Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Case 001186

Error and/or relief

Remanded for the trial court to state on the record the fines and assessments imposed and for the preparation of an amended abstract of judgment that reflects the oral judgment.

First Holding:

Our review of the record disclosed that the trial court’s imposition of fines and assessments is unclear. A trial court must include a detailed recitation of all the fines and assessments imposed at sentencing. The trial court orally imposed a $7,200 restitution fine under section 1202.4, but then stated: “The court will stay any mandatory fines and fees and … the court will impose that which are mandatory.” We are unable to determine what specific financial obligations the court intended to impose.

Authority:

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment lists a $7,200 parole revocation fine, a $360 court operations assessment, a $270 criminal conviction assessment, and a $300 sex offender’s fine, but it is not clear from the record which of those amounts, if any, the trial court orally imposed. An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction. It does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.

The sentence is reversed and the matter is remanded for the trial court to impose sentence and to clarify on the record the fines and assessments imposed. The court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 [Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.]

Case 001181

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court failed to recalculate defendant’s custody credits at resentencing and specify the updated total in the amended abstract of judgment to reflect the period between his original sentencing in 2016 and the resentencing hearing in 2023.

Holding:

Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Saibu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 41 [trial court must calculate time served and credit against subsequent sentence when remand results in modification of a felony sentence]

Case 001172

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to deny the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage based on its reliance on the recitations of fact in the appellate opinion on the defendant’s original conviction.

First Holding:

SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

The legislation amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986

Second Holding:

SB 1437 also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. As amended in 2021 by SB 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 1172.6 makes eligible for resentencing persons convicted of murder pursuant to any theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648

Third Holding:

Under section 1172.6, a defendant must file a petition in the sentencing court claiming that:

(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.

(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960

Fourth Holding:

Where the petition complies with the requirements of section 1172.6(a), and after the parties have had the opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause, and, thereafter, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(c), (d)

Fifth Holding:

While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.

In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may neither engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion nor make credibility determinations. At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only if the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658

Sixth Holding:

We review de novo the denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200

Seventh Holding:

The parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. The record of conviction includes jury instructions, charging documents, and verdict forms. Although the trial court may consider the procedural history of a prior appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing, it cannot consider the factual summary of a prior appellate opinion at any stage of the section 1172.6 petition process.

Authority:

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731-732

People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1188

People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 929

Eighth Holding:

Section 1172.6(a)(3), does not render categorically ineligible for relief petitioners who could have raised on direct appeal a challenge to imputed malice based on a claim of instructional ambiguity.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648-649

Case 001169

Error and/or relief

The court erred in discharging a juror during deliberations without conducting an adequate hearing to determine whether the juror could continue to deliberate in a fair and impartial manner.

First Holding:

The right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury is part of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. A sitting juror’s actual bias, which would have supported a challenge for cause, renders the juror unable to perform his or her duty and thus subject to discharge and substitution. Actual bias in this context is defined as the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1312

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 589

People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 581

Second Holding:

Under section 1089, if at any time, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears the court may order the juror discharged. When a court is informed of allegations which, if proven true, would constitute good cause for a juror’s removal, a hearing is required.

Grounds for investigation or discharge of a juror may be established by his or her statements or conduct, including events which occur during jury deliberations and are reported by fellow panelists.

Authority:

PEN 1089

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 588

Third Holding:

A distinction must be made between a juror who cannot fairly deliberate because of bias and one who, in good faith, disagrees with the others and holds his or her ground. A trial court’s inquiry into possible grounds for discharge of a deliberating juror should be as limited in scope as possible, to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations.

The inquiry should focus upon the conduct of the jurors, rather than upon the content of the deliberations. Additionally, the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court’s instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists.

Authority:

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

Fourth Holding:

We review the trial court’s decision to discharge a juror under section 1089 for an abuse of discretion under the heightened demonstrable reality test, which entails a more comprehensive and less deferential review than the substantial evidence test.

This test requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that [good cause for removing the juror is established. In determining whether the juror’s inability to perform his or her duty appears in the record as a demonstrable reality we do not reweigh the evidence.

Under the demonstrable reality standard, the record must give us confidence that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by the evidence on which it actually relied. In making that determination, we consider both the evidence itself and the reasons the court articulated for its conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450-451

Fifth Holding:

The defendant did not forfeit his claim by failing to request additional inquiry because the court has a duty to investigate when it possesses information that might constitute good cause to remove a juror even if the defendant objects to such an inquiry.

Authority:

People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506

Sixth Holding:

The court did not adequately investigate the reasons for the jurors statements. The information provided by the juror required the judge to conduct further inquiry on the conduct in question. The juror stated that he did not think he could be fair to either side because of the conduct of the jury he described to the judge in general terms, without specifics. The court’s inquiry did not go far enough to determine reliably that the juror was, in fact unable to continue deliberating in a fair and impartial manner. When a juror’s answer is ambivalent, the court is not entitled to presume the worst.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 694, 701

Seventh Holding:

The erroneous discharge of the juror requires reversal. However, this reversal does not create a double jeopardy bar to retrial.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 454

Case 001158

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to reimpose a restitution fine that was more than 10 years old at the time of the resentencing under section 1172.75.

Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) mandates vacating restitution fines imposed under section 1202.4 after 10 years. Because the defendant’s fine was imposed more than 10 years ago, any balance is unenforceable and uncollectible by operation of law, and the fine must be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 599-601 [Section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart section 1465.9’s 10-year clock], review granted on unrelated grounds Mar. 11, 2026, S295038]