Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Case 001156

Error and/or relief:

The trial court should have granted the defendant’s Pitchess motion and conducted an in camera review of the officers’ personnel records.

First Holding:

A movant under the Pitchess statutes must show, among other things, good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought. A showing of good cause is measured by relatively relaxed standards that serve to insure the production for trial court review of all potentially relevant documents.

This good cause requirement has two components. First, the movant must set forth the materiality of the information sought to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. The function of this requirement is to exclude requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges. Accordingly, a defendant seeking Pitchess discovery must establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer’s version of events.

If the movant shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met. If information is material within the meaning of Brady, it is necessarily material to the subject matter involved in a criminal prosecution.

Authority:

EVID 1043

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 41-42

Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021

Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83

Second Holding:

Second, the good cause requirement obliges the movant to articulate a reasonable belief that the agency has the type of information sought. This belief may be based on a rational inference. What the defendant must present is a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents. The information sought must be described with some specificity to ensure that the defendant’s request is not so broad as to garner all information that has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime but is limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted by the defendant. This specificity requirement excludes requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges.

Authority:

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 42

Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1021, 1025

Third Holding:

If the trial court finds good cause for the motion, the court must examine the requested materials in camera to determine whether they should be disclosed to the defendant and whether certain specified categories of information must be withheld.

Authority:

City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s denial of a Pitchess motion for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 311

Fifth Holding:

By parsing the defendant’s claims as alleging a conspiracy among the several correctional officers, rather than focusing on the individual involvement of each officer and whether the defendant presented a plausible factual scenario in which, for example, one of the officers planted the contraband and/or falsified his report, the trial court abused its discretion as its ruling falls outside the bounds of reason.

Authority:

People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 850

Sixth Holding:

We find that the defendant’s Pitchess motion presented a specific factual scenario establishing a plausible factual foundation for his allegations.

Authority:

City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147

Seventh Holding:

A showing of good cause is measured by relatively relaxed standards that serve to insure the production for trial court review of all potentially relevant documents. Further, the defendant need not point to any corroboration for the defendant’s account, and is also not required to present a credible or believable factual account of, or a motive for, police misconduct.

Rather, all that is required is the presentation of a scenario that might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges. Depending on the circumstances of the case, a sufficient factual allegation in a Pitchess motion may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.

Considering the relatively relaxed standards which should be applied by the trial court to assess whether such a factual scenario was plausible, the defendant clearly made such a showing here.

Authority:

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179

Uybungco v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1049

Eighth Holding:

Where the trial court has erroneously rejected a showing of good cause for Pitchess discovery and has not reviewed the requested records in camera, the proper remedy is not outright reversal, but a conditional reversal with directions to review the requested documents in chambers on remand.

Following remand, after reviewing the confidential materials in chambers, the trial court may determine that the requested personnel records contain no relevant information and reinstate the judgment.

It is also possible for the trial court to determine on remand that relevant information exists and should be disclosed. In that event, that the trial court must order disclosure, allow the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice, and order a new trial if there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had the information been disclosed.

Authority:

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 180-181

Ninth Holding:

We find that the defendant, by failing to object when they were imposed, has forfeited his argument challenging the fines, fees, and assessments on appeal. In general, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of fines, fees, and assessments at sentencing forfeits the right to challenge those fines, fees, and assessments on appeal.

This general rule applies when the relevant statute includes an ability to pay component, including when the defendant makes a constitutional argument. Given that the defendant is in the best position to know whether he has the ability to pay, it is incumbent on him to object to the fine and demonstrate why it should not be imposed. Ability to pay is a factual determination that is properly raised and determined first in the trial court.

We recognize however, there is a possibility the defendant demonstrates he is entitled to a new trial based on the outcome of the Pitchess proceedings below. In that event, and assuming he is again convicted following that new trial, he may address any applicable fines and fees that may be imposed at sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624

People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862

People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856-858

People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729

People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1154

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 597

Case 001151

Error and/or relief

The court made several sentencing errors. The strike based on a violation of section 186.22 requires examination whether the elements found true at the time of conviction meet the heightened requirements of the amendments under AB 333.

The court imposed the upper term on several counts despite there being no jury trial waiver nor stipulation by the defendant to the aggravating factors. Further, the court relied on factors in aggravation that were also the basis of enhancements, violating the prohibition against dual use.

The court erred in imposing two full terms consecutively for two counts, as consecutive determinate (subordinate) terms are limited to one-third the middle term.

The court miscalculated the credit for time served.

First Holding:

AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to narrow the definition of “benefit” to mean “to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. The amendment applies retroactively to cases that are not final on appeal to determine whether a prior violation of section 186.22 constitutes a strike or a prior serious felony.

We remand to permit the prosecution the opportunity to establish that the prior conviction (from more than 15 years ago) constitutes a strike and a prior serious felony conviction under current law. conviction.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586–587

Second Holding:

Section 1170(b)(1) provides that when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). Under subdivision (b)(2), the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. A defendant is entitled to have a jury determine the facts justifying an upper term based on the “increasing seriousness” of a defendant’s prior convictions.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078, 1085-1086 [increasing seriousness of a crime required a jury determination]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 759–760

Third Holding:

The court erred in relying on two factors in aggravation that formed the basis of enhancements for which punishment was imposed. This was error because of the prohibition against the dual use of facts to impose an upper term sentence based on the facts of an enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(5)

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

Fourth Holding:

The court imposed two consecutive 18-year terms for each of the attempted murder counts, which consisted of the upper term of nine years double for the prior strike. This was error. The trial court may the full term, either lower, middle, or upper, for the principal term. However, in general (there are exceptions), the court may impose only one-third of the middle term’for subordinate terms.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1(a)

People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 655

Fifth Holding:

The court erred in its calculation of credit for time served, and on remand the court shall ensure that the abstract of judgment be amended to reflect the proper credits.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Case 001148

Error and/or relief

The court improperly imposed a fine and penalty assessments of $3200 without specifying how that sum was reached. Remanded for the court to determine the fine under section 290.3. The court also failed to award sufficient credit for time served. And the court improperly issued a protective order pertaining to someone who was neither a victim of nor a witness to the crime.

First Holding:

The reporter’s transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that the trial court imposed a restitution fine of $1,000 and the $3,200 penalty assessment. The court did not explain how this penalty assessment had been calculated. A restitution fine is not subject to penalty assessments.

The probation report recommended that, under section 290.3, the defendnat be ordered to pay a fine of $3,200 including penalty assessment. The probation report did not explain how the figure of $3,200 had been reached.

The court’s minutes show a restitution fine of $1,000 and a fine of $3,200 pursuant to Section 290.3. The abstract of judgment states that appellant shall pay a $3200 fine pursuant to PC 290.3.

Under section 290.3(a) the maximum fine was $300 because this was appellant’s first conviction of an offense specified in section 290(c).

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(e)

PEN 290.3(a)

PEN 290(c)

Second Holding:

On a $300 fine imposed under section 290.3, the maximum penalty assessments total $930. The penalty assessments are:

(1) a 100 percent state penalty assessment under 1464(a)(1) equal to $300;

(2) a 70 percent additional penalty under Government Code section 76000(a)(1)) equal to $210;

(3) a 20 percent state surcharge under section 1465.7) equal to $60;

(4) a 50 percent state court construction penalty under Government Code section 70372 equal to $150;

(5) a 20 percent additional penalty for emergency medical services under Government Code section 76000.5 equal to $60;

(6) a 10 percent additional DNA penalty under Government Code section 76104.6(a)(1)) equal to $30; and

(7) a 40 percent additional state-only DNA penalty under Government Code section 76104.7(a) equal to $120.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1457-1458 [the penalty assessments on a $300 fine imposed pursuant to section 290.3(a) should have totaled $930]

People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928 [though in Hamed, the GOV 76104.7(a) assessment was at 30 percent, before the section was amended to increase it to 40%]

Third Holding:

The abstract of judgment should detail the amounts of and statutory basis for the base fine and each of the penalty assessments imposed. Although we recognize that a detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not authorize shortcuts. All fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of judgment. If the abstract does not specify the amount of each fine, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation cannot fulfill its statutory duty to collect and forward deductions from prisoner wages to the appropriate agency.

Accordingly, the matter must be remanded to the trial court for recalculation of the section 290.3(a) fine and penalty assessments.

(Gary note: The court also concluded that the defendant was entitled to be present at the hearing on the recalculation, to allow the defendant to present a challenge on his ability to pay. The court did not cite any specific authority for that directive, but I’m guessing it probably had a case like People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 in mind.)

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1459

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200

Fourth Holding:

A sentencing court must award credits for all days in custody up to and including the day of sentencing. In addition to actual credit, which accumulates from time spent in custody, detainees in local institutions are usually able to earn credit against their eventual sentence for good behavior and work performed. The parties agree that the credits awarded by the court were short by 3 days. On remand, the court should recalculate the presentence custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Crenshaw (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1169, 1181

Fifth Holding:

At the time of sentencing, the trial court issued a protective order directing appellant to not contact Person A.

Section 136.2 covers protective orders. Section 136.2(i)(1) provides that, if a defendant has been convicted of [the court describes the crime committed here], the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. Person A was not a victim of the [specified crime].

Section 136.2(i)(2) authorizes the issuance of an order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the witness has been harassed by the defendant. Person A was not a percipient witness to the crime.

Thus, we direct the trial court to strike the protective order as to Person A.

Authority:

PEN 136.2

Sixth Holding:

The defendant did not object to the no-contact order. As a general rule, an appellant waives issues on appeal that he or she did not initially raise in the trial court. But there are exceptions to this rule for unauthorized sentences and sentencing decisions that are in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue a protective order during sentencing, we will consider the defendant’s claim on the merits.

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382

Case 001139

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion by denying mental health diversion because the court’s finding that his proposed treatment plan would not address his mental health needs was not supported by the record. The trial court abused its discretion by denying developmentally disabled diversion because the defendant did not produce suitable treatment program.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to create a pretrial diversion program for criminal defendants with diagnosed mental health disorders. The statute expressly promotes increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. Section 1001.36 requires the trial court to find the defendant both eligible for diversion and suitable for the program. Section 1001.36(b) and (c) set forth the criteria for each.

Authority:

PEN 1001.35

PEN 1001.36

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890-891, 887 (section 1001.36 was designed to encourage trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion, providing treatment for qualifying mental disorders that result in criminal behavior)

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Second Holding:

If the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also be satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant. This is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet.

Rather, section 1001.36(f)(1) read as a whole appears to contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion program. Under this provision, a court might reject diversion if it concluded that the proposed treatment services did not target or could not effectively address the defendant’s particular diagnosis. For instance, the court might be legitimately concerned if the evaluation of the defendant suggested the need for psychiatric medication and the recommended program did not provide psychiatric services.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(f)(1)(A)(i)

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 134

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892, 895, fn. 9

Third Holding:

Even where a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the defendant meets all the eligibility and suitability requirements, the trial court may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion. But this residual discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.

That purpose includes a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the community. Where the court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(a)

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135

Fourth Holding:

A trial court’s ruling on a request for mental health diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Further, action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

The trial court found the defendant made a prima facie showing that he was eligible and suitable for mental health diversion but denied diversion because it found the defendant’s proposed treatment program would not meet his mental health needs. We conclude substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding. (Gary note: The opinion then discusses facts specific to this defendant and the evidence produced, and concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that there was no suitable treatment plan.)

Under the circumstances, we will conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter for the court to reconsider the motion, bearing in mind the statutory principles and purpose of the mental health diversion statute.

Authority:

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 892, 895

Fifth Holding:

In this instance, the defendant also was denied diversion under section 1001.20 et seq. for developmentally disabled persons. When the court suspects that a defendant may have a developmental disability, the trial court shall order the prosecutor, the probation department, and the regional center to prepare reports on specified aspects of the defendant’s case. The trial court has a sua sponte duty to consult with the relevant agencies to determine whether a defendant may be diverted.

As with a denial of a request for mental health diversion, we review a trial court’s denial of developmental disability diversion for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

Authority:
PEN 1001.20

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 16, 18-19 [abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard]

Sixth Holding:

Unlike other diversion statutes, section 1001.23(b) does not include a stand-alone requirement that the defendant prove that his or her developmental disability was a significant factor in the commission of the charged crime.

Authority:

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 24

Seventh Holding:

There is no dispute that the defendant has a developmental disability and is eligible for regional center services. The trial court denied developmental disability diversion because it was not satisfied that the defendant presented a suitable program to meet his needs.

Under section 1001.20 et seq., however, the defendant was not required to provide a proposed plan or one that would meet his needs.

Remand is required so that the court can exercise informed discretion with the information required by statute, keeping in mind the ultimate question of whether, in light of the statutorily-prescribed considerations, defendant is a person who would benefit by diversion.

Authority:

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 31-32, 28 [trial court erroneously denied motion for developmental disability diversion under the misguided view that defendant was obligated to provide a treatment plan]

Case 001128

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the credit for time served. Although the court acknowledged that section 654 applied, it erroneously imposed concurrent sentences rather than staying any. The minute order mentions only that the two counts were stayed, and does not reflect the order for concurrent sentences. The abstract of judgment indicates that the counts were both stayed and to be served concurrently. Remanded for correction of these errors.

First Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mullins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 594, 612

Second Holding:

Sentences must be stayed to the extent that section 654 prohibits multiple punishment.

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Section 654 bars multiple punishment for offenses arising out of a single occurrence where all the offenses were incident to one objective.

Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.

In such circumstances, the court must impose but stay execution of sentence on all of the convictions arising out of the course of conduct except for one. It has long been established that the imposition of concurrent sentences is precluded by section 654 because the defendant is deemed to be subjected to the term of both sentences although they are served simultaneously.

(Gary Musing, of marginal historical interest: Prior to 1998, Penal Code section 654 had exactly the same language as it currently has, and a court was free to impose sentence on any one of the counts to which section 654 applied. See People v. Norrell (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1. In response to that Supreme Court decision, the Legislature amended section 654 to require that the court impose sentence on the count containing the longest potential term.

(Through AB 518, effective 1/1/2022, the Legislature restored section 654 to its former language, returning to the court the discretion to choose on which count punishment should be imposed and executed.

(There is likely language in one or more of the cases cited below that were decided during the time frame requiring imposition of sentence on the count carrying the longest term. Don’t be misled by that, as the law has changed, restoring the court’s discretion to choose among the counts.)

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353

People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591

People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208

People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338

People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887, abrogated on other grounds as stated in People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048, 1067, fn. 8;

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1413

Third Holding:

A sentencing court must award credits for all days in custody up to and including the day of sentencing. This includes partial days. Because an abstract of judgment represents the process and authority for carrying the judgment and sentence into effect, it is paramount that the abstract reflects the appropriate sentence and credits.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735

People v. King (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 882, 886

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Fourth Holding:

At sentencing, the court imposed a $300 restitution fine, pursuant to section 1202.4(b), which it stayed. It also imposed and suspended a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. The abstract of judgment, however, erroneously lists the fines as $900. It also fails to state the restitution fine is stayed. We therefore order the errors in the amount of the restitution fines be corrected.

Authority:

People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 22 [a court may only impose one restitution fine per case, so it is error to impose a restitution fine as to each count]

Fifth Holding:

The court also imposed ancillary assessments. We remand to give the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate whether he has the ability to pay, under equal protection principles, inasmuch as the court has the authority to waive such fees entirely in civil matters.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9, 30

Sixth Holding:

Due process does not require an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine. Instead, the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. Four factors are relevant to determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay.

Authority:

U.S. Const., Eighth Amendment

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11 & fn. 6, 23

United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 327–328

People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728