Tag Archives: Alternative sentencing scheme

Plea bargains, Sentencing

Case 001012

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously composed the defendant’s eight-year prison sentence.

First Holding:

The parties agree that the trial court erred in imposing the defendant’s eight-year term as a three-year term under Vehicle Code section 10851, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus a two-year enhancement pursuant to section 666.5. Section 666.5 is not an enhancement. It is an alternative sentencing scheme. The sentencing triad for section 666.5 is two, three, and four years.

Authority:

PEN 666.5

People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 869

Second Holding:

The parties and the trial court intended and agreed that the defendant would be sentenced to the upper term of four years pursuant to section 666.5, doubled to eight years pursuant to the Three Strikes law if he failed to comply with the conditions of the plea agreement. Because the court made a judicial error in rendering the judgment and not a clerical error, we remand the matter to the trial court to resentence the defendant pursuant to the plea agreement.

Authority:

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001010

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In resentencing the defendant, the court abused its discretion in not giving proper consideration to whether to strike prior strike convictions. Remanded for proper consideration.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.

Effective January 1, 2024, a trial court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.

Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading.

In resentencing the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, the resentencing court shall consider if the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, and whether those circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Second Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

Section 1385(c)(2) further provides that, in exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. Accordingly, if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, then the court need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296

Third Holding:

A court’s decision not to strike a prior serious felony enhancement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 585

People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242–243 [a trial court’s exercise of discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice]

Fourth Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,1029

Fifth Holding:

A trial court has discretion under the Three Strikes law to dismiss or vacate prior conviction allegations or findings in the furtherance of justice. In exercising its discretion, the court may give no weight whatsoever to factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes scheme.

Instead, preponderant weight must be accorded to factors intrinsic to the scheme, such the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and the prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects. In considering these intrinsic factors the court must determine whether the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.

While the purpose of the Three Strikes law was to ensure longer prison sentences, the “overarching consideration” and “underlying purpose” in striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1385(a)

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530-531

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 498–500

Sixth Holding:

Abuse of discretion in failing to strike a prior conviction occurs in limited circumstances: where the trial court is not aware of its discretion; where the trial court considers impermissible factors; or where applying the Three Strikes law would produce an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd result under the specific facts of a particular case.

A reviewing court’s disagreement with the trial court’s weighing of proper factors (as distinct from the trial court’s reliance on improper factors in the weighing process) does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

We conclude from this record that the trial court failed to balance the appropriate factors set forth in Williams, that is, the defendant’s personal background, character, and prospects, and the specifics of his criminal history, the characteristics of the present offense for which he was being resentenced, or if a shorter sentence would accommodate risks to public safety.

Significantly, courts have reversed the denial of dismissal of prior strikes in instances where the prior strikes were far more serious than the defendant’s.

(Gary note: I have left out the appellate court’s recitation of facts peculiar to this defendant and the facts in this case, but court determined that the lower court had not given proper consideration of those factors. It remanded for a proper consideration.)

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378-379

People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029

People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140–1141 [defendant’s three previous strikes were two robberies and assault with a knife]

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000978

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose the normal base term for several of his offenses in addition to the life terms under the Three Strikes law for those same offenses. The court failed to update the credit for time served. And the abstract of judgment misidentifies a second degree robbery as in the first degree, and must be corrected.

First Holding:

Where, as here, a defendant’s current sentence includes prison prior term enhancements rendered invalid under section 1172.75(a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely the striking of newly invalid enhancements.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

Second Holding:

The Three Strikes law is a penalty provision, not an enhancement. It is not an enhancement because it does not add an additional term of imprisonment to the base term. Instead, it provides for an alternate sentence (25 years to life) when it is proven that the defendant has suffered the requisite number of convictions, prior and present. (At least two prior serious felony convictions, and the current offense being a qualifying offense for invocation of Third Strike sentencing.)

Authority:

People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744

Third Holding:

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court pronounces an unauthorized sentence, the sentence may be set aside and is no bar to the imposition of a proper judgment thereafter, even though it is more severe than the original unauthorized pronouncement.

Authority:

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 431–432

People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1036, fn. 21

Fifth Holding:

The trial court erred in failing to update his presentence credits at the time of resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Sixth Holding:

The amended abstract of judgment incorrectly lists the defendant’s conviction in count 3 as one for first degree robbery, when in fact the conviction should be identified as one for second degree robbery. The abstract of judgment must be corrected.

(Gary note: Though the court discussed the need for amending the abstract of judgment for various reasons through the opinion, it did not cite authority for its order that it be corrected. There is plenty of authority available, of course. I have set out some cases the court could have drawn from, but there are undoubtedly many others.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case 000900

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in failing to award pretrial credit for time served on several of the counts for which a determinate sentence was imposed. The abstract of judgment must be corrected as it incorrectly describes findings by the jury as enhancements.

First Holding:

We review de novo the application of section 2900.5 to the defendant’s sentence. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.

Authority:

People v. Cofer (2026) 20 Cal.5th 1, 12

Second Holding:

Under section 2900.5, defendants who serve time in custody prior to their sentencing “receive credit against their prison terms for all of those days spent in custody prior to sentencing, so long as the presentence custody is attributable to the conduct that led to the conviction.

Section 2900.5(b) states in relevant part, that for the purposes of this section credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.

That language does no more than clarify that when consecutive terms are imposed for multiple offenses in a single proceeding, only one of the terms shall receive credit for presentence custody. Thus, if sentences are imposed consecutively in a single proceeding, dual credits are expressly prohibited by statute.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793

People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 1192, fn. 9

Third Holding:

Section 669(a) provides that whenever a person is committed to prison on a life sentence that is ordered to run consecutive to any determinate term of imprisonment, the determinate term of imprisonment shall be served first.

Authority:

PEN 669(a)

Fourth Holding:

Three separate sentencing schemes governed the defendant’s sentencing. For his conviction for murder (count 1), his indeterminate sentence was dictated by sections 190 and 190.2(a).

For his convictions for rape in concert (count 3) and oral copulation in concert (count 4), his indeterminate sentences were supplied by the One Strike law.

His determinate sentences for counts 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 were governed by sections 1170 and 1170.1. As the determinate sentences must be served first, the credit for time served should have been applied against the total term imposed for all seven of the determinate components of the sentence, and the court erred in failing to award credits against that part of the determinate sentence that applied to three of the counts.

He is entitled to no presentence custody against the remaining indeterminate sentences, as they were imposed consecutively.

Authority:

PEN 190

PEN 190.2

PEN 667.61(c)

PEN 669(a)

PEN 1170.1

PEN 2900.5

In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 724 [The trial court must impose a One Strike sentence when a One Strike allegation is properly pled and proved.]

Fifth Holding:

The abstract of judgment is in error in describing the jury’s true findings under sections 190.2(d) and 667.61 as sentencing “enhancements.” The jury’s true findings pursuant to sections 190.2(d) and 667.61 are penalty provisions that exposed the defendant to greater punishment than would be authorized by a verdict on the underlying offense alone; they were not sentencing enhancements. They should not be so described in the abstract of judgment.

We will direct the trial court to delete the entries under “enhancements” in part 2 of the defendant’s indeterminate abstract of judgment.

(Gary note: The court did not cite authority for its directive that the abstract of judgment be corrected. I have listed several below (beginning with Mitchell) on which the court could have relied.)

Authority:

People v. Boswell (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 55, 60


People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 117
.

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000855

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred under section 654 by imposing concurrent sentences on three separate convictions arising from the same single act.

First Holding:

Section 654(a) provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. When a court determines that a conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose sentence but to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence. The imposition of concurrent sentences is precluded by section 654 because under such a sentence the defendant is deemed to be subjected to the term of both sentences although they are served simultaneously.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 796

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380 [The trial court is required to impose judgment on each count, which involves selecting a term, and then staying execution of the duplicative sentence, the stay to become permanent upon defendant’s service of the portion of the sentence not stayed.]

Second Holding:

Section 654 provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379

Third Holding:

One provision of the One Strike law, section 667.61(h)), states: “Notwithstanding any other law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, a person who is subject to punishment under this section.”

There is a split of authority over whether this provision precludes a sentencing court from staying execution of a One Strike sentence under section 654. We conclude that People v. Govan has the better reasons view of the interplay between section 667.61(h) and section 654.

Authority:

People v. Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669

People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1032-1035 [Based on the Govan court’s review of legislative history, the “no suspension clause” must be read in the context of a bar against the grant of probation, and does not supersede section 654’s prohibition against multiple punishment, disagreeing with Caparaz.]

Fourth Holding:

When we interpret a statute, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.

We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.

If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.

Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.

Authority:

People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990

Fifth Holding:

Courts have recognized that the suspension clause’s language has a technical meaning unique to a grant of probation. We therefore conclude the Legislature intended for section 667.61(h)’s suspension clause to have its technical, probation related meaning.

Indeed, as used in section 1203(a), “probation” means the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and revocable release in the community under the supervision of a probation officer.

When the Legislature uses a term of art, a court construing that use must assume that the Legislature was aware of the ramifications of its choice of language. We therefore conclude the Legislature intended for section 667.61(h)’s suspension clause to have its technical, probation related meaning.

Authority:

PEN 7(c) [Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and any others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed according to that peculiar and appropriate meaning.]

People v. Govan (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1033

People v. Superior Court (Himmelsbach) (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 524, 536, fn. 8 [the words ‘suspension of execution’ are employed in conjunction with a grant of probation and have developed into terms of art], (disapproved on another ground by People v. Norrell (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1, 7, fn. 3)

People v. Borynack (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 958, 965

Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 850, fn. 3

Sixth Holding:

This interpretation is consistent with how some courts have interpreted similarly worded statutes. Many related criminal statutes with related purposes contain language identical to section 667.61(h). Courts have not historically interpreted similar statutory provisions as precluding a stay under section 654.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141 [We consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.]

People v. Barela (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 152, 160 [holding section 1203.06–with similar language–does not preclude a stay under section 654]

People v. Superior Court (Himmelsbach) (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 524, 536, fn. 8 [rejecting as unpersuasive the contention that a prohibition on suspension of execution of sentence under repealed section 12311 precluded a stay under section 654]

Seventh Holding:

We presume that when the Legislature enacted section 667.61 in 1994 and amended it in 2006, the Legislature was aware of how courts had interpreted identical statutory language and that the Legislature intended for that interpretation to also apply to section 667.61.

Where legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially similar language, we may presume that the Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.

Authority:

People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1367

Eighth Holding:

Finally, we are satisfied that interpreting section 667.61 as allowing a stay under section 654 is consistent with the One Strike law’s legislative purpose in imposing lengthy prison sentences for certain sex offenses.

Although interpreting section 667.61 this way allows for shorter sentences in some circumstances, it does not require it. Rather, it leaves the decision to the trial court’s sound sentencing discretion.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989

Ninth Holding:

When a sentencing court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

In light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.

The record indicates, however, that the trial court did not understand the scope of its discretion. The court expressly stated it took no joy in imposing the harsh sentence, and that it had imposed counts concurrently wherever it could, but that it had no discretion to impose other than the harsh sentence–that the sentence it imposed were the only options.

Therefore, we must remand for resentencing given the extent of the court’s full discretion under section 654.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424

People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527

(Gary note, of marginal historical interest: Prior to 1998, Penal Code section 654 had exactly the same language as it currently has, and a court was free to impose sentence on any one of the counts to which section 654 applied. See People v. Norrell (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1. In response to that Supreme Court decision, the Legislature amended section 654 to require that the court impose sentence on the count containing the longest potential term. Through AB 518, effective 1/1/2022, the Legislature restored section 654 to its former language, thus restoring to the court the discretion to choose on which count punishment should be imposed and executed.)

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000838

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because the court did not follow the required procedures for adjudicating the petition brought under section 1170.91, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. We also direct the superior court to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

We interpret the requirements of section 1170.91 de novo.

Authority:

People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 237

Second Holding:

Section 1170.91(b)(1) provides that a person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea, who is, or was, a member of the United States military and who may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the person’s military service may petition for a recall of sentence, before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in the case, to request resentencing if the circumstance of suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the person’s military service was not considered as a factor in mitigation at the time of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170.91

Third Holding:

If the trial court finds the defendant satisfies the criteria for relief, the court may, in the interest of justice, do either of the following: (1) reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence; or (2) vacate the conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading, and then resentence the defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment with the concurrence of both the defendant and the prosecution.

Authority:

PEN 1170.91(b)(3)(A)–(B)

Fourth Holding:

Upon receiving a section 1170.91 petition for resentencing, the trial court must hold a public hearing to determine whether the defendant satisfies the statutory criteria for relief. The prosecution, the defense, and any victim must be given at least 15 days’ notice of the hearing. At that hearing, the prosecution shall have an opportunity to be heard on the defendant’s eligibility and suitability for resentencing. The trial court erred by denying the defendant’s petition for resentencing without holding a properly noticed public hearing as required by section 1170.91(b)(3).

Authority:

PEN 1170.91(b)(3)

People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 239

Fifth Holding:

Though the original version of section 1170.91 limited its application to those serving a determinate sentence, the Legislature amended the section in 2022 to remove the limitation.

Authority:

People v. Sherman (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 325, 330 [In 2022, the Legislature amended

again. The 2022 amendment expanded subdivisions (a) and (b) to include those serving indeterminate sentences]

People v. Harrison (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1154 [same]

Sixth Holding:

There is a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. It states that the defendant was convicted of grand theft of a vehicle pursuant to section 487h(a), when in fact he was convicted of the lesser included offense of unlawful driving of a vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 10851(a).

If not already done, the abstract of judgment must be amended to correct this error.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000833

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court’s true findings on three of the four strike priors and three of the four prior serious felony enhancements must be vacated and the matter remanded to the court for any retrial of these allegations, because there is insufficient evidence to support the finding defendant’s three 2016 convictions qualify as serious or violent felonies for purposes of three of the four strike priors and three of the four prior serious felony enhancements under the 2022 amendments to section 186.22 enacted by AB 333.

First Holding:

Under the Three Strikes law, defendants previously convicted of serious or violent felonies are subject to increased prison terms: if a defendant has one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, the defendant’s term of imprisonment is doubled, and if a defendant has two or more such strike priors, the defendant may receive life imprisonment.

The Three Strikes law defines “serious or violent” felony to include any offense defined as a serious felony under section 1192.7(a). Section 1192.7 defines “serious felony” to include, among other things, any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22.

Authority:

PEN 1170.12

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

Second Holding:

Section 186.22(a) makes it unlawful to actively participate in a criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, and to willfully promote, further, or assist in felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.

Section 186.22(b) provides for enhancements if a person commits a felony for the benefit of such a gang. Section 186.22 also defines the terms criminal street gang and pattern of criminal gang activity as well as benefitting a gang.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, the definition of a pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas former section 186.22(f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a ‘criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern that have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offense commonly benefitted a criminal street gang and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. Moreover, because these changes are ameliorative in nature, they apply to nonfinal judgments on appeal.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Fourth Holding:

Fletcher held that, where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes a felony violation of section 186.22 is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583, 607

Fifth Holding:

On appeal, a reviewing court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In other words, the reviewing court determines whether a rational trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

The People must prove all elements of an alleged sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the mere fact of conviction under a particular statute does not prove the offense was a serious felony, otherwise admissible evidence from the entire record of the conviction may be examined to resolve the issue.

Authority:

People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082, 1083

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1067

Sixth Holding:

The inquiry concerning whether a prior conviction qualifies as a serious felony is a determination regarding the nature or basis of the defendant’s prior conviction—specifically, whether that conviction qualified as a conviction of a serious felony.

If the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense.

In such a case, if the statute under which the prior conviction occurred could be violated in a way that does not qualify for the alleged enhancement, the evidence is thus insufficient, and the People have failed in their burden.

Authority:

People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682, 706

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065 (superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in People v. Frahs (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 784, 795)

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000779

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate the trial court’s true finding that defendant’s 2012 conviction qualifies as a serious or violent felony for purposes of the strike prior and prior serious felony enhancements and remand the matter to the trial court for any retrial of this finding.

First Holding:

Under the Three Strikes law, defendants previously convicted of serious or violent felonies are subject to increased prison terms: If a defendant has one prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, the defendant’s term of imprisonment is doubled, and if a defendant has two or more such strike priors, the defendant may receive life imprisonment.

The Three Strikes law defines “serious or violent” felony to include any offense defined as a serious felony under section 1192.7(a). Section 1192.7(c) defines “serious felony” to include, among other things, “any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22.”

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

Second Holding:

Assembly Bill 333 amended section 186.22. Effective January 1, 2022, this legislation narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, the definition of a pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern that have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. Moreover, because these changes are ameliorative in nature, they apply to nonfinal judgments on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Third Holding:

On appeal, a reviewing court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In other words, the reviewing court determines whether a rational trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

The People must prove all elements of an alleged sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the mere fact of conviction under a particular statute does not prove the offense was a serious felony, otherwise admissible evidence from the entire record of the conviction may be examined to resolve the issue.

If the prior conviction was for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presume the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense.

In such a case, if the statute under which the prior conviction occurred could be violated in a way that does not qualify for the alleged enhancement, the evidence is thus insufficient, and the People have failed in their burden.

Authority:

People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082, 1083

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065, 1067

Fourth Holding:

In Fletcher, our Supreme Court held that where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Accordingly, whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes a felony violation of Section 186.22 is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22. The matter must be remanded to the trial court for any retrial of these allegations, and if required, any resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case 000743

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because the defendant was not convicted of a serious felony in this case, the two five-year prior serious felony enhancements are not authorized and must be stricken.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes law is a sentencing scheme that requires a court to double or sometimes triple the punishment for a felony offense if the defendant was previously convicted of a crime that qualifies as a serious or violent’ felony. The serious or violent felonies that trigger this sentencing scheme, commonly referred to as strikes or strike priors, are enumerated by statute. If a defendant’s current offense is a serious felony, the defendant is also subject to a five-year prior serious felony enhancement—a so-called ‘nickel prior’—in addition to any strike

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582

People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1129,

People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613

Second Holding:

Penal Code section 667(a) provides that a person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately. A serious felony means a serious felony listed in section 1192.7(c), which identifies 42 offenses as serious felonies, including any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life.

Authority:

PEN 667(a)

PEN 1192.7(c)

Third Holding:

For an offense falling within the enumerated list without any change in elements since the conviction, the question whether that conviction qualifies as a serious felony is entirely legal. But if there is a factual question of whether conduct underlying the crime qualifies the offense as a serious felony, any such facts must be tried to the same factfinder that decided the defendant’s guilt of the charged crime.

Authority:

PEN 969f(a)

People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 456

Fourth Holding:

None of the defendants prior convictions are for offenses listed in section 1192.7(c). And though he received a life sentence because he was a third-strike offender, section 1192.7(c)(7) category requires that the offense be itself punishable by life imprisonment, without regard to application of the Three Strikes law based on defendant’s status as a recidivist.

Authority:

People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1122, 1130

People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192, 198 [construing the ineligibility factors of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012–Proposition 36–depends on the nature of the offense itself, not the effect of other prior convictions on the defendant’s sentence]

People v. Harrison (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1159 [construing the ineligibility factors for consideration under section 1170.91 regarding the mitigating effect of trauma incurred in the course of military service, which may even include recall of the sentence and resentencing]

Fifth Holding:

Because the defendant was not convicted of a serious felony in this case, the two five-year prior serious felony enhancements are not authorized and must be stricken. We have authority to correct a sentence that is not authorized by law. But when an error affects part of a sentence, the case must be remanded for a full resentencing hearing as to all counts to permit a trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. We thus remand for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 128

People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13.)

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 588-589

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000729

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the court was required to resentence the defendant under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to determine whether he should be sentenced as a second strike defendant under the Act, subject to a finding that such resentencing would present an unreasonable risk of danger to the public in the context of the Act.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 limited indeterminate life sentences for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenses. Pursuant to the Reform Act, codified at section 1170.126, a defendant can petition for a recall of sentence and request resentencing. In 2021, section 1172.75 was enacted by the Legislature, directing courts resentencing defendants to use currently applicable sentencing rules and to apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” with a goal of eliminating disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

PEN 1172.75

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 849

Second Holding:

In Guevara, the Supreme Court held that because section 1172.75 incorporates the consideration of the danger to public safety inherent in section 1170.126, the two statutes operate harmoniously, and section 1172.75 is therefore constitutional and a valid, applicable statute under which a defendant may request resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 850

Third Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires that the resentencing court makes a new determination as to whether a defendant’s resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as of the present day. A prior finding that a particular defendant poses a risk to public safety under section 1170.126(f) is unquestionably relevant, and will no doubt be given consideration by a court subsequently resolving a resentencing under section 1172.75 involving an indeterminate Three Strikes sentence.

However, given significant passage of time, it is possible that a defendant who once presented a threat to public safety may no longer do so. For instance, not only may defendants present evidence that they have significantly rehabilitated since a prior section 1170.126 proceeding, but serious illness or advanced age may have substantially reduced the danger to public safety they once posed. Realistically assessing such changed circumstances is appropriately left to the trial court on remand.

On remand, the trial court should conduct an analysis of whether defendant, at the time of the hearing, continues to pose a danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 878, fn. 17

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000699

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the prior conviction constituting a strike because it involved criminal gang activity is still a strike when examined under the changes made by AB 333 to criminal gang activity law.

First Holding:

The defendant’s 2014 prior conviction qualified as a strike only by virtue of a gang enhancement under section 186.22 for possession of a firearm by a felon. Since this conviction in 2014, the elements of the gang allegation have been statutorily modified. Prior to 2022, an allegation of a prior conviction carrying a sentence enhancement under section 186.22(b), was deemed a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7(c)(28), and could result in a sentence under the Three Strikes law.

In 2021, the Legislature passed AB 333. Relevant here, AB 333 amended section 186.22 by redefining the elements required to prove gang offenses and enhancements and narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. In Tran, the Supreme Court held AB 333 is ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments as provided for in In re Estrada.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

In Fletcher, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether AB 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law.

The Supreme Court concluded that where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law. It also held that it applies retroactively to cases in which the judgment is not yet final.

Accordingly, because there is no indication that the defendant’s 2014 conviction was obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements, we reverse the true finding on the strike prior and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on the strike allegation.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Amelioration, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000632

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court did not determine whether the defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication in 2013 qualifies as a strike under the current version of section 186.22(b). Further, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot serve as the basis for a prior serious felony enhancement. We remand the matter to permit retrial of the gang enhancement under the current section 186.22 and for a full resentencing following retrial or the People’s election not to pursue retrial.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature amended section 186.22 with the passage of AB 333. Among other things, AB 333 changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206,

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Second Holding:

Even if a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, courts must look to current law, as amended in AB 333, to determine whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. The defendant’s prior conviction in this case could qualify as a strike offense only with the gang enhancement found true prior to AB 333. We must vacate the true finding on the strike prior and remand to permit the People to retry the gang enhancement under current law to determine whether the defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a strike prior.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583, 587, 603-604, 607

Third Holding:

The defendant’s juvenile adjudications cannot be considered a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of the mandatory five-year enhancement in section 667(a).

Authority:

People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080, fn. 10

People v. West (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 100, 110

Fourth Holding:

When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893