Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Case 001172

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to deny the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage based on its reliance on the recitations of fact in the appellate opinion on the defendant’s original conviction.

First Holding:

SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

The legislation amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986

Second Holding:

SB 1437 also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. As amended in 2021 by SB 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 1172.6 makes eligible for resentencing persons convicted of murder pursuant to any theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648

Third Holding:

Under section 1172.6, a defendant must file a petition in the sentencing court claiming that:

(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.

(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960

Fourth Holding:

Where the petition complies with the requirements of section 1172.6(a), and after the parties have had the opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause, and, thereafter, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(c), (d)

Fifth Holding:

While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.

In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may neither engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion nor make credibility determinations. At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only if the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658

Sixth Holding:

We review de novo the denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200

Seventh Holding:

The parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. The record of conviction includes jury instructions, charging documents, and verdict forms. Although the trial court may consider the procedural history of a prior appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing, it cannot consider the factual summary of a prior appellate opinion at any stage of the section 1172.6 petition process.

Authority:

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731-732

People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1188

People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 929

Eighth Holding:

Section 1172.6(a)(3), does not render categorically ineligible for relief petitioners who could have raised on direct appeal a challenge to imputed malice based on a claim of instructional ambiguity.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648-649

Case 001169

Error and/or relief

The court erred in discharging a juror during deliberations without conducting an adequate hearing to determine whether the juror could continue to deliberate in a fair and impartial manner.

First Holding:

The right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury is part of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. A sitting juror’s actual bias, which would have supported a challenge for cause, renders the juror unable to perform his or her duty and thus subject to discharge and substitution. Actual bias in this context is defined as the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1312

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 589

People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 581

Second Holding:

Under section 1089, if at any time, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears the court may order the juror discharged. When a court is informed of allegations which, if proven true, would constitute good cause for a juror’s removal, a hearing is required.

Grounds for investigation or discharge of a juror may be established by his or her statements or conduct, including events which occur during jury deliberations and are reported by fellow panelists.

Authority:

PEN 1089

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 588

Third Holding:

A distinction must be made between a juror who cannot fairly deliberate because of bias and one who, in good faith, disagrees with the others and holds his or her ground. A trial court’s inquiry into possible grounds for discharge of a deliberating juror should be as limited in scope as possible, to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations.

The inquiry should focus upon the conduct of the jurors, rather than upon the content of the deliberations. Additionally, the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court’s instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists.

Authority:

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

Fourth Holding:

We review the trial court’s decision to discharge a juror under section 1089 for an abuse of discretion under the heightened demonstrable reality test, which entails a more comprehensive and less deferential review than the substantial evidence test.

This test requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that [good cause for removing the juror is established. In determining whether the juror’s inability to perform his or her duty appears in the record as a demonstrable reality we do not reweigh the evidence.

Under the demonstrable reality standard, the record must give us confidence that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by the evidence on which it actually relied. In making that determination, we consider both the evidence itself and the reasons the court articulated for its conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450-451

Fifth Holding:

The defendant did not forfeit his claim by failing to request additional inquiry because the court has a duty to investigate when it possesses information that might constitute good cause to remove a juror even if the defendant objects to such an inquiry.

Authority:

People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506

Sixth Holding:

The court did not adequately investigate the reasons for the jurors statements. The information provided by the juror required the judge to conduct further inquiry on the conduct in question. The juror stated that he did not think he could be fair to either side because of the conduct of the jury he described to the judge in general terms, without specifics. The court’s inquiry did not go far enough to determine reliably that the juror was, in fact unable to continue deliberating in a fair and impartial manner. When a juror’s answer is ambivalent, the court is not entitled to presume the worst.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 694, 701

Seventh Holding:

The erroneous discharge of the juror requires reversal. However, this reversal does not create a double jeopardy bar to retrial.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 454

Case 001158

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to reimpose a restitution fine that was more than 10 years old at the time of the resentencing under section 1172.75.

Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) mandates vacating restitution fines imposed under section 1202.4 after 10 years. Because the defendant’s fine was imposed more than 10 years ago, any balance is unenforceable and uncollectible by operation of law, and the fine must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 599-601 [Section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart section 1465.9’s 10-year clock], review granted on unrelated grounds Mar. 11, 2026, S295038]

Case 001156

Error and/or relief:

The trial court should have granted the defendant’s Pitchess motion and conducted an in camera review of the officers’ personnel records.

First Holding:

A movant under the Pitchess statutes must show, among other things, good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought. A showing of good cause is measured by relatively relaxed standards that serve to insure the production for trial court review of all potentially relevant documents.

This good cause requirement has two components. First, the movant must set forth the materiality of the information sought to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. The function of this requirement is to exclude requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges. Accordingly, a defendant seeking Pitchess discovery must establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.

If the movant shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met. If information is material within the meaning of Brady, it is necessarily material to the subject matter involved in a criminal prosecution.

Authority:

EVID 1043

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 41-42

Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021

Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83

Second Holding:

Second, the good cause requirement obliges the movant to articulate a reasonable belief that the agency has the type of information sought. This belief may be based on a rational inference. What the defendant must present is a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents. The information sought must be described with some specificity to ensure that the defendant’s request is not so broad as to garner all information that has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime but is limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted by the defendant. This specificity requirement excludes requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.

Authority:

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 42

Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021, 1025

Third Holding:

If the trial court finds good cause for the motion, the court must examine the requested materials in camera to determine whether they should be disclosed to the defendant and whether certain specified categories of information must be withheld.

Authority:

City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s denial of a Pitchess motion for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 311

Fifth Holding:

By parsing the defendant’s claims as alleging a conspiracy among the several correctional officers, rather than focusing on the individual involvement of each officer and whether the defendant presented a plausible factual scenario in which, for example, one of the officers planted the contraband and/or falsified his report, the trial court abused its discretion as its ruling falls outside the bounds of reason.

Authority:

People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 850

Sixth Holding:

We find that the defendant’s Pitchess motion presented a specific factual scenario establishing a plausible factual foundation for his allegations.

Authority:

City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147

Seventh Holding:

A showing of good cause is measured by relatively relaxed standards that serve to insure the production for trial court review of all potentially relevant documents. Further, the defendant need not point to any corroboration for the defendant’s account, and is also not required to present a credible or believable factual account of, or a motive for, police misconduct.

Rather, all that is required is the presentation of a scenario that might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges. Depending on the circumstances of the case, a sufficient factual allegation in a Pitchess motion may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.

Considering the relatively relaxed standards which should be applied by the trial court to assess whether such a factual scenario was plausible, the defendant clearly made such a showing here.

Authority:

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179

Uybungco v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1049

Eighth Holding:

Where the trial court has erroneously rejected a showing of good cause for Pitchess discovery and has not reviewed the requested records in camera, the proper remedy is not outright reversal, but a conditional reversal with directions to review the requested documents in chambers on remand.

Following remand, after reviewing the confidential materials in chambers, the trial court may determine that the requested personnel records contain no relevant information and reinstate the judgment.

It is also possible for the trial court to determine on remand that relevant information exists and should be disclosed. In that event, that the trial court must order disclosure, allow the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice, and order a new trial if there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had the information been disclosed.

Authority:

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 180-181

Ninth Holding:

We find that the defendant, by failing to object when they were imposed, has forfeited his argument challenging the fines, fees, and assessments on appeal. In general, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of fines, fees, and assessments at sentencing forfeits the right to challenge those fines, fees, and assessments on appeal.

This general rule applies when the relevant statute includes an ability to pay component, including when the defendant makes a constitutional argument. Given that the defendant is in the best position to know whether he has the ability to pay, it is incumbent on him to object to the fine and demonstrate why it should not be imposed. Ability to pay is a factual determination that is properly raised and determined first in the trial court.

We recognize however, there is a possibility the defendant demonstrates he is entitled to a new trial based on the outcome of the Pitchess proceedings below. In that event, and assuming he is again convicted following that new trial, he may address any applicable fines and fees that may be imposed at sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624

People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856-858

People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729

People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1154

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 597

Case 001151

Error and/or relief

The court made several sentencing errors. The strike based on a violation of section 186.22 requires examination whether the elements found true at the time of conviction meet the heightened requirements of the amendments under AB 333.

The court imposed the upper term on several counts despite there being no jury trial waiver nor stipulation by the defendant to the aggravating factors. Further, the court relied on factors in aggravation that were also the basis of enhancements, violating the prohibition against dual use.

The court erred in imposing two full terms consecutively for two counts, as consecutive determinate (subordinate) terms are limited to one-third the middle term.

The court miscalculated the credit for time served.

First Holding:

AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to narrow the definition of “benefit” to mean “to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. The amendment applies retroactively to cases that are not final on appeal to determine whether a prior violation of section 186.22 constitutes a strike or a prior serious felony.

We remand to permit the prosecution the opportunity to establish that the prior conviction (from more than 15 years ago) constitutes a strike and a prior serious felony conviction under current law. conviction.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586–587

Second Holding:

Section 1170(b)(1) provides that when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). Under subdivision (b)(2), the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. A defendant is entitled to have a jury determine the facts justifying an upper term based on the “increasing seriousness” of a defendant’s prior convictions.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078, 1085-1086 [increasing seriousness of a crime required a jury determination]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 759–760

Third Holding:

The court erred in relying on two factors in aggravation that formed the basis of enhancements for which punishment was imposed. This was error because of the prohibition against the dual use of facts to impose an upper term sentence based on the facts of an enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(5)

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

Fourth Holding:

The court imposed two consecutive 18-year terms for each of the attempted murder counts, which consisted of the upper term of nine years double for the prior strike. This was error. The trial court may the full term, either lower, middle, or upper, for the principal term. However, in general (there are exceptions), the court may impose only one-third of the middle term’for subordinate terms.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1(a)

People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 655

Fifth Holding:

The court erred in its calculation of credit for time served, and on remand the court shall ensure that the abstract of judgment be amended to reflect the proper credits.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5