Tag Archives: Motion to suppress

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000086

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence, contending the court erred when it found police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him. Because we have concluded there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s conduct, when considered in the totality of circumstances, supported a reasonable suspicion that he was, or was about to be, engaged in activity relating to crime, we agree with defendant that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Accordingly, the subsequent recovery of the handgun was the product of an illegal detention and arrest and evidence related to the recovery was subject to exclusion.

[GARY NOTE: The facts relied on by the court are too extensive to adequately summarize. Essentially, the officer saw a group of people milling about. When some appeared to notice him, they ran off, though the defendant and one other did not run off. The officer described various body movements and claimed to have seen something that was not borne out by the appellate court’s review of the body cam video.]

First Holding:

The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative stop when the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. [Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause. Because it is a less demanding standard, reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause. The standard depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Courts cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty where none exists. Rather, they must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.

Authority:

Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380–381

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041

Second Holding:

The officer’s subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, and an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.

Authority:

People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083

Third Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.

Authority:

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043

Fifth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000071

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his interrogation statements because he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda. His statements were involuntary and coerced. We conclude the admission of the interrogation was prejudicial. We therefore reverse his convictions and remand for retrial.

First Holding:

A custodial interrogation can come in various forms and does not require questions. The term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.

Authority:

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

Second Holding:

Miranda’s safeguards do not apply when police ask a suspect routine booking questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services. But there is an exception to that exception: courts have recognized the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under the guise of seeking objective or neutral information, deliberately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.

Authority:

Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601

United States v. Zapien (9th Cir. 2017) 861 F.3d 971, 975

E

Third Holding:

When a police officer has reason to know that a suspect’s answer may incriminate him even routine questioning may amount to interrogation.

Authority:

United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3d 1143, 1147

Fourth Holding:

Once a suspect states he wishes to consult with an attorney, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is present or the suspect reinitiates contact. This is a bright-line rule: it requires all questioning cease after a suspect requests counsel. This is a prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through badgering or overreaching—explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional—might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance. Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, everything changes; that is, the police can no longer engage in efforts to convince the suspect to speak to them.

Authority:

Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484–485

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 580

Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1022

People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 932

Fifth Holding:

The error requires reversal unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

We review Miranda claims under federal constitutional standards. We accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. When an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply independent review.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 578

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1023

People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 158