Category Archives: Probation Parole PRCS

Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001073

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying relief on the defendant’s petition for relief under section 1203.4. We remand to enable the trial court to determine whether defendant is still on probation for another offense, which would affect her present eligibility for relief

First Holding:

The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of her conviction under section 1203.4, having previously successfully been discharged from probation early (she had completed all of the terms of her probation, which the trial court at the hearing on her motion for early discharge from probation expressly found to be very commendable). The trial court denied the petition for relief under 1203.4 on the basis that it was too soon after her probation was terminated.

A person is eligible for section 1203.4 relief if she proves that (1) (a) she has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, (b) she has been discharged prior to the termination of probation, or (c) it is otherwise in the interest of justice to grant relief, and (2) she is not then serving a sentence for an offense, on probation for an offense, or charged with the commission of an offense.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(a)

People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1459

People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 263 [burden of proof on applicant for relief]

Second Holding:

Although a court retains discretion whether to grant relief in the third, interests of justice scenario, relief is mandatory and must be granted in either of the first two scenarios—assuming the defendant meets the additional requirement that she is not serving a sentence, on probation, or charged with an offense at the time of her petition.

Because relief in this scenario is mandatory, the trial court’s stated concerns about defendant having only been off probation slightly over a year and relief being not in the interest of justice have no bearing on the propriety of relief.

Authority:

People v. Butler (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 585, 587

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 1001

People v. E.B. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 47, 54

Third Holding:

Early termination of probation for reasons other than good conduct does not qualify as a discharge from probation

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 262-263

Fourth Holding:

The record is unclear whether the defendant was on probation for a different offense at the time she submitted her petition for relief under section 1203.4. Thus, we must remand for the court to make that determination.

Authority:

People v. Wilkinson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1574 [remanding to trial court to finish the analysis it would have performed if the court had not made error]

Fifth Holding:

Section 1203.4 is a rehabilitative provision that rewards a person who has successfully completed probation. It authorizes a person who previously entered a guilty or no contest plea to withdraw the plea (or, if convicted by other than plea, to have the verdict of guilty set aside), have the charges underlying the conviction dismissed, and thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense.

This dismissal does not, strictly speaking, expunge the conviction, because charges dismissed under section 1203.4 may be treated as convictions for some purposes.

(Gary note: Read section 1203.4 carefully with regard to that preceding statement. While it’s certainly a nice closure, and maybe more than a simple pat on the back, it does not give the person a completely clean slate.)

Authority:

People v. Woodward (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 379, 398,

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 803

People v. Seymour (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1429

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001067

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief:

There is not sufficient nexus with the current offense or with future criminality to justify the imposition of the gang conditions of probation. In addition, payment for counseling cannot be ordered as a condition of probation. We direct the trial court to strike the gang conditions and to modify the counseling provision to clarify that payment of costs is not a condition of probation.

First Holding:

When a trial court grants probation, section 1203.1(j) states that the court may impose and require any or all of the terms of imprisonment, fine, and conditions specified in that section, and other reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.

Accordingly, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(j)

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120

Second Holding:

There are limits to the conditions a court may impose. Under Lent, a condition of probation will be invalid if it:

(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,

(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and

(3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.

This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s decision to impose a given probation condition for an abuse of discretion, considering the facts of the underlying offense and the defendant’s background. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379; People v. Patillo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1579.) We review constitutional challenges to specific conditions of probation—including assertions that a condition improperly delegates the trial court’s authority—de novo.

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

People v. Patillo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1579

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Fourth Holding:

The defendant complains that the court should not have reviewed his juvenile record, as juvenile proceedings are confidential.

In general, juvenile court records are confidential. Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 governs the release of juvenile court records. It enumerates a list of persons who may inspect a juvenile case file without a court order, which includes, among others, court personnel, the district attorney, a city attorney, or city prosecutor authorized to prosecute criminal or juvenile cases under state law, attorneys for the parties, judges, referees, other hearing officers, probation officers, and law enforcement officers who are actively participating in criminal or juvenile proceedings involving the minor, and any other person who may be designated by court order of the judge or the juvenile court upon filing a petition.

Authority:

WIC 827

City of Eureka v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 761

Fifth Holding:

Welfare and Institutions Code section 828(a)(2) states that a court shall consider any information relating to the taking of a minor into custody, if the information is not contained in a record that has been sealed, for purposes of determining whether adjudications of commission of crimes as a juvenile warrant a finding that there are circumstances in aggravation pursuant to Section 1170 of the Penal Code or to deny probation.

The defendant’s juvenile record has not been sealed. Thus, court personnel, the prosecutor, and the probation department were permitted to inspect the records without court order. Moreover, the court was permitted to consider information related to the taking of Reeves into custody for the purpose of determining whether to grant or deny probation.

Authority:

WIC(a)(2)

Sixth Holding:

Probation conditions need not relate directly to the underlying conviction, and may, instead, be reasonably related to future criminality. But here we cannot conclude that the gang conditions are reasonably related to future criminality. As discussed, even if appropriately considered, the defendant’s juvenile record is 10 years old, and in the intervening 10 years, there is no indication that the defendant has engaged in any criminal activity related to gangs.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Seventh Holding:

Courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense. Yet Lent’s requirement that a probation condition must be reasonably related to future criminality contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. Thus, not every probation condition bearing a remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous connection to future criminal conduct can be considered reasonable.

Courts are not authorized to impose “conditions to shield probationers from exposure to people and circumstances that are less than ideal but are nonetheless unrelated to defendant’s current or prior offenses or any factor suggesting a risk of future criminal conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that the gang conditions are not reasonable under Lent and must be stricken.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

People v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568, 574, 577

Eighth Holding:

The trial court may order a defendant to pay for reasonable costs of probation; however, such costs are collateral and their payment cannot be made a condition of probation.

Accordingly, we will direct the trial court to modify the condition with this clarification.

Authority:

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321

Ninth Holding:

The defendant’s remaining arguments about the propriety of the order directing that all costs are to be borne by the defendant are forfeited for lack of objection at the time they were ordered.

Authority:

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 858–859 [defendant waived arguments regarding ability to pay probation costs by failing to raise them in the trial court]

Plea bargains, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001066

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The four-year term of probation is stricken and modified to reflect the agreed-upon three-year term.

Holding:

The defendant entered into a plea bargain in which he would be granted probation for a period of three years. The probation officer’s report spelled out recommended terms and conditions of probation, but recommended that probation be for four years. The court sentenced the defendant to a term in state prison, suspended execution of sentence, and placed the defendant on probation for four years. Neither the court nor any party present noted, explained, or challenged on the record the imposition of the four-year probationary term.

The Attorney General agrees that the court erroneously violated the terms of the plea agreement by placing the defendant on probation for a period longer than the agreed-upon three years and further agrees that the defendant’s challenge to the court’s violation of the plea agreement is not waived, and thus does not address the defendant’s alterative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The usual remedies for violation of a plea bargain are to allow defendant to withdraw the plea and go to trial on the original charges, or to specifically enforce the plea bargain. Specific enforcement is appropriate when it will implement the reasonable expectations of the parties without binding the trial judge to a disposition that he or she considers unsuitable under all the circumstances. The four-year term of probation is stricken and modified to reflect the agreed-upon three-year term.

Authority:

People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860–861

Eighth Amendment, Equal protection, Plea bargains, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001044

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose a term of 16 months in jail as a condition of probation. The matter must be remanded for resentencing, and for the court to determine the issue of the amount of the restitution fine in light of Kopp.

First Holding:

The trial court imposed a jail term of 16 months as a condition of probation because he had missed his appointment with his probation officer and failed to appear at the sentencing hearing. However, section 19.2 provides that, except in situations not here relevant, in no case shall any person sentenced to confinement in a county or city jail, as a condition of probation upon conviction of either a felony or a misdemeanor, be committed for a period in excess of one year.

Authority:

PEN 19.2

Second Holding:

Although Bailey held that the one-year limit may be waived by the defendant, Bailey is distinguishable because the defendant Bailey entered a knowing and intelligent waiver. There is no evidence here that the defendant was informed of the 12-month limit under section 19.2, and his agreement to the longer term was therefore not a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Authority:

People v. Bailey (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 828, 831

People v. Arnold (2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 308 [regarding waiver of credit for time served, the gravamen of whether such a waiver is knowing and intelligent is whether the defendant understood he was relinquishing or giving up custody credits to which he was otherwise entitled under section 2900.5]

People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 [criminal defendant’s waiver of right to jury trial may not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it]

Third Holding:

On remand, the defendant may challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive under the federal and state constitutions. As to ancillary costs, if requested by the defendat, the trial court shall consider his inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1), allowing the parties to present any relevant evidence or argument on the matter.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 8th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30-31

Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001038

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was a violation of separation of powers for the trial court to delegate authority to the probation department the decision of which counseling or rehabilitation program deemed appropriate by the probation officer. The trial court is directed to modify the treatment condition by either specifically identifying the type of treatment program(s) or striking the condition altogether.

First Holding:

The California Constitution states that the powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. Trial courts broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.

Authority:

Calif. Const., art. III, sec. 3

PEN 1203.1

People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26

Second Holding:

But no statutory provision sanctions a delegation of unlimited discretion to a probation officer to implement or interpret probationary terms. These determinations are essentially judicial functions. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.

The defendant’s treatment condition delegates unlimited discretion to his probation officer to determine and implement the nature and amount of treatment that the defendant may be required to complete, including whether a program is residential or outpatient. Because the treatment condition does not identify the type of counseling or treatment that he is required to complete, the trial court’s imposition of the condition is an improper delegation of authority.

Authority:

People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353, 358

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902