Tag Archives: Duty of the court

Case 001127

Error and/or relief

Whether or not the court had the right to issue a protective order during the proceedings prior to entry of judgment, the court failed to terminate the protective order following the judgment. Remanded for that purpose.

First Holding:

The trial court issued a pretrial criminal protective order on behalf of the victim after the defendant entered his plea. The trial court did not make any findings on the record but ordered no contact with the victim and a 100-yard stay away order There were no objections from counsel. According to the criminal protect order, the orders remain in effect until further court order.

The court had no authority to issue a protective order under section 136.2(a) after sentencing, and it did not issue one. But the order that it made after the guilty plea stated it was to remain in effect until further order of the court, which the court never made. We therefore remand to the trial court to issue a proper notice of termination of protective order so that proper authorities will know that the order has expired.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 227, 236

Second Holding:

Section 136.2 is limited to the pendency of a criminal action because section 136.2 is aimed at protecting only victims or witnesses.

Authority:

PEN 136.2(a)

People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118

People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159 superseded in statute as stated in Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948, 960, related to the issuance of restraining orders in domestic violence cases

(Gary Musings:

(This case had an interesting twist. The attorney filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. A Wende brief is filed when appointed counsel determines that there are no arguable issues to raise in the appeal. After setting forth the statements of the case and facts sufficient to guide the Court of Appeal, the brief asks the appellate court to independently review the entire record to determine whether there are issues that counsel should brief. The defendant is given an opportunity to submit a supplemental brief in which the defendant argues whatever the defendant believes to be an issue.

(The Wende brief process is available only in appointed appeals, and applies only to the first appeal of right–essentially to the direct appeal from the conviction initiated within the timeframe for the filing of a notice of appeal following entry of judgment. Wende was California’s ultimate answer to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. In essence, I assume there was concern that appointed counsel may have less incentive to go the whole mile for the client.

(Keep in mind we’re talking about conditions more than 60 years ago, around the time Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. While I am certain that there were many attorneys who diligently sacrificed many hours for their indigent client, I also assume that there must have been concern that maybe not all attorneys put in as much effort on appointed cases as they would for their wealthy clients. The independent review of the record by the court was designed to protect the indigent defendants from inadequate effort.

(There’s probably much more to it than I stated, and perhaps I even have missed the mark on why Anders came about. But regardless of what was written, I suspect there was some wink wink nod nod behind the scenes recognizing that some cases demonstrated a tad bit of underrepresentation. Maybe I’m wrong. It doesn’t change the quirk in this case, however.

(By the way, the same concern–whatever it might have been–does not arise with retained counsel. Presumably retained attorneys have a financial incentive to do as much as they possibly can for their clients.

(All that is background–accurate or not–for the twist in this case. The defendant’s supplemental brief essentially was a challenge to his guilty plea. Thus, a certificate of probable cause would normally be required, under section 1237.5 and Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b). Had appointed counsel attempted to raise the arguments the defendant raised on his own, the court would not have been permitted to address the issues, because there is no latitude when an issue requires a certificate of probable cause and one has not been issued.

(But in this case, the court concluded that Wende requires it to conduct a full review of the record and to address with reasons all of the issues presented by the defendant in a supplemental brief. Specifically, in People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, the Supreme Court imposed a judicial principle that when an indigent defendant submits a supplemental brief following counsel’s filing of a Wende brief, the appellate court must address all of the issues raised and state reasons for its conclusions on their merits.

(In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the lack of a certificate of probable cause was not a bar to its review of the issues raised by the defendant himself in a supplemental brief, in compliance with Wende and Kelly.

(Keep in mind that this is NOT a published opinion, and thus cannot be cited to compel an appellate court to ignore the absence of a certificate of probable cause when reviewing a defendant’s post-Wende supplemental brief. But Wende and Kelly were published opinions, and there’s no reason that I am aware of that counsel could not urge the court to grant a petition for rehearing if the court declined to address the defendant’s supplemental brief issues because of a lack of a certificate of probable cause.)

Authority (the middle two only in Gary Musings):

People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335

Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738

People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106

Case 001123

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying the defendant’s request for mental health diversion after considering only one of the two available medical reports before determining that the defendant presented an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety within the meaning of section 1170.18.

(Gary note: as I explain below in a note to the Third Holding, that standard is slated to change 1/1/27.)

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 gives trial courts discretion to grant pretrial diversion for defendants with qualifying mental health disorders. The court may postpone prosecution to allow the defendant to receive mental health treatment. The Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626, 632

People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 451

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149

Second Holding:

Defendants requesting mental health diversion have the burden to make a prima facie showing that they will meet the minimum requirements of eligibility for diversion and that they and the offense are suitable for diversion.

A defendant is eligible under section 1001.36(b) if:

(1) a qualified mental health expert has diagnosed the defendant within the last five years with a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (with limited exceptions); and

(2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the charged offense.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b)

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891

Third Holding:

A defendant is suitable for diversion under section 1001.36(c) if the defendant satisfies four requirements:

(1) a qualified mental health expert concludes the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment;

(2) the defendant consents to diversion and agrees to waive his or her speedy trial rights;

(3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and

(4) if treated in the community, the defendant will not pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” as defined in section 1170.18.

(Gary note: Effective 1/1/2027, the language in 1001.36(c)(4) regarding an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (as defined in section 1170.18) changed to something much less favorable for seekers of diversion. AB 46 (enacted as Chapter 18) and AB 2273 (enacted as Chapter 298) amended section 1001.36 by changing and renumbering the “public safety” subdivision language to 1001.36(c)(D). Instead of incorporating the “superstrike” language of Penal Code section 1170.18, the language effective 1/1/27 will read “The defendant will not pose a substantial and undue risk to the physical safety of another person, if treated in the community. …”)

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)

People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439, 458

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891-892

Fourth Holding:

Even if the defendant makes a prima facie showing he or she meets the statutory requirements, the trial court has residual discretion to deny diversion. The court must exercise its residual discretion consistent with the principles and purpose of the mental health diversion statutes.

Authority:

People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 53

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135

Fifth Holding:

We review the trial court’s order granting or denying a request for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. The court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 135

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

(Gary note: The appellate court described confusion in the record as to whether the trial court had the second mental health report available or read it. The trial court denied the request for diversion on finding that the defendant posed an unreasonable danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18. The appellate court remanded for the trial court to review that second report before making a determination on whether the defendant poses a reasonable risk of committing a so-called superstrike.

(As I noted above, however, that bar is lowered as of 1/1/27. Of course, the trial court should still consider the second report. The question I have and do not know the answer to is whether the defendant is entitled to the heightened standard as it existed at the time he made his request for diversion and as it stands as of the writing of this summary, or whether any delay in the new proceedings past 2026 will subject him to evaluation as a risk under the new lower bar. Was that a question? Hmmm. You get my drift, though, right?)

Case 001120

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing.

First Holding:

Franklin held that youth offenders must have an opportunity to put on the record information relevant to any eventual Penal Code section 3051 youth offender parole hearing.

Authority:

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

The defendant committed his crime several decades earlier, when he was 21. After the defendant was sentenced, section 3051 became effective in 2014. Section 3051(b) requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a youth offender parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a youth offender’s incarceration.

The date of the hearing depends on the youth offender’s controlling offense, defined as the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment. The section applies to offenders like the defendant who committed their controlling offense when they were 25 years old or younger.

Authority:

PEN 3051

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277

Third Holding:

After section 3051’s passage, Franklin held that the section contemplated that information regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate consideration by the board. Under section 3051(f)(2), persons with information about youth offender may submit statements for review by board. Assembling such mitigating information will typically be more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense.

Authority:

PEN 3051(f)(2)

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283

Fourth Holding:

Cook held that youth offenders whose convictions are final may move in the trial court for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. Section 1203.01 provides that postjudgment, a trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Fifth Holding:

The trial court erred in concluding it did not have jurisdiction to act because the filing of a notice of appeal on an earlier motion for discovery deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed.

Generally, the filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until it determines the appeal and issues the remittitur, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over anything affecting the judgment.

However, appellate jurisdiction does not divest the trial court of all power to act. Perfection of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court only of matters embraced in the matter being appealed. The trial court otherwise may act on any matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order on appeal.

Authority:

CCP 916

People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1064

Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1089

Sixth Holding:

The Franklin motion was unaffected by and unrelated to the order on appeal. That is, the appeal pending when the defendant filed his Franklin motion concerned a motion for postconviction discovery. In contrast, proceedings under Franklin constitute a remedy of evidence preservation.

Also, Franklin proceedings are unrelated to the validity of the defendant’s sentence. Neither the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation process disturbs the finality of state convictions. Thus, the Franklin hearing the defendant requested was not embraced in the order on appeal and therefore the trial court had jurisdiction to hear his motion.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446-447, 451

People v. Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 201, 207 [Franklin hearing does not expose a defendant to increase or decrease in sentence]

Seventh Holding:

The court erred in denying the motion as not being in compliance with Cook. The defendant’s motion was sufficient to initiate Franklin proceedings. The requirements for a Franklin motion are minimal, and the motion need not describe in detail the evidence the youth offender seeks to preserve. Instead, where a motion includes relevant criminal case information and legal authority and establishes eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing, the motion should be granted.

Here, the defendant’s motion cited section 1203.01 and 3051 and Cook in his motion. He stated his qualifying age, the original case number. He identified the controlling offense of murder, requested counsel, said he had never had a Frankling hearing, and asked for an opportunity to make a record of his characteristics as a youth offender. Based on this information, the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to initiate Franklin proceedings.

We express no opinion on whether the trial court must hold a formal Franklin hearing.

Authority:

People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150, 152 [legally sufficient Franklin motion only requires defendant be given opportunity to place additional evidence in record]

People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 893–894 [trial court erred by denying Franklin motion that identified original case, relevant law, defendant’s age, sentence, and relief requested]

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446-447, 459 [court has discretion to determine how to conduct process efficiently]

Case 001116

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in failing to consider whether the criminal gang activity enhancements were still valid with the passage of AB 333 after the initial conviction and sentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, B333 amended section 186.22 to impose new substantive and procedural requirements for gang allegations and the substantive offense of gang participation.

First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Third, AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational.

Authority:

People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

Under Estrada, in the absence of a contrary indication of legislative intent, legislation that ameliorates punishment applies to all cases that are not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date. When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error.

AB 333 applies retroactively in this case. AB 333 added new elements to the substantive offense and enhancements in section 186.22.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Third Holding:

When the defendant’s sentence was recalled, his judgments became nonfinal and “the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and [Guzman] regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgments thus became nonfinal, and it remains nonfinal in its present posture. His judgments became nonfinal for Estrada purposes and the trial court erred by failing to address the amendments that AB 333 made to the gang enhancement statute.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161-162

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 400

People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 380-381 [the defendant was entitled to benefit of AB 333 because his judgment was no longer final following recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)]

Fourth Holding:

The proper remedy in this case is to remand for the trial court to determine whether the People can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.

Authority:

People v. Copper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738, 742-744, 746 [applying Chapman to conclude that lack of jury instruction on AB 333’s new elements was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]

People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 480 [The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where newly required elements were never tried to the jury—is to remand and give the People an opportunity to retry the affected charges]

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Fifth Holding:

The defendant concedes that retrial is not automatic and requests that we assess the trial court’s error instead of remanding to the trial court. Although some appellate courts have engaged in harmless error analysis in similar situations (e.g., Sek), we conclude that in this case, the trial court is well-situated to make the prejudice determination.

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 668-669

Sixth Holding:

Regardless of the outcome on the question of AB 333, the defendant is entitled to full resentencing on remand.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392-393 [a criminal case in which the sentence is not yet final, including one in which an appellate court has affirmed the conviction and remanded for reconsideration of sentencing-related issues, is not final for purposes of Estrada, and the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation apply retroactively]

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]

Case 001115

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in failing to consider whether the criminal gang activity enhancements were still valid with the passage of AB 333 after the initial conviction and sentencing.

First Holding:

Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b) (with one exception) is legally invalid. The sentencing court, upon being notified that a person in custody is currently serving a prison term that includes a now-invalid section 667.5(b) enhancement, becomes vested with jurisdiction to review the judgment, verify the existence of an invalid enhancement, recall the sentence, and resentence the defendant.

Section 1172.75(d)(2) directs the court to conduct a full resentencing, regardless of whether the enhancement was executed or stayed, and apply any other changes in the law.

Authority:

1172.5

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054, 1061–1062

Second Holding:

Once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence, whereupon the trial court may impose any appropriate sentence. A full resentencing requires the court to consider all sentencing options available under the law at the time of the resentencing hearing.

This includes any ameliorative amendments to criminal statutes (unless otherwise expressed by the Legislature). The amendments to section 186.22 brought about by ABB 333 are ameliorative and apply retroactively.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206‒1207

Third Holding:

A trial court’s resentencing decision under section 1172.75 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court.

A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.

In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Fourth Holding:

When the defendant was resentenced under section 1172.75, the court had the jurisdiction and duty to consider the ameliorative effects of AB 333 on the gang enhancements found true by the jury in the pre-AB 333 era. A review of the record from the resentnecing hearing indicates the court did not consider defendant’s section 186.22 arguments. The court’s failure to consider this issue when resentencing defendant requires remand.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 393 [Because the judgment in this case was not final for Estrada purposes, the appellant was entitled to the retroactive application of AB 333]

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391