Tag Archives: Alternative sentencing scheme

Case: 000157

Error and/or relief

In light of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fletcher, we vacate the trial court’s findings that defendant’s 2016 conviction for violating section 186.22(a) constituted a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of Three Strikes sentencing and imposing a prior serious felony conviction enhancement. Defendant’s sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, to narrow the definition of criminal street gang in order to focus on true gang-related crimes, having determined that in practice the original definition of a criminal street gang was not narrowly focused on punishing true gang-related crimes. The Legislature in AB 333 redefined the term criminal street gang so as to truly target the population of criminals for which an enhanced punishment is warranted. As noted, AB 333 made significant changes to the elements of gang offenses and enhancements as defined in section 186.22.

Authority:

AB 333

PC 186.22

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576

People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169

Second Holding:

Defendant was convicted of making criminal threats in this case more than two years after the amendment of section 186.22, but for purposes of sentencing under the Three Strikes law and imposition of a prior serious felony conviction enhancement, the trial court found true that in 2016, defendant was convicted of active participation in a criminal street gang, in violation of section 186.22(a), which is a serious felony. Courts of Appeal were split on whether prosecutors were required to prove prior gang convictions under section 186.22 as amended by AB 333 or whether it was sufficient to show a conviction under the statute in effect at the time of the prior conviction.

Based on this split of authority, defendant claimed entitlement to relief from the court’s findings related to his 2016 gang conviction because the conviction must meet the elements of section 186.22(a), as amended by AB 333. The California Supreme Court resolved the split of authority in defendant’s favor and held that where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Third Holding:

On remand, the People may elect to retry the prior conviction allegations under section 186.22(a) as amended by AB 333.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608

Case: 000126

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously used the defendant’s 2012 prior conviction to sentence him under the Three Strikes law without first determining whether that gang-enhanced felony could have been obtained after amendments enacted by AB 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699).

First Holding:

Where a defendant has previously suffered a conviction under the prior version of Penal Code section 186.22, the changes made in AB 333 apply to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576

Second Holding:

By treating the defendant’s 2012 conviction as a prior strike conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence that is unauthorized by law under Fletcher. The defendant’s argument is therefore not forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 7 [forfeiture principles do not apply to legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751 [The unauthorized sentence rule is an exception to the forfeiture doctrine. It permits a challenge to an unauthorized sentence on appeal even if the defendant failed to object below.]

Case: 000122

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court erred in failing to resentence him under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to twice the principal term for the underlying crime, as opposed to the 25-year-to-life sentence it reimposed. The People concede both of these points. We vacate the defendant’s sentence, and remand for a full resentencing with directions to recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

Even where the defendant is serving a sentence under the Three Strikes law, on recall the trial court is required to apply the Three Strikes Reform Act in a section 1172.75 proceeding absent a finding of unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

Second Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Case 000054

Error and/or relief

We find there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant’s prior strikes were based on separate criminal acts, and we remand for resentencing on that basis. There was insufficient evidence to impose his federal conviction for bank robbery as a prior strike because it could not be shown that the conviction was based on a different criminal act than either of his two state robbery convictions.

First Holding:

If two strike offenses are based on a single act, the court must dismiss one of the strikes.

Authority:

People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638

Second Holding:

Prior convictions for multiple criminal acts committed in a single course of conduct may be treated as separate strikes, so long as the convictions are not so closely connected that treating them as separate strikes would be contrary to the spirit of the Three Strikes law.

Authority:

People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 35

People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 648

[GARY NOTE: The California Supreme Court issued its opinion–published, of course, but hey!–in People v. Shaw (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1089 on December 15, 2025. It concluded that only one strike can be based on the single act of vehicular manslaughter that resulted in the death of two occupants of the car his vehicle struck. One justice wrote a concurring opinion in which he questioned the continuing validity of People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24 (holding that two prior offenses committed seconds apart against a single victim may be treated as separate strikes) and People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930 (holding that two offenses committed in quick succession against two separate victims qualify as separate strikes). Two other justices agreed with the concurring opinion. It may be that the majority believed that Shaw did not present the precise question raised in Benson and Furhman and therefore decided not to venture beyond the facts before it at this time. That’s pure speculation by me, of course. But there may be an audience in our high court willing to closely examine exactly what can constitute separate strikes where the crimes are closely related in time and nature.]

Third Holding:

Penal Code section 654 does not apply to successive federal and state prosecutions.

Authority:

People v. Belcher (1974) 11 Cal.3d 91, 98

People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234 [Retrial of prior conviction findings is not barred by the state or federal prohibitions on double jeopardy even when a prior conviction finding is reversed on appeal for lack of substantial evidence]

Case 000033

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by not obtaining defendant’s personal waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial on allegations of aggravating circumstances and prior convictions under the Three Strikes law. As to the prior convictions, we find no prejudice. The error was prejudicial, however, with regard to the aggravating circumstances.

First Holding:

There is a constitutional right to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence. A waiver of the right must be personally expressed by the defendant in open court. It must be explicit and will not be implied from the defendant’s conduct. A failure to object will not preclude his asserting on appeal his constitutional right to a jury trial.

Authority:

Section 16 of Article I of the California Constitution

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46-47

Second Holding:

A complete deprivation of a jury trial on issues of guilt is of a different magnitude than the denial of a jury determination on penalty allegations. Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.

Authority:

Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212

Third Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review. Under that standard, reversal and remand are required unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified. Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 743

Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19

Fourth Holding:

The opening brief contains a footnote in which he cursorily asserts a related claim of insufficient evidence. We exercise our discretion to disregard points raised in a footnote rather than being properly presented under a discrete heading with appropriate analysis. Footnotes are not the appropriate vehicle for stating contentions on appeal

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)

People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1412, fn. 5

Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947

People v. Crosswhite (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 494, 502, fn. 5

Fifth Holding:

With respect to the prior convictions, defendant’s claims are insufficiently developed and could be rejected for that reason alone.

Authority:

People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2

People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150

Sixth Holding:

Outside the pronouncement of judgment, discrepancies between a minute order and the reporter’s transcript are resolved by adopting whichever should be given greater credence under the circumstances of the particular case.

Authority:

People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880

People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599

Seventh Holding:

There is no federal or state constitutional right to a jury trial on the fact of a prior conviction. In California, defendants have a statutory right to a jury trial on the question of whether or not the defendant has suffered the prior conviction. The requirement of an express waiver under section 16 of article I of the California Constitution] applies to the constitutional right to a jury trial, but not to jury trial rights that are established only by statute. Therefore, the statutory right to a jury trial on prior conviction allegations can be impliedly waived and forfeited.

Authority:

PEN 1025(b) and (c)

Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224

People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 125

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46

People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 737–738

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589

Eighth Holding:

As a general rule, double jeopardy principles do not prohibit retrial following reversal on appeal for reasons other than insufficiency of the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 855

Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721, 728–729

Ninth Holding:

Juvenile adjudications do not, under any circumstances, qualify as convictions for purposes of section 667(a) (the enhancement for prior convictions of a serious felony when the new offense is a serious felony).

Authority:

People v. West (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 100, 107–108

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 798

People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080, fn. 10

People v. O’Neal (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1068

Case 000030

Error and/or relief

The trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence in count 1 when it sentenced the defendant as a third-striker, because assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury is not a serious or violent felony.

First Holding:

Assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury is not a serious or violent felony.

Authority:

People v. Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [A violation of former section 245(a)(1) is a serious felony only if the prosecution properly pleads and proves that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or personally used a firearm or a dangerous or deadly weapon]

Second Holding:

When a defendant with two or more convictions for serious and/or violent felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes law is convicted of a non-strike offense, the defendant must be sentenced as a second-striker with respect to that offense.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674

People v. Lynn (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 594

Third Holding:

Because the sentence was unauthorized, we remand the matter to the trial court for a full resentencing hearing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Case 000004

Error and/or relief:

The defendant was sentenced to a Three Strikes term for prior serious felonies, both gang related felonies that would not comport with AB 333 today given that he admitted them under the elements of the crimes in effect in 2015 and 2019 prior to AB 333. They can’t be used as priors. The DA may choose to retry those allegations on remand.

First Holding:

Gang allegations on prior convictions cannot be sustained if not in compliance with AB 333.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576

Second Holding:

The DA may choose to retry those allegations on remand.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576;