Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Case 001215

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court failed to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served. We remand to the trial court for recalculation of the custody credits.

Holding:

The trial court failed to award the custody credits he earned since the time of his original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1 [Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.]

Case 001214

Error and/or relief:

The court erred in advising the defendant that he was not entitled to a jury trial on several of the alleged aggravating factors. Therefore the waiver of a jury on the aggravating factors was not valid. Remanded for jury trial on the aggravating circumstances or a proper waiver or stipulation.

First Holding:

A criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than a prior conviction, relied upon to justify an upper term sentence is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution under section 1170(b).

Section 1170(b) provides that a trial court may not impose the upper term when a criminal statute specifies three possible terms of confinement unless circumstances in aggravation justify doing so and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

U.S. Const., 6th Amend.

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

Second Holding:

An aggravating circumstance is a fact that makes the offense ‘distinctively worse than the ordinary. A fact constituting an element of the offense cannot be relied upon by a trial court to aggravate or enhance a sentence on that offense. Notwithstanding the right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors relied on to impose the upper term, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. However, the court’s consideration is limited to the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements.

Pursuant to Apprendi, “ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, except for the fact of a prior conviction.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.420(h)

People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817, overruled on other grounds in Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1084–1085

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

People v. Marshall (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1253, 1259

People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 952–953, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751, 768–769

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466

Third Holding:

In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court imposed new limits on the factors that a sentencing judge may rely upon to increase a sentence in the absence of a jury finding or a defendant’s stipulation. Whether offenses occurred on separate occasions can require an examination of a range of facts, including whether the defendant’s past offenses were committed close in time, whether they were committed near to or far from one another, and whether the offenses were similar or intertwined in purpose and character. The question of whether the offenses occurred on separate occasions must be submitted to a jury, not determined by a judge.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 825, 828

Fourth Holding:

In Wiley, the trial court imposed the upper term sentence based on the defendant’s prior convictions, poor performance on probation, and the fact that the charges are becoming more serious. However, the Wiley court, relying on Erlinger, found that the trial court erred because the federal Constitution’s jury trial right requires that a jury determine whether the particular details of a defendant’s criminal history establish an unsatisfactory probation performance or demonstrate convictions of increasing seriousness, before a trial court can rely on those facts to justify an upper term sentence.

Wiley stated that the trial court’s findings also exceeded the scope of the statutory exception to the jury trial right for prior convictions that appears in section 1170(b)(3)

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1077-1078, 1085

Fifth Holding:

The failure to afford the defendant a jury trial on the aggravating factors was prejudicial and a federal constitutional error subject to review under Chapman.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

The Sixth Amendment is violated when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Seventh Holding:

A defendant must express the right to a jury trial in words. Waiver must be expressed in words and will not be implied from a defendant’s conduct. Moreover, a court may not accept a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial unless the waiver is knowing and intelligent, that is, made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it, as well as voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.

The record reflects that the court incorrectly informed the defendant that he was entitled to a jury trial on only one of the aggravating factors alleged, and that the remaining three must be decided by the judge. In light of this incorrect statement, the defendant’s waiver of a jury cannot be said to have been with full awareness of the right being abandoned.

Authority:

People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 990

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47 [“When the constitutional right to jury trial is involved, we have required an express waiver even in cases in which the circumstances make it apparent that all involved—the trial court, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the defendant—assumed that the defendant had waived or intended to waive the right.

Eighth Holding:

Constitutional issues, even in cases involving mixed questions of law and fact, are reviewed de novo on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894.

Ninth Holding:

Whether a defendant’s convictions were numerous is a matter of fact for the jury to decide, as making that determination involves more than simply counting the convictions, which cannot be established by the bare fact of a defendant’s prior convictions.

Authority:

People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 847–848

Case 001199

Error and/or relief:

The defendant’s convictions for murder and attempted murder must be reversed because of the trial court’s incorrect response to a jury question about the level of provocation required to reduce murder from first to second degree.

First Holding:

During deliberations, the jury inquired about the provocation necessary to reduce murder from first to second degree. The court’s response allowed the jury to use the more stringent objective test for assessing provocation necessary for a voluntary manslaughter conviction rather than the subjective test required for reducing murder from first to second degree.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000

Second Holding:

Courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct juries on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. Instructions must be correct. There is no duty to clarify or amplify adequate instructions absent a request. But courts must provide the jury with accurate information in response to a jury request on a question of law.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1331

People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 369

Third Holding:

We independently review the accuracy of supplemental instructions, examining whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions as asserted by the defendant. We consider the instructions as a whole and assume the jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 369

Fourth Holding:

First degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, premeditation, and deliberation. The defendant must act deliberately, carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice to kill before he or she completes the acts that caused the death. Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice but without premeditation or deliberation.

Heat of passion arising from provocation negates premeditation and deliberation, thus reducing first degree murder to second degree murder. Specifically, if the provocation precludes the defendant from subjectively deliberating or premeditating, the crime is second degree murder. This is a subjective test for assessing provocation as a basis to reduce malice murder from the first to the second degree: it inquires whether the defendant in fact committed the act because he was provoked

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 166

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000

Fifth Holding:

Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder. If the provocation would cause a reasonable person to react with deadly passion, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice so as to further reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter. The provocation must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment.

Thus, determining whether to reduce malice murder to voluntary manslaughter requires applying an objective test and a subjective test. The prosecution must disprove the existence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt to establish malice.

Authority:

PEN 192(a)

People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 642

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60

People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 [A heat of passion theory of manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective component]

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000-1001

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 253

Sixth Holding:

The jury inquired specifically about the test between first degree murder and second degree murder. The court’s response was appropriate had the question asked for the test between murder and manslaughter, but not for the question actually asked.

By so responding, the court authorized the jury to use the objective standard for assessing provocation to determine whether to reduce murder from first to second degree. The court thereby erred. Only a subjective test for provocation is relevant when deciding to reduce murder from first to second degree. The trial court’s response misled the jury to believe that to reduce murder from first to second degree, provocation must meet the same objective test that leads to a reduction to voluntary manslaughter.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000

People v. Ocegueda (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 548, 558-559 [instruction that an objective test applied to reduce murder from first to second degree would result in a reasonable probability jury understood an instruction in a legally impermissible manner]

Seventh Holding:

We review an instructional error that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense under the standard in Chapman. Under that standard, we must reverse a judgment unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error. After examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, we cannot conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 829

People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 615

People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13

(Gary note: At this point, the court analyzed the evidence that supported its conclusion that it could not find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I have omitted its references to various facts specific to this case, but I had decided to list some of the cases the court cited as it identified the various factors. The cases that follow as Authority for the Seventh Holding are merely cases that discuss the question of the subjective aspect of provocation or that support indications that the case was not an open and shut case.)

People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583 [provocative conduct may be physical or verbal]

People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 180 [any intense emotion (except revenge) may suffice to satisfy the subjective provocation component, including fear and panic]

People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 907 [deliberations lasting nearly six hours demonstrates finding of guilt was not open and shut]

People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 385 [request to reread substantial portion of testimony demonstrates closeness of case]

Eighth Holding:

We must reverse his premeditated and deliberate attempted murder conviction for the same reason reversal of the murder conviction is required. Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.

Like murder, an attempted murder that occurs as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse is premeditated and deliberate.

When relying on heat of passion as a partial defense to the crime of attempted murder, both provocation and heat of passion must be demonstrated.

If the prosecution fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the defendant cannot be convicted of attempted murder.

Considering all the instructions provided as a whole, and for the same reasons set forth in our analysis of the previous claim, there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the court’s supplemental instruction — that it could apply the objective standard when assessing whether the defendant was provoked — to preclude it from considering subjective provocation when determining whether the defendant committed attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739

People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543 [same definitions of willful, deliberate and premeditated apply to attempted murder and murder]

People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 704, 709

People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 887–888

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Doane (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 965, 980

Ninth Holding:

We remand to give the prosecution the opportunity to retry the defendant on his charges or accept modification to the judgment to reflect the defendant’s convictions for second degree murder and attempted murder without the premeditation enhancement. Depending on the outcome, resentencing is warranted to allow the trial court to reconsider the entire sentencing structure.

Authority:

People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 386

People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 647

People v. Bautista (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1438

Case 001194

Error and/or relief:

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended, pursuant to section 1172.1, that the trial court recall the defendant’s sentence and resentence him based on recent changes in the law giving courts discretion to strike five-year serious felony enhancements under section 667(a)(1), as well as the nature of the offense and his conduct in prison. The court erred in declining to resentence the defendant.

First Holding:

The People contend we should dismiss this appeal as moot because the defendant has been released on parole. We disagree. An appeal becomes moot if without any fault of the opposing party, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of defendant, to grant him any effectual relief whatever.

As a parolee, the defendant is subject to significant restrictions on his liberty. For example, he may not travel more than 50 miles from his residence without his parole agent’s permission, and he is subject to search or seizure by any peace officer at any time without warrant. This appeal could potentially lead to a reduction in his sentence, which would in turn grant him effectual relief by reducing or terminating his period of parole.

Authority:

People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645

People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1069

Second Holding:

CDCR has long had the authority to recommend inmates in its custody to the trial court for resentencing. Such a recommendation gives the trial court the authority to resentence in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously been sentenced. This means the court can impose any otherwise lawful resentence suggested by the facts available at the time of resentencing, so long as the new sentence was not longer than the original one.

Under the former version of the statute, however, the court was not required to resentence the defendant, or even “to respond to the recommendation

Authority:

PEN 1170(d) (former)

Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455-456

Third Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature enacted AB 1540 which, in recognition of the scrutiny that has already been brought to these referrals by the referring entity, forbade courts from ignoring recommendations for recall and resentencing. Under the new version of the law, codified as what is now section 1172.1, when the trial court receives a recommendation for resentencing, it must notify and appoint counsel to represent the defendant, and must set a status conference within 30 days. Following this notification, the statute sets forth a two-step process. The first step imposes a procedural gate on whether the defendant is eligible for recall and resentencing. Only if the defendant passes that initial eligibility test does the matter proceed to the second step, which is the resentencing hearing itself.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

Fourth Holding:

With regard to the first step, section 1172.1 creates a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if the trial court finds the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18(c).

Section 1170.18(c) in turn defines an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as an unreasonable risk that the defendant will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)]. This subdivision of section 667 identifies eight types of particularly serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as super strikes.

In sum, CDCR’s recommendation creates a presumption in favor of a resentencing hearing unless the court finds the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

PEN 1170.18

People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818

Fifth Holding:

To support a finding of dangerousness under this standard, the evidence must show more than a generalized concern about the defendant’s ability to continue to commit crimes. Instead, the inquiry must focus on the likelihood the defendant will commit a limited subset of violent felonies.

The court’s finding must be based on supporting evidence, not speculation or the arguments of counsel. In addition, the proper focus is on whether the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, not merely whether he did at the time of his conviction.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 410

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450

People v. Saelee (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 744, 754-755

People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 913

Sixth Holding:

We review the trial court’s denial of recall and resentencing for abuse of discretion. We review the factual findings underlying the decision, such as whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18(c) for substantial evidence.

(Gary note: At this point, the appellate court examined the specific facts and background in this case and determined that the evidence did not support a finding that the defendant was likely to commit a super strike.)

Authority:

People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082

People v. Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 409

Seventh Holding:

The trial court’s error in not holding a resentencing hearing had practical consequences in depriving the defendant of an opportunity to offer a statement in mitigation, to testify on his own behalf, and to present other information as of the resentencing hearing date regarding the appropriate sentence.

The court’s statements at step one indicate that it was unlikely to reduce the defendant’s sentence, but we can only speculate if the court would have felt the same after reviewing a full resentencing record which was never developed.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.437

People v. Evans (2008) 44 Cal.4th 590, 598-600

Eighth Holding:

Significantly, the People do not argue that we should apply the Watson standard or make any other argument regarding harmless error. We thus conclude the error was not harmless.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1178

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425 [the Watson standard for judging harmless error does not apply when it “does not properly take into consideration the more speculative inquiry of what choice the court is likely to make in the first instance” at resentencing]

Ninth Holding:

Upon holding a proper hearing, nothing in this opinion restricts the trial court’s discretion upon remand in resentencing the defendant or implies that he is entitled to a reduced sentence. Although a presumption favors granting recall and resentencing in the first place, the sentence ultimately imposed by the court is left to its discretion without any further application of the presumption.

Authority:

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 707 [If the court on remand declines to exercise its discretion under section 1385 to strike an enhancement, that ends the matter and the defendant’s sentence stands]

People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 820

Case 001188

Error and/or relief

The trial court gave two conflicting instructions on unlawfully taking or deriving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851. One of the instructions omitted an element of the crime. We reverse the conviction on that count and remand for retrial.

First Holding:

Vehicle Code section 10851 can be violated in two general ways, by taking the vehicle (driving theft) or by driving the stolen vehicle after the theft is complete (posttheft driving). The theft of the vehicle may be considered complete when the driving is not part of the original taking; when the driving is an act distinct from the taking; when the driving is for purposes unconnected with the original taking; when the driving is no longer part of a continuous journey away from the locus of the theft; or when the driving is not part of the escape from the scene of the theft.

Authority:

People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 394–395

People v. Van Orden (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1285

Second Holding:

Posttheft driving consists of driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent after the vehicle has been stolen, with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of title or possession. Where the evidence shows a substantial break between the taking and the driving, posttheft driving may give rise to a conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 distinct from any liability for vehicle theft.

Authority:

People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1188

People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1136

Third Holding:

Stealing a vehicle and continuing to drive it after the theft is complete are separate and distinct violations of Vehicle Code section 10851(a). Driving theft is a theft conviction; posttheft driving is not. While a theft-based violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 may be punished as a felony only if the vehicle is shown to have been worth over $950, a violation committed by posttheft driving may be charged and sentenced as a felony regardless of value.

Authority:

People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 395

People v. Van Orden (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1285-1286

People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1136

Fourth Holding:

There are alternative versions of the CALCRIM No. 1820 jury instruction pertaining to section 10851. The first version indicates that the People must prove; 1 The defendant took someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent; 2. When the defendant took the vehicle, the defendant intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time; AND 3. The vehicle was worth more than $950.

The second alternative differs as to only the third element, requiring that the driving occurred after a substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.

After telling the jury that the defendant was charged with unlawfully driving [sic] a vehicle in violation of section 10851, the court instructed only as to the first alternative, except that instead of “The defendant took someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent,” it stated “The defendant drove [sic] someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent.” Neither the written nor the oral instruction contained the third element for posttheft driving, that the driving occurred after a substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.

Authority:

CALCRIM No. 1820

Fifth Holding:

We review instructional error de novo, assessing whether the instruction accurately states the law. Further, we review a challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense. All criminal defendants have the right to a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which the defendant is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824

Sixth Holding:

A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is reviewed under the standard in Chapman. Under Chapman, we must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances,” we determine the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Merely showing the evidence presented at trial could support a conviction, however, is not sufficient. Instructional error is harmless where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. The Attorney General bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Gary note: The court then discussed aspects of the case that caused it to conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts of this case.)

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 838-839

People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1138

People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13