Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000167

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in calculating the presentence custody credits. He actually served more time than the court calculated. We award him the additional days he is entitled to and direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment and minute order to reflect the correct award.

Holding:

Upon conviction, a criminal defendant is entitled to credit for actual time served. This time includes confinement from the date of arrest to the date when the sentence commences. Generally, a term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual custody. When a defendant is convicted of a violent felony as defined by section 667.5(c), however, work time is accrued at a rate of no more than 15 percent. Any miscalculation of credits results in an unauthorized sentence, and an unauthorized sentence may be corrected upon discovery.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a)

PEN 4019(a)(1)

PEN 4019(f)

PEN 2933.1(a)

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000165

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in reimposing an unenforceable restitution order and in failing to update the defendant’s custody credits. Though the court did not orally reimpose the fine or recalculate credit for time served, the amended abstract of judgment reflects the fine and the credits he received at the defendant’s original sentencing.

First Holding:

The restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4(b) Must be vacated because it is over 10 years old.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. The defendant is entitled to an updated abstract that accurately reflects the amount of custody credits earned.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

Abstracts and Minutes, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case: 000147

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) believed the abstract of judgment was ambiguous because the felony complaint had specifically alleged defendant’s offense was committed under circumstances that would have rendered it a violent felony pursuant to section 667.5(c)(21), but it is not clear from the Minute Order or the Abstract whether the allegation was found true.

The trial court responded by amending the abstract of judgment to check the box indicating that the offense for which petitioner was convicted constituted a violent felony and by forwarding a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to CDCR. We conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the abstract of judgment in the manner that it did after execution had commenced, requiring vacatur of the amended abstract of judgment and reinstatement of the original abstract.

First Holding:

Where a trial court fails to make a necessary finding on a special allegation and imposes a sentence as if the finding were not true, we presume the omission was deliberate and the trial court’s silence operates as a not true finding. In Candelario, the defendant admitted the truth of a special allegation that he suffered a prior conviction at the time he entered his plea, but the trial court omitted any reference to the allegation in its minute order and abstract of judgment, although the printed form contained a box specifically for such entries.

In evaluating the effect of the omission, our high court explained that admission of the prior offense did not thereby relieve the court of its responsibility to pronounce judgment finding petitioner guilty of the substantive offense with a prior conviction, and to have such judgment entered in the official records of the court. If the record is silent in that regard, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be inferred that the omission was an act of leniency by the trial court. In such circumstances the silence operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true. Even when the defendant admits the prior conviction, the court is not compelled to make a finding on the charge.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702

Second Holding:

The failure to check the box in the abstract of judgment form indicating that defendant’s conviction constituted a violent felony may have been erroneous, but under Candelario and other cases, any such error would have been upon judicial error and not an error in the abstract of judgment. Instead, the abstract of judgment appears fully consistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment omitting a true finding on the special allegation and imposing a sentence consistent with a conviction for a nonviolent felony.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702

People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 14-15 [failure to mention prior conviction at the time judgment is pronounced must be interpreted as deliberate act of leniency]

People v. Gutierrez (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1440 [When no words are used and the trier of fact fails to make a finding the effect is the same as a finding of not true]

People v. Burnett (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 257, 260-261 [On a silent record, the Court of Appeal will presume that the trial court’s failure to impose a statutorily mandated fine was a result of making factual findings in support of a statutory exception to imposition of the fine]

People v. Farias (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 619, 635-636 [In the absence of any mention of necessary findings under the three strikes law at the time of sentencing or in the abstract of judgment, we treat defendants as if the trial court concluded the strike allegations were not true]

Third Holding:

Given our conclusion that the trial court’s original judgment in 2017 should be interpreted as a conviction for a nonviolent felony, the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend the judgment to add a true finding. As the California Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced. And a judgment for imprisonment ordinarily is deemed executed when a certified copy of the minute order or abstract of judgment is furnished to the officer whose duty it is to execute the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344

People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089

Fourth Holding:

The exceptions to the rule are limited and do not apply here. This was not a clerical error that could be corrected at any time. This was not a request by CDCR for resentencing under section 1172.1 (which would prohibit a sentence greater than the initial sentence). Because the failure to make any finding on the special allegations pursuant to section 667.5 operates as a finding of not true on the allegation, the sentence was not unauthorized, so there is no need to enter the debate on the authority of a court to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, even when the matter has not vested jurisdiction.

Authority:

People v. Farias (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 619, 635-636

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 1120 [holding a trial court that imposes an unauthorized sentence retains jurisdiction to correct the sentence at any time the error comes to its attention]

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, at pp. 67-68 [disagreeing with Codinha, stating that no cases hold that trial courts can act to correct unauthorized (or unlawful or invalid) sentences outside of some other posture where they independently have jurisdiction to do so]

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, at pp. 634-642 [The unauthorized sentence doctrine does not itself create jurisdiction for a trial court to rule on an incarcerated defendant’s motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence]

People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 797

Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review

Case: 000144

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on simple battery as a lesser included offense of the sexual battery count. Thus, we reverse the misdemeanor sexual-battery conviction and remand for the People to elect whether to retry that charge or accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of simple battery. In either case, the defendant shall be fully resentenced.

First Holding:

The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on all lesser included offenses if there is substantial evidence from which a jury can reasonably conclude the defendant committed the lesser, uncharged offense, but not the greater. Thus, even though the defendant did not request an instruction on simple battery below, the claim is preserved for appeal.

Authority:

People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 29, 33, fn. 6

Second Holding:

We review de novo whether a trial court erred by not instructing on a lesser included offense, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine whether substantial evidence supported the instruction.

Authority:

People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 30

Third Holding:

It is a crime to touch an intimate part of another person, if the touching is done against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse. Simple battery is defined as any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. The least touching may constitute battery, and a touching is unlawful if it is harmful or offensive. It is undisputed that simple battery is a lesser included offense of sexual battery. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that there was substantial evidence on which a reasonable juror could have relied to determine that he committed simple battery only.

Authority:

PEN 243.4(e)(1)

PEN 242

People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404

People v. Yonko (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1010

Fourth Holding:

Generally, a trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence is state law error that requires reversal if a different result was reasonably probable under Watson. A reasonable juror could have believed everything the victim said said but still harbored a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s purpose in touching her was sexual. The prejudice stemming from such an error is the risk that the jury ignored its instructions and convicted the defendant of an offense for which the prosecution did not carry its burden. The jury might have been convinced that the defendant was guilty of some lesser included offense and, as a result, been tempted to convict of a greater offense rather than acquit. Nor did the jury make any other findings establishing that it necessarily concluded the defendant had such a purpose. Particularly given that the jury was willing to convict him of lesser included offenses on other counts, we perceive nothing in the record dispelling the risk that because it was not instructed on simple battery, it convicted him of sexual battery rather than acquitting him.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818

People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196, 200, 201

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260

Fifth Holding:

The People must elect whether to retry that charge or accept a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of simple battery. In either case, the defendant shall be fully resentenced.

Authority:

People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 681

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000129

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court must correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court never imposed fines or fees other than restitution to the Victim’s Compensation Board, and must recalculate his actual custody credits.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the court waived the imposition of a restitution fine and the parole revocation fine and other fines and fees.  [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, but the law is clear that it has the authority to do so, and I have listed some authorities below.]

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

As the People did not object in the court below, the People have forfeited the issue of the propriety of the trial court order waiving the restitution and other fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

Third Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing. [GARY NOTE: the court did not cite authority for remanding for the court to determine custody credits, but the law is clear, per the authorities I have set forth below.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case: 000128

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We find that the nature of the required program is impermissibly vague in the condition of probation that the defendant “enter into and continue such education, psychological, psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation program as directed by the probation officer or as specifically ordered as a term of probation, and shall not leave or terminate such programs without the permission of the probation officer.”

First Holding:

Applying de novo review, we address each challenge to a probation condition separately.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Second Holding:

It is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer. Although a probation condition need not be set forth with mathematical certainty, the language used must have reasonable specificity. Here, such specificity is lacking. The program choices for the probation officer are open-ended, ranging from education to psychological and psychiatric to drug, alcohol, or other rehabilitation. This is too vague to pass muster, and we cannot interpret it more narrowly in light of other probation conditions, the probation report, or the trial court’s commentary. Without meaningful guidance from the record, the open-ended program condition cannot be saved by permitting the probation department to provide the necessary specificity.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000126

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously used the defendant’s 2012 prior conviction to sentence him under the Three Strikes law without first determining whether that gang-enhanced felony could have been obtained after amendments enacted by AB 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699).

First Holding:

Where a defendant has previously suffered a conviction under the prior version of Penal Code section 186.22, the changes made in AB 333 apply to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576

Second Holding:

By treating the defendant’s 2012 conviction as a prior strike conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence that is unauthorized by law under Fletcher. The defendant’s argument is therefore not forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 7 [forfeiture principles do not apply to legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751 [The unauthorized sentence rule is an exception to the forfeiture doctrine. It permits a challenge to an unauthorized sentence on appeal even if the defendant failed to object below.]

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000125

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It appears the trial court, in finding that the defendant is guilty of murder under current law, misunderstood that its role as independent fact finder entailed weighing witness credibility. We therefore remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6(d). At that evidentiary hearing, the defendant may again raise any contention regarding witness credibility, which the trial court must then rule on in deciding whether the defendant is guilty of murder under current law.

First Holding:

The trial court’s role at the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 is to act as an independent fact finder and determine, in the first instance, whether the petitioner committed murder under the law as amended by SB 1437.

Authority:

People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123

Second Holding:

The statute’s plain language shows the People are required to establish the defendant is guilty under current law as a matter of fact and beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact finder tasked with holding the People to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial and determine whether that proof leaves it with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. Unlike the prima facie stage where the trial court should not decide unresolved factual issues that involve credibility determinations or weighing of evidence, the court should decide such issues after issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 294-296

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000122

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court erred in failing to resentence him under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to twice the principal term for the underlying crime, as opposed to the 25-year-to-life sentence it reimposed. The People concede both of these points. We vacate the defendant’s sentence, and remand for a full resentencing with directions to recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

Even where the defendant is serving a sentence under the Three Strikes law, on recall the trial court is required to apply the Three Strikes Reform Act in a section 1172.75 proceeding absent a finding of unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

Second Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000121

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court failed to recalculate the actual time defendant had served pursuant to the sentence for which he was being resentenced and reflect those credits in the amended abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Second Holding:

Generally, a clerical error is one inadvertently made. Clerical error can be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court itself. A court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records at any time so as to make these records reflect the true facts.

Authority:

People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 808

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000120

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant submitted both a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for recall and resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court erroneously treated both as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which it denied without prejudice to allow the defendant to separately file a petition under section 1172.6. Though contained in the same envelope and assigned a single case number by the court clerk, there were two separate matters presented to the trial court. The matter is remanded for the trial court to give due consideration to the petition/motion filed for recall of sentence under section 1172.6. There is also an error in the abstract of judgment that should be corrected, depending on the outcome of the hearing on the petition.

First Holding:

The record indicates that defendant submitted not only a petition for writ of habeas corpus, but also a separate motion for resentencing. The title page of the habeas petition states it was being filed concurrently with a motion for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. Defendant included a separate section 1172.6 “motion” with its own title page and caption designating it as such. That defendant, a prisoner, mailed the documents in one envelope as opposed to two, and placed his “motion” for resentencing before the exhibits to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, does not change the fact he submitted a separate “motion” to the court. As for the assignment of only one case number—for the habeas proceeding—this was a clerical matter over which defendant had no control. The trial court was required to consider the motion/petition filed under section 1172.6.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960 [where resentencing petition complies with the three facial sufficiency requirements of sec. 1172.6(b), the court proceeds to consider whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under subd. (c)]

Second Holding:

The abstract contains an error on whether the two counts were ordered served concurrently or consecutively. Should the trial court determine defendant is ineligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.6, we direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment that corrects this error.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical error in their records at any time and appellate courts that have assumed jurisdiction over a case may order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect judgment]

Defenses, Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000109

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was charged with first degree murder under two theories–deliberation and premeditation, and lying in wait. The jury was not required to agree unanimously on the theory. He was convicted of first degree murder, along with a count of attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation. We conclude that insufficient evidence supports the finding of lying in wait. One of the elements of lying in wait, namely, “a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act,” is not supported by substantial evidence. That conclusion requires us to reverse the finding on the lying-in-wait special circumstance, but it does not require a reversal of the first degree murder convictions, as they are supported by the alternative theory of premeditation and deliberation.

First Holding:

The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires an intentional murder, committed under circumstances that include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage It includes the elements of first degree lying-in-wait murder but requires the additional element that the killing was intentional, not merely committed with implied malice.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)(15)

People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 74

Second Holding:

To support a finding of concealment of purpose, it is not required that a defendant be literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim. Rather, it is sufficient that a defendant’s true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct. The concealment, in that sense, is that which puts the defendant in a position of advantage, from which the factfinder can infer that lying-in-wait was part of the defendant’s plan to take the victim by surprise. Concealment of purpose inhibits detection, defeats self-defense, and may betray at least some level of trust, making it more blameworthy than premeditated murder that does not involve surprise.

The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires no fixed, quantitative minimum time, but the lying in wait must continue for long enough to premeditate and deliberate, conceal one’s purpose, and wait and watch for an opportune moment to attack. To distinguish the circumstance from ordinary premeditation and deliberation, a distinct period of watchful waiting is required. “Watchful” does not require actual watching; it can include being alert and vigilant in anticipation of the victim’s arrival to take him or her by surprise.

Authority:

People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 966–967

People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 67

People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 204

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 629

People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 551

People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 247

Third Holding:

In assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The same standard applies when examining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a special circumstance finding. “Substantial evidence” includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.

Authority:

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57

Fourth Holding:

A first degree murder verdict will be upheld if there is sufficient evidence as to at least one of the theories on which the jury is instructed, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground. The appellate court should affirm the judgment unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory. In making that determination, we examine the entire record, including the facts and the instructions, the arguments of counsel, any communications from the jury during deliberations, and the entire verdict.

The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Thus, our inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury returned a verdict of first degree murder based solely on lying in wait, rather than also on premeditation and deliberation. The jury’s express findings in connection with the attempted murder in count 2 preclude any reasonable probability the jury relied solely on lying in wait as the theory for first degree murder.

Authority:

People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 552 [affirming first degree murder based on sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation despite insufficient evidence to support lying in wait]

People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130

Fifth Holding:

The court committed harmless error under Chapman in declining the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the theory of imperfect self-defense. Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. if a person kills in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense, the belief negates what would otherwise be malice, and that person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not murder.

Authority:

People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561

People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Sixth Holding:

The trial court was required to instruct on imperfect self-defense if there was substantial evidence to support the theory. “Substantial evidence” is evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter was committed, but does not include evidence that is speculative, minimal, or insubstantial.

Authority:

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 253

People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132

Seventh Holding:

We review de novo a trial court’s decision not to give an imperfect self-defense instruction. When the record contains substantial evidence of imperfect self-defense, the trial court’s failure to instruct on that theory amounts to constitutional error and is thus subject to review under the federal Chapman standard. Under the Chapman standard, reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Though there was insufficient evidence of the watchful waiting to support a finding of lying in wait, the jury returned a finding that the murder was committed by lying in wait.

There was sufficient evidence of the aspects of lying in wait other than watchful waiting. Because of its true finding on lying in wait, the jury could not have found an imperfect self-defense in which the defendant used deadly force against the victim because he unreasonably believed that doing so was necessary to defend himself.

Authority:

People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 665 [a jury’s true finding on a lying-in-wait special circumstance negated any possibility that defendant was prejudiced from the failure to instruct on unreasonable self-defense theories of manslaughter]