Tag Archives: Retroactivity

Case 001178

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court erred in not determining whether the gang enhancements met the requirements of AB 333, which amended the elements required for the enhancements since they were originally imposed.

First Holding:

AB 333 changed what the prosecution must prove to establish a gang enhancement. As relevant here, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, required that any pattern of criminal activity be one the gang’s members collectively engage in, and required that the offense have commonly benefited the gang in a way that is more than reputational. The jury that found the gang enhancements true more than 20 years ago was not instructed on these requirements because they did not yet exist.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 761–762 [describing the organizational nexus the amended statute requires]

Second Holding:

The amendments apply to the defendant. A recall and resentencing under section 1172.75 reopens the judgment, and a sentence that has been reopened is not final for purposes of In re Estrada. A case in which an appellate court has affirmed the conviction and remanded for reconsideration of sentencing-related issues is not final and that ameliorative legislation therefore applies. A remand is required.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392-393

Third Holding:

There remains the question of remedy. In our discretion, in the appropriate case, we can determine whether the erroneous imposition of a gang enhancement was harmless based on the appellate record. But here, unlike in Cooper, no reporter’s transcript of the trial has been prepared, and the trial evidence is not available to us. Accordingly, the trial court is better positioned to develop that record and to assess harmlessness against it.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207 [omission of an element added by intervening law requires reversal unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same]

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 743–747

Fourth Holding:

We do not shift the burden the law assigns. The burden of establishing that the omission of a correct jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt rests with the People, as the beneficiaries of the error, and it remains with them on remand.

Authority:

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 349

Case 001151

Error and/or relief

The court made several sentencing errors. The strike based on a violation of section 186.22 requires examination whether the elements found true at the time of conviction meet the heightened requirements of the amendments under AB 333.

The court imposed the upper term on several counts despite there being no jury trial waiver nor stipulation by the defendant to the aggravating factors. Further, the court relied on factors in aggravation that were also the basis of enhancements, violating the prohibition against dual use.

The court erred in imposing two full terms consecutively for two counts, as consecutive determinate (subordinate) terms are limited to one-third the middle term.

The court miscalculated the credit for time served.

First Holding:

AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to narrow the definition of “benefit” to mean “to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. The amendment applies retroactively to cases that are not final on appeal to determine whether a prior violation of section 186.22 constitutes a strike or a prior serious felony.

We remand to permit the prosecution the opportunity to establish that the prior conviction (from more than 15 years ago) constitutes a strike and a prior serious felony conviction under current law. conviction.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586–587

Second Holding:

Section 1170(b)(1) provides that when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). Under subdivision (b)(2), the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when circumstances in aggravation of the crime justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial.

A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. A defendant is entitled to have a jury determine the facts justifying an upper term based on the “increasing seriousness” of a defendant’s prior convictions.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078, 1085-1086 [increasing seriousness of a crime required a jury determination]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 759–760

Third Holding:

The court erred in relying on two factors in aggravation that formed the basis of enhancements for which punishment was imposed. This was error because of the prohibition against the dual use of facts to impose an upper term sentence based on the facts of an enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(5)

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

Fourth Holding:

The court imposed two consecutive 18-year terms for each of the attempted murder counts, which consisted of the upper term of nine years double for the prior strike. This was error. The trial court may the full term, either lower, middle, or upper, for the principal term. However, in general (there are exceptions), the court may impose only one-third of the middle term’for subordinate terms.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1(a)

People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 655

Fifth Holding:

The court erred in its calculation of credit for time served, and on remand the court shall ensure that the abstract of judgment be amended to reflect the proper credits.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Case 001141

Error and/or relief

The court erred in sentencing the defendant for a term in prison that had not yet been enacted at the time of the crime.

First Holding:

On September 9, 2010, the Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 went into effect, significantly increasing the penalties for sex crimes against minors by imposing longer determinate sentences, indeterminate sentences for some crimes, and longer parole restrictions.

The penalty for continuous sexual abuse of a minor under section 288.5 changed from 25 years to life from the former sentence of 15 years to life.

Authority:

People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 237, fn. 4

In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 713-714 [The amendment to section 667.61 added subdivision (j)(2)to increase the penalty to 25 years to life]

Second Holding:

Our state and federal Constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws. Any law that applies to events occurring before its enactment and which disadvantages the offender either by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime is prohibited as ex post facto.

The offenses the jury found defendant had committed against the victim necessarily occurred prior to when she turned 14 years of age prior to the effective date of Chelsea’s Law. Thus, the increased punishment under Chelsea’s Law effective on September 9, 2010, was not applicable, and the court erred in imposing a 25-year-to-life sentence. The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Authority:

People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1306

Case 001116

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in failing to consider whether the criminal gang activity enhancements were still valid with the passage of AB 333 after the initial conviction and sentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, B333 amended section 186.22 to impose new substantive and procedural requirements for gang allegations and the substantive offense of gang participation.

First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational.

Authority:

People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

Under Estrada, in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, legislation that ameliorates punishment applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date. When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error.

AB 333 applies retroactively in this case. AB 333 added new elements to the substantive offense and enhancements in section 186.22.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Third Holding:

When the defendant’s sentence was recalled, his judgments became nonfinal and “the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and [Guzman] regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgments thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture. His judgments became nonfinal for Estrada purposes and the trial court erred by failing to address the amendments that AB 333 made to the gang enhancement statute.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161-162

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 400

People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 380-381 [the defendant was entitled to benefit of AB 333 because his judgment was no longer final following recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)]

Fourth Holding:

The proper remedy in this case is to remand for the trial court to determine whether the People can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.

Authority:

People v. Copper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738, 742-744, 746 [applying Chapman to conclude that lack of jury instruction on AB 333’s new elements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]

People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 480 [The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where newly required elements were never tried to the jury—is to remand and give the People an opportunity to retry the affected charges]

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Fifth Holding:

The defendant concedes that retrial is not automatic and requests that we assess the trial court’s error instead of remanding to the trial court. Although some appellate courts have engaged in harmless error analysis in similar situations (e.g., Sek), we conclude that in this case, the trial court is well-situated to make the prejudice determination.

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 668-669

Sixth Holding:

Regardless of the outcome on the question of AB 333, the defendant is entitled to full resentencing on remand.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392-393 [a criminal case in which the sentence is not yet final, including one in which an appellate court has affirmed the conviction and remanded for reconsideration of sentencing-related issues, is not final for purposes of Estrada, and the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation apply retroactively]

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]

Case 001115

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in failing to consider whether the criminal gang activity enhancements were still valid with the passage of AB 333 after the initial conviction and sentencing.

First Holding:

Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b) (with one exception) is legally invalid. The sentencing court, upon being notified that a person in custody is currently serving a prison term that includes a now-invalid section 667.5(b) enhancement, becomes vested with jurisdiction to review the judgment, verify the existence of an invalid enhancement, recall the sentence, and resentence the defendant.

Section 1172.75(d)(2) directs the court to conduct a full resentencing, regardless of whether the enhancement was executed or stayed, and apply any other changes in the law.

Authority:

1172.5

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054, 1061–1062

Second Holding:

Once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence, whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate sentence. A full resentencing requires the court to consider all sentencing options available under the law at the time of the resentencing hearing.

This includes any ameliorative amendments to criminal statutes (unless otherwise expressed by the Legislature). The amendments to section 186.22 brought about by ABB 333 are ameliorative and apply retroactively.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206‒1207

Third Holding:

A trial court’s resentencing decision under section 1172.75 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court.

A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.

In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Fourth Holding:

When the defendant was resentenced under section 1172.75, the court had the jurisdiction and duty to consider the ameliorative effects of AB 333 on the gang enhancements found true by the jury in the pre-AB 333 era. A review of the record from the resentnecing hearing indicates the court did not consider defendant’s section 186.22 arguments. The court’s failure to consider this issue when resentencing defendant requires remand.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 393 [Because the judgment in this case was not final for Estrada purposes, the appellant was entitled to the retroactive application of AB 333]

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391