.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case 000008

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appealed from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter to the lower court because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding defendant aided and abetted the murder of the officer.

First Holding:

In this instance, the appellate court found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant aided and abetted the murder.

Authority:

SB 1437

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869

Second Holding:

A trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial evidence. Under this standard, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

Third Holding:

Under a direct aider and abettor liability theory, the prosecution must prove the person who is not the actual killer engaged in the requisite acts and had the requisite intent to aid and abet the target crime of murder.

Authority:

People v. Pacheco (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118, 124

Fourth Holding:

Direct aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712-713

Fifth Holding:

It is well settled that aiding and abetting the commission of a crime requires some affirmative action.

Authority:

People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 868

Sixth Holding:

A person present at the scene of a crime—even one who is the criminal’s companion, knows a crime is being committed, fails to prevent it, and later expresses approval of it—is not guilty of aiding and abetting the crime if he takes no action to aid or encourage the crime.

Authority:

In re K.M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 323, 329

 

Elements of crime, Vicarious liability

Case 000002

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief:

Mere presence at the scene is not substantial evidence to support conspiracy.

Holding:

Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish participation in a conspiracy to commit that crime or aiding and abetting its commission.

Authority:

People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 165 [Because the law will not recognize a rule of guilt by association, we insist on proof of a defendant’s knowledge of, and specific intent to further, [a conspiracy’s] unlawful ends]

People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 72

In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting]