Tag Archives: Restitution fine

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Fines and fees, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 001052

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Gary note:  This case had a ton of issues.  The wins consisted of striking two of the four counts of being a felon in possession of ammunition; because he did not waive his presence at the court trial, reversal of the findings on his prior convictions and aggravating circumstance in aggravation made in his absence; remand for a hearing on his strikes that were based on the pre-AB 333 amendments to the criminal gang activity statute; correction of the abstract of judgment that reflected fines and fees that were not orally pronounced; and correction of his credit for time served.  In the course of deciding the case, however, the court announced several principles that I feel are important, even though in this instance they were resolved against the defendant. 

I apologize for the length of the summary.  

First Holding:

In assessing a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We presume the evidence of each element of the offense was sufficient, and defendant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating otherwise. To meet this burden, defendant must do more than just recite his own evidence or portray the available evidence in a light favorable to him.

We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence. We must accept all logical inferences that the jury may have drawn from circumstantial evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.

Authority:

People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329

People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573-1574

People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925

People v. Lucero (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 370, 411

Second Holding:

It is a firmly entrenched principle of appellate practice that litigants must adhere to the theory on which a case was tried. Stated otherwise, a litigant may not change his or her position on appeal and assert a new theory. To permit this change in strategy would be unfair to the trial court and the opposing litigant. To be sure, we have discretion to consider a new theory on appeal when it is purely a matter of applying the law to undisputed facts.

But the defendant cannot now, for the first time, claim that insufficient evidence supports his convictions based on new evidence and and a new theory. Accordingly, we decline to consider defendant’s new theory on appeal.

Authority:

Brown v. Boren (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316

Third Holding:

A trial court must give an instruction on every theory of the case that is supported by substantial evidence. But the court must not give an instruction that is not correct or pertinent, nor is it required to give an instruction that is not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047

People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 823

Fourth Holding:

We note that defendant forfeited his challenge to (a particular jury instruction) because he did not raise the same instructional error issue in the trial court as he raises on appeal. We nonetheless address the merits because defendant maintains that (the jury instruction) as given was not a correct statement of the law.

Authority:

People v. Rios (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1139 [Generally, an issue is forfeited on appeal if the defendant failed to make a timely and specific objection on the ground asserted on appeal]

People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 719 [The rule of forfeiture does not apply, however, if the instruction was an incorrect statement of the law, or if the instructional error affected the defendant’s substantial rights]

Fifth Holding:

We review claims of instructional error de novo. We must review the wording of the jury instruction and assess whether it accurately states the law. We must also consider whether a reasonable likelihood exists that the challenged instruction caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution.

The challenged instruction is viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. There is no error in a trial court’s failing or refusing to instruct on one matter, unless the remaining instructions, considered as a whole, fail to cover the material issues raised at trial.

As long as the trial court has correctly instructed the jury on all matters pertinent to the case, there is no error. We interpret the instructions so as to support the judgment if they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579

People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 277

People v. Vang (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1129

Sixth Holding:

On appeal, we review independently the question whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.

Trial courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct juries on all lesser included offenses where there is substantial evidence raising a question as to whether all the elements of the charged offense are present. Under the substantial evidence standard, the trial court has no obligation to instruct on theories not supported, or only weakly supported by the evidence.

However, instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury. Substantial evidence in this context is evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.

Authority:

People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 113

People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645

People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 155, 162

People v. Reeves (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 14, 51

Seventh Holding:

The defendant cannot be convicted of multiple counts of being a felon in possession of different types of ammunition. Multiple items of contraband that are classified within a single statutory category or subdivision will support only a single violation of a possession statute. This includes possession of different types of ammunition.

There is, however, an exception when contraband is possessed by a defendant at different times or at different locations.

Authority:

In re Carleisha P. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 912, 923

De La Cerda v. Superior Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 40

People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1253

People v. Von Latta (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 329

Eighth Holding:

Defendant was not present for the bifurcated bench trial on his prior convictions and aggravating factors allegations. The parties agree that this was error because defendant did not expressly waive his right to be present for the bench trial in writing as required by section 977(b)(1).

Authority:

PEN 977(b)(1)

Ninth Holding:

A defendant has a right to be present at critical stages of a criminal prosecution, a right protected by both the federal Constitution and the state Constitution. California has also guaranteed the right by statute, under section 977. The defendant may waive that right.

The waiver of a defendant’s right to be present may be in writing and filed with the court or, with the court’s consent, may be entered personally by the defendant or by the defendant’s counsel of record. Although the defendant submitted a writing under which he waived his right to a jury trial on prior convictions and aggravating factors allegations, the waiver extended only to his right to a jury, not to his right to be present.

Authority:

PEN 977

U.S. Const., 6th and 14th Amends.

Cal. Const., art. I, secs. 15, 16

Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745

People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 311

Tenth Holding:

Absent a valid waiver, constitutional error concerning a defendant’s right of presence is subject to harmless error review under Chapman. We must therefore assess whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not contribute to the outcome of the proceeding.

Here, defense counsel did not call any witnesses and submitted on the prosecution’s exhibits at the bifurcated trial. Had defendant been present at the trial, he could have assisted in his defense and/or exercised his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf regarding any number of the aggravating factors that were alleged against him.

Thus, we cannot say that the exclusion of defendant at the bifurcated bench trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we will remand the matter for a new bifurcated trial on the prior convictions and aggravating factors.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23

People v. Millsap (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 368, 384

Eleventh Holding:

The trial court found true that defendant had been convicted in 1999 of unlawful possession of a firearm committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Based upon the recent decision in Fletcher, both parties request that the true finding on the prior gang-related enhancement be vacated and that the matter be remanded for a retrial in conformance with the changes to the law on criminal street gangs after AB 333.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576

Twelfth Holding:

The Three Strikes law doubles a felony sentence if the defendant has a prior conviction for a serious felony, which includes any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22. A prior felony firearm conviction constitutes a strike if committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang” pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1).

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

PEN 667(d)(1), (e)(1)

PEN 1170.12(b)(1)(c)(1)

People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 45

Thirteenth Holding:

AB 333, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 186.22 to narrow the definition of benefit to mean to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.

This provision applies retroactively to cases that are not final on appeal to determine whether a prior violation of section 186.22 constitutes a strike. With regard to prior convictions that are premised on violations of section 186.22, current law applies in determining whether they qualify as prior serious felony convictions under section 1192.7(c)(28). The appropriate remedy is to remand to permit the prosecution the opportunity to establish that the prior conviction constitutes a strike under current law.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 586-587, 607-608

Fourteenth Holding:

The trial court did not mention any fines or fees at the sentencing hearing and the minute order is also silent on this subject. However, the abstract of judgment reflects the following fines and fees were imposed: $300 for restitution (sec. 1202.4(b)); $400 for the court security fee (sec. 1465.8); and $300 for the criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373). The $300 parole revocation restitution fine (sec. 1202.45) was conditionally suspended.

Rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement. Entering the judgment in the minutes being a clerical function, a discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as entered in the minutes is presumably the result of clerical error. Nor is the abstract of judgment controlling. The abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction. By its very nature, definition and terms it cannot add to or modify the judgment which it purports to digest or summarize.


If there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minutes or abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

PEN 1207

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186

Fifteenth Holding:

The trial court did not orally impose restitution fines or fees, nor were any included in the Minute Order from the sentencing hearing. The People did not object to the court’s failure to orally impose the fines or fees.

Because the restitution fine and matching parole revocation fine are discretionary given the court’s ability to not impose them if it makes certain findings on the record, the People forfeited the imposition of the fines by not objecting. Accordingly, we decline the People’s request for a remand on the restitution fines and instead, direct those fines to be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

Sixteenth Holding:

However, the same is not true for the two mandatory ancillary costs including the court operations assessment and the court facilities assessment. Indeed, the trial court was required to impose these fees but did not do so, nor did it state any reasons for declining to do so.

Accordingly, on remand, the trial court is directed to either impose these fees or state its reasons for declining to do so

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

GOV 70373

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App5th 963, 967

Seventeenth Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects the credit for time served. Although there was no oral pronouncement of credit for time served at the sentencing hearing, the probation officer’s report shows that she calculated the total credit for time served based on defendant’s presentencing time in jail. We agree with the parties that this is a miscalculation, and any miscalculation of credits results in an unauthorized sentence, which may be corrected upon discovery.

Credits for presentence custody are calculated from the day of arrest through the day of sentencing. The defendant was sentenced 11 days later than reported by the probation officer. Accordingly, the correct number of actual days of presentencing time served is (a number greater than 900 days).

Because he was convicted of violent felonies, the defendant cannot earn conduct credit in excess of 15%.

Authority:

PEN 2933.1

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

People v. Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 816 [explaining proper method of calculation for conduct credits under section 2933.1]

People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735

Eighth Amendment, Equal protection, Plea bargains, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 001044

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to impose a term of 16 months in jail as a condition of probation. The matter must be remanded for resentencing, and for the court to determine the issue of the amount of the restitution fine in light of Kopp.

First Holding:

The trial court imposed a jail term of 16 months as a condition of probation because he had missed his appointment with his probation officer and failed to appear at the sentencing hearing. However, section 19.2 provides that, except in situations not here relevant, in no case shall any person sentenced to confinement in a county or city jail, as a condition of probation upon conviction of either a felony or a misdemeanor, be committed for a period in excess of one year.

Authority:

PEN 19.2

Second Holding:

Although Bailey held that the one-year limit may be waived by the defendant, Bailey is distinguishable because the defendant Bailey entered a knowing and intelligent waiver. There is no evidence here that the defendant was informed of the 12-month limit under section 19.2, and his agreement to the longer term was therefore not a knowing and intelligent waiver.

Authority:

People v. Bailey (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 828, 831

People v. Arnold (2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 308 [regarding waiver of credit for time served, the gravamen of whether such a waiver is knowing and intelligent is whether the defendant understood he was relinquishing or giving up custody credits to which he was otherwise entitled under section 2900.5]

People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 [criminal defendant’s waiver of right to jury trial may not be accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is, made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it]

Third Holding:

On remand, the defendant may challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive under the federal and state constitutions. As to ancillary costs, if requested by the defendat, the trial court shall consider his inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1), allowing the parties to present any relevant evidence or argument on the matter.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 8th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30-31

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 001001

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

(Gary note: This is not a win, but it contains of discussion on what excess credit for time served can apply to in the context of fines or fees.)

Penal Code section 2900.5 does not apply to restitution fines or nonpunitive assessments.

First Holding:

At the conclusion of the defendant’s proceedings, his credit for time served exceeded the total prison commitment that was imposed. His contention that section 2900.5 requires that his excess credits be applied against the ordered restitution fine and ancillary fees raises a matter of statutory interpretation requiring this court to exercise de novo review.

Authority:

People v. Carranza (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th Supp. 17, 23.

Second Holding:

Section 2900.5(a) provides that all presentence custody credit awarded to a defendant shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any base fine that may be imposed, at the rate of not less than one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) per day, or more, in the discretion of the court imposing the sentence.

If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served. In any case where the court has imposed both a prison or jail term of imprisonment and a fine, any days to be credited to the defendant shall first be applied to the term of imprisonment imposed, and thereafter the remaining days, if any, shall be applied to the base fine.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Third Holding:

Section 2900.5 has undergone several changes, and prior to 2014 included restitution fines as subject to offset by excess days. Since 2017, the relevant language now requires that credit be applied to “any base fine,” with penalties and assessments imposed on the base fine to be reduced by the percentage the base fine has been satisfied. Excess credits cannot be applied to reduce restitution fines. Section 2900.5 does not apply to restitution fines, nor does it apply to nonpunitive assessments, such as the court operations assessment and the criminal conviction assessment imposed in this case.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 92-93

People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, 967, fn. 7

People v. Rojas (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 48, 56

 

Fines and fees, Gary Musings, Sentencing

Case 001000

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The sentence on the defendant’s misdemeanor counts should have been stayed under section 654 as part of the same conduct as the felony.

First Holding:

Under rule 4.412(b), a defendant is estopped from challenging his or her sentence based on section 654’s prohibition of double punishment where the defendant agreed to a specified term in prison or county jail and is sentenced to that term or a shorter one. Rule 4.412(b) codifies one of the applications of the case law rule that defendants are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed.

But in this case, the defendant did not expressly agree to any sentencing irregularity in exchange for a benefit. The record shows that it was an open plea, meaning that no promises were made as to his sentence. The defendant agreed that he could be sentenced to up to four years in one case and six years in the other, but those terms represented the maximum permitted for the offenses regardless of any plea agreementg. He faced anything up to and including the maximum term allowed.

Authority:

PEN 654

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b)

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295

People v. Velasquez (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 503

People v. Superior Court (Sanchez) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 567, 574–575

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 156

People v. Henderson (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 785, 788 [an open plea is one under which there is no promise about the nature or duration of the defendant’s sentence]

Second Holding (and Gary Musings):

In Jones, the defendant agreed to plead no contest to all charges and admit the enhancement allegations in exchange for a lid below the maximum term in sentencing. The lid was not the maximum exposure Jones would otherwise face absent the plea agreement. Rather, it restricted the sentence the trial court could impose but to a term less than Jones’s maximum exposure. It was not an open plea.

In Cole, the defendant pleaded guilty on the condition that his sentence would not exceed 25 years to life, whereas he was exposed to a term of 75 years to life but for the agreed lid. It, too, was not an open plea.

Thus, in Jones and Cole, the estoppel principle described in Hester applied, because the defendants were not permitted to complain on appeal about sentences that were limited by the terms of their pleas to something lower than the maximum that could have been imposed in the absence of their agreements.

That is not the case here, as the agreement did not specify a lid. There was simply a recognition of the maximum possible sentence that could be imposed for each count, regardless of any agreement.

(Gary note: In Jones and Cole, as stated in Jones, had they a problem with their sentences, they should have attempted to withdraw their pleas in the trial court when the sentences were imposed. Though not expressed, implicit in the court’s reliance on Cole and Jones as examples where estoppel applies is the recognition that an appeal from a denied motion to withdraw a plea requires a certificate of probable cause. For a pretty good discussion of certificates of probable cause, I have included Buttram in the Authority listed below, but it was not cited by or discussed in the opinion.

(If your client wishes to appeal after entering a plea agreement of any sort, you need to research whether a certificate of probable cause is required. If there is any chance at all that the appeal would undermine any of the terms of the plea agreement, a certificate is likely required. A common myth is that a certificate is not required to appeal any errors alleged to have occurred after the plea. Don’t fall for it. Instead, the focus is on the plea agreement itself. And the requirement of a certificate of probable cause is separate from the doctrine of estoppel addressed in this opinion. In Jones, there was no disagreement that omission of the application of section 654 created an unauthorized sentence. The obstacle was that the defendant was estopped from raising the issue because of his agreement.

(Although they’re all important, one must-read case is People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, which I’ve listed below but was not cited by the court here. The defendant pleaded guilty with an agreement on the sentence. Unbeknownst to him at the time of his own sentencing, his co-defendants apparently received significantly lower sentences. He appealed, claiming his sentence was disproportionate. Because he had not sought and been issued a certificate of probable cause, the Supreme Court concluded his appeal should have been dismissed. His challenge to his sentence, even on constitutional grounds, was a challenge to his plea, and thus a certificate was required.

(Also note that, under section 1237.5(a), a certificate of probable cause can be issued only where the application for a certificate shows “reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings.”

(Although it is described as a certificate of probable cause, “it is not the trial court’s responsibility to determine if there was error in the proceedings. The trial court’s sole objective is to eliminate those appeals having no possible legal basis by refusing to issue a certificate of probable cause. See People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84, quoting People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 819. Holland also reminds us (in footnote 6) that a petition for writ of mandate is the means by which one may challenge a denial of an application for certificate of probable cause. Neither Holland nor Warburton were cited in the opinion, because a certificate of probable cause was not even an issue in the case.

(Until 2022, if it appeared to the clerk of the superior court that a notice of appeal from a guilty plea required a certificate of probable cause, the clerk would mark the notice received but inoperable. To get past that hurdle, the notice would have to reflect that it is a challenge to the sentence and was not a challenge to the plea (or that it was an appeal from a guilty plea after a denial of a motion to suppress evidence on search and seizure grounds under section 1538.5. Rule 8.304(b) was amended effective 1/1/22, and now provides that “If the defendant does not file the written statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 or the superior court denies a certificate of probable cause, the appeal will be limited to issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause.” That was a vast improvement, from our defense perspective, because at least the notice of appeal initiated an appeal, albeit only on grounds not requiring a certificate.

(All of this Gary note is triggered by the court’s comment in Jones, cited by this court as distinguishable, that a defendant facing a 654 problem on an agreed-upon sentence must deal with it at the trial court level by moving to withdraw his or her plea timely. So this Gary note is really dealing with sub-sub-nonissues that I think you should nonetheless be aware of. Think of this lengthy aside as getting more for your money. Money? We ain’t got no money! We don’t need no money. You don’t have to show me any stinking money. Oops, sorry, got carried away a bit there.)

Authority:

People v. Jones (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735, 739

People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 856-858

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290,

People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773,

People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68

People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84

People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 819

Third Holding:

Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. If, on the other hand, defendant harbored multiple criminal objectives, which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, “even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Assad (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 187, 200

People v. Rodriguez (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005

Fourth Holding:

As there was no discussion at sentencing of section 654, we must affirm the sentence if an implied finding that section 654 does not apply is supported by substantial evidence. The record demonstrate that the defendant committed the offenses the misdemeanor cases with the objective to steal the contents of his victims’ vehicles. There is no evidence to support a finding that he formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced. Accordingly, the sentences on the misdemeanor counts must be stayed.

Authority:

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730–731

People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162

Fifth Holding:

Separate restitution fines may be imposed for each case that are not consolidated, even if resolved jointly by plea bargain. Defendants who commit multiple crimes, and are consequently before the court in multiple cases when their pleas are taken, are properly subject to multiple fines. This straightforward application of the requirement that fines be imposed in every case serves the purpose of the state Restitution Fund, as well as the rehabilitative and deterrent functions of restitution fines.

Authority:

People v. Soria (2010) 48 Cal.4th 58, 64-66

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000995

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This appeal is from the resentencing under section 1172.75. The restitution fine must be stricken, as now it was imposed more than 10 years ago. There are errors in the abstract of judgment that must be corrected.

First Holding:

The trial court originally imposed the restitution fine in August 2015. Since then, the Legislature amended section 1465.9 to provide that restitution fines under section 1202.4 are uncollectible and unenforceable after 10 years and that the part of the judgment imposing the fine must be vacated. While the court reimposed the $4,000 restitution fine less than 10 years after the original sentencing, 10 years have passed since the court originally imposed the $4,000 restitution fine, and thus the balance is now unenforceable and uncollectible. We will therefore strike the restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 17

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601, review granted on a different issue Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Second Holding:

The abstract lists the prior prison term enhancement as stayed, when in fact that enhancement was stricken by the trial court. In addition, the four-month sentence on count three is listed as concurrent when it should be listed as consecutive. We will therefore order amendment of the abstract to correct these errors

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [oral pronouncement of judgment ordinarily controls]

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000990

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court did not orally pronounce any fines or fees at sentencing, but the minute order and abstract of judgment reflect the imposition of a restitution fine, a stayed parole revocation fine, a court operations assessment, and a criminal conviction assessment. The abstract of judgment must be corrected.

First Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral imposition of sentence on the one hand and the minutes and abstract of judgment on the other, the oral judgment controls. An abstract of judgment must be corrected if it does not reflect the oral judgment accurately.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385, 387-389

Second Holding:

The court did not orally pronounce any fines or fees at sentencing, but the minute order and abstract of judgment reflect the imposition of a $300 restitution fine, a $300 stayed parole revocation fine, a $40 court operations assessment, and a $30 criminal conviction assessment.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

PEN 1202.45

PEN 1465.8

GOV 70373

Third Holding:

We decline to remand the matter because no party objected to the trial court’s failure to impose fines and fees at sentencing. All claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ raised for the first time on appeal are not subject to review. Appellate courts may not correct a discretionary sentencing choice if the People failed to object at sentencing.

A restitution fine under section 1202.4 is a discretionary sentencing choice. And by waiving any objection to the restitution fine, the People also effectively waive any objection to the parole revocation fine, because the parole revocation fine must match the restitution fine as a matter of law.

As to the court operations assessment and the criminal conviction assessment, neither party asserts that the trial court’s failure to impose these fees was unauthorized or reflects an obvious legal error at sentencing that is correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further findings.

Absent such an argument, we decline to disturb the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852-853

People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1153

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [sentence is unauthorized if it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case]

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30 [equal protection principles permit trial courts to waive fees under sec. 1465.8 and Gov. Code, sec. 70373, upon request, where defendant lacks ability to pay]

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000972

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The $300 restitution fine the court imposed at the defendant’s resentencing must be vacated pursuant to section 1465.9(d), because more than 10 years have elapsed since the trial court imposed the original fine in 1996.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

The restitution fine must be vacated because more than 10 years have elapsed since the original imposition of the fine, and reimposition of the fine in a different amount at a section 1172.75 resentencing does not restart section 1465.9(d)’s 10-year clock.

Authority:

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601 [under language of sec. 1465.9(d), resentencing does not restart the 10-year clock], review granted on different issue on Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000971

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The restitution fines imposed more than 10 years prior to the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 must be vacated.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to add subdivision (d), which provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000957

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be amended to show that the restitution fine was vacated and the trial court security fee was stayed. We also order corrections on the minute order from the resentencing hearing.

First Holding:

At the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the court suspended or stayed any unpaid amounts of the previously imposed court fees and the restitution fine. In contrast, the abstract of judgment filed after the resentencing hearing erroneously showed the trial court imposed the restitution fine of $10,000 and the court security fee of $20.

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement. Further, the minute order reflects that the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, whereas he was actually convicted of murder in the first degree.

The minute order also must be amended.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

Further, although the trial court intended to stay or suspend any unpaid balance of the restitution fine, that fine must be vacated because it was imposed more than 10 years earlier and the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect that it has been vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000955

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the court should have stricken the restitution fine, as it was more than 10 years old.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), providing that any portion of a restitution fine under section 1465.9 not paid within 10 years must be vacated. Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000931

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment fails to list the imposition of the restitution fine that was ordered for the misdemeanor conviction. It must be corrected.

(Gary note: Yep, not a win, but another example of errant abstracts.)

First Holding:

Where a defendant has been convicted of both a misdemeanor and a felony, it is proper for the court to impose separate restitution fines. The parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45 should match the portion of the restitution fine associated with the felony conviction to which a period of parole applied.

Authority:

People v. Holmes (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 539, 546-548

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment is missing the $150 restitution fine imposed on the misdemeanor count. We will direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment including this additional restitution fine. Because the trial court’s minute order following sentencing already includes this amount, no amendment to that document is required.

(Gary note: The court did not cite authority for its order to correct the abstract of judgment, so I have listed some cases that the court could have drawn from.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Eighth Amendment, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000917

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We are not convinced that section 1202.4 is facially unconstitutional, but we will remand this matter to the trial court to give the defendant an opportunity to bring an as-applied challenge to the restitution fine under the excessive fines clauses of the Eighth Amendment and California Constitution.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4(b) requires that in every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. For a felony, the minimum fine is $300 and the maximum is $10,000. Fines for a misdemeanor range from $150 to $1000.

The court shall impose the restitution fine unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.

A defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)

Second Holding:

Due process did not require an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine. Kopp instructed instead that the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. The excessive fines analysis arises under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.

Authority:

U.S. Const. Eighth Amendment

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23

Third Holding:

Following Bajakajian, our Supreme Court in Lockyer stated that four factors are relevant to determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally excessive:

(1) the defendant’s culpability;

(2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty;

(3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and

(4) the defendant’s ability to pay.

Kopp observed that a fine is excessive only if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense that it punishes, a deferential standard that recognizes that the Legislature makes judgments in the first instance about the appropriate punishment for offenses and judicial determinations of the gravity of a particular criminal offense are inherently imprecise.

Kopp remanded to give the defendant the opportunity to raise such a challenge.

Authority:

United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 327–328

People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23-24

Fourth Holding:

A statute will be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional questions if such an interpretation is fairly possible. It would be remarkable and plainly unconstitutional for the Legislature to prohibit a trial court from considering a defendant’s invocation of a constitutional right.

We will therefore not construe section 1202.4 as preventing defendants from raising an excessive fines challenge to the minimum fine. Instead, we read the statute as simply establishing that as a statutory matter in the absence of an excessive fines challenge, a trial court cannot refrain from imposing the minimum $300 restitution fine based on a defendant’s inability to pay alone.

This is congruent with Kopp and excessive fines analysis jurisprudence, which considers a defendant’s ability to pay as one of four relevant factors, not as dispositive on its own.

Authority:

People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 682

People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728

People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1070 [While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.]

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23 [citing Aviles with approval]

Fifth Holding:

Neither the defendant nor the trial court had the benefit of Kopp when the defendant was sentenced, so she did not present her challenge to the restitution fine through the proper excessive fines analysis that Kopp makes clear is appropriate.

Accordingly, as Kopp itself did, we will remand this matter to the trial court to give the defendant the the opportunity to assert the legal analyses applicable to such a challenge and argue how the particular facts of this case inform such an inquiry.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23