Error and/or relief
The court imposed an incorrect maximum term for the juvenile, and one of the probation conditions was overbroad.
First Holding:
The court declared that the maximum confinement time for the minor was 16 years, when it fact the maximum was 10 years.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726(d)(1) provides that if the minor is removed from the physical custody of the minor’s parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
Authority:
WIC 726(d)(1)
Second Holding:
Section 726 defines the maximum term of imprisonment as the middle of the three time periods set forth in section 1170(a)(3) of the Penal Code, plus enhancements.
To the extent section 726 is ambiguous, we think it logical that the method for selecting the term for the underlying offense should apply in selecting the term for an enhancement.
Here, the middle term for the underlying offense is six years, and the middle term for the enhancement is four years, for a total of ten years.
Authority:
WIC 726(d)(2)
In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 [interpreting prior version of section 726]
Third Holding:
The juvenile court ordered a total commitment of in terms of a number of days that exceed even the 16-year maximum confinement time in the court’s minute order. Rather than expressing the commitment in days, we will modify the disposition order such that appellant’s total commitment is for the maximum confinement period of 10 years.
Authority:
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 896, fn. 15 [remand unnecessary where maximum sentence had been imposed]
Fourth Holding:
Appellant’s probation conditions included the following: (1) “You shall not possess, nor shall you knowingly associate with anyone who possesses, any weapon, including, but not limited to firearms, pellet or BB guns, chemical weapons, a replica of any weapon, ammunition, or C02 canisters. You shall not remain in any vehicle where you know anyone has such a weapon or ammunition”; and (2) “You shall not associate with any person who is using or trafficking in any controlled substance, including marijuana.”
The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions, but a probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. While we generally review the imposition of probation conditions for abuse of discretion, we review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.
The two conditions at issue are overbroad because they encompass people who legally possess weapons and use controlled substances. We will modify these conditions to specify that they apply only to illegal possession or use. While the word “trafficking” seems to imply illegal conduct, to remove any doubt, we will also specify that the trafficking must be illegal. The condition prohibiting association with those using or trafficking in controlled substances lacks a knowledge requirement. Modification to impose an explicit knowledge requirement is necessary to render the condition constitutional.
Authority:
In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118
People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892
People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 101-102