Category Archives: Elements of crime

Case 001077

Error and/or relief

Because there was a change in the statutory or case law, previous petitions under section 1172.6 are not a bar to a petition filed in reliance on the change in the law. It was error to summarily deny the petition.

First Holding:

Neither the express language of section 1172.6 nor the stated purpose of the legislation supports limiting access to relief under section 1172.6 where the subsequent petition rested on new legal authority that challenged the basis for the superior court’s summary denial of the previous petition. Enactment of SB 775 constituted new legal authority that entitled the defendant to file a new petition.

Authority:

People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 946-947

Second Holding:

A defendant whose resentencing petition is denied before an order to show cause issues must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result.

The record of conviction here fails to establish that defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Accordingly, it is apparent that but for the trial court’s error, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 974

Third Holding:

The jury was instructed that an aider and abettor must have intended to commit, or aid and abet the felony of robbery (in this case) before or at the time that she caused the death. This was error. Under section 189(e)(2), a nonkiller must intend to kill and must assist the actual killer in the lethal act itself to be guilty of felony murder.

The instructions did not require the jury to make that finding. Thus, the record of conviction does not establish that the defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law and the trial court’s error in dismissing her petition for resentencing as an invalid, successive petition was not harmless. The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Authority:

PEN 189(e)(2)

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678, 693

Case 001075

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing and staying enhancements under section 12022.7(e) on counts 2, 3, and 4, and under section 12022.7(a) on count 2, because the jury did not find those allegations true.

Holding:

In their appellate briefing, the parties agree that the trial court erred in imposing and staying enhancements under section 12022.7, subdivision (e) on counts 2, 3, and 4, and under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) on count 2, because the jury did not find those allegations true. In keeping with the parties’ concessions, we strike these four enhancements.

Authority:

Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 674 [An express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in the disposition of the case.]

Case 001065

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences for both assault (count 7) and carjacking (count 6). Remanded for resentencing.

First Holding:

The court was required under section 654 to stay the sentence imposed on one of the counts because both were based on the same physical act of driving a vehicle in a threatening manner. Section 654 allows the trial court to stay the sentence for either count 6 or count 7, at its discretion.

Authority:

PEN 654

Second Holding:

The enhancement for personal use of a firearm imposed on the carjacking count must be stricken because no evidence was presented that a firearm was employed during the commission of that offense and that the enhancement for infliction of great bodily injury on the murder count is prohibited by section 12022.7(g).

The Attorney General concedes the above enhancements must be stricken, noting that the information did not allege these enhancements and the jury made no such findings.

Authority:

PEN 12022.7(g)

Case 001064

Error and/or relief

The court erred in concluding that the defendant was, as a matter of law, ineligible under section 1172.6 to seek recall of the early 2000s murder conviction. The court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold further proceedings consistent with section 1172.6(d).

First Holding:

SB 1437, effective on January 1, 2019, amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

It amended section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address felony-murder liability, and it added what is now now section 1172.6, which provides a procedure by which those convicted of murder can seek retroactive relief if the changes in the law would affect their previously sustained convictions.

Section 188 now provides that, except as stated in section 189(e), in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 188

PEN 189

Second Holding:

Under section 189(e), a participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in section 189(a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:

(1) The person was the actual killer.

(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.

(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2(d).

Authority:

PEN 189(e)

Third Holding:

SB 775, effective January 1, 2022, extended SB 1437’s application to those convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

Fourth Holding:

Upon receiving a petition, if the petitioner has requested counsel, the court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(b), (c)

Fifth Holding:

The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.

At the prima facie inquiry stage, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.

If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner. In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971-972

Sixth Holding:

If the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. Within 60 days after the order to show cause has issued, the trial court must then hold a hearing “to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(c), (d)

Seventh Holding:

In Morris, the Supreme Court construed the language in section 189(e) on the liability of one aiding and abetting first degree murder to require proof the defendant aided or abetted the actual killer in the lethal act itself, and not just the underlying felony.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678, 681-686

Eighth Holding:

The jury here was instructed that, if the jury determined that the defendant was not the killer, the defendant could be convicted of murder if the jury found that the defendant, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor in the commission of robbery, kidnapping, and/or carjacking that resulted in the death of the named human being.

Such a finding is insufficient under Morris to establish the requisite actus reus to the extent the defendant was convicted as a nonkiller.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 683

Case 001059

Error and/or relief

The sentence for the defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition should be stayed because it arises from the same, indivisible act underlying his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon.

First Holding:

Section 654(a) provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Courts have found section 654 prohibits punishing a defendant for both being a felon in possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition when all of the ammunition in question was loaded into the firearm or had been fired from it.

Authority:

People v. Broadbent (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 917, 922

Second Holding:

Because a stay of the defendant’s 16-month sentence on count three results in a relatively minor reduction in his total sentence [essentially, 67.333 years to life], we will modify the judgment instead of remanding the case for further proceedings.

Authority:

People v. Burns (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1184 [Staying execution of the penalty imposed for the lesser offense remains the preferred remedy where the reduction in sentence would be relatively minor]