Tag Archives: Statutory interpretation

Case 001175

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court should have vacated the restitution fine, which was imposed more than 10 years earlier.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AAB 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) modified section 1465.9. Section 1465.9(d) now provides, in pertinent part, that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. There is no language in section 1465.9 limiting its relief in cases of resentencing.

As the application of amended section 1465.9 involves statutory construction, it is subject to de novo review.

Authority:

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626 [holding that analogous language in section 1465.9(a) mandates vacation of a portion of a judgment for the purpose of striking the unpaid balance of the relevant assessment]

Case 001165

Error and/or relief

The defendant has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that the prosecutor used racially discriminatory language, including language that, to an objective observer, compares the defendant to an animal, within the meaning of the Racial Justice Act (RJA).

The judgment is reversed.The defendant’s conviction and sentence are vacated and are legally invalid. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with Penal Code section 745(a).

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2021, the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. An RJA violation may be established if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that during the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, an attorney in the case used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.

Racially discriminatory language includes language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, language that compares the defendant to an animal. Thus, the RJA prohibits the use of racially discriminatory language that directly appeals to bias and facially neutral language that implicitly appeals to racial bias. To identify language that falls in the latter category, in particular, requires a nuanced inquiry that is sensitive to context.

Authority:

PEN 745

People v. Bankston (2026) 19 Cal.5th 786, 856-857

Second Holding:

It is undisputed that the RJA took effect before jury selection, trial, and entry of judgment here. At no point in the trial proceedings, however, did the defendant object to the statements he now challenges from the prosecutor’s voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument, despite raising the RJA at other points during the trial. Many appellate courts have found that a section 745 claim, like any other appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 812

People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1074

People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25, 39

People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 114–115

People v. Wagstaff (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1219

People v. Gomez (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 384, 391–392

Third Holding:

Nothing in the chaptered amendments to section 745 enacted by AB 1071 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) requires a reviewing court to address record-based RJA claims on direct appeal. The plain language of the statute establishes what was intended by the Legislature, and when the statutory language is clear, there is no need to resort to statutory construction.

Although early versions of AB 1071 introduced and ultimately passed by the Legislature and enacted into law contained language that record-based claims on appeal shall not be subject to waiver, that language was eliminated in the legislative process. We cannot overlook this deletion in determining the legislative intent. A review of the legislative history reflects that the Legislature intended to leave courts free to apply the forfeiture doctrine to unpreserved RJA claims.

Authority:

People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 690

People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1, 19, fn. 4 [considering amendments to bill as aid in determining legislative intent]

Fourth Holding:

That RJA claims are generally subject to forfeiture, however, does not end our analysis. Neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic. Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence.

The purpose of a timely objection to preserve claims of error is to permit the trial court to address an alleged issue and to cure any curable defects. Absent certain exceptions, appellate courts do not consider claims of error that could have been raised below because it is typically both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim which could have been properly litigated and addressed in the trial court.

But this case presents a unique scenario not typically present when a litigant fails to preserve a claim: The trial court was alerted that the prosecutor’s comments may have implicated racial bias during voir dire but swiftly rejected that interpretation.

(Gary note: The facts on which the court relied are not of any value to this summary, as they were case specific. The prosecutor compared the defendant to animals, and in more than simply a passing or light reference, and the court failed to sustain the defense objection.)

Authority:

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434

People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 275–276, overruled on a different ground as stated in People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47, fn. 3

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353

People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7–8

Fifth Holding:

On this unique record, where we see no likelihood that counsel’s reiteration of the objection by the prospective juror* would have produced a different result or finding, or that objections to predator/prey references—connoting nonhuman predators without specifically identifying any—would have been any more fruitful than prospective juror No. 50’s objection to the prosecutor’s direct reference to jurors judging a pit bull, we will exercise our discretion to reach the merits of defendant’s RJA claims to forestall his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

(*Gary note: a prospective juror actually raised the objection to the prosecution’s analogy during voir dire, and the trial court rejected it. On the merits of the RJA claim, the court analyzed details of the statement made during the trial by the prosecution, the defense, and the court, and concluded that the defendant demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecution used racially discriminatory language during voir dire and closing arguments in violation of section 745(a)(2). That analysis has no value outside the unpublished opinion other than to the defendant, so I have not included it.)

Authority:

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6,

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 326

Sixth Holding:

Finding a violation of the RJA, as judgment has already been entered, we vacate the defendants’ convictions and sentences and remand the matter to the trial court for determination of a remedy, potentially including retrial. The RJA expressly requires that after a judgment has been entered, if a violation of the RJA has been found, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a). In the course of our review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict within the meaning of appellate review, and thus retrial is not barred.

Authority:

PEN 745(e)(2)(A)

People v. Superior Court (Woodward) (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 679, 697 [a determination of legal insufficiency of the evidence serves as a constitutional bar to retrial for that offense]

Case 001150

Error and/or relief

The court had no jurisdiction to issue a post-sentence protective order on a person who was neither a victim nor a percipient witness.

First Holding:

Although the defendant did not object to the protective orders, sentences entered in excess of a trial court’s jurisdiction may be challenged for the first time on appeal. We therefore address the defendant’s objection to the protective orders issued under section 136.2.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382

Second Holding:

Section 136.2 does not authorize post-sentence protective orders based on his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. Section 136.2(a) provides that, upon a good cause belief that a victim or witness was harmed, intimidated, or dissuaded, a court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue an order restraining the defendant from, among other things, communicating with a specified witness or a victim except through an attorney under reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.

Section 136.2(i) also provides that when a criminal defendant has been convicted of certain specified offenses, at the time of sentencing a trial court shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim that may extend up to 10 years. Subdivision (i)(2) also permits similar orders concerning percipient witnesses that have been harassed.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

Third Holding:

Prior to 2011, section 136.2 permitted protective orders only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings and did not authorize such orders after the defendant was sentenced.

Authority:

People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382

People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118

Fourth Holding:

The legislative history reveals that the Legislature added subdivision (i) to section 136.2 in express reliance on the decisions holding that subdivision (a) does not authorize post-sentencing restraining orders. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature understood that subdivision (a) of section 136.2 does not authorize post-sentence protective orders and that the section authorizes such orders only under subdivision (i).

Authority:

Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill 723 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 18, 2011, p. 6

Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill 723 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 2, 2011, p. 2

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.2(i) authorizes post-sentence protective orders when a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, as defined in section 13700 or in section 6211 of the Family Code; a violation of section 236.1(a), (b), or (c) prohibiting human trafficking; section 261; section 261.5; former section 262; section 266h(a); section 266i(a); a violation of section 186.22; or a crime that requires the defendant to register pursuant to section 290(c).

The defendant’s conviction does not fall within any of those categories, and the protective order was unauthorized. The protective orders against the defendant are stricken.

Authority:

PEN 136.2(i)

Case 001105

Error and/or relief

The court erred in staying the greater firearm enhancement under section 654 in order to impose a lesser firearm enhancement, rather than striking it under section 1385.

First Holding:

After considering the defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor, the court chose to sentence the defendant on the firearm enhancement under section 12022.5(a) (for 10 years) instead of under section 12022.53(c) (punishable by 20 years). The court purported to stay the 12022.53(c) enhancement under section 654.

Authority:

PEN 12022.5(a)

PEN 12022.53(c)

Second Holding:

Section 654(a) provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.

Authority:

PEN 654

Third Holding:

In general, we review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement under section 1385(a). However, the trial court purported to stay the 20-year enhancement pursuant to section 654. Under Corpening, at step one, courts examine the facts of the case to determine whether multiple convictions are based upon a single physical act. When those facts are undisputed—as they are here—the application of section 654 raises a question of law we review de novo.

In Gonzales, the Supreme Court found that section 654 did not apply to whether the trial court properly stayed the punishment for the firearm enhancement at issue in that case. Although the trial court correctly stayed all of the prohibited firearm enhancements, it incorrectly issued those stays under section 654, which applies only to offenses punishable in different ways, not to prohibited enhancements committed in the commission of an unstayed offense.

Thus, the issue we resolve is one of statutory interpretation regarding the trial court’s interpretation of its authority to impose, stay, or strike firearm enhancements under sections 12022.53(c), 12022.5(a), and 1385.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312

People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1123, fn. 5

Fourth Holding:

The court acts in excess of its jurisdiction and imposes an unauthorized sentence when it erroneously stays or fails to stay execution of a sentence under section 654. Under the unauthorized sentence rule, a party does not forfeit the right to argue that a sentence is unlawful by failing to object in the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 635

Fifth Holding:

The court may, in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by section 12022.53.

(Gary note: The appellate court cited several passages from section 12022.53 that reflect that a LESSER enhancement may be stayed (rather than stricken) when both the lesser and the greater are found true, as only one can be imposed. It reviewed the language the trial court used in sentencing the defendant to the lesser firearm enhancement, and concluded that the intention of the trial court could only be carried out by striking the greater enhancement under section 1385, which is permitted by section 12022.53(h).)

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(h)

PEN 1385

Case 001102

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred when it found the defendant unsuitable for Proposition 36 rehabilitation when it had not ordered and considered an evaluation by a drug addiction expert as required by Penal Code section 11395,(d)(1)(B).

First Holding:

Section 11395, known as the “Treatment-Mandated Felony Act,” was enacted as part of Proposition 36, which was approved by voters in November 2024. The statute gives repeat hard drug possession offenders the option of participating in drug and mental health treatment.

The individual must plead guilty or no contest to again possessing a hard drug, admit the alleged prior qualifying convictions, waive time for sentencing or judgment, and agree to participate in treatment.

If he or she successfully completes treatment, the defendant’s plea shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose. Such individuals are not to be sentenced to jail or prison unless a court determines that the person is not eligible or suitable for treatment.

Authority:

HSC 11395

Second Holding:

The statute further states that, upon or subsequent to arraignment for a violation of the section, and at the request or with the consent of the defendant or their attorney, the court shall order a drug addiction expert to conduct a substance abuse and mental health evaluation of the defendant. The evaluation may be based on an interview of the defendant or others with relevant knowledge, and can include “medical records, criminal history, prior treatment history, and records pertaining to the current offense. The expert shall submit a report of the evaluation to the court and the parties.

Authority:

HSC 11395(d)(1)(B)

Third Holding:

We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of the statute as allowing it to find defendant unsuitable for treatment without first obtaining the drug addiction expert report. Our task is to determine the electorate’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We turn first to the language of the provision, giving the words their ordinary meaning.

We construe the language in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme in light of the electorate’s intent. If the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls and consideration of extrinsic sources to determine the electorate’s intent is unnecessary.

Authority:

People v. Fouse (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1145

Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900-901 [a reviewing court applies the same principles that govern statutory construction when interpreting a voter initiative]

Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83

Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 919

Fourth Holding:

Given section 11395’s clear language, we need not look beyond the statute itself to discern the electorate’s intent. As the statute makes clear, immediately upon or after arraignment for violating the statute, and either at the request or with the consent of the defendant or their attorney, the trial court “shall” order a drug addiction expert evaluation, and that report “shall” be submitted to the court and the parties. While the trial court has the discretion ultimately to decide that a defendant is unsuitable for treatment once the court considers the drug addiction expert’s evaluation, the expert’s evaluation must come first.

The trial court abused its discretion when it decided, notwithstanding the statutory provisions, that defendant was unsuitable for treatment before obtaining the necessary report.

Authority:

HSC 11395(d)(1)(B)