Category Archives: Standard of review

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001011

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in ruling that the defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because the abstract of judgment did not reflect any now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. The abstract of judgment was in error.

First Holding:

Before 2020, the Penal Code instructed criminal sentencing courts to impose a one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail term’ the defendant had previously served for a felony. Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated one-year prior prison term enhancements except in cases involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses.

In 2021 the Legislature enacted section 1172.75, which “made the change retroactive. Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1053-1054

Second Holding:

In section 1172.75(b), the Legislature established a mechanism for resentencing individuals currently serving a term for a judgment that includes such an enhancement. Section 1172.75(b) requires the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations to identify for the sentencing courts all persons currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).

Further, if a sentencing court verifies that a defendant was sentenced under an invalid enhancement, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(b) and (c)

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Third Holding:

Where section 1172.75 applies, it requires full resentencing. Section 1172.75(d)(1) states that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety, and further, resentencing shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1067

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855 [By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements.]

Fourth Holding:

We generally review a trial court’s decision under section 1172.75 for an abuse of discretion. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence, consider whether the court’s rulings of law are correct, and determine whether the court’s application of the law to the facts is arbitrary or capricious. However, where the appeal from a resentencing order raises a question of law, our review is de novo.

Authority:

People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 366, review granted Aug. 13, 2025, S291628

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855-856, 857

People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 194 [reviewing de novo whether the word imposed as used in 1172.75 applies to cases where execution of a prior prison term enhancement was stayed], affirmed (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57

Fifth Holding:

The trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment controls over a conflicting abstract of judgment. In this instance, the prior convictions were never stricken, and thus should have been reflected in the abstract of judgment. The defendant was eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Whalum (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1, 15 [Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.]

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855 [Any discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as recorded in the clerk’s minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result of clerical error.]

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001010

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In resentencing the defendant, the court abused its discretion in not giving proper consideration to whether to strike prior strike convictions. Remanded for proper consideration.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.

Effective January 1, 2024, a trial court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.

Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading.

In resentencing the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, the resentencing court shall consider if the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, and whether those circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Second Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

Section 1385(c)(2) further provides that, in exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. Accordingly, if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, then the court need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296

Third Holding:

A court’s decision not to strike a prior serious felony enhancement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 585

People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242–243 [a trial court’s exercise of discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice]

Fourth Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,1029

Fifth Holding:

A trial court has discretion under the Three Strikes law to dismiss or vacate prior conviction allegations or findings in the furtherance of justice. In exercising its discretion, the court may give no weight whatsoever to factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes scheme.

Instead, preponderant weight must be accorded to factors intrinsic to the scheme, such the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and the prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects. In considering these intrinsic factors the court must determine whether the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.

While the purpose of the Three Strikes law was to ensure longer prison sentences, the “overarching consideration” and “underlying purpose” in striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1385(a)

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530-531

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 498–500

Sixth Holding:

Abuse of discretion in failing to strike a prior conviction occurs in limited circumstances: where the trial court is not aware of its discretion; where the trial court considers impermissible factors; or where applying the Three Strikes law would produce an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd result under the specific facts of a particular case.

A reviewing court’s disagreement with the trial court’s weighing of proper factors (as distinct from the trial court’s reliance on improper factors in the weighing process) does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

We conclude from this record that the trial court failed to balance the appropriate factors set forth in Williams, that is, the defendant’s personal background, character, and prospects, and the specifics of his criminal history, the characteristics of the present offense for which he was being resentenced, or if a shorter sentence would accommodate risks to public safety.

Significantly, courts have reversed the denial of dismissal of prior strikes in instances where the prior strikes were far more serious than the defendant’s.

(Gary note: I have left out the appellate court’s recitation of facts peculiar to this defendant and the facts in this case, but court determined that the lower court had not given proper consideration of those factors. It remanded for a proper consideration.)

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378-379

People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029

People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140–1141 [defendant’s three previous strikes were two robberies and assault with a knife]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001006

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for a new hearing on the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, in light of new case law regarding examination of prior serious felonies and strikes depending on criminal gang activity. Further, the restitution fine must vacated, as it is more than 10 years old.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes law is a sentencing scheme that requires a court to double or sometimes triple the punishment for a felony offense if the defendant was previously convicted of a crime that qualifies as a serious or violent felony. The serious or violent felonies that trigger this sentencing scheme, commonly referred to as strikes or strike priors, are enumerated by statute. The list of serious felonies includes any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22. Section 186.22 defines substantive gang offenses and gang enhancements.

Authority:

PEN 667(e)

PEN 1170.12(c)

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

PEN 667.5(c)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582

Second Holding:

The Legislature enacted AB 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which among other things, changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. Fletcher held that prior convictions premised on section 186.22 must be examined under currently law in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions or strikes.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 585, 587

Third Holding:

When the applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing. The Salazar court accordingly held that when a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Though the Salazar decision is premised on the trial court’s scope of discretion being changed during pendency of appeal, whereas here the trial court’s discretion has remained the same but a material fact about defendant’s past record has been modified since the time of sentencing. We nevertheless find the test set forth in Salazar to be applicable here, because the Salazar court itself observed the similarity between the two scenarios: A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424-425

Fourth Holding:

Retrial of the strike under the current law would be appropriate, should the prosecutor so choose.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 608

Fifth Holding:

The restitution fine was imposed in 2011. Section 1465.9(d) has been added since then, to provide that any restitution fine is unenforceable and uncollectible upon the expiration of 10 years after date of imposition.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001003

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The verdict form contained a typographical error regarding the appropriate subdivision on the use of firearm enhancement. The reference to subdivision (d) in the verdict from is stricken. There are several errors in the abstract of judgment and minute order that require correction.

First Holding:

A verdict is to be given a reasonable intendment and be construed in light of the issues submitted to the jury and the instructions of the court. Technical defects in a verdict may be disregarded if the jury’s intent to convict of a specified offense within the charges is unmistakably clear, and the accused’s substantial rights suffered no prejudice.

Where the error is in the recording of the judgment, as opposed to in the rendering of the judgment, it is clerical error which may be disregarded or corrected. Here, inclusion of subdivision (d) in addition to subdivision (a) was clearly a clerical error, and must be stricken from the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 373, 378–379

People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 447

People v. Camacho (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273

People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 370

Second Holding:

The minute order fails to reflect that on motion by the prosecution the court dismissed the factors in aggravation. It must be corrected to reflect the dismissal. The abstract of judgment reflects that the defendant must pay [more than $10,000] to the Victim Compensation Board twice. The duplicate entry must be stricken from the abstract of judgment. There is an error on the abstract of judgment in reflect the determinate term where an indeterminate term has also been imposed, and the abstract of judgment must be corrected accordingly.

(Gary note: The court cited no authority for its orders directing the corrections, except for Wright, which it cited to demonstrate how the abstract should have been prepared. I have include some cases that the court could have drawn from as authority, had it felt it necessary.)

Authority:

People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 848 [where remainder of sentence is indeterminate, in section six, the determinate form CR-290 must show no time]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Discretion, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000999

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request for mental health diversion because its finding that he is ineligible for diversion is not supported by substantial evidence.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to authorize trial courts to grant pretrial mental health diversion to defendants diagnosed with qualifying mental disorders. To be eligible for mental health diversion, a defendant must meet two requirements.

One, the defendant must have been diagnosed within the past five years with a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

And two, the defendant’s mental disorder must be a significant factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b)

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 677

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 400

Second Holding:

Among the express purposes of the diversion program is to increase diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.

Under section 1001.36(b), the court must find a causal connection unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the mental disorder was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. Eligibility no longer turned on findings to the court’s satisfaction.

The statute requires the court to find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrates otherwise. And it is the prosecution’s burden to provide clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption.

Authority:

Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 80

People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891

People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 52

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 688

Third Holding:

Once a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, the trial court must then determine whether a defendant is suitable for diversion using the four criteria outlined in section 1001.36(c): (1) A qualified mental health expert has determined the defendant’s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant has consented to diversion and waived the right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant has agreed to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, and (4) the court has determined the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 400-401

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. By definition, ‘substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere speculation.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851

Fifth Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before us is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the dispute] fact was true.

More specifically, in this context, we must determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. To answer that question, we review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.

(Gary note: The balance of the decision discusses the conclusions drawn by the trial court that it relied on to conclude that the mental disorder did not contribute to the offense. The appellate court concluded that the inferences the trial court drew were not substantial evidence to overcome by clear and convincing the presumption that the mental disorder was a contributing factor, and reversed the denial. It remanded for the court to reconsider the defendant’s application for mental health diversion consistent with the appellate court’s opinion.)

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401-402

Duty of counsel, Duty of the court, Immigration, Plea bargains, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000994

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea conviction under section 1473.7, because the defendant demonstrated entitlement to relief.

First Holding:

In response to the absence of a legal remedy for individuals who are no longer in custody but find themselves facing unanticipated immigration consequences resulting from a guilty or no contest plea entered years earlier, the Legislature added section 1473.7 to the Penal Code, effective January 1, 2017. The statute was subsequently amended to broaden eligibility for relief beyond the entry of a plea.

In relevant part, the statute now provides that individuals may file a motion for relief from a conviction or sentence on the basis that the conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. Relief is not contingent upon establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(a)

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 522-523

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 12-13

Second Holding:

A defendant must satisfy three statutory requirements to be eligible to seek relief from a legally invalid conviction or sentence under section 1473.7(a)(1). The movant must show he is no longer in criminal custody, and the conviction or sentence being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization. The motion must also be timely.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 13

Third Holding:

To prevail under section 1473.7, a defendant must demonstrate that his conviction is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging his or her ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.

The defendant must first show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.

Next, the defendant must show that his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.

Prejudical error means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529

Fourth Holding:

We evaluate prejudicial error under the totality of the circumstances.

Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.

The defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea and the difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at trial are also relevant.

These factors are not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.

A defendant must provide objective evidence to corroborate factual assertions. Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320-321

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529-530

People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 564

Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. 357, 358

Fifth Holding:

On appeal, we apply independent review to evaluate whether a defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its immigration consequences.

We exercise independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law, and defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on the credibility of witnesses the superior court heard and observed.

However, when, as in this case, the trial court’s findings derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, the trial court and the reviewing court are in the same position, and no deference is owed.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319-320

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527-528

Sixth Holding:

The focus of this inquiry is the defendant’s own error. Thus, the key is the mindset of the defendant and not what an objectively reasonable person would have understood under the circumstances.

The defendant is the only one with direct access to his state of mind, but a defendant’s assertion as to his or her state of mind is not accepted at face value by courts evaluating a section 1473.7 motion. Such assertions must be corroborated with objective evidence.

A party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration of plea counsel.

Authority:

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 16-17

People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871

People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 325

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 962

Seventh Holding:

The standard section 1016.5 advisement—given to all criminal defendants in California who plead guilty to any offense other than an infraction—that his or her criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences does not bar a defendant from seeking relief from his plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance based on immigration consequences. Thus, the fact the superior court advised defendant pursuant to section 1016.5 does not resolve the matter against defendant.

Authority:

People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 889, 895

People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 577-578

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 962

Eighth Holding:

Prior to Padilla, there was no Sixth Amendment obligation on the part of defense counsel to affirmatively advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a conviction. Rather, most courts had determined that no such duty existed.

As a general rule, a failure to anticipate changes in the law is not considered ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Gary note:  I think we all know what the court means by “Prior to Padilla, there was no Sixth Amendment obligation ….”  But I think a more accurate statement would be something like, “Padilla was the first pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court recognizing that the Sixth Amendment places an obligation on the part of defense counsel to ….”  The Sixth Amendment was certainly not amended to add any provision generating a new obligation.  The Sixth Amendment has been around for centuries, unchanged.  It was only its import that hadn’t been seen in the past, at least by the High Court.

(The court’s phrasing as I’ve set out in the Ninth Holding tracks what I’m saying.

(I mention this because I think sometimes it is important to argue that something is NOT new law, and that it has BEEN the law all along, notwithstanding that it had not previously been understood to be the law.  Why is that important?  It can make the difference in whether a court recognizes that your client’s rights were violated, even though it was only through a later appellate analysis that the nature of the violation was discovered.  We don’t want the court to assume that, because no court had seen it before, your client is not entitled to its benefit.

(There have been decisions, of course, that decline to revisit cases where, had the law been understood at the time, there would have been a different result.  But that is generally related to the principle of finality of judgment and the jurisdiction of the court to act on the case.  While not directly the same, think of the Estrada presumption of retroactivity of ameliorative changes in the law to those whose judgments are not final, in the absence of clear intent that the change was to be applied prospectively only.  

(Just sayin’.

(Of course, with respect to Padilla, the practical effect is that yes, the Sixth Amendment imposes the obligation on the attorney to provide the advice, but the failure to do so prior to Padilla is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel as that principle has been described in the past.  As the court in this case said, relying on In re Grinder, “As a general rule, a failure to anticipate changes in the law is not considered ineffective assistance of counsel.”

(Was there a change in the law?  Or simply a change in the understanding of the Sixth Amendment?  Of course, the opposition might argue that court pronouncements dictate what is the law, and therefore they represent the law, and thererfore it wasn’t until Padilla that the Sixth Amendment created the obligation.  An interesting debate, or not, but for another time.)  

Authority:

Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356

Chaidez v. United States (2013) 568 U.S. 342, 353

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 17

In re Grinder (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 845, 872

Ninth Holding:

Here, defendant entered his plea 15 years before the United States Supreme Court held in Padilla that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to provide affirmative and competent advice to noncitizen defendants regarding the potential immigration consequences of their criminal cases. As such, defendant’s attestation that his attorney did not advise him about the immigration consequences of his plea is consistent with the state of the law at that time.

(Gary note: The appellate court examined and analyzed extensively many facts in the record from which it concluded that, based primarily on the principles I have extracted in this summary, the defendant was entitled to relief because his plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently within the contemplation of section 1473.7. I have omitted those details, some of which included citations to other cases apparently relevant to those details. Since this was an unpublished decision and cannot be cited for comparison, and since this is supposed to be a summary and not a copy of the entire decision, I have to stop about here.)

Authority:

PEN 1016.2

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 18

People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 307–312

 

Duty of the court, Jury trial, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000993

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court failed to properly advise the defendant of his right to a jury trial on certain aggravating factors, and that his admissions to those factors were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Accordingly, we vacate appellant’s sentence and remand the matter for a full resentencing.

Before the matter was submitted to the jury, appellant admitted the allegations of circumstances in aggravation under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) through (5). During the admission colloquy, the trial court advised appellant that he only had the right to a court trial on the truth of the allegations. We agree with the defendant that this advisement was incorrect, and that the record does not establish that his admissions were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

The factors in question under rule 4.421(b) are, in essence:
(2) The defendant’s prior convictions are numerous and of increasing seriousness;
(3) The defendant has served prior terms in prison;
(4) The defendant was on probation or parole when he committed the alleged offenses; and
(5) The defendant’s prior performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory.

First Holding:

A criminal defendant has the right to a jury trial on the facts underlying aggravating factors used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence under section 1170(b). That right is not merely a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally required for all aggravating facts.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

Second Holding:

Section 1170(b)(3) provides a limited exception for prior convictions, permitting the court to consider them based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Our Supreme Court has clarified, however, that the exception is narrowly limited to the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements.

Applying this principle, Wiley held that jury findings were required for aggravating factors based on increasingly serious prior convictions and unsatisfactory prior performance on probation or parole.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082

Third Holding:

Because the Sixth Amendment affords a defendant the right to a jury trial on alleged aggravating factors, a valid admission to those factors requires the same advisements and waivers required for a stipulation to a prior conviction.

This includes advisement and waiver of the defendant’s Boykin-Tahl rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront adverse witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.  A defendant must also be advised of the penal consequences of the admission.

If the trial court fails to properly advise the defendant of these rights or consequences, reversal is required unless the record affirmatively shows, under the totality of the circumstances, that the admission was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Authority:

People v. Kinnear (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1127

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 745–746

Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238

In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122

People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170

People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361–365

Due process, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000992

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We find sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant violated the conditions of his probation. But in light of the materially inaccurate information that appears to have influenced the defendant’s sentence, we cannot conclude that the superior court exercised informed discretion in imposing his sentence. Remanded for resentencing.

First Holding:

A probation violation is provable by a preponderance of the evidence. We review factual findings in this respect for substantial evidence. Under that standard, our review is limited to the determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the trial court’s decision. In conducting this inquiry, we give full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Authority:

People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441

People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318

People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 198

Second Holding:

There may be situations in which a prisoner is entitled to a new sentencing hearing, but only where he shows that: (1) material false information was (2) relied upon by the sentencing judge, and (3) the defendant had no opportunity at the time of sentencing to correct such false information. The probation officer’s report stated that the defendant was found in violation of probation for, among other things, using illicit drugs. In fact, he was not found to have used drugs, and he was not found in violation for using drugs.

The record here reflects that the court relied on that materially false information. When defense counsel attempted to bring it to the court’s attention that the statement was untrue, the court gave no feedback or acknowledgement and simply proceeded with sentencing, in contrast to an earlier correction on a different misunderstanding brought to the court’s attention by the prosecutor, whom the court thanked for bringing the correction to the court’s attention.

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. On this record, which appears to show that the sentencing court believed that the drug-use allegations had been proven, we cannot be confident that the court exercised informed discretion.

Authority:

In re Beal (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 94, 99–100

People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8

Third Holding:

A court’s alleged reliance on inaccurate information that appears to have contributed to the defendant’s sentence implicates the federal constitutional guarantee of due process. We evaluate such claims under the standard set forth in Chapman. This stricter standard of review requires reversal unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Eckley (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 251

Fourth Holding:

In revoking and terminating probation, trial court is entitled to consider defendant’s performance on probation from the time it was originally granted until it was reinstated for the final time.

Authority:

People v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 145, 151

Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000991

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Insufficient evidence supported the jury’s gang predicate offense findings, and we therefore reverse the true findings on the gang and gang firearm enhancements, as well as the gang special circumstance. We reject the defendant’s other arguments.

First Holding:

The role of the reviewing court in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence claims is a limited one. We review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court, that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

When there are two possible grounds for the jury’s verdict, one unreasonable and the other reasonable, we will assume, absent a contrary indication in the record, that the jury based its verdict on the reasonable ground.

Authority:

People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 277–278

Second Holding:

To prove the gang allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution had to show (1) the defendant committed the murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, and (2) with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.

A criminal street gang is defined as (1) an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, (2) having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the enumerated criminal acts, (3) having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and (4) whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.

A pattern of criminal gang activity means (1) the commission of or conviction of, two or more enumerated criminal acts, (2) provided at least one of these offenses occurred after September 26, 1988, and the last of those offenses occurred within three years of the prior offense and within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to have been committed, (3) the offenses were committed on separate occasions by two or more members, (4) the offenses commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and (5) the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.

The acts making up the pattern of gang activity are commonly referred to as predicate offenses.

Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential[,] current or previous witness or informant. The charged offenses cannot be used to satisfy the gang allegation requirements.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(b)(1), (e)(1), (e)(2), (f)

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 460

People v. Shively (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 460, 465-466

(Gary note:

(Gary note: The balance of this aspect of the opinion deals with the specifics of the evidence and inferences to be drawn, and the appellate court determined that the evidence in support of two of the three predicate offenses alleged by the prosecution were not supported by sufficient evidence. The court then reversed the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance gang allegation under section 190.2(a)(22) and the true findings on the gang enhancements charged under sections 186.22 (b)(1)(C) and 12022.53(d) and (e). It remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

(The defendant unsuccessfully raised many other issues. I have included several as holdings (Third through Eighth) because they do state important legal principles even though unrelated to the sufficiency of evidence successful argument.)

Third Holding:

Advocates are given significant leeway in discussing the legal and factual merits of a case during argument. Prosecutors have wide latitude to present vigorous arguments so long as they are a fair comment on the evidence, including reasonable inferences and deductions from it. When attacking the prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, the defendant must show that, in the context of the whole argument and the instructions, there was a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. In conducting this inquiry, we do not lightly infer that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.

A prosecutor’s conduct violates a defendant’s constitutional rights when the behavior comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects ‘ “the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Even if the behavior does not reach that level of egregiousness, it may still violate California law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods when attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. he focus of the inquiry is on the effect of the prosecutor’s action on the defendant, not on the intent or bad faith of the prosecutor.

Authority:

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666

People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 606

People v. Sanchez (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528

Fourth Holding:

A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is ordinarily preserved for appeal only if the defendant made a timely and specific objection at trial and requested an admonition. The primary purpose of the requirement that a defendant object at trial to argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct is to give the trial court an opportunity, through admonition of the jury, to correct any error and mitigate any prejudice. Consistent with that purpose, a court will excuse a defendant’s failure to object only if an objection would have been futile, or if an admonition would not have mitigated the harm caused by the misconduct.

Authority:

People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 853

Fifth Holding:

The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense. In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. However, the trial court should only give instructions supported by substantial evidence.

Evidence is substantial’ for this purpose if it is sufficient to deserve consideration by the jury, that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive. At the same time, instructions not supported by substantial evidence should not be given. It is error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case.

Authority:

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824

People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 58

People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1049-1950

Sixth Holding:

In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. We independently review the wording of a jury instruction to assess whether the instruction accurately states the law. The test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the charge in a manner that violated the defendant’s rights.

Further, the correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction. Moreover, any theoretical possibility of confusion may be diminished by the parties’ closing arguments. Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the facts of the case.

Authority:

People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953

People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210

People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218

People v. Davison (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 206, 212

People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220, overruled on another ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192

Seventh Holding:

The Watson standard of prejudice (i.e., the error is reversible when there is a reasonable probability defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error) applies to an instruction that misdirects the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions. In contrast, the Chapman standard of review (i.e., error is harmless only when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained) applies when an instruction improperly describes or omits an element of the offense.

Authority:

People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 493

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Eighth Holding:

When a trial court orally misstates instructions that are legally correct in written form, the jury is presumed to be guided by the written instructions based upon copies of the instructions received for deliberations.

Authority:

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 687

People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 200–201 [written instructions control over verbal instructions]

People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803 [same]

People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 680 [we view the record as a whole, and consider the instructions in context]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000989

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On retrial of the gang allegations in light of the changes made by AB 333 since the original conviction, the court misinstructed the jury on the relationship between the gang’s predicate offenses and its organizational structure, its primary activities, or its common goals and principles. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the gang enhancements.

First Holding:

We review instructional error claims under an independent or de novo standard of review.

Authority:

People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218

Second Holding:

A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the essential elements of a special circumstance allegation or a sentence enhancement. Failure to properly instruct on an essential element is constitutional error, warranting reversal unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under the Chapman harmless error standard, the burden is on the People, not the defendant, to demonstrate that the violation of the defendant’s federal constitutional right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard requires the beneficiary of a federal constitutional error–the People–to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.

Authority:

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409-410

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Atkins (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 963, 981 [the presumption is that we must reverse, unless we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 349

People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463

Third Holding:

The California Supreme Court issued its decision in Clark in February 2024. The jury reached its verdicts in the instant case several months later. The CALCRIM instructions defining the gang enhancement allegations and special circumstances were amended a month later to add two sentences, as required by Clark:

“As used here, members collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity when the crimes that make up the pattern of criminal gang activity can be connected to the gang as a whole. Collective engagement requires a connection between the crimes and the gang’s organizational structure or manner of governance, its primary activities, or its common goals and principles.”

The trial court used the older versions of CALCRIM No. 1401 (the gang enhancement), and CALCRIM No. 736 (the gang-murder special circumstance), and therefore did not instruct the jury on the required organizational nexus between the predicate crimes and the gang as interpreted and stated in Clark. This was plainly an instructional error committed by the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743

Fourth Holding:

Although we have found that there was sufficient evidence to establish the nexus between the gang as an organization and the predicate offenses—a very low threshold—that is not the same as finding that failure to instruct on this element was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In order to find the trial court’s instructional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury could have rendered different verdicts on the gang allegation and the gang-murder special circumstance absent the error. Because of the narrow focus of the trial, and because of the recent changes to the law, the importance of the People establishing the validity of the gang’s predicate offenses played an outsized role in these proceedings. We are not certain what 12 jurors might have done had they been properly instructed.

Because of the anomalies in this case, we must reverse the jury’s true findings on the gang enhancements because we cannot find that the instructional error was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.

Authority:

People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463

People v. Atkins (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 963, 981 [the presumption is that we must reverse, unless we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]

Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000987

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the juvenile court’s restitution order as modified to reduce the amount of restitution by $110.

First Holding:

In calculating restitution a court need not ascertain the exact amount of loss, and a restitution award based upon estimates and averages. A court retains broad discretion to estimate costs incurred by a party seeking restitution.

Authority:

Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 309-310

Second Holding:

A restitution order is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The court’s factual findings supporting restitution are reviewed for substantial evidence and a restitution order that is based upon an error in law constitutes an abuse of discretion. A victim’s restitution right to restitution is to be construed broadly and liberally.

Authority:

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 361

In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661

Third Holding:

A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion if there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered. The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, provided it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation.

There is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might be recoverable in a civil action. Nonetheless, a juvenile court must use a rational method of calculation and must rely on facts found by a preponderance of the evidence to make the victim whole.

Authority:

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 361

In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 853, 855-856

In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102

Fourth Holding:

Restitution hearings are intended to be informal, and Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof. A prima facie showing of loss may be based on the victim’s testimony. Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as a result of the minor’s delinquent acts, the burden shifts to the minor to disprove the amount of the losses claimed by the victim.

Authority:

People v. Weatherton (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 676, 684

In re J.L. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 355, 362

In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102

People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26

Fifth Holding:

Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. The minor argues that the victim’s testimony was sometimes internally inconsistent; however, inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence go to credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence, which are matters for the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202

In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149

Amelioration, Discretion, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000984

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in imposing the firearm enhancement on count 2.

First Holding:

In affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s request for dismissal of the firearm enhancement attached to count 1, we review the trial court’s sentencing decision at a section 1172.75 resentencing for an abuse of discretion, including a court’s determination of dangerousness. Section 1172.75(d) vests the superior court with broad discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry.

Under an abuse of discretion standard, we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

A court also abuses its discretion if the decision is made without the sentencing court’s informed discretion or if the court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers.

The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.

A defendant’s citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. We assume the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725

People v. Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 [a court’s sentencing decision implies requisite subsidiary findings]

Second Holding:

On count 2, the defendant had been convicted of section 246 (shooting at an occupied vehicle), enhanced under section 12022.53(d) for an additional 25 years to life. (In the prior appeal from the conviction, the appellate court struck the enhancements on count 2 under sections 12022.53(b) and (c), because section 246 is not one of the crimes listed in 12022.53(a) that subdivisions (b) and (c) can apply to.) At the 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the court imposed the lesser enhancement on count 2, under section 12022.53(c), for an enhancement of a determinate term of 20 years instead of the indeterminate 25 years to life he was serving under section 12022.53(d).

Because section 246 is not a crime listed under section 12022.53(a) to which subdivisions (b) and (c) can be applied, it was error to reduce the section 12022.53(d) enhancement to 12022.53(c).

While the trial court could dismiss the section 12022.53(d), firearm enhancement as to count 2, it could not impose a lesser enhancement under section 12022.53(c). We vacate the sentence as to count 2 and remand for resentencing as to that count only.

(Gary note: The court did not mention it as an option, but the trial court can dismiss the section 12022.53 (as the appellate court stated) and impose an enhancement on a lesser included enhancement, such as section 12022.5.

(Under People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, the Supreme Court extended its holding of Tirado (which held that a court could exercise its discretion to impose a lesser section 12022.53 enhancement to the one that was found true) to expressly permit striking section 12022.53 and imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement authorized elsewhere in the Penal Code, outside section 12022.53. Under McDavid, the court in this case could strike the 12022.53(d) enhancement and impose an enhancement under section 12022.5, for example. In other words, the court is not faced with a choice of it’s either all or nothing.)

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(a)

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 699, fn. 12

(People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015)