Category Archives: Elements of crime

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 001150

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court had no jurisdiction to issue a post-sentence protective order on a person who was neither a victim nor a percipient witness.

First Holding:

Although the defendant did not object to the protective orders, sentences entered in excess of a trial court’s jurisdiction may be challenged for the first time on appeal. We therefore address the defendant’s objection to the protective orders issued under section 136.2.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382

Second Holding:

Section 136.2 does not authorize post-sentence protective orders based on his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Section 136.2(a) provides that, upon a good cause belief that a victim or witness was harmed, intimidated, or dissuaded, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue an order restraining the defendant from, among other things, communicating with a specified witness or a victim except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.

Section 136.2(i) also provides that when a criminal defendant has been convicted of certain specified offenses, at the time of sentencing a trial court shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim that may extend up to 10 years. Subdivision (i)(2) also permits similar orders concerning percipient witnesses that have been harassed.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

Third Holding:

Prior to 2011, section 136.2 permitted protective orders only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings and did not authorize such orders after the defendant was sentenced.

Authority:

People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382

People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118

Fourth Holding:

The legislative history reveals that the Legislature added subdivision (i) to section 136.2 in express reliance on the decisions holding that subdivision (a) does not authorize post-sentencing restraining orders. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature understood that subdivision (a) of section 136.2 does not authorize post-sentence protective orders and that the section authorizes such orders only under subdivision (i).

Authority:

Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill 723 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 18, 2011, p. 6

Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill 723 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 2, 2011, p. 2

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.2(i) authorizes post-sentence protective orders when a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in section 13700 or in section 6211 of the Family Code; a violation of section 236.1(a), (b), or (c) prohibiting human trafficking; section 261; section 261.5; former section 262; section 266h(a); section 266i(a); a violation of section 186.22; or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to section 290(c).

The defendant’s conviction does not fall within any of those categories, and the protective order was unauthorized. The protective orders against the defendant are stricken.

Authority:

PEN 136.2(i)

Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 001141

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in sentencing the defendant for a term in prison that had not yet been enacted at the time of the crime.

First Holding:

On September 9, 2010, the Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 went into effect, significantly increasing the penalties for sex crimes against minors by imposing longer determinate sentences, indeterminate sentences for some crimes, and longer parole restrictions.

The penalty for continuous sexual abuse of a minor under section 288.5 changed from 25 years to life from the former sentence of 15 years to life.

Authority:

People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 237, fn. 4

In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 713-714 [The amendment to section 667.61 added subdivision (j)(2)to increase the penalty to 25 years to life]

Second Holding:

Our state and federal Constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. Any law that applies to events occurring before its enactment and which disadvantages the offender either by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime is prohibited as ex post facto.

The offenses the jury found defendant had committed against the victim necessarily occurred prior to when she turned 14 years of age prior to the effective date of Chelsea’s Law. Thus, the increased punishment under Chelsea’s Law effective on September 9, 2010, was not applicable, and the court erred in imposing a 25-year-to-life sentence. The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Authority:

People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1306

Due process, Elements of crime, Pleading, Sentencing

Case 001133

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The gang conspiracy convictions are unsupported by substantial evidence that defendants committed the target offense charged, i.e., a violation of section 26100(c). We therefore modify the verdicts on count 5 to reflect convictions for gang conspiracy based on a lesser included target felony violation of section 26100(d). Resentencing is required on this count and vacate the sentences.

The sentences on count 2 must be vacated because the alternate penalty provision set forth in section 186.22(b)(4) was neither pled nor proved. Additionally, imposition of both the gang enhancement and firearm enhancement on this count violates the dual use prohibition set forth in section 12022.53(e)(2).

We remand for resentencing.

(Gary note: This was a multiple-defendant case with an extremely long opinion. There were many issues, most of which resulted in a finding of no error, and I have not attempted to list them all.)

First Holding:

The information charged defendants in count 5 with gang conspiracy for promoting, furthering, assisting, or benefitting from felonious criminal conduct, specifically Penal Code section 26100(c). Section 26100(c) is violated by the willful and malicious discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person other than an occupant of a motor vehicle.

Authority:

PEN 26100(c)

Second Holding:

In this case there was no evidence that a firearm was discharged at anyone other than an occupant of a motor vehicle. Under sections 1181 and 1260, an appellate court that finds that insufficient evidence supports the conviction for a greater offense may, in lieu of granting a new trial, modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense.

In a conspiracy case, the defendant may be convicted of conspiring to commit a lesser crime included in the alleged target offense.

Authority:

PEN 1181

PEN 1260

People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 671

People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1706 [the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to instruct on lesser included target offenses if there is evidence from which the jury could find a conspiracy to commit a lesser offense]

Third Holding:

It is well settled that a section 182.5 conspiracy (i.e., conspiracy in connection with participation in a criminal street gang) relates only to the commission of a felony. Thus, a gang conspiracy requires the actual commission of felonious criminal conduct as either an attempt or a completed crime.

A violation of section 26100(d) [discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle] is a wobbler, meaning it is chargeable or, in the discretion of the court, punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor. An attempted or completed felony violation of section 26100(d) may appropriately serve as the target offense for a gang conspiracy conviction.

In light of the insufficient evidence of a violation under subdivision (c), we will modify the verdicts on count 5 to reflect the gang conspiracy convictions are predicated upon a felonious violation of section 26100(d).

Authority:

PEN 26100(d)

People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 262

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789

Fourth Holding:

In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. However, a judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.

When a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed.

An offense is necessarily included within another if the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, such that all legal elements of the lesser offense are also elements of the greater. In other words, if a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included offense within the former.

Authority:

People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226-1227

People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736

People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 987 [a defendant cannot be convicted of both a greater offense and a necessarily included offense based on the commission of the same act]

People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 207

Fifth Holding:

The elements of the crimes of active participation in a gang (section 186.22) and gang conspiracy (section 182.5) are nearly identical.

However, whereas active participation may be committed by any of the alternative means of promoting, furthering, or assisting in felonious conduct by gang members, gang conspiracy may be committed by any of the alternative means of promoting, furthering, assisting, or benefitting from the felonious conduct of gang members.

Although all the elements of the active participation offense are also included in the gang conspiracy offense, it is possible to commit gang conspiracy without committing the active participation offense if the defendant merely benefits from the felonious criminal conduct of fellow gang members.

Thus, because gang conspiracy may be committed without necessarily committing the offense of active participation in a criminal street gang, active participation is not a necessarily included lesser offense.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

PEN 182.5

People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 207

People v. Hinojos (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 19, 33–34 [utilizing the same reasoning to hold that section 654 did not bar imposition of the gang enhancement on the defendant’s gang conspiracy convictions]

Sixth Holding:

The court erred in sentencing defendants pursuant to section 186.22(b)(4) because this alternate penalty provision was not alleged in the information. Section 186.22(b)(4) is an alternate penalty provision prescribing indeterminate terms of life imprisonment for those who committed certain enumerated felonies under the same gang-related circumstances described elsewhere in section 186.22. If the elements are present, the sentence will be an indeterminate term of life, with a specified minimum term.

A defendant has a due process right to fair notice of any sentencing allegation that, if proven, will increase the punishment for a crime. As a matter of due process, an alternative punishment provision must be pleaded and proved.

The failure to plead an alternate penalty provision deprives the defendant of fair notice of his or her sentencing exposure by failing to inform him or her that an alternate sentence carrying a higher term will be pursued.

Additionally, a defendant is deprived of adequate notice if punishment is imposed under one provision, and an enhancement was alleged under a different, mutually exclusive provision, even if facts supporting the alternate allegation are contained in the information.

Even if the statute alleged in the information cross-references the statute under which an alternate penalty is pursued, the information fails to inform the defendant that the prosecution will seek to impose the more stringent sentence; therefore, imposition of the higher alternate sentence would violate due process.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 12 Cal.5th 957, 970

Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 899–900, and fn. 6

In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 717, 723, 724 [information alleging One Strike allegation pursuant to sec. 667.61(b)/(e)(4) for an offense against more than one victim was inadequate to provide the defendant notice the prosecution might seek a One Strike sentence pursuant to sec. 667.61(j)(2) for an offense against a child under 14 years of age, even though the facts supporting the allegation were contained in the information].

People v. Sweeney (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 295, 301 [information alleging gang enhancements under sec. 186.22(b) did not give the defendant adequate notice that an alternate sentence under subd. (d) might apply]

Seventh Holding:

The matter must be remanded for full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 588–589 [remanding for a full resentencing hearing as to all counts in light of an unauthorized enhancement]

People v. Delgado (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 839, 855 [It is perfectly proper for this court to remand for a complete resentencing after finding an error with respect to part of a sentence]

People v. Lopez (2022) 12 Cal.5th 957, 975–976 [remanding for resentencing after finding the alternate penalty provision set forth in sec. 186.22(b)(4) to be inapplicable]

Eighth Holding:

In a case in which it is proper to invoke section 186.22(b)(4), the court cannot both invoke that alternative sentencing scheme and impose the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(e) on a principal who did not personally use the firearm. Only one of these enhancements may be imposed.

Section 186.22(b)(4) permits an indeterminate life sentence for criminal gang activity if certain conditions are present. Section 12022.53(e)(1) extends liability for the firearm use of another to a principal who did not personally use or discharge the weapon, but who violated subdivision (b) of section 186.22.

Section 12022.53(e)(1) creates an exception to the personal use requirement of section 12022.53(b) through (d) in a prosecution where findings have been made pursuant to section 186.22. In a case where section 186.22 has been found to be applicable, in order for section 12022.53 to apply, it is necessary only for a principal, not the accused, in the commission of the underlying felony to personally use the firearm; personal firearm use by the accused is not required under these specific circumstances.

However, as a consequence of this expanded liability under section 12022.53(e), the Legislature has expressly determined in section 12022.53(e)(2) to preclude the imposition of an additional enhancement under section 186.22 in a gang case unless the accused personally used the firearm.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(d)

PEN 12022.53(e)(2)

People v. Salas (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1281–1282

People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583, 593, 595-596 [In choosing which of those two provisions to apply, the trial court must, consistent with section 12022.53(j), choose the provision that will result in a greater sentence.]

Ninth Holding:

The availability of increased punishment is a matter of pleading and proof. The information alleged only that a principal personally discharged and used a firearm. Moreover, the prosecution did not request that the jury be instructed regarding personal firearm use or discharge or the firearm enhancement, and the verdict did not call for a jury finding on this point. There was therefore no finding that the defendant personally used or discharged a firearm in the commission of the crime. As a matter of law, the special circumstance finding in a different count applies only to that count and does not provide a finding sufficient to overcome the bar against dual use of the gang finding set forth in section 12022.53(e)(2).

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(j) [For the penalties in this section to apply, the existence of any fact required under subdivision (b), (c), or (d) shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact ….]

People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1007 [Whether a defendant used a firearm in the commission of an enumerated sex offense is for the trier of fact to decide.]

Elements of crime, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 001125

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse one of the two counts of robbery for insufficient evidence. The matter is remanded for resentencing.

First Holding:

The defendant and his accomplices broke into a house. The defendant pointed a gun at the homeowner, while one of the accomplices pointed a gun at a sleeping child. They took property and fled. The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of robbery.

Section 211 defines robbery as the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.

Authority:

PEN 211

Second Holding:

Because the child slept through the entire act, there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction of robbing that child. In cases where the victim’s lack of resistance or unconsciousness is not due to the defendant surreptitiously drugging the victim, but due to the victim’s own actions, the legal authorities and courts of this and other states have found the force element lacking when the defendant takes property from an unconscious victim.

In cases where the evidence showed the defendant took property from a person who was voluntarily asleep or unconscious from drinking, the courts have held the evidence did not support a robbery conviction.

Authority:

People v. Kelley (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1368–1369

People v. Russell (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 136, 138–139 [theft from drunk, robbery conviction reversed]

Hicks v. State (1974) 232 Ga. 393 [theft from sleeping person; armed robbery conviction reversed]

People v. Jones (1919) 290 Ill. 603 [pickpocket of drunk, robbery conviction reversed]

Hall v. People (1898) 171 Ill. 540 [theft from unconscious drunk, robbery conviction reversed]

Bowling v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1952) 253 S.W.2d 21 [theft from unconscious drunk, robbery conviction reversed]

State v. Cohen (1978) 60 Ohio App.2d 182 [theft from sleeping person, robbery conviction reversed]
People v. Flynn (1984) 123 Misc.2d 1021 [475 N.Y.S.2d 334, 337] [Such activities as rolling a drunk, picking a pocket or snatching a purse from an unsuspecting and unresisting victim may properly bring forth a felony count of larceny from the person; but, because of the lack of physical force involved, these actions will not support any robbery charge.]

Marks v. State (1940) 69 Okla. Crim. 330 [noting the force or fear element is missing when the theft is from one who is helplessly drunk]

Third Holding:

This rule does not apply to carjacking, however, under the rationale expressed in Hill. Unlike robbery, carjacking is more a crime against a person than against property.

Authority:

People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 860

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case 001124

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the denial of the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 and direct the trial court to consider the defendant’s youth at the time of the killing as a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant formed the requisite mental state to be convicted of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder.

First Holding:

The trial court found that the defendant directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder. To satisfy the actus reus for that theory of liability, the aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The relevant act is the act that proximately causes death.

The required mens rea is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991

Second Holding:

Based on our review of the trial court’s written order denying resentencing, we conclude the trial court understood and applied the elements of directly aiding and abetting an implied malice murder. We therefore review its decision for substantial evidence.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We do not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility determinations. We presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence to support the judgment. To overturn a conviction based on insufficient evidence, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.

Authority:

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331

People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118

People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755

Third Holding:

The defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider his youth when deciding the resentencing petition. He did not raise the issue in the trial court, arguably forfeiting the issue. But we agree that considering the issue on the merits is appropriate where this emerging area of the law was only developing at the time the trial court denied the petition.

In Pittman, for example, the defendant argued for the first time on appeal after the denial of resentencing that his youth (21 years old at the time of the offense) was relevant to whether he acted with implied malice and therefore could be found guilty of second degree murder. The appellate court observed that the policy interests underlying the felony-murder cases—that youth is relevant to a criminal defendant’s ability to perceive risk and consequences, and therefore to the level of culpability—apply equally in the context of implied malice murder.

The Pittman court further concluded that failure to consider Pittman’s youth was not harmless, given trial evidence of Pittman and his peers acting impulsively and under the influence of transient rashness.

Authority:

People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416, 418 [Cases discussing the role of youth in relation to criminal culpability stress two areas: youthful offenders’ relative impulsivity and their vulnerability to peer pressure]

Fourth Holding:

The defendant was 20 years old at the time of the crime. Impulsivity and vulnerability to peer pressure may have contributed to his participation in the unplanned group attack of a rival gang member. We find it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been reached on the defendant’s petition had the trial court considered his youth.

Authority:

People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 417 (applying the Watson standard)

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818