Category Archives: Elements of crime

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case 001041

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for recall of sentence under section 1172.6. The evidence is insufficient to support he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The order denying the defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction and resentence him on the remaining charges.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted SB 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who was not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

To accomplish these goals, SB 1437 redefined malice in section 188, and narrowed the classes of persons liable for felony murder under section 189. It also added what is now section 1172.6 to the Penal Code, which permitted those convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition to have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced on any remaining counts. SB 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) subsequently extended this relief to persons convicted of manslaughter.

If a trial court determines that a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, it shall issue an order to show cause” and hold an evidentiary hearing.

At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder under California law as amended by SB 1437. The parties may offer evidence from a prior trial or hearing or offer new or additional evidence.

If the prosecution fails to carry its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.

Authority:

PEN 188

PEN 189

PEN 1172.6

Second Holding:

We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. Under this standard, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298

Third Holding:

A person who did not kill or act with the intent to kill may be liable for murder under the felony-murder doctrine only if they were a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The major participant and reckless indifference standards did not originate with SB. 1437, but rather the Legislature imported those standards from section 190.2(d), which governs the felony-murder special circumstance that renders a criminal act eligible for the death penalty or life without parole.

In Banks and Clark, our high court interpreted section 190.2(d) and provided guidelines for the major participant and reckless indifference standards. When SB 1437 amended section 189 to incorporate major participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark.

Authority:

PEN 189(e)(3)

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 881

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710

Fourth Holding:

Banks identified factors relevant to determining whether a defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony:

(1) the defendant’s role in planning the crime that led to the death;

(2) the defendant’s role in supplying or using deadly weapons;

(3) the defendant’s awareness of the particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of other participants;

(4) whether the defendant was present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent it, and whether the defendant’s own actions or inactions played a particular role in the death; and

(5) the defendant’s actions after lethal force was used.

Authority:

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803

Fifth Holding:

Clark identified factors relevant to whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life:

(1) the defendant’s knowledge of weapons, and the use and number of weapons;

(2) the defendant’s physical presence at the scene of the crime and opportunity to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim;

(3) the duration of the interaction between the perpetrator and the victim;

(4) the defendant’s knowledge of their cohort’s propensity for violence or likelihood of killing; and

(5) the defendant’s attempts to minimize violence during the crime.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618-622

Sixth Holding:

A defendant’s youth can also be a relevant factor in the reckless indifference analysis.

Authority:

People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558–559

Seventh Holding:

No one of the Banks or Clark factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient to establish a defendant was a major participant or acted recklessly indifferent to human life. Moreover, there is often a significant overlap between being a major participant and acting with reckless indifference to human life, for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615, 618

Eighth Holding:

In cases where a major participant finding was substantiated, there was evidence that the defendant played a substantial role or was a mastermind who planned and organized the underlying offense and orchestrated the events at the scene.

(Gary note: A portion of this part of opinion compares the defendant’s participation to cases in which there was a finding of substantial participation. I have listed those cases below–after the Clark reference, which pertains to the first paragraph of this “Eighth Holding”–because they do hold that the conduct as described does represent sufficient substantial evidence in support of a finding that the accused was a major participant in the underlying felony.)

Authority:

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615, 612

Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158 (Tison) [petitioners were actively involved in every element of the kidnaping-robbery and were physically present during the entire sequence of criminal activity culminating in the murder and the subsequent flight]

People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 584 [defendant agreed to rob someone with his brother, helped pick out the victim, and after the victim was injured, held the firearm while his brother rifled through the victim’s pockets]

People v. Richardson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1088, 1091-1092 [The defendant yelled, “Shoot him. Shoot him,” directing his armed coparticipants to shoot a citizen who was following the defendant’s car during the commission of the crime. Richardson was a major participant in the underlying robbery, as his orders to shoot showed he took on—or already had—a role in directing the robbery and the conduct of his coparticipants.]

Ninth Holding:

But even if we assume the defendant was a major participant, the evidence is insufficient to support that he exhibited reckless indifference to human life. Reckless indifference to human life is implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.

It encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions. Examples of reckless indifference include the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s property.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 616-617

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676

Tenth Holding:

The reckless indifference standard has both a subjective and an objective component. Subjectively, the defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed, and he or she must consciously disregard the significant risk of death his or her actions create.

Objectively, the risk of death must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him or her, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation. Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any violent felony is insufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life; only knowingly creating a grave risk of death satisfies the statutory requirement.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 617

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677

Eleventh Holding:

Participation in a “garden-variety armed robbery,” i.e., one in which the only factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun, is insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 884

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 [the fact a participant or planner of an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life]

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 805 [participation in an armed robbery, without more, does not involve engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death]

(Gary note:

(At this point and throughout the opinion, the appellate court compares and contrasts the defendant’s conduct in this case with other cases in which the question of major participant and reckless indifference to human life was resolved by finding either the presence or the absence of same.

(The analysis is fact-specific and would be of no value in your cases because you cannot cite an unpublished case, so you would have no way to get the facts of this summarized case before your court. But you should be able to learn what you need from the published cases this appellate court discussed in reaching its conclusion that this defendant was not a major participant in the underlying felony, and that his conviction for voluntary manslaughter (obtained by plea agreement) must be vacated.)

 

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review, Vicarious liability

Case 001033

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to deny the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. Remanded for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

First Holding:

Section 189, as amended, limits liability under a felony-murder theory principally to actual killers and those who, with the intent to kill, aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were major participants in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2(d)—that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.

Authority:

PEN 189

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Second Holding:

A person convicted of felony murder or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced. The petition must allege the petitioner was:

(1) charged with one of the enumerated crimes under a theory of felony murder or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime;

(2) convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter; and

(3) could not presently be convicted of murder because of changes to sections 188 or 189.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

Third Holding:

Where the petition complies with the three requirements, the superior court proceeds to section 1172.6c), to assess whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing for relief. The prima facie inquiry is limited. The court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.

If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. A court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. At the prima facie hearing, the court may consider the record of conviction. If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the superior court may dismiss the petition.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960, 971

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Fourth Holding:

A denial at the prima facie stage is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. This is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52

Fifth Holding:

To be liable for felony murder as a direct aider and abettor, a nonkiller must not only share the perpetrator’s intent to kill but must also aid or abet the actual killer in the lethal act, and not just the underlying felony.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 693

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991 [implied malice murder liability as a direct aider and abettor requires aiding the commission of the perpetrator’s life-endangering act]

Sixth Holding:

Since a nonkiller must aid or abet the actual killer in the lethal act itself, and not just the underlying felony, the jury’s true finding on the lying-in-wait special circumstance is insufficient to prevent defendant from making a prima facie showing for resentencing relief under section 1172.6.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 693

People v. Bocanegra (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 481

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Jury trial, Pleading, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 001032

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, it was error for the court to impose a term of prison under section 12022.53(d), an enhancement that was not pleaded or proved on the count for which it was imposed. It was also error for the court not to consider the impact of AB 333’s amendments on criminal gang activity laws on the defendant’s sentence.

First Holding:

Section 12022.53(d) provides that a person who, in the commission of a felony specified in section 246(a), or section 26100(c) or (d), personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined in section 12022.7, or death, to a person other than an accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.

Section 12022.53(e)(1) provides that the enhancements provided in this section shall apply to any person who is a principal in the commission of an offense if both of the following are pled and proved:

(A) The person violated subdivision (b) of Section 186.22.

(B) Any principal in the offense committed any act specified in subdivision (b), (c), or (d).

In other words, a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(e)(1) imposes vicarious liability for another’s personal use of a firearm on aiders and abettors who commit crimes in participation with a criminal street gang.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53

People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1171

Second Holding:

Here, the vicarious gang-related firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(d) and (e)(1) was alleged as to count 1. The jury found that enhancement true, but it made no finding defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense proximately causing GBI or death to a nonaccomplice as required under section 12022.53(d). The verdict form reflects the jury found true the vicarious gang-related firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(e)(1), but does not include a finding regarding the personal and intentional discharge firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(d). This is fatal to imposition of a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(d).

Further, the trial court dismissed the gang enhancement that was charged, which resulted in section 12022.53(e) being inapplicable. The section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement must be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53

Third Holding:

On resentencing, the prosecution asked that if the trial court was not going to reimpose the gang enhancement, that it dismiss the enhancement under AB 333, which would permit the prosecution to retry the gang enhancement to prove that it was valid under the AB 333 amendments. The court declined to decide the retroactivity of AB 333, and instead dismissed it in the interest of justice under section 1385.

By declining to make a decision about the retroactive application of AB 333, the trial court potentially deprived the People of their opportunity to retry the gang enhancement, and the court did not adequately consider whether AB 333 would affect the imposition of the gang-related vicarious firearm enhancement. Without considering the full effect of AB 333, the court exercised less than fully informed sentencing discretion. This was an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [a court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record]

Fourth Holding:

We remand for a full resentencing. As the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(d) was not found true by the jury and was unlawfully imposed, it shall be stricken. Given this changed circumstance, resentencing is required to allow the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion anew.

When a case is remanded for resentencing by an appellate court, the trial court is entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme. Not limited to merely striking illegal portions, the trial court may reconsider all sentencing choices. This rule is justified because an aggregate prison term is not a series of separate independent terms, but one term made up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one component infects the entire scheme.

Moreover, because AB 333 applies retroactively, the trial court must apply these changes in the law and consider, in the first instance, whether the jury’s gang enhancement finding is viable, and, if not, the People may elect to retry the enhancement.

In the absence of the gang enhancement, the gang-related vicarious firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(d), (e)(1) cannot be imposed as it is predicated on a pled and proven section 186.22(b) gang enhancement.

(Gary note: I was a bit confused by the presence of this observation, because it appeared to me that the appellate court stated that the jury verdict failed to make a finding of personal use by a participant; I cite the principle here, but I was surprised to see it in this case. Is the court saying that the prosecution gets another opportunity to try the 12022.53(d) enhancement that was missing a vital component? I may have misread something–the opinion dealt with a very complicated set of circumstances, peculiar to this case, that arose in the resentencing)

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388,

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 668, 669–670 [by requiring proof that benefit to gang was more than reputational, AB 333 added a new element to the enhancement; prosecution was entitled to an opportunity to retry the gang enhancement upon remand]

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 746–747 [where newly required elements were never tried to jury, remedy is to remand and give the People an opportunity to retry affected charges]

Fifth Holding:

Upon resentencing, subject to the principles articulated in Henderson and its progeny, the trial court may not impose a greater aggregate sentence than that imposed at the resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495–497

People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281

People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357

People v. Trammel (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 415, 434

People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 763–764, [exception to Henderson applies only to unauthorized sentences that were unlawfully lenient to the detriment of the People]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001029

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court should have granted the defendant’s request to retry his case to the extent that he was prosecuted under the criminal gang statutes in effect prior to their amendent by AB 333.

The defendant’s conviction for active participation in a street gang and the true findings on the gang enhancements on counts 2 and 3 are reversed. The People may seek to try the gang charge and enhancements under amended section 186.22. Following any trial, or if none occurs, the trial court will conduct a full resentencing under section 1172.75. Judgment is otherwise affirmed.

First Holding:

AB 333 modified the law on gang crimes and enhancements in several ways. It amended section 186.22 to increase the evidentiary burden to prove the crime of active participation in a criminal street gang and a gang enhancement by requiring the charged offense and any predicate offenses benefit the gang in a way that is more than reputational.

It amended the definition of a pattern of criminal gang activity—an element of proving the crime of active participation as well as a gang enhancement—to mean two or more predicate offenses, the last of which occurred within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to have been committed.

It also precluded using the currently charged offense to establish a pattern. Proving predicate offenses under section 186.22(b) now requires showing a connection between the predicate offenses and the organizational structure, primary activities, or common goals and principles of the gang.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749

Second Holding:

The jury convicted the defendant under the prior version of section 186.22. With the relevant aspects of AB 333 applying retroactively, this disconnect with the law as it has since been amended constitutes error affecting defendant’s conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang and the true findings as to the gang enhancements.

Under Chapman, vacating the jury’s finding is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the finding would have been the same’ under current law. If there is any reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the finding, vacatur is required.

Authority:

People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 715

In re A.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 557, 570

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Lewis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 874, 887

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Third Holding:

We cannot say the jury would have found appellant guilty of active participation in a criminal street gang, or found true the special allegations, beyond a reasonable doubt under the new law based on the record. The evidence provides little information from which the jury could infer the predicate offenses benefitted a gang in a way that was more than reputational, much less connect the offenses to the organizational structure, primary activities, or common goals and principles of the gang.

Authority:

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 454 [absence of evidence how predicate offenses actually benefitted the gang cannot preclude finding that the benefit was merely reputational


Fourth Holding:
The defendant’s remaining contentions need not be addressed by this court, as he will be able to address his concerns in the trial court upon full resentencing. We decline to advise the trial court about its future application of the sentencing laws.

Authority:
People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [As a general rule, we do not issue advisory opinions indicating what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 001024

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In light of Emanuel, we reverse the denial of the defendant’s motion for resentencing filed under section 1172.6.

First Holding:

The trial court denied the defendant’s petition for resentencing, finding that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to for human life during the commission of the offenses. there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. For that reason alone, he is entitled to resentencing relief under section 1172.6.

Authority:

People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 117

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed SB 1437 to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were ‘major participants in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

When the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder can only be convicted where he acted with malice aforethought, and malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 188

PEN 189

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 846-847

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Third Holding:

SB 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law.

The process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met, including that the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the petition to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether relief should be granted.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Fourth Holding:

Because the standard under section 189(e)(3) for holding a defendant liable for felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section 190.2(d), death penalty cases interpreting section 190.2(d), including Banks and Clark, are controlling here.

Authority:

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522

People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123

Fifth Holding:

To determine whether a defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human life under section 190.2(d), courts consider a list of considerations, including use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.

This list of factors is nonexhaustive. None of them is necessary, nor is anyone one of them necessarily sufficient. Instead, the totality of the circumstances must be analyzed to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 884

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618

Sixth Holding:

Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element. As to the subjective element, the defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed, and he or she must consciously disregard the significant risk of death his or her actions create.

As to the objective element, the risk of death must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him or her, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.

Authority:

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677

Seventh Holding:

On appeal from an order denying a petition under section 1172.6, we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. We examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.

Authority:

People v. Richardson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1090

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298

People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 1225

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57

Eighth Holding:

As the passenger in the car driven by another who drove dangerously and recklessly in an effort to evade capture, the defendant had no meaningful opportunity to interfere with the driving. The driving resulted in a collision with the victim’s car, killing her. There is insufficient evidence that the defendant knowingly created a grave risk to the life of that person.

Instead, the record shows that the defendant was, at worst, a passive passenger as the codefendant drove recklessly, which is insufficient to support a finding that the defendant acted with reckless indifference to the victim’s life.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 896