Tag Archives: Retroactivity

Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000755

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because of a change in the law while the minor’s case has been pending, the restitution fine ordered by the court must be stricken.

First Holding:

Here, the juvenile court imposed a restitution fine as a condition of probation. At the time of the minor’s disposition, the restitution fine was mandatory. Effective January 1, 2025, however, the Legislature passed AB 1186 which amended Welfare and Instituitons Code section 730.6 to prohibit a court from imposing a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section 602.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(a)(2)

Second Holding:

An adult or juvenile offender is generally entitled to benefit from amendments that become effective while their case is on appeal and not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 [applying a revised version of the statute in setting a restitution fine]

In re N.D. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 885, 891 [rule of retroactivity applies to juvenile delinquency judgments]

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [Where the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.

Third Holding:

Because imposing a restitution fine constitutes “punishment” and the minor’s case was not yet final when section 730.6 became effective, we conclude section 730.6 operates retroactively and precludes imposition of a restitution fine. Therefore, the restitution fine should be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Allen (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 312, 321

Amelioration, Gary Musings, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000723

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court was required to revisit whether the gang enhancement attached to the felony assault charge was still valid in light of changes to the gang criminal activity statutes under AB 333. When asked to strike the enhancement, the trial court stated that it did not have discretion to relitigate the facts underlying the gang enhancement. This was error.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 rendered legally invalid any prior prison term enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020 (unless the enhancement was imposed for a prior sexually violent conviction), and it created a resentencing procedure for defendants who are currently serving sentences that include such an enhancement. Section 1172.75(c) requires a court to strike any now-invalid prior prison term enhancement and recall the defendant’s sentence.

Section 1172.75(d) provides instructions for resentencing. Among other things, the provision requires the court to resentence the defendant under current law, including any changes in law that reduce sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matters, or is unaware of the scope of its discretion such that it does not exercise its discretion at all. We independently review questions of statutory interpretation implicated by the trial court’s decisions.

Authority:

People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765

People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, 366

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 made several changes to the law governing the gang enhancement.

First, AB 333 narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, it changed the requirement that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity to now require that any such pattern be collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, it narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal gang activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date of the currently charged offense; (2) the pattern offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the pattern offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) none of the pattern offenses is the same as the currently charged offense.

Finally, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational, under the amended provision, include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

Fourth Holding:

AB 333’s amendments to section 186.22 apply retroactively to the defendant’s case because they are ameliorative changes and the defendant’s case became nonfinal when the court vacated and recalled his sentence under section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 396–400

Fifth Holding:

In Stamps, the Supreme Court held that a trial court may not modify a plea agreement because a plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound. But, as the Supreme Court explained in Doe v. Harris, the terms of the plea agreement can be affected by changes in the law. By implementing such changes, the trial court is not altering the terms of the plea bargain.

Thus, under Doe, the defendant’s 2016 plea agreement is deemed to incorporate the Legislature’s subsequent enactment of AB 333. Consequently, requiring the parties compliance with changes to section 186.22 made retroactive to the defendant does not violate the terms of the plea agreement. We therefore conclude that the gang-related enhancement findings must be vacated and the matter remanded to give the People the opportunity to prove the applicability of the enhancements under the amendments to section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 701

Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 73-74

People v. Harrell (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 161, 168

People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346

Extensive Gary Note, NOT In The Opinion:

Gary note: I think I first noted this in my summary for Case 000532. But effective 1/1/2025, section 1171 provides that a resentencing under any ameliorative provisions cannot result in an order to set aside a plea bargain in which the sentence was specified. In other words, section 1171 appears to have overturned the Stamps decision with respect to allowing the lower court or the prosecution to set aside a plea bargain if the ameliorative provisions apply to change the sentence in a way that the prosecutor or court do not like.

This question was granted review in a case that originally issued a published opinion in 2024 (100 Cal.App.5th 768), where it defined the issue as “Is the prosecution entitled to rescind a plea agreement when a defendant receives a full resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728) and the trial court intends to reduce the sentence beyond eliminating the prior prison term enhancements?”

On 12/18/2024, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal on the People’s motion for the Court of Appeal to vacate its earlier decision [which, in fact, concluded that the prosecutor could NOT rescind the agreement] and reconsider its opinion in light of the passage of AB 2483, which enacted section 1171. It also ordered the Court of Appeal’s original opinion to be depublished.

On remand, the Court of Appeal set aside its earlier opinion and issued a new opinion in which it said, “At the hearing, Montgomery may seek relief under any provision of section 1172.75, and neither the prosecutor nor the court may rescind the plea agreement due to a resulting sentence reduction.”

The original Court of Appeal opinion was published, and it provides an analysis of why a review of the legislative history of AB 483 (which enacted section 1172.75)–including uncodified portions of AB 483– compelled it to conclude that Stamps did not apply. But the subsequent opinion following the Supreme Court’s transfer relied solely on section 1171, and the opinion was not published.  As I stated, the “published” opinion also was wiped off the books when the Supreme Court ordered it depublished.

In the recent decision People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, the Supreme Court indicated its awareness of section 1171–as it obviously did when it transferred the Montgomery case–but declined to apply it where the case was a direct appeal from the judgment itself, in which the appellant challenged the stipulated sentence–in which he agreed to and received an upper term before section 1170 was amended to require jury findings for upper terms.

See Mitchell’s footnote 9. Keep in mind that section 1171 was created to guide courts in the handling of newly enacted ameliorative legislation. The Supreme Court in Mitchell seems to have left open the question where the appeal is from the original judgment itself, rather than an appeal from an attempt at securing relief from ameliorative statutes. Its footnote 9 ends, “We decline to consider this argument because we have concluded that Mitchell is entitled to a remand under our established precedent in Stamps. We express no view on the applicability of section 1171 to this case or how it might affect the options described above. Mitchell may raise this issue in the Court of Appeal or the trial court in the first instance.”

And for the rest of the story, the Court of Appeal has since, in an unpublished sentence, remanded the matter to the trial court to permit the defendant to seek relief under the ameliorative provisions.  At that time, the defendant may present the argument that section 1171 bars the prosecution or the court from seeking that the plea agreement be set aside if either the prosecutor or the court is not satisfied with any resulting modification of the sentence.

Authority:

Gary has no authority, just musings.

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000706

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At a resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.1(a)(1) for the defendant, the trial court reduced defendant’s prison term by striking certain enhancements and re-imposing a restitution fine under section 1202.4(b). In considering the gang enhancements that were imposed in 2006, the court should have examined them to determine whether the elements met the current requirements under the amendments by AB 333 to section 186.22. Also, the restitution fine is more than 10 years old and must be vacated.

First Holding:

When defendant admitted to the enhancement in 2006, former section 186.22(b)(1) provided a sentencing enhancement for a person who committed a felony for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. As the defendant was convicted of attempted murder, carrying a sentence of a life term, the enhancement imposed a minimum of 15 years before release on parole. Without the enhancement, the defendant’s minimum eligibility would have been after seven years.

Authority:

FORMER PEN 186.22

Second Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature passed AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, which added new elements to gang enhancements in section 186.22. It narrowed the definition of criminal street gang and pattern of criminal activity, as well as what it means for an offense to have commonly benefited a street gang.

Under the new legislation, imposition of a gang enhancement requires proof of the following additional requirements with respect to predicate offenses: (1) the offenses must have commonly benefited a criminal street gang where the common benefit is more than reputational; (2) the last predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the date of the currently charged offense; (3) the predicate offenses must be committed on separate occasions or by two or more gang members, as opposed to persons; and (4) the charged offense cannot be used as a predicate offense.

These changes benefit defendants by raising the threshold for a true finding on a gang enhancement.

Authority:

CURRENT PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206

Third Holding:

The defendant and the People agree that defendant’s 2006 admission to the gang enhancement on count 1 does not satisfy all the elements for a gang enhancement under the new legislation. Under our independent standard of review, we find no reason to disagree.

Authority:

People v. Rosbury (1997) 15 Cal.4th 206, 209 [de novo review applies when legality of sentence is purely a legal question]

Fourth Holding:

Because the defendant’s admission in 2006 would not satisfy the elements for a gang enhancement under current law, his past admission cannot now support beyond a reasonable doubt the additional punishment allowed by the enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082 [elements of an alleged sentence enhancement must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt]

People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458 [guilty plea admits of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to every element of crime charged]

Fifth Holding:

AB 333’s substantive changes apply retroactively to all cases not yet final. When a sentence is recalled for resentencing, the matter is non-final and subject to application of ameliorative amendments, like AB 333. The record plainly supports that the defendant’s case was not final because his sentence was recalled under section 1172.1. He was therefore entitled to the benefits of AB 333. Accordingly, we reverse the true findings on the gang enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 396, 398–399 [recognizing a judgment becomes nonfinal when sentence is vacated and new sentence is imposed]

People v. Lopez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 835, 845–846 [recalled sentence not final]

Sixth Holding:

The restitution fine imposed in 2006 must be vacated, as it was imposed more than 10 years ago.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000699

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the prior conviction constituting a strike because it involved criminal gang activity is still a strike when examined under the changes made by AB 333 to criminal gang activity law.

First Holding:

The defendant’s 2014 prior conviction qualified as a strike only by virtue of a gang enhancement under section 186.22 for possession of a firearm by a felon. Since this conviction in 2014, the elements of the gang allegation have been statutorily modified. Prior to 2022, an allegation of a prior conviction carrying a sentence enhancement under section 186.22(b), was deemed a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7(c)(28), and could result in a sentence under the Three Strikes law.

In 2021, the Legislature passed AB 333. Relevant here, AB 333 amended section 186.22 by redefining the elements required to prove gang offenses and enhancements and narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. In Tran, the Supreme Court held AB 333 is ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments as provided for in In re Estrada.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

In Fletcher, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether AB 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law.

The Supreme Court concluded that where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law. It also held that it applies retroactively to cases in which the judgment is not yet final.

Accordingly, because there is no indication that the defendant’s 2014 conviction was obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements, we reverse the true finding on the strike prior and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on the strike allegation.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000635

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the court to consider the recent decision in Kopp on the imposition of fines and fees, and also to conduct a full resentencing in light of this remand for resentencing.

First Holding:

Kopp clarified the standards applied when a defendant challenges the imposition of certain fines and fees on the grounds that they are unlawful because he cannot afford to pay them. We remand the matter to the trial court to apply those standards regarding its imposition of various fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 31

Second Holding:

Because his conviction is not final on direct review, the defendant may be entitled to the benefit of various intervening changes in the law, including AB 333 (gang allegations) and the Racial Justice Act. AB 333, for example, limits what predicate offenses the People can now use to prove a group is a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 186.22.

On remand, the defendant can ask the trial court to provide relief under relevant intervening ameliorative sentencing laws, including but not limited to SB 81, 483, 567, and 1393; AB 333 and 518, as well as any appropriate challenges under the Racial Justice Act. But this court need not decide which intervening laws apply retroactively and whether their application requires any retrial or change in sentence.

Authority:

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 448

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 400

People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693 [courts abide by a cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more]

Amelioration, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000632

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court did not determine whether the defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication in 2013 qualifies as a strike under the current version of section 186.22(b). Further, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot serve as the basis for a prior serious felony enhancement. We remand the matter to permit retrial of the gang enhancement under the current section 186.22 and for a full resentencing following retrial or the People’s election not to pursue retrial.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature amended section 186.22 with the passage of AB 333. Among other things, AB 333 changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206,

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Second Holding:

Even if a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, courts must look to current law, as amended in AB 333, to determine whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. The defendant’s prior conviction in this case could qualify as a strike offense only with the gang enhancement found true prior to AB 333. We must vacate the true finding on the strike prior and remand to permit the People to retry the gang enhancement under current law to determine whether the defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a strike prior.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583, 587, 603-604, 607

Third Holding:

The defendant’s juvenile adjudications cannot be considered a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of the mandatory five-year enhancement in section 667(a).

Authority:

People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080, fn. 10

People v. West (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 100, 110

Fourth Holding:

When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000629

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the superior court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4(b), that is no longer enforceable or collectible, and it imposed additional fines and fees that were not originally imposed and which came into effect after the defendant’s original sentencing. We modify the judgment by vacating the challenged fines and fees.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature enacted SB (Stats. 2021 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), retroactively invalidating prison prior enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b), except those that were based on a conviction for a sexually violent offense. Once the court verifies that the current judgment includes such a sentencing enhancement, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. Resentencing under section 1172.75 is not limited to striking the section 667.5(b), enhancement. Rather, the court must conduct a full resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 368, 373

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 348, fn. 5

People v. Gray (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 148, 163

People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 381

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855

Second Holding:

Our review of the imposition of fines and fees is de novo.

Authority:

People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 593 [de novo review in cases of statutory interpretation]

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 983 [authority of trial court to impose fine or fees turns on relevant statutory provisions and presents essentially an issue of law]

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to add subdivision (d), which provides that, on the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. The defendant was resentenced in November 2024, weeks before the effective date of the amendment. But the amendment applies retroactively to his sentence. The section 1202.4 restitution fine, which was imposed over 10 years ago in 2003, must therefore be vacated.

Authority:

PC 1465.9

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748 [absent evidence to the contrary, we presume ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments]

Fourth Holding:

The statute authorizing the remaining fines and fees did not become effective until after the defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, the superior court was not authorized to impose these fines and fees on resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 754

People v. Castillo (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1414

People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274 [A new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case 000615

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals an order partially denying her request for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. We reverse the order because she was entitled to have the court consider her eligibility for ameliorative relief under changes to the former version of section 186.22 (under which she had been convicted) made by AB 333.

First Holding:

The defendant’s judgment became nonfinal when she returned to the trial court under section 1172.75 for recall and resentencing. Section 1172.75 provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense, is legally invalid.

Once the trial court verifies the current judgment includes the enhancement, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. When resentencing the defendant, the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

By the plain language of the statute, the defendant was entitled to be considered for any legislative enactments that might provide for a reduction of sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276

Second Holding:

In the criminal law context, when ameliorative legislation goes into effect, we generally presume the Legislature intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible to all nonfinal cases. For purposes of Estrada, the test for finality is whether the criminal prosecution or proceeding as a whole is complete.

The meaning of finality in the Estrada context is distinct from the issue of whether a judgment is final for purposes of appealability. In the context of recall and resentencing, a granting of a petition for resentencing renders a conviction nonfinal for purposes of retroactive application of ameliorative legislation.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745

People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 679

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392-393

People v. Trent (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 251 [defendant entitled to retroactive application of Assembly Bill No. 333 upon resentencing under section 1172.6 based on changes to felony murder rule]

People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 551 [defendant entitled to retroactive application for Proposition 57 and Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) upon resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6]

Third Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature passed AB 333, enacting the STEP Forward Act of 2021. AB 333 made several changes to the law on gang enhancements.

First, it substantively narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang.

Second, it also changed former subdivision (f)’s requirement that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang to now require that any such pattern be collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, it also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (l) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as oppose to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, it narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. The defendant was entitled to the benefit of AB 333 because her judgment was not final when the court engaged in resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000591

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in finding true the defendant’s two prior strikes. The true findings on appellant’s prior strike conviction allegations are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court. Upon remand, the court is directed to give the People the opportunity to retry the strike allegations.

First Holding:

In 2022, AB 333 went into effect and made changes to the law on gang enhancements, including narrowing the definitions of a criminal street gang, and pattern of criminal activity.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

The defendant’s 2014 prior felony conviction was a strike because it included a gang enhancement under the then-version of section 186.22. Where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. The current law applicable to a nonfinal proceeding includes AB 333’s redefinition of the elements of gang offenses and enhancements under section 186.22.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

In re Estrada [(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169

Third Holding:

There was insufficient evidence for the court to find that the defendant’s 2010 conviction for grossly negligent discharge of a firearm qualified as a strike prior, because no evidence was presented that the defendant personally used the firearm. It is possible to be convicted of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm under section 246.3 without personally using a firearm, e.g., as an aider and abettor. The People in this case presented evidence only of appellant’s conviction, and not any information regarding the conviction’s underlying facts.

Thus, the People proved nothing more than the least adjudicated elements of the prior conviction. Because there was no admission or evidence that appellant personally used a firearm, which would qualify his prior section 246.3 conviction as a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7(c) the trial court’s true finding was in error. The remedy in such a case is remand for retrial at the prosecution’s election.

Authority:

People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 112-113

People v. Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 262

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239

Fines and fees, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000587

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On appeal from a hearing under section 1172.75, the appellate court struck the balance of the restitution fine as it was ordered more than 10 years prior to the resentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended and now provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Respondent asserts the trial court did not impose the restitution fine nor parole revocation fine at the time of resentencing and therefore it must be stricken for that reason. Generally, respondent is correct.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027 [striking a restitution fine from the record and the abstract of judgment where the court failed to orally impose the fine during the sentencing hearing]

People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [resentencing necessarily requires a court to impose a new sentence, including any fines, fees, and assessments]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [the oral pronouncement of judgment controls]

Third Holding:

In this instance, however, the trial court merely reaffirmed the original judgment with the exception of striking the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement. The judgment following the resentencing is not yet final, we conclude appellant is entitled to have the restitution fine stricken. As appellant’s restitution fine was first imposed more than 10 years ago, it is now unenforceable and uncollectible under section 1465.9(d).

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted on another issue Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745 [absent evidence to the contrary, we presume ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments]

Fourth Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) does not apply to the parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. In Kopp, the court vacated any unpaid portion of the defendant’s restitution fine under section 1465.9(d), but nonetheless remanded the matter because a parole revocation fine is still required and was to be set in the same amount as the restitution fine would have been had the court properly considered the defendant’s ability to pay and stayed.

Further, section 1465.9 makes no mention of the parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. We are not to insert a term that was not included in a statute or omit a term that has been included. Although a parole revocation fine is closely related to a restitution fine in that they must be imposed at the same time and in the same amounts, a parole revocation fine serves a different purpose, i.e., to deter a prisoner from violating parole, to incentivize a prisoner’s rehabilitation while on parole, and to recoup costs if parole is violated. That purpose is still relevant where, as here, an inmate might one day be paroled. No principle or authority supports vacating the parole revocation fine.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 12, 24, 30

People v. Massicot (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925

People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 427, 429

Fifth Holding:

It was unnecessary for the trial court to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served. The sentence from which this appeal was taken has not yet begun to be served, because it was ordered to run consecutive to the one he is currently serving from another county. Under other circumstances, a court may be required to calculate custody credits on a sentence imposed by another county. The present case presents does not present such a circumstance.

Authority:

People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1126 [in a determinate sentence case, sentencing court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence replaced another county’s sentence; the second county became the sentencing court]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000572

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The gang and gang-related firearm enhancements must be vacated in light of the amendments under AB 333.

First Holding:

AB 333, which amended section 186.22, was enacted in 2021 and became effective on January 1, 2022. The amendments AB 333 made to section 186.22 apply retroactively to the defendant’s case. The substantive amendments to section 186.22 require us to vacate the jury’s findings on the gang allegations and gang-related firearm allegations. We remand the matter to afford the prosecution the opportunity to retry these allegations, should it choose to do so.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

AB 333 added new elements to the substantive gang offense and gang enhancements in section 186.22—for example, by requiring proof that gang members collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity, that the predicate offenses were committed by gang members, that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang, and that the predicate and underlying offenses provided more than a reputational benefit to the gang. These changes had the effect of increasing the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 9

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749

Third Holding:

When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error. On this record, reversal of the gang enhancements is required, and the prosecution must be given the opportunity to establish the additional elements on remand, should it choose to do so.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Eagle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 275, 280

Fourth Holding:

In addition to amending section 186.22, AB 333 added section 1109, which requires that the trial of a gang enhancement charged under section 186.22(b), be bifurcated from and follow trial of the underlying offenses when requested by the defendant. AB 333’s enactment of section 1109 became effective almost two years after defendant’s trial. But section 1109 is not retroactive and therefore does not apply.

Authority:

PEN 1109

People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129 [disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, at p. 31]

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 9

Fifth Holding:

The same rationale applies to the jury’s findings on the section 12022.53(e)(1) firearm allegations, which require findings under section 186.22(b). Section 12022.53(e)(1) provides for enhanced firearm penalties for any person who is a principal in the commission of an offense if the prosecution pleads and proves that (1) the person violated section 186.22(b), and (2) any principal in the offense committed a firearm violation specified in section 12022.53(b), (c), or (d).

Here, the jury found three section 12022.53(e)(1) allegations true as to the defendant. Because this enhancement depends on a finding pursuant to section 186.22(b), the changes to section 186.22 made by AB 333 require that the true findings on these allegations also be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(e)(1)

People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346-348

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000537

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded to give the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the 2011 prior strike conviction alleged in the information remains a strike under the current version of section 186.22, criminal gang activity.

First Holding:

The defendant was convicted in 2011 of carrying a loaded firearm with an enhancement that the crime was committed for the benefit of a gang. A prior felony firearm conviction constitutes a strike if committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1). Thus, the prior conviction was alleged as a strike, resulting in a doubled sentence.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

PEN 667(d)(1)

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 456

Second Holding:

AB 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to narrow the definition of benefit to mean to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. The amendment applies retroactively to cases that are not final on appeal to determine whether a prior violation of section 186.22 constitutes a strike or a five-year sentence enhancement. Current law applies in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions. The appropriate remedy is to remand to permit the prosecution the opportunity to establish that the prior conviction constitutes a strike under current law.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586–587