Category Archives: Fifth Amendment

Fifth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000858

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We hold that the officers’ un-Mirandized questioning of the defendant was a custodial interrogation and reverse the judgment.

First Holding:

When reviewing issues under Miranda, we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence but independently determine whether the interrogation was custodial. Where, as here, an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission are undisputed and subject to our independent review.

Authority:

People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1161

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172

Second Holding:

To give force to the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination, a custodial interrogation must be preceded by Miranda warnings and the suspect’s voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights.

Persons in custody thus must be warned that they have the right to remain silent, any statement made may be used as evidence against them, and they have the right to an attorney.

For Miranda purposes, interrogation means express questioning or words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Authority:

Florida v. Powell (2010) 559 U.S. 50, 59

People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 530–531

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 244

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

Third Holding:

The protections provided by Miranda apply only to custodial interrogations. The term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Volunteered statements, for instance, that were not made in response to police questioning are not the product of an interrogation and thus not inadmissible under Miranda even when the statements were made while in custody.

Where a defendant seeks to exclude statements made in the absence of a Miranda advisement, they must therefore establish both that the police questioning was an interrogation and that it occurred while the individual was in custody.

Authority:

People v. Zapata (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 529, 538

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648

Fourth Holding:

A custodial interrogation occurs when a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would feel that their freedom has been deprived in any significant way; for example, a formal arrest or a restraint of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.

When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have understood their situation. All the circumstances of the interrogation are relevant to this inquiry, including the location, length and form of the interrogation, the degree to which the investigation was focused on the defendant, and whether any indicia of arrest were present.

Whether a person is in custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.

Authority:

California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125

People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491

People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172

Fifth Holding:

When the court considers whether an individual was in custody during their questioning, it looks at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest. The courts have articulated a number of non-exhaustive factors to consider when conducting this analysis.

The relevant factors include: (1) whether contact was initiated by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; (2) whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect; (3) location of the interview; (4) whether police informed the person they were under arrest or in custody; (5) whether they informed the person they were free to terminate the interview and leave at any time; (6) whether there were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the interview; (7) length of the interrogation; (8) how many police officers participated; (9) whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; (10) whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; (11) whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; (12) whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and 13) whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.

Authority:

People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162

Sixth Holding:

The circumstances are less likely to suggest to an individual that they are unable to leave or end the questioning when they voluntarily subject themselves to such an examination.

Authority:

People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528, 541 [holding that the defendant was not in custody when he voluntarily came to the police station for an interview]

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 173 [defendant’s agreement to be voluntarily interviewed in unmarked police car weighed against a custodial finding]

Seventh Holding:

A custodial interrogation does not occur where an officer detains a suspect for investigation and limits questioning to the purpose of identification or obtaining sufficient information to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions that a crime has occurred.

Authority:

People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180

People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 679–680

Eighth Holding:

The mere fact that an individual is a suspect is not enough to foster a custodial environment; the officers’ suspicion must also be communicated to that person for it to factor into the custody determination.

The awareness of the person being questioned by an officer that the police have ample cause to arrest him, may well lead him to conclude, as a reasonable person, that he is not free to leave, and that he has been significantly deprived of his freedom.

Authority:

People v. Vasquez (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1163—1164

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 176 [holding that officers’ expressed belief that the defendant was culpable and they had evidence to prove it weighed in favor of custody determination]

Ninth Holding:

An interview that takes place in public within view of any passersby reduces the ability of an unscrupulous officer to use illegitimate means to elicit incriminating responses and should lessen a suspect’s fear of abuse should they not cooperate.

Authority:

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 438

Tenth Holding:

The longer the period of questioning, the more likely it will be found to be coercive and custodial, although even one question may be enough in the proper circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Herdan (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 300, 307, fn. 12

Eleventh Holding:

If the court finds that the statement was admitted in violation of Miranda, the court must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not impact the jury’s guilty verdict, such that the jury would not have reached a different result had the trial court excluded the challenged statements.  

The court assesses whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 21–22

People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 495

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Twelfth Holding:

A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. On the record in this case, we cannot find that the admission of the defendant’s statements was harmless error.

Authority:

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296.

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 181 [finding prejudice where there were no witnesses or physical evidence and defendant’s non-Mirandized statements was primary evidence]

Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Jury trial, Standard of review

Case 000780

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the detectives subjected defendant to a custodial interrogation. Their failure to advise him of his Miranda rights therefore required the suppression of his confession.

First Holding:

Under Miranda, suspects questioned by law enforcement after being taken into custody must first be informed that they have the right to remain silent, that any statements they make may be used against them, and that they have a right to the presence of an attorney. If police interrogate a suspect in custody without providing these advisements, the suspect’s responses cannot be admitted to establish their guilt.

Authority:

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16

Second Holding:

The duty to advise suspects of their Miranda rights applies only if they are in custody. Custody is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In deciding if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes, the question is whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. To answer this question, the court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16

Third Holding:

Relevant considerations include (1) who initiated the contact; (2) whether the person agreed to the interview; (3) whether the person was questioned as a witness or suspect; (4) the interview’s location; (5) whether police said the person was under arrest or in custody (6) conversely, whether they said the person was free to leave at any time; (7) whether the person’s movement was restrained; (7) the length of questioning; (8) the number of officers; (9) the degree of police control over the interrogation; (10) whether officers conveyed a belief in the person’s guilt and suggested they had incriminating evidence; (11) whether the tone was aggressive or accusatory; (12) whether police used interrogation tactics designed to pressure the person; and (13) whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16-17

Fourth Holding:

The prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant was not in custody. We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence but independently decide if the interrogation was custodial.

(GARY Note: the court then described the events in detail that led the court to declare “Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation long before he received Miranda advisements.” Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not useful to recite the circumstances, because you cannot cite this case as an example of a finding that Miranda rights should have been given earlier. If an attorney wants to read the full opinion, I can provide it on request.)

Authority:

In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 445

Fifth Holding:

A confession held inadmissible by reason of having been obtained in violation of the prophylactic Miranda requirements is subject to a harmless-error standard of review specified in Chapman. Under that standard, we ask whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 21-22

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Sixth Holding:

The erroneous admission of defendant’s confession cannot be regarded as unimportant. A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. Confessions often operate as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense and are thus much more likely to be prejudicial.

Authority:

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296

People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86

Seventh Holding:

We decline to consider defendant’s testimony at trial in assessing harmlessness. When an illegally obtained confession is erroneously admitted, the defendant’s testimony will not render the error harmless unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not take the stand in an attempt to mitigate the explosive impact of a confession which had left his case in ruin.

Authority:

People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 151

Defenses, Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Jury instructions, Standard of review

Case 000691

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court gave an erroneous instruction on involuntary manslaughter requiring reversal. Based on the findings of the jury that the defendant was not guilty under any valid theory, we do not order retrial on the involuntary manslaughter.

First Holding:

(Gary note: I provide the following as context for the results in this opinion. These summaries are intended and designed to highlight principles of law, not so much the specific factual situation in which the error occurred. In this jury instruction error case, though, a little more factual specificity may aid the reader in understanding the more universal principles.

(In this case, the judge modified the standard instruction on involuntary manslaughter in such a way that the jury first had to find that the defendant acted in complete self-defense, and then had to determine whether he did so in a negligent matter. But that is not the law. Complete self-defense ends the question. Had the defendant acted in any way that was NOT complete self-defense, then he would not have been acting lawfully. And the jury necessarily found that he acted in complete self-defense, so it was misled by the instruction that allowed the jury to find him guilty of involuntary manslaughter.

(The opinion summarizes the context: “Here, the jury found defendant not guilty of first degree and second degree murder based on the finding that defendant acted in lawful self-defense in shooting defendant. It further found defendant not guilty of voluntary manslaughter rejecting that unreasonable self-defense was applicable. It found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, finding, as recognized by the trial court, that defendant, ‘in a lawful act of self-defense, was criminally negligent in how he did it, and in his criminally negligent manner resulting in an involuntary manslaughter.’ As we have concluded, such determination was not a valid theory of involuntary manslaughter. There was no other theory of involuntary manslaughter presented to the jury. Here, the only question for the jury was whether defendant acted in reasonable self-defense in shooting [the victim] one time in the face. Once it concluded that such use of force was reasonable, it found lawful self-defense, which was a complete defense to involuntary manslaughter. The jury necessarily relied on the erroneous instruction to convict defendant of involuntary manslaughter after finding the complete defense of justifiable homicide. The error was prejudicial.”)

It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. It is also well settled that this duty to instruct extends to defenses if it appears … the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.

Authority:

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73

Second Holding:

In reviewing a claim that the court’s instructions were incorrect or misleading, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions as asserted by the defendant. We consider the instructions as a whole and assume the jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions.

Authority:

People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1013

Third Holding:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A defendant lacks malice and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in limited, explicitly defined circumstances: either when the defendant acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, or when the defendant kills in unreasonable self-defense—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense.

Authority:

PEN 192

People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 132

People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87-88

Fourth Holding:

A defendant commits involuntary manslaughter by committing a homicide with the mens rea of criminal negligence. The offense must be based on one of three predicate acts: (1) killing in the commission of a misdemeanor ; (2) killing in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection; or (3) killing in the commission of a noninherently dangerous felony committed without due caution and circumspection.

The performance of an act with criminal negligence supplies the criminal intent for involuntary manslaughter, regardless whether the conduct underlying the offense is a misdemeanor, a lawful act, or a noninherently dangerous felony.

Authority:

People v. Sevilla (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 618, 626

Fifth Holding:

A killing in perfect self-defense is justifiable homicide. Perfect self-defense requires that one must actually and reasonably believe in the necessity of defending oneself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. Imperfect self-defense reduces an intentional and unlawful killing to voluntary manslaughter. Imperfect self-defense occurs when defendants act in the actual but unreasonable belief they are in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.

Authority:

People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 321

People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645

Sixth Holding:

In determining whether error has been committed in giving or not giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions as a whole and assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.

Authority:

People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1172

Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000663

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Substantial evidence does not support the defendant’s conviction for exhibiting harmful matter to a minor.

First Holding:

The law governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is well established. In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. A reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Authority:

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

Second Holding:

Under section 288.2(c), “harmful matter” is defined in section 313. Section 313(a) states that harmful matter means matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a whole, depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.

This definition is virtually identical to the constitutional standard of obscenity set forth in Miller. We conclude the record does not contain evidence from which a jury could reasonably find the video the defendant showed them minor was harmful matter within the meaning of section 288.2(a)(2) and section 313. Therefore, substantial evidence does not support the defendant’s conviction, and we will reverse the judgment and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24

People v. Dyke (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1383

Third Holding:

Nudity or depictions of sexual intercourse or other sexual activity do not, by themselves, make a movie obscene.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1291

Fourth Holding:

The defendant may not be retried on this count.

Authority:

United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 131

Amelioration, Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000601

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding the defendant is guilty of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, under a still-valid theory, and reversal for resentencing is unwarranted. As for the defendant’s evidentiary challenges, however, we hold the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting and relying on the grand jury transcript and police reports. As a result, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing.

First Holding:

SB 1437 was enacted to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. It amended section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address felony-murder liability. Through section 1172.6, it provided a means of relief for those whose convictions would no longer be considered murder under the revised law.

Authority:

SB 1437

PEN 1172.6

Second Holding:

In the context of an appeal from a criminal conviction where substantial evidence does not support a conviction, the remedy is generally not a new trial. The sufficiency of the evidence is considered by examining the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and deciding whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission.

Authority:

People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271–272 [the federal and California Constitutions preclude retrial if a court determines the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of law]

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684,

People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311

Third Holding:

The reason for this is that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary trial errors as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. While the former is in effect a finding that the government has failed to prove its case against the defendant, the latter implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but is simply a determination that he has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect.

Thus, as a general rule, it is well established that if the defendant secures on appeal a reversal of his conviction based on trial errors other than insufficiency of evidence, he is subject to retrial.

Authority:

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684,

People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1, 6

Fourth Holding:

Although principles of double jeopardy are not implicated in the voluntary section 1172.6 petition process, an insufficient evidence claim, coupled with additional challenges to the admission of evidence, may give rise to an issue of remedy.

If, considering the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s denial of the section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, it signals a substantive failure of proof by the government much like it does in the context of a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, suggesting reversal for resentencing is the appropriate remedy. Under 1172.6(d)(3) if the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the petitioner shall be resentenced.

Authority:

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1068

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 875, 896 [directing resentencing be granted on remand where insufficient evidence supported denial of sec. 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing]

Fifth Holding:

On the other hand, a prejudicial procedural error (such as an evidentiary error), on its own, typically signals nothing about whether the petitioner is or is not guilty of murder under the law as amended by SB 1437, but points only to a flawed judicial process. In cases involving only this latter situation, remand for a new evidentiary hearing is ordinarily the appropriate remedy. This remedy is especially apt in the context of section 1172.6, which was created by the Legislature as an act of lenity.

Authority:

People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116, 137 & fn. 3 [in the absence of a substantial evidence challenge, prejudicial evidentiary errors warrant remand for a new evidentiary hearing rather than remand for resentencing]

People v. Lopez-Barraza (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1255 [remanding for a new evidentiary hearing where trial court impermissibly relied on evidence admitted at the petitioner’s trial that contradicted jury findings]

People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1062–1063 [conditionally reversing denial of sec. 1172.6 petition after evidentiary hearing to permit the trial court to reconsider discovery motion, and to order a new evidentiary hearing if additional evidence disclosure was warranted]

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1067–1068 [sentence modification procedure under sec. 1172.6 is an entirely voluntary process and constitutes an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution]

Sixth Holding:

The grand jury transcript is not admissible under section 1172.6(d)(3)’s exception for evidence previously admitted at a prior hearing or trial.

Authority:

People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116

Seventh Holding:

Since Davenport and Cody, appellate courts have considered whether section 1172.6(d)(3)’s hearsay exception extends to transcripts from grand jury proceedings. In Ocobachi, the court held it did not. The court explained the existing hearsay exception for former testimony found in Evidence Code section 1291 requires a showing of witness unavailability) and that the party against whom the former testimony was offered had been given the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

Unlike former testimony given during a petitioner’s preliminary hearing or original trial, Ocobachi pointed out the person investigated at a grand jury proceeding is not a party but a target who has no right to appear or offer evidence at grand jury proceedings. Thus, unlike in Davenport and Cody, admitting a transcript of grand jury testimony under section 1172.6(d)(3) would require ignoring both provisions of Evidence Code section 1291, creating an overbroad hearsay exception. In contrast, Robinson [review granted] concluded that the grand jury transcript may be considered at the section 1172.6 hearing.

Authority:

People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158–1159

People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 103

People v. Ocobachi (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1183

People v. Robinson (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 854, 872, review granted Feb. 26, 2025, S288606

Eighth Holding:

The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. We consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961

People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990

Ninth Holding:

Grand jury proceedings are not adjudicative, unlike hearings and trials in a criminal proceeding, nor are they adversarial. Rather, they are investigatory proceedings: a judicial officer does not typically preside over grand jury proceedings; a defendant does not receive notice of grand jury proceedings; and a defendant has no right to appear, offer evidence, or cross-examine witnesses. Despite similarities in their function, unlike preliminary hearings, grand jury proceedings are one-sided investigatory proceedings.

Authority:

Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1026

People v. Petrilli (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 814, 824

People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 595

Tenth Holding:

It would be anomalous for the Legislature to have amended the statute under SB 775 to tighten the evidentiary rules by excluding preliminary hearing testimony under section 872(b) [which allows a magistrate to find probable cause at a preliminary hearing based on the testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer that would otherwise be excluded as inadmissible hearsay], which is subject to cross-examination, but not exclude similar section 939.6(c), testimony received at a grand jury proceeding, which is untested by cross-examination.

Authority:

People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 101 [in construing statutes, courts should strive to avoid anomalous results]

Eleventh Holding:

We agree with the parties that the police reports and related witness statements collected by the police are hearsay because they were created out of court and were offered (and considered) for the truth of the matter asserted. These documents also contain out-of-court statements of witnesses that constitute another layer of hearsay when offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

While there may be an applicable exception for some of the information contained in the police reports, there must also be a hearsay exception for out-of-court witness statements recorded in the documents that were considered for the truth of the matter asserted. Many of the findings taken from the police reports involved nonparty witness statements recorded by the police that were considered for the truth of the matter asserted, but no hearsay exception was identified

Authority:

EVID 1200(a)[hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove that its assertion is true]

People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 844–845 [arrest report admissible under official records exception to hearsay rule to the extent it reported an act, condition, or event observed by law enforcement pursuant to Evid. Code sec. 1280]

Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 192 [observing the general rule that each level of out-of-court statements in documents such as probation and police reports must fall under a hearsay exception to be admitted into evidence]

Twelfth Holding:

Judicial notice extends only to notice of the document’s existence, not necessarily to the truth of the facts contained within a document. Judicial notice of a document is not a vehicle for the admission of hearsay contained within the document.

Authority:

People v. Moore (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 168, 178

People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 458–459 [the fact that a document may be judicially noticed under Evid. Code sec. 452 does not mean all the hearsay statements within the document are admissible or noticeable]

Thirteenth Holding:

Prejudice is shown where it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Fourteenth Holding:

On other questions the defendant has asked us to address, we decline to do so in light of the remand and reversal. As a general rule, we do not issue advisory opinions indicating what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Authority:

People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084

Elements of crime, Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Fines and fees, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000546

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this trial that resulted in a conviction of two counts of felony vandalism, the trial court erred under state law by admitting the victim’s hearsay testimony about the costs to repair her vehicle. The admission of the hearsay testimony was prejudicial under state law. We reverse the vandalism convictions and remand for the People to elect whether to retry them as felonies or accept their reduction to misdemeanors.

First Holding:

Other than the deductible, an insurance company paid for the repair of the damages. The victims testified to what she was told was the cost of the repairs. No repair bill was introduced into evidence. The trial court erroneously overruled defendant’s objections to the victim’s hearsay statements regarding the cost of repairs. State-law errors are reviewed for harmlessness under Watson. Under Watson, reversal is required if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have achieved a more favorable result absent the out-of-court statements.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1308

People v. Lozano (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 366, 381–382

Second Holding:

The vandalism convictions must be reduced to misdemeanors because of the error in admitting the victim’s hearsay testimony. The only further relief the defendant could obtain from prevailing on his substantial-evidence claim is a bar to retrying him on the damage-value element. To resolve this claim, we consider whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.

Authority:

People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 591

People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87

Third Holding:

Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission. The reason for this is that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary trial errors as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. While the former is in effect a finding that the government has failed to prove its case against the defendant, the latter implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but is simply a determination that the defendant has been convicted through a judicial process that is defective in some fundamental respect.

Authority:

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fifth Amendment, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000524

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing, it was error to increase the originally-imposed $300 restitution fine to $10,000.00. It was also error to fail to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served.

First Holding:

Although defendant arguably has forfeited the claim of error because he did not object to the sentence below, we will reach the issue because he also contends his attorney was ineffective.

Authority:

People v. Daniels (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 29, 31

Second Holding:

When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California’s constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. Statutorily mandated restitution fines constitute punishment and there is no principled basis for excluding them from the rationale of Henderson. The restitution fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.4(b) cannot exceed the $300 originally imposed. Therefore, we remand the matter and direct the trial court to reduce the restitution fine to $300, as originally assessed.

Authority:

 

People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482

People v. Jones (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1783, 1785

People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 357

People v. Daniels (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 29, 31-32

People v. Thompson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1276 [court directed trial court to reduce increased section 1202.4 fine to amount originally assessed]

Third Holding:

A restitution fine under section 1202.4 constitutes punishment. It is required in every case where a person is convicted of a crime unless the court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. For felony convictions, the required fine is not less than $300 and not more than $10,000.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody up to that time, including his time in custody after the original sentencing. As the trial court failed to recalculate the credit for time served, the matter must be remanded for the custody credits to be recalculated.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Evidence, Fifth Amendment, Sentencing

Case 000517

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to include in the restitution order reimbursement for expenses incurred by the victim that were not caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct.

First Holding:

The defendant concedes he forfeited his Fifth Amendment claim by failing to object during trial on this ground to the admission of the pretext call evidence, the prosecutor’s arguments and questions on his silence, and the adoptive admission jury instruction. We elect to address the issue in order to forestall a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 471 [failure to object to jury instruction forfeits appellate claim of error]

People v. Adanadus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 512 [requiring timely objection to preserve prosecutorial misconduct claim]

People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1224-1225, fn. 2 [claim based on privilege against self-incrimination may be forfeited]

People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126

Second Holding:

The police arranged a pretext call between the victim and the defendant, during which the defendant did not deny the victim’s accusations. That evidence was presented at trial as an adoptive admission. The defendant argued that it was a violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, because he had previously been advised by counsel to make no statements to the victim. The People’s emphasis on the presence or absence of government coercion fails to account for the rationale underlying adoptive admissions, which is that the natural reaction of an innocent man to an untrue accusation is to enter a prompt denial.

That inference is only justified where the person is accused of having committed a crime, under circumstances which fairly afford him an opportunity to hear, understand, and to reply, and which do not lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

But advice of counsel is one form of restraint that might bar a free response by a person accused of a crime and therefore may not give rise to an inference of acquiescence or guilty consciousness as an adoptive admission. An accused’s express invocation of the right to remain silent on the advice of counsel is precisely a circumstance that may lend itself to the inference that the accused’s silence in the face of accusations stems merely from the assertion of that right.

[Gary note on the rest of the story–the appellate court proceeded to conclude that under the actual facts of the case, it was not error to allow the evidence as an adoptive admission.  I have included this holding merely for its educational value, though it did not assist this defendant.]

Authority:

People v. Simmons (1946) 28 Cal.2d 699, 712, 715–716

People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189

Third Holding:

A victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime. The trial court’s discretion in setting the amount of restitution is broad, and it may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. The hearing to establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a criminal prosecution, and no particular kind of proof evidence is required.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 470

People v. Lockwood (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 91, 96

Fourth Holding:

The restitution power conferred by section 1202.4 in cases where a criminal defendant is sentenced to prison is not as broad as the court’s power to order restitution as a condition of probation, which need only be reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. The victim’s mother’s expense incurred for paying for the defendant’s trip to a foreign country was entirely unrelated to the defendant’s criminal conduct, as was the victim’s rideshare share expenses on the day of the crime. Those portions of the restitution order must be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1101

AppellateAdvisor Updates, Due process, Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Jury instructions, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000489

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There is insufficient evidence to support the child pornography count. The court also impermissibly restricted cross-examination to the extent that it violated the defendant’s right to cross-examine the witness. After reconsideration following four days of testimony, the court changed its mind. Rather than allow the defense to rebut the evidence already before the jury or declare a mistrial, the court instructed the jury that it was striking that portion of the victim’s testimony over the last four days as to her feelings in response to defendant’s actions, statements and text messages, instructing the jury to disregard the stricken testimony.

On this record, the defendant was denied a fair trial, and the judgment is reversed.

First Holding:

There is insufficient evidence to support the child pornography count. The photograph on which it relies does not depict a minor personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct, as defined in section 311.4(d). Exhibition of the breasts is not included in the statutory definition of sexual conduct. In the context of section 311.4, the rectal area is not equivalent to buttocks and, to the extent rectal area may include any portion of the buttocks, it is limited to a portion of the lower buttocks near the rectum or anus.

Authority:

PEN 311.4(d)

PEN 311.11(a)(1)

PEN 311.4(d)

People v. Wallace (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 582 ([exposure of breasts does not constitute the prohibited exhibition under section 311.4], disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452)

People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 545

Second Holding:

The Kongs factors are not included in the standard CALCRIM No. 1145 instruction. The factors are derived from People v. Kongs, where the Court of Appeal applied a list of six factors adopted by the federal courts for a trier of fact to consider when determining what constitutes a lascivious exhibition of specified private parts in assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim under section 311.4 (using a minor to pose for sex acts) and section 311.11(a) (possession of child pornography).

[GARY NOTE: While it would be perfectly proper to provide the specific language and factors recited in the opinion, I’ve exercised my “G-Rating”-censorship-reserved-right to modify the actual language used and to go no further than I’ve recited. If the factors may have a bearing in your case, you should be reading Kongs for yourself.]

Authority:

People v. Kongs (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1753–1755

Third Holding:

We conclude no reasonable jury could determine, based on the overall content of the photograph, that it depicts an exhibition of the rectal area for the viewer’s sexual stimulation. We thus conclude the subject photograph does not, as a matter of law, depict the minor engaging in or simulating sexual conduct. Consequently, the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of child pornography in count 26. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial on this charge.

Authority:

People v. Spurlock (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1133

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 468

Fourth Holding:

The admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair. Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.

Authority:

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439

Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 70

People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229

Fifth Holding:

At trial, the prosecutor extensively questioned the minor about how the defendant made her feel through his statements and actions. The defendant’s defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s line of questioning on relevance grounds, but the trial court overruled the objection, finding the testimony relevant to the minor’s credibility. As a result, over the course of four days, the minor was permitted to testify extensively on direct examination on how the defendant’s encouraging words made her feel.

When the defense proffered evidence that portrayed an opposite picture of the minor, the trial court conceded that it should have sustained the defense objection on relevancy grounds, denied the defendant’s request to introducing the contrasting evidence, and purported to strike the offending portions of the minor’s direct testimony, instructing the jury to disregard the minor’s testimony over the four days as to her feelings regarding the defendant’s statements. This presentation of extensive inadmissible evidence, combined with the exclusion of defense evidence that would have rebutted the inadmissible testimony, denied the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.

Authority:

People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214

Sixth Holding:

Constitutional errors in admitting or excluding evidence are both subject to harmless error review. Federal constitutional errors subject to harmless error review are reviewed under Chapman, which requires us to reverse the conviction unless the People can demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To determine whether the People have carried their burden, we examine the entire record and must reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.

Authority:

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 412

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,

People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671

Seventh Holding:

Even thoughtfully phrased limiting instructions may be insufficient to mitigate the harm resulting from prejudicial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 Cal.3d 719, 730 [No limiting instruction, however thoughtfully phrased or often repeated, could erase from the jurors’ minds the prejudicial evidence]

Eighth Holding:

Ordinarily, a party’s failure to object to certain testimony at all, or failure to object on the specific grounds asserted on appeal, would render a challenge to the admission of the testimony forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 831

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000347

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse and vacate the true findings on the gang murder special circumstances for counts 1 and 4. We also reverse and vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements for counts 1, 2, and 4. We remand the matter to the trial court to allow the District Attorney to retry the gang murder special circumstance and the gang enhancement for count 4 under the current version of the laws as amended by AB No. 333. Principles of double jeopardy preclude retrial as to the gang murder special circumstance for count 1 and the gang enhancement for counts 1 and 2.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 amended section 186.22. The amendment narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang as used for the gang enhancement in section 186.22(b) and the gang murder special circumstance in section 190.2(a)(22). It changed the definition to an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, rather than individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity under the former version of section 186.22. A pattern of criminal activity under former section 186.22(e) required two or more predicate offenses committed on separate occasions or by evidence of such offenses committed by two or more persons on the same occasion.

The amendment changed the requirements of a pattern of criminal activity in four ways. First, a pattern of criminal activity now requires the predicate offenses to be separate from the currently charged offense or offenses. Second, the last predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the commission of the currently charged offense. Third, it requires that the predicate offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to persons. Fourth, the predicate offenses must have commonly benefited a criminal street gang. AB 333 narrowed the common benefit for the gang by the commission of an offense to be more than reputational. The prosecution must show how the predicate offenses provided an actual common benefit to the gang, and that they did not merely enhance the reputation of its individual members.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 460-461

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 450

Second Holding:

AB 333 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments as we have here. The instructions read to the defendant’s jury preceded the effective date of AB 333 and his appeal was pending on that effective date. The new requirements in section 186.22 apply retroactively to his case on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 396

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738-739

Third Holding:

We must reverse the gang enhancements and the gang murder special circumstance if any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion regarding the new requirements of AB 333.

Authority:

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 462

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 739

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 453

Fourth Holding:

The double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution’s Fifth Amendment provides that no person may be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The state constitution provides the same protection. A defendant may not be tried a second time for the same offense if the conviction is set aside for insufficiency of the evidence. Our conclusion that the gang special circumstance and the gang allegation were unsupported by sufficient evidence bars retrial.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 15

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 454-455, 468

Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Juveniles, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000306

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The evidence to support the alleged use of a deadly weapon is insufficient as a matter of law. The minor was alleged to have committed robbery with the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (knife).

First Holding:

Section 12022(b)(1) allows a defendant’s sentence to be enhanced if he or she personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon during a felony. To prove use, the evidence must show something more than merely being armed. Intentionally displaying a weapon in a menacing manner qualifies. When a defendant deliberately shows a weapon or otherwise makes its presence known, and there is no evidence to suggest any purpose other than intimidating the victim (or others) so as to successfully complete the underlying offense, the fact finder is entitled to find a facilitative use rather than an incidental or inadvertent exposure. But the use enhancement is not applicable if the evidence shows that the defendant’s conduct with respect to the weapon appears to be purely incidental to the crime, or if the defendant did no more than passively display the weapon.

Authority:

People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672

People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 302

People v. Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317, 325

People v. Hays (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 534, 548–549

Second Holding:

To determine whether the defendant used a knife for purposes of section 12022(b)(1), we may properly consult cases construing the term uses in other enhancement statutes, including cases involving the personal use of a firearm. But in doing so, we are mindful that unlike a firearm, a knife can be, and usually is, used for innocent purposes, and for that reason is not among the few objects that are inherently deadly weapons.

Authority:

People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1198, overruled on other grounds in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216

People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 6

Third Holding:

In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an enhancement, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59–60

Fourth Holding:

On a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we consider the record evidence, not how a trial court might have responded to a timely objection.

Authority:

People v. McCullogh (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 596

In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 776 [No objection is necessary to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for appeal]

People v. Hiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 335, 345 [a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is generally not subject to forfeiture]

Fifth Holding:

Reversal of the use enhancement for insufficiency of the evidence bars retrial of the enhancement.

Authority:

Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 42

People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 591

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fifth Amendment, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000206

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The true findings on the gang enhancements and gang-related firearm enhancements are vacated. The sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded. On remand, the People may retry the enhancement allegations under the law as amended by AB 333. If the People do not retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of a retrial, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Several years after the defendant was sentenced, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1(a)(1), based on the defendant’s exceptional conduct while incarcerated. The trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced him to 40 years to life, despite the recommendation by both parties that the sentence be reduced to a determinate term less than half that 40-year minimum. The trial court erred in not examining the impact of AB 333, which amended the gang activity statutes significantly. When the defendant’s sentence was recalled, the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and the defendant regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of AB 333’s ameliorative changes to section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161–162

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312 [the application of law to undisputed facts is a question of law subject to de novo review]

Second Holding:

The evidence adduced at the defendant’s trial was insufficient to establish that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang beyond enhancing its reputation. Accordingly, we must vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements under section 186.22(b)(1), as well as the true findings on the gang-related firearm enhancements under section 12022.53(b), (c), (d), and (e)(1).

Authority:

People v. Lee (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 232, 239–240

People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206, fn. 11

Third Holding:

Because we do not reverse based on the insufficiency of the evidence required to prove a violation of the statute as it read at the time of trial, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution will not bar a retrial. Where, as here, evidence is not introduced at trial because the law at that time would have rendered it irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is proper and the reviewing court does not treat the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669-670

Fourth Holding:

Whether the People decide not to retry the enhancements, or at the conclusion of such a retrial, the defendant is entitled to a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]