Category Archives: Elements of crime

Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case 001019

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because their was no requisite relationship between the defendant and the victim, it was error for the court to impose a protective order.

First Holding:

Section 136.2(i)(1) and (i)(2) provide in relevant part that when a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in Penal Code section 13700 or in Family Code section 6211, the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim or percipient witness of the crime.

Authority:

PEN 136.2(i)

Second Holding:

Penal Code section 13700 defines domestic violence to mean, in relevant part, abuse committed against an adult or a minor who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.

Authority:

PEN 13700

Third Holding:

Family Code section 6211 defines domestic violence to mean, in relevant part, abuse perpetrated against:

(a) A spouse or former spouse;

(b) A cohabitant or former cohabitant;

(c) A person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship;

(d) A person with whom the respondent has had a child;

(e) A child of a party or a child who is the subject of an action under the Uniform Parentage Act, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child to be protected; or

(f) Any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.

Authority:

FAM 6211

Fourth Holding:

The defendant did not have a relationship with the victim within the meaning of either Penal Code section 13700 or Family Code section 6211. Nor did the defendant’s crimes fall within any of the other offenses enumerated in section 136.2(i), which lists other qualifying offenses including human trafficking, specified sex offenses, and participation in criminal street gang.

Therefore, the post-conviction protective order was unauthorized under section 136.2(i). It must be vacated.

Authority:

People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461, 466

People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 212

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Vicarious liability

Case 001018

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court was mistaken in concluding that the jury was not instructed on felony murder, and was therefore in error when it denied the petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage.

Holding:

A person convicted of felony murder may file a petition to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced under section 1172.6. For reviewing the petition at the prima facie stage to determine whether it states facts that, if true, presents a qualifying claim, the Legislature has set the prima facie bar intentionally low.

The record in fact establishes that the jury was instructed on felony murder. Because the record of conviction does not preclude the possibility that the jury could have improperly imputed malice, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage. Remanded for further proceedings.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

Elements of crime

Case 001017

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals from his convictions of two counts of misdemeanor battery. Appellant contends, and respondent agrees, that both counts are based on the same act and both convictions cannot stand.

Holding:

An amended information charged appellant in count 1 with battery with serious bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 243(d) and in count 3 with battery with injury on a peace officer in violation of section 243(c)(2). A jury found appellant not guilty of both counts, and guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery (sec. 242) for both counts. The defendant’s single head-butt resulted in two convictions for misdemeanor battery. Only one conviction can stand.

A defendant may not be convicted of multiple counts for the same offense based on a single criminal act.

Authority:

People v. Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974, 994, fn. 8 [“we confirm that the same course of conduct may not form the basis of separate convictions for the same offense]

People v. Torres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 849, 858-859 [explaining that when a defendant is convicted of two of the same offenses based on the same act, the error cannot be corrected by simply staying the sentence on one count]

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 001016

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to issue protective orders, because the defendant was not convicted of a qualifying offense, and the person for whose benefit order was issued was not a victim of the defendant’s crime.

First Holding:

Section 136.2(i)(1) provides authority for the imposition of postconviction protective orders where a defendant is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence offense.

Authority:

PEN 136.2(i)(1)

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901

Second Holding:

Domestic violence is abuse committed against, among other categories of victims, a person with whom the defendant had a dating relationship. Domestic violence is abuse perpetrated against (a) a spouse or former spouse[; (b) a cohabitant or former cohabitant; (c) a person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship; (d) a person with whom the respondent has had a child; (e) [a] child of a party; or (f) any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.

“Abuse” is the intentional or reckless causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another. Section 136(3) defines “victim” as any natural person with respect to whom there is reason to believe that any crime as defined under the laws of this state or any other statute or of the United States is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated.

Thus, a postconviction protective order under section 136.2(i)(1) is authorized if: (1) the defendant has been convicted of one (or more) of the statutorily enumerated crimes; and (2) the protected person qualifies as a victim of said crime(s).

Authority:

PEN 13700

FAM 6211

People v. Walts (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 127, 139

People v. Lopez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 227, 237

Third Holding:

Courts do not have inherent authority to issue a criminal protective order absent a statute authorizing such an order.

Authority:

People v. Corrales (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 283, 286-287

Fourth Holding:

The defendant was not convicted of a domestic violence or other offense that authorized the court to issue a protective order under section 136.2(i)(1). His conviction did not justify a protective order. Nor was the protected person a victim of his crime.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901 [where the defendant’s convictions are not domestic violence offenses, the court does not have statutory authority to impose a postconviction protective order, and it must be stricken]

People v. Pena (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 640, 648 [the Legislature amended section 136.2(i)(1), in 2018 to specify that a victim is only a victim of the crime the defendant was convicted of committing]

People v. Walts (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 127, 143 [if there is no reason to believe that an enumerated section 136.2(i)(1) offense for which the defendant was convicted is being or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated against a particular person, that person is not a victim and may not seek, or be named as protected party by, a protective order under section 136.2(i)(1)]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001006

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for a new hearing on the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, in light of new case law regarding examination of prior serious felonies and strikes depending on criminal gang activity. Further, the restitution fine must vacated, as it is more than 10 years old.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes law is a sentencing scheme that requires a court to double or sometimes triple the punishment for a felony offense if the defendant was previously convicted of a crime that qualifies as a serious or violent felony. The serious or violent felonies that trigger this sentencing scheme, commonly referred to as strikes or strike priors, are enumerated by statute. The list of serious felonies includes any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22. Section 186.22 defines substantive gang offenses and gang enhancements.

Authority:

PEN 667(e)

PEN 1170.12(c)

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

PEN 667.5(c)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582

Second Holding:

The Legislature enacted AB 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which among other things, changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. Fletcher held that prior convictions premised on section 186.22 must be examined under currently law in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions or strikes.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 585, 587

Third Holding:

When the applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing. The Salazar court accordingly held that when a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Though the Salazar decision is premised on the trial court’s scope of discretion being changed during pendency of appeal, whereas here the trial court’s discretion has remained the same but a material fact about defendant’s past record has been modified since the time of sentencing. We nevertheless find the test set forth in Salazar to be applicable here, because the Salazar court itself observed the similarity between the two scenarios: A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424-425

Fourth Holding:

Retrial of the strike under the current law would be appropriate, should the prosecutor so choose.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608

Fifth Holding:

The restitution fine was imposed in 2011. Section 1465.9(d) has been added since then, to provide that any restitution fine is unenforceable and uncollectible upon the expiration of 10 years after date of imposition.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9