Category Archives: Retroactivity

Case: 000182

Error and/or relief

In light of AB 333, the trial court’s true findings on the prior serious felony enhancement and the strike prior allegations must be reversed. It is undisputed that there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s prior gang-related conviction (sec. 186.22(a)) satisfied the more stringent evidentiary requirements imposed by the change in law. Therefore, the court erred in considering that conviction to double defendant’s sentence. Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence and remand the matter for further proceedings. The defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings, including a full resentencing. On remand, the People may elect to retry, under current law, the allegation that defendant’s prior gang-related conviction qualifies as a serious felony and strike prior for purposes of the three strikes law and a prior serious felony enhancement.

First Holding:

Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) narrowed liability for gang-related offenses by requiring more stringent evidentiary requirements for proving them.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 576

Second Holding:

AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. It applies to the analogous determination under section 667(a) for prior serious felony enhancements. Thus, AB 333’s amendments to section 186.22 apply to the current determination of whether the prosecution has proven the prior serious felony enhancement allegations in this case. In other words, whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes a felony violation of Section 186.22 is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583, 605, 607

Third Holding:

Where, as here, AB 333 applies retroactively to the determination of whether a prior gang-related conviction qualifies as a serious felony for purposes of the three strikes law and a prior serious felony enhancement we review for harmless error pursuant to Chapman. Vacating a true finding is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the finding would have been the same under current law. If there is any reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the finding, vacatur is required.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Lewis (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 874, 887

Fourth Holding:

At the time the defendant entered his guilty plea, the People were not required to prove, and defendant did not admit, the current evidentiary requirements of that provision, as amended by AB 333. Under these circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the true findings on the allegations that defendant’s prior gang-related conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony for purposes of the three strikes law and the prior serious felony enhancement and remand the matter to the trial court to allow the People the opportunity to retry those allegations under current law, considering the elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 607-608

Case: 000180

Error and/or relief

The restitution fine imposed more than 10 years ago must be stricken from the judgment.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The statute is retroactive, because On January 1, 2025, when the amendment became effective, his restitution fine was rendered uncollectible and unenforceable. There is no authority for the People’s assertion that a hearing on a petition for resentencing under section 1172.75 starts a new period of 10 years.

Authority:

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069 [applying the amendment to a restitution fine imposed in 2008]

Case: 000137

Error and/or relief

The minor contends, and the People concede, that recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 apply retroactively, requiring that the restitution fine imposed by the juvenile court be stricken.

First Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended section 730.6 and removed the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine. The relevant portion of the statute now provides that the court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section 602.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

Second Holding:

Appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of this amendment.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745-746 [ameliorative legislation changes applicable to cases pending on appeal]

Case: 000134

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in imposing the upper term on factors that had not been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

A criminal judgment does not become final for purposes of Estrada when an appellate court affirms a conviction, but leaves sentencing issues pending before the trial court following remand. During the resentencing on remand, the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation apply retroactively.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

Absent waiver or stipulation, aggravating factors such as the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions and unsatisfactory performance on probation must be found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury before those facts can be used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082

Third Holding:

This case must be distinguished from Brannon-Thompson, which found that the plain language of section 1172.75(d)(4) indicated the Legislature intended the new burden of proof amendments to section 1170(b) to apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper term for the first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing. In this case, the defendant was not being resentenced after a prior sentence that imposed an upper term was recalled.

Instead, he was on remand from the prior appeal directive to strike prior prison term enhancements before section 1172.75 even went into effect (which the court did). As such, when the trial court proceeded to resentence defendant in 2023, his sentence already lacked any enhancements imposed pursuant to former section 667.5(b). Defendant accordingly was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2023, making the provision inapplicable. Instead, appearing for resentencing based on a remand in the prior appeal, the defendant was entitled to the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation, including the new evidentiary standards of section 1170(b).

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455

Case: 000130

Error and/or relief

Following remand from the defendant’s prior appeal, the trial court declined to strike a firearm enhancement. The court did not realize the impact of recent changes in the law on gang criminal activity, asserting that its jurisdiction was limited to the scope defined in the remittitur (which remanded for reconsideration of the request to dismiss the firearm enhancement). We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for the trial court to rule on defendant’s motion to dismiss the gang enhancements, and to reconsider its determination declining to dismiss the firearm enhancements under section 1385 under the standard more recently articulated by the Supreme Court.

First Holding:

The scope of the superior court’s jurisdiction as defined by a remittitur does not prevent the retroactive application of ameliorative laws. We review associated questions of statutory construction de novo. Whether a statute applies retroactively is a question of statutory construction we review de novo. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 1385(c).

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 396

People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242

People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033

Second Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the nine mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

Third Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances, when they are present. In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024

Fourth Holding:

The Legislature amended PC 186.22(g) to redefine the phrase “benefit, promote, further, or assist” a criminal street gang for the purposes of section 186.22. The phrase now means “to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational.” Those elemental changes apply retroactively to all nonfinal cases such as this one.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(e)(1)

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745

Fifth Holding:

Where a statute is silent regarding retroactivity, we employ the ordinary presumptions and rules of statutory construction to discern the Legislature’s intent. Ordinarily, statutes are presumed to apply only prospectively, unless the Legislature expressly declares otherwise. Estrada, however, held that an amendment to a statute that lessened punishment for a crime gave rise to an inference of contrary legislative intent; that is, that the Legislature must have intended that the amendment mitigating punishment would apply retroactively to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The Estrada rule rests on an inference that the Legislature intends an amendment reducing punishment under a criminal statute to apply as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.

Authority:

Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 230

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308

Sixth Holding:

If the trial court exercises its discretion to dismiss the gang enhancements, the prosecution will be entitled to the same remedy as the defense (i.e., withdrawal from the plea agreement) and the trial court may withdraw its approval of the plea agreement as well. In that event, the trial court must restore the parties to the status quo ante, including permitting the prosecution to request to reopen the preliminary hearing and present evidence on the new elements of the gang allegations or to proceed without those charges.

Authority:

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 707-708

People v. Superior Court (Garcia) (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 256

Mendoza v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 42

Seventh Holding:

Penal Code section 1016.7 provides that, in the interest of justice and to reach a just resolution during plea negotiations, the prosecutor shall consider whether the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, whether the defendant is or was a youth at the time of the commission of the offense, and whether any of those considerations contributed to the commission of an alleged offense. The statute defines youth as any person under 26 years of age on the date of the offense. But it is not retroactive. It does not reduce punishment for a criminal offense, create discretion to reduce punishment, narrow the scope of criminal liability, or create a concrete avenue for certain individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more leniently or avoid punishment altogether.

Authority:

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 13

Case: 000126

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously used the defendant’s 2012 prior conviction to sentence him under the Three Strikes law without first determining whether that gang-enhanced felony could have been obtained after amendments enacted by AB 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699).

First Holding:

Where a defendant has previously suffered a conviction under the prior version of Penal Code section 186.22, the changes made in AB 333 apply to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576

Second Holding:

By treating the defendant’s 2012 conviction as a prior strike conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence that is unauthorized by law under Fletcher. The defendant’s argument is therefore not forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 749, fn. 7 [forfeiture principles do not apply to legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 751 [The unauthorized sentence rule is an exception to the forfeiture doctrine. It permits a challenge to an unauthorized sentence on appeal even if the defendant failed to object below.]

Case: 000117

Error and/or relief

The trial court’s judgment is modified to vacate any portions of the probation related fees imposed by the trial court as part of probation condition No. 14 that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021.

First Holding:

AB 1869 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) repealed the authority to collect various fees. The bill makes the unpaid balance of these fees unenforceable, uncollectible, and requires that any portion of a judgment imposing such fees be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The defendant is entitled to the retroactive application of these ameliorative changes.

Authority:

People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 680

People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 258

Case 000088

Error and/or relief

The trial court made several errors in resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.5. It failed to strike the now-invalid priors, if failed to consider the impact of AB 333 on gang aspects; it imposed of repealed $10 admin fee. On remand the court must also recalculate credits and correct the abstract of judgment. [GARY NOTE: The opinion also provided extensive discussion of the application of section 1385, regarding dismissals in the furtherance or interest of justice, touching on abuse of discretion, etc., that were resolved against the defendant on appeal. I have provided a few principles and authorities on those points for educational reasons, even though they did not support relief for the defendant in this instance.]

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 declares legally invalid all one-year prior prison term enhancements except those for sexually violent offenses described in WI Code section 6600(b). Because the defendant’s two priors are not sexually violent offenses, they were legally invalid and should have been stricken.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333) modified the gang enhancement by adding new requirements that did not previously exist. Because AB 333 retroactively applies to people, like defendant, who have been granted a resentencing hearing, the trial court erred in not assessing whether the jury’s findings in this case otherwise addressed the new requirements or whether the jury’s failure to do so was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 395-396

Third Holding:

The trial court imposed a $10 administrative screening fee ostensibly under section 1463.07 in November 2018. This is unenforceable because our Legislature in 2021 repealed that section and nullified prior fees imposed under that section.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Fourth Holding:

It was not necessary for the trial court to respond to all of the defendant’s contentions at the sentencing hearing. Unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set forth in the rules.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.409 [sentencing factors will be deemed to have been considered unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise]

People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765

People v. Parra Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322

People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637

Fifth Holding:

We review the exercise of sentencing discretion for an abuse of discretion but recognize that a trial court’s reliance on an incorrect legal standard constitutes such an abuse. Application of the wrong test in determination of whether a defendant poses a danger to public safety is an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

Sixth Holding:

Despite the use of the phrase “shall be dismissed,” section 1385’s provisions that require a court to give great weight in favor of dismissal do not apply where a trial court finds that dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296

People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 444-446

People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 335-337

People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1284-1290

People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 238-241

People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15-21

Case 000068

Error and/or relief

The matter must be remanded again, this time for retrial of the section 667(a) enhancement in light of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333), which narrowed liability for gang-related crimes.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 amended section 186.22 to change the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

AB 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of prior serious felony enhancements under section 667(a). Whether a prior conviction was for an offense that constitutes a felony violation of Section 186.22 is determined by applying the current version of section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582-583, 607

Third Holding:

Assembly Bill No. 333 is retroactive under Estrada, meaning it applies to cases like this one where the judgment is not yet final.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Fourth Holding:

In this instance, the appellate court filed a memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(1). The Courts of Appeal should dispose of causes that raise no substantial issues of law or fact by memorandum or other abbreviated form of opinion. Such causes could include: (1) An appeal that is determined by a controlling statute which is not challenged for unconstitutionality and does not present any substantial question of interpretation or application; (2) An appeal that is determined by a controlling decision which does not require a reexamination or restatement of its principles or rules; or (3) An appeal raising factual issues that are determined by the substantial evidence rule. [Gary note: I included this tidbit simply to raise awareness of a Court of Appeals options in how opinions may be crafted.]

Authority:

California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1(1)

 

Case 000056

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals an order partially denying his request for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. We reverse the order because the defendant was entitled to have the court consider his eligibility for relief under Assembly Bill No. 333.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements for prior prison terms.

Authority:

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388

Second Holding:

Assembly Bill 333 (revising the elements that must be proven to support gang crimes and enhancement allegations) applies to cases where a defendant is resentenced pursuant to section 1172.75, even where there was a negotiated plea agreement.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 400

Third Holding:

Assembly Bill 333 took effect on January 1, 2022 and is considered ameliorative legislation.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 397

People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477

Fourth Holding:

The trial court should have considered the applicability of Assembly Bill 333 in the context of the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, whether or not his counsel brought the issue to the attention of the court. By its express language, section 1172.75 itself puts the onus on the trial court to apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences. Assembly Bill 333 is such a law and should have been addressed by the trial court.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2

Fifth Holding:

In the criminal law context, when ameliorative legislation goes into effect, we generally presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all non-final cases.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745

Sixth Holding:

For purposes of Estrada, the test for finality is whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.

Authority:

People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 679 [The meaning of finality in the Estrada context is distinct from the issue of whether a judgment is final for purposes of appealability]

Case 000051

Error and/or relief

The restitution fine must be vacated because more than 10 years have elapsed since the court imposed the fine.

First Holding:

Restitution fines are no longer collectible 10 years after their imposition and the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

Section 1465.9 is retroactive to those whose judgments are not final.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [absent evidence to the contrary, we presume ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments]

Case 000035

Error and/or relief

After the passage of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the court held a resentencing hearing at which it recalled defendant’s sentence, struck the prison prior enhancement, sentenced defendant to a term of 24 years, and set the matter for further resentencing. At the subsequent hearing, the court denied defendant’s motion to strike his 10-year gang enhancement, finding that granting it would endanger public safety. On appeal, defendant asserts the court erred in failing to conduct a full resentencing — specifically, that it did not consider Assembly Bill No. 333’s impact on his sentence. He also claims the court erred by considering his current dangerousness, rather than his future dangerousness upon release, and by not recalculating his custody credits at resentencing. The People concede that the matter should be remanded for a full resentencing and that defendant’s credits should be recalculated.

First Holding:

The matter must be remanded for a full resentencing. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall]

Second Holding:

Amendments made by Assembly Bill 333 regarding elements constituting gang misconduct applied retroactively.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 28

Third Holding:

If the court determines the gang enhancement must be vacated, the People must be given the opportunity to retry the gang enhancement in compliance with the amendments brought about by Assembly Bill 333. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction. If the People choose to retry it, the trial court is directed to conduct a full resentencing after that issue has been decided.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669

United States v. Tateo (1964) 377 U.S. 463, 465

Fourth Holding:

If the court modifies a defendant’s sentence, then the court must recalculate the number of days that the defendant has already spent in custody and award those recalculated credits in the new abstract of judgment.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, 37, 41