Error and/or relief
The trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his interrogation statements because he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda. His statements were involuntary and coerced. We conclude the admission of the interrogation was prejudicial. We therefore reverse his convictions and remand for retrial.
First Holding:
A custodial interrogation can come in various forms and does not require questions. The term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
Authority:
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436
Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301
Second Holding:
Miranda’s safeguards do not apply when police ask a suspect routine booking questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services. But there is an exception to that exception: courts have recognized the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under the guise of seeking objective or neutral information, deliberately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.
Authority:
Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601
United States v. Zapien (9th Cir. 2017) 861 F.3d 971, 975
E
Third Holding:
When a police officer has reason to know that a suspect’s answer may incriminate him even routine questioning may amount to interrogation.
Authority:
United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3d 1143, 1147
Fourth Holding:
Once a suspect states he wishes to consult with an attorney, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is present or the suspect reinitiates contact. This is a bright-line rule: it requires all questioning cease after a suspect requests counsel. This is a prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through badgering or overreaching—explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional—might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance. Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, everything changes; that is, the police can no longer engage in efforts to convince the suspect to speak to them.
Authority:
Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484–485
People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 580
Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350
People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1022
People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 932
Fifth Holding:
The error requires reversal unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
Sixth Holding:
We review Miranda claims under federal constitutional standards. We accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. When an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply independent review.
Authority:
People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 578
People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1023
People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 158