Category Archives: AppellateAdvisor Updates

Abstracts and Minutes, AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case 000985

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The sentencing minute order cites the statute for the firearm enhancement as section 12022.53(d), instead of section 12022.5(a). On remand, the trial court is therefore instructed to correct the sentencing minute order nunc pro tunc.

Holding:

The sentencing minute order from January 7, 2025 contains the same error contained in the original abstract of judgment, i.e., the statute for the firearm enhancement is cited as section 12022.53(d), instead of section 12022.5(a). While the abstract of judgment was subsequently corrected, there is nothing to indicate in the record that the sentencing minute order was also corrected. On remand, the trial court is therefore instructed to correct the sentencing minute order nunc pro tunc.

(Gary note: The court does not cite its authority to order correction of the minutes, likely because it’s so obvious, not to mention that it apparently had previously spotted the same error in the abstract of judgment and ordered its correction. For your convenience, I have listed a nonexclusive list of cases that the court could have chosen its authority from.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case 000970

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects a total additional term of 30 years for the gun enhancements instead of 20 years. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement.

On remand, we direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect an enhancement of 20 years under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), and a stayed term under section 12022.53(b).

Holding:

The trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence is inconsistent with the judgment recorded: it imposed and stayed a 10-year term for the section 12022.53(b) enhancement, but the abstract of judgment imposed the term along with the 20-year term under section 12022.53(c).

When an abstract of judgment does not reflect the actual sentence imposed in the trial judge’s verbal pronouncement, we have the inherent power to correct such clerical error on appeal. We accordingly order that the abstract of judgment be corrected to conform with the sentence that the trial court actually imposed.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case 000766

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court miscalculated the credit for time served. The matter is remanded for recaculation. The court also failed to specify whether it was imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences for the three conviction offenses. On remand, it must specify that the terms are to be served concurrently.

First Holding:

The trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment did not specify whether the sentences for the three counts were to run concurrently or consecutively with respect to one another. This means that by default they all run concurrently.

Authority:

PEN 669(b)

People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 915

Second Holding:

The court erred in its calculation of credit for time served, and it must recalculate the credits on remand.

(Gary note: the court cited no authority, likely because the error and solution are obvious. I have listed the code section for your convenience.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

AppellateAdvisor Updates, Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000762

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss his conviction under section 1203.4 following his fulfillment of conditions of probation. The trial court concluded that the defendant was not eligible for relief as long as he had to register as a sex offender. The trial court denied the defendant’s petition for an erroneous reason without determining whether he fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire probation period. Therefore, the order denying the petition is reversed, and the trial court is directed to make that determination.

First Holding:

When a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, the defendant is entitled to have his conviction set aside and the case dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(a)(1)

Second Holding:

This statutory provision is clear. If the defendant fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, the trial court shall allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information. Dismissal in this circumstance is mandatory.

Authority:

People v. Daffeh (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 790, 796

People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 892, fn. 6 [under section 1203.4, if the petitioner establishes either of the necessary factual predicates, the trial court is required to grant the requested relief]

Third Holding:

A person who has suffered a conviction specified in section 290 is required to register as a sex offender, notwithstanding dismissal of such conviction pursuant to 1203.4. But the duty to register as a sex offender does not make the person ineligible for relief under section 1203.4

Authority:

Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 423

People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287

People v. Hamdon (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1071, fn. 3 [Section 290.007 expressly precludes relief from the sex offender registration requirement for persons whose convictions are dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4]

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 996 [same]

Fourth Holding:

If the defendant has not fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation or been discharged prior to the termination of the probation period, the court still has discretion to grant relief in the interests of justice.

Authority:

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 991

AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case 000714

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At a Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the appellant moved to dismiss one of his two prior strike convictions under Romero. In denying his Romero motion, the trial court erroneously found that the defendant was a “fourth striker.” We hold that it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have granted the defendant’s Romero motion had it not made this error. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court to reconsider the defendant’s Romero motion.

First Holding:

The Three Strikes law consists of two, nearly identical statutory schemes designed to increase the prison terms of repeat felons. In Romero, the Supreme Court held that the trial court may, in furtherance of justice, strike prior felony allegations in cases arising under the Three Strikes law pursuant to section 1385(a). At the section 1172.75 resentencing hearing in this case, the trial court was required to apply Romero and subsequent revisions to the Three Strikes law regarding enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 503, 504

Second Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the defendant served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody for at least five years. Effective January 1, 2020, SB 136 amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.

Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other offenses became legally invalid. The Legislature later enacted SB 483, effective January 1, 2022, to make the changes implemented by SB 136 retroactive by adding what is now section 1172.75 to the Penal Code.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681

People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380

Third Holding:

Section 1172.75(c) requires the trial court, upon being properly notified that a defendant is serving a sentence that includes a legally invalid prior prison term enhancement, to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. A trial court has the authority to strike prior strikes under section 1385(a) and Romero at a section 1172.75 resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 345

Fourth Holding:

A trial court must make its decision to strike or not strike a prior conviction by considering factors that are intrinsic to the Three Strike law’s sentencing scheme. The factors a trial court must consider include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the current conviction; (2) the nature and circumstances of the prior strike convictions; and (3) the defendant’s background, character, and prospects. If the defendant falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, the court may, in furtherance of justice, treat the defendant as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373

Sixth Holding:

The trial court denied the defendant’s Romero motion in part based on an erroneous belief that he was a fourth striker when he was actually a third striker. The trial court’s characterization of the defendant’s prior criminal record in denying Romero relief was erroneous and, accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant Romero relief.

Regarding forfeiture, it is true that the defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the trial court’s mischaracterization of the defendant’s prior criminal record. We have discretion, however, to reach the merits of an argument that has not been preserved for review.

We exercise that discretion here because it is in the interests of justice to address the defendant’s meritorious contention. Had the court granted his Romero motion, this would have changed his sentence from an indeterminate term to a determinate one. By reaching the merits, we obviate the need to address the parties’ contentions regarding whether trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by not objecting.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,v 161, fn. 6

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400 [To forestall defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we decline to find forfeiture under the circumstances of this case]

Seventh Holding:

Turning to whether the error was prejudicial, we conclude it was. When a trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentencing choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper.

A reasonable judge could have concluded the defendant’s purported fourth strike weighed strongly against granting Romero relief. Given comments by the judge in the record that favored the defendant, we conclude it is reasonably probable the court would have granted the motion had it known the defendant was a third striker and not a fourth striker. We remand for resentence.

Authority:

People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492

AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case 000508

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We agree with the defendant that the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it decided the Romero motion, so we vacate her sentence and remand for the court to reconsider the Romero motion. The court erroneously believed it did not have discretion to dismiss the strike unless mental illness played a substantial part in the crime. The matter is remanded with directions to reconsider the Romero motion and then to resentence the defendant.

First Holding:

Section 1385(a) gives trial courts discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in furtherance of justice. The length of the defendant’s sentence is the overarching consideration because the underlying purpose of striking prior strikes is the avoidance of unjust sentences. The court must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present offense and prior strikes, and the particulars of their background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the spirit of the three strikes law in whole or in part.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

Second Holding:

We review the ruling on a Romero motion for abuse of discretion. The court abuses its discretion if the record affirmatively shows that the court misunderstood the scope of its discretion or applied the wrong legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376

People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1020

Third Holding:

The court applied the wrong legal standard when it reasoned that if the defendant’s actions were “due to drugs and alcohol, then that is not a DSM-4 or 5, and the Court is not allowed to strike the strikes.” A person’s drug or alcohol use relates to their background, and whether they were under the influence when they committed an offense relates to the nature and circumstances of the offense.

The defendant’s background and the nature and circumstances of the prior offense are mandatory considerations, according to our Supreme Court. Moreover, a defendant’s substance abuse may be a mitigating factor that supports dismissing the prior strike, regardless of whether there is a mental health diagnosis under the DSM. The court therefore applied an incorrect legal standard and misunderstood the scope of its discretion when it concluded that it was not allowed to dismiss the strikes because they resulted from the defendant’s drug or alcohol use.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 [courts must consider the nature and circumstances of the prior strike offenses, as well as the defendant’s background, character, and prospects]

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 494, 503

People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1143-1144

Fourth Holding:

Moreover, under the information available in the record, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result but for the court’s error.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

AppellateAdvisor Updates, Due process, Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Jury instructions, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000489

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There is insufficient evidence to support the child pornography count. The court also impermissibly restricted cross-examination to the extent that it violated the defendant’s right to cross-examine the witness. After reconsideration following four days of testimony, the court changed its mind. Rather than allow the defense to rebut the evidence already before the jury or declare a mistrial, the court instructed the jury that it was striking that portion of the victim’s testimony over the last four days as to her feelings in response to defendant’s actions, statements and text messages, instructing the jury to disregard the stricken testimony.

On this record, the defendant was denied a fair trial, and the judgment is reversed.

First Holding:

There is insufficient evidence to support the child pornography count. The photograph on which it relies does not depict a minor personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct, as defined in section 311.4(d). Exhibition of the breasts is not included in the statutory definition of sexual conduct. In the context of section 311.4, the rectal area is not equivalent to buttocks and, to the extent rectal area may include any portion of the buttocks, it is limited to a portion of the lower buttocks near the rectum or anus.

Authority:

PEN 311.4(d)

PEN 311.11(a)(1)

PEN 311.4(d)

People v. Wallace (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 568, 582 ([exposure of breasts does not constitute the prohibited exhibition under section 311.4], disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452)

People v. Cantrell (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 523, 545

Second Holding:

The Kongs factors are not included in the standard CALCRIM No. 1145 instruction. The factors are derived from People v. Kongs, where the Court of Appeal applied a list of six factors adopted by the federal courts for a trier of fact to consider when determining what constitutes a lascivious exhibition of specified private parts in assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim under section 311.4 (using a minor to pose for sex acts) and section 311.11(a) (possession of child pornography).

[GARY NOTE: While it would be perfectly proper to provide the specific language and factors recited in the opinion, I’ve exercised my “G-Rating”-censorship-reserved-right to modify the actual language used and to go no further than I’ve recited. If the factors may have a bearing in your case, you should be reading Kongs for yourself.]

Authority:

People v. Kongs (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1753–1755

Third Holding:

We conclude no reasonable jury could determine, based on the overall content of the photograph, that it depicts an exhibition of the rectal area for the viewer’s sexual stimulation. We thus conclude the subject photograph does not, as a matter of law, depict the minor engaging in or simulating sexual conduct. Consequently, the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for possession of child pornography in count 26. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial on this charge.

Authority:

People v. Spurlock (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1133

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 468

Fourth Holding:

The admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair. Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the evidence must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.

Authority:

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439

Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 70

People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229

Fifth Holding:

At trial, the prosecutor extensively questioned the minor about how the defendant made her feel through his statements and actions. The defendant’s defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s line of questioning on relevance grounds, but the trial court overruled the objection, finding the testimony relevant to the minor’s credibility. As a result, over the course of four days, the minor was permitted to testify extensively on direct examination on how the defendant’s encouraging words made her feel.

When the defense proffered evidence that portrayed an opposite picture of the minor, the trial court conceded that it should have sustained the defense objection on relevancy grounds, denied the defendant’s request to introducing the contrasting evidence, and purported to strike the offending portions of the minor’s direct testimony, instructing the jury to disregard the minor’s testimony over the four days as to her feelings regarding the defendant’s statements. This presentation of extensive inadmissible evidence, combined with the exclusion of defense evidence that would have rebutted the inadmissible testimony, denied the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.

Authority:

People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214

Sixth Holding:

Constitutional errors in admitting or excluding evidence are both subject to harmless error review. Federal constitutional errors subject to harmless error review are reviewed under Chapman, which requires us to reverse the conviction unless the People can demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To determine whether the People have carried their burden, we examine the entire record and must reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.

Authority:

People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 412

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,

People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671

Seventh Holding:

Even thoughtfully phrased limiting instructions may be insufficient to mitigate the harm resulting from prejudicial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 Cal.3d 719, 730 [No limiting instruction, however thoughtfully phrased or often repeated, could erase from the jurors’ minds the prejudicial evidence]

Eighth Holding:

Ordinarily, a party’s failure to object to certain testimony at all, or failure to object on the specific grounds asserted on appeal, would render a challenge to the admission of the testimony forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 831

AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case: 000430

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to impose the full term for an enhancement attached to the offense that was designated as a subordinate term.

First Holding:

A sentencing court has a duty to impose the punishment prescribed by law, and has no discretion to deviate from the statutorily specified penalty. When the trial court has imposed a sentence that could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case, it has imposed an unauthorized sentence that must be corrected even if raised for the first time on appeal.

Authority:

PEN 12

People v. Martinez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012

People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962

Second Holding:

Defendant was convicted of two or more felonies. Section 1170.1(a) required the trial court to select a principal term and designate the terms for his other convictions as subordinate terms. The conviction carrying the greatest term of imprisonment is designated the principal term. For the conviction designated as the principal term, the court must impose the full term. Subordinate terms and their applicable enhancements receive one-third of the middle term. The count to which the enhancement was designated as a subordinate term, so the court should have imposed only one-third of its middle term rather than its full term.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1(a)

People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 202

Third Holding:

Counts that are subject to full-term sentencing under PC 667.6 are not to be including in any determination under section 1170.1. Thus, it was not error for the court to designate count 7 (which was not subject to section 667.6) as the principal term (to be served as a full term) under section 1170.1 even though the court had imposed sentence on two other counts as full term under section 667.6.

Authority:

People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115

[GARY NOTE: though the purpose for which Pelayo was cited continues to be true, Pelayo’s recitation of section 1170.1’s treatment of enhancements on subordinate terms is outdated, as section 1170.1 has since been amended to include enhancements on subordinate terms whether or not the subordinate term was for a violent felony.]
AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case: 000419

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to impose a $41 fine under section 1202.5. It is ordered stricken.

Holding:

Under section 1202.5(a), courts are required to impose a fine on a defendant who is convicted of a theft-related offense listed in the statute. Here, the $41 crime prevention fine was unauthorized because defendant’s convictions are not among the offenses listed in section 1202.5(a). Thus, we strike the $41 crime prevention fine from defendant’s sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1202.5(a)

AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case 000032

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony, the order revoking the defendant’s Post-Release Community Supervision (PRCS) is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

First Holding:

A preliminary hearing transcript of a witness’ testimony is not admissible at a parole or probation revocation hearing absent a showing of good cause.

Authority:

People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711

People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144

Second Holding:

A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence in a revocation hearing will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1197-1198

Third Holding:

The court reviews rulings on whether hearsay was improperly admitted at a violation hearing for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Abrams (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 396, 400

Fourth Holding:

Before a defendant’s probation or parole may be revoked, the prosecution must prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Authority:

People v. O’Connell (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066

Fifth Holding:

Probation and parole revocations are not part of a criminal prosecution; as such, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not apply.

Authority:

People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 163

Sixth Holding:

The Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation does not apply to probation violation hearings; rather, a defendant’s right to cross-examine and confront witnesses at a violation hearing stems from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This right to confrontation, however, is not absolute and the parole revocation process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.

Authority:

People v. Abrams (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 396, 400

People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 716, 719

Seventh Holding:

In considering the admissibility of hearsay evidence at a parole or probation revocation hearing, a case-by-case consideration is necessary because under a due process analysis, the importance of a defendant’s confrontation right will vary with the circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Liggins (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 55, 66-67

Eighth Holding:

The California Supreme Court has has established two separate standards for admitting hearsay evidence depending on whether the hearsay is testimonial or documentary in nature. With respect to testimonial evidence, a preliminary hearing transcript of a witness’ testimony is not admissible at a parole or probation revocation hearing absent a showing of good cause. The broad standard of good cause is met (1) when the declarant is unavailable under the traditional hearsay standard, (2) when the declarant, although not legally unavailable, can be brought to the hearing only through great difficulty or expense, or (3) when the declarant’s presence would pose a risk of harm (including, in appropriate circumstances, mental or emotional harm) to the declarant.

Authority:

People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1199

People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 713-714

People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1159-1160

Ninth Holding:

First, to be testimonial the statement must be made with some degree of formality or solemnity. Second, the statement is testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution. Statements which merely record objective facts or observations of fact are generally not testimonial in nature. Nor are official records which serve purposes other than to aid a criminal investigation.

Authority:

People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, 619-621

People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569, 582

Tenth Holding:

In contrast to the good cause standard for testimonial hearsay, documentary hearsay evidence may be admitted at a probation or parole revocation proceeding if there are sufficient indicia of reliability regarding the proffered material. The right of confrontation is not absolute; revocation proceedings should be flexible enough to allow for conventional substitutes for live testimony (including affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence); and various federal courts had demonstrated a willingness to consider inadmissible hearsay evidence when it is accompanied by a reasonable indica of reliability.

Authority:

People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 709

Eleventh Holding:

Whereas the need for confrontation is particularly important where the evidence is testimonial, because of the opportunity for observation of the witness’s demeanor, the witness’s demeanor is not a significant factor in evaluating foundational testimony relating to the admission of evidence such as laboratory reports, invoices, or receipts. This is because, often, the purpose of such foundational testimony is simply to authenticate the document, and the author, signator or custodian of the document may not even be able to recall from memory the specific contents of the writing.

Authority:

People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1157

Twelfth Holding:

In determining whether the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence prejudiced a defendant, we apply the “harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt” standard as the error is of federal constitutional dimension.

Authority:

People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1161

Thirteenth Holding:

Post-Release Community Supervision (PRCS) was created by the Legislature in 2011 as an alternative to parole for non-serious, nonviolent felonies. It is similar, but not identical to parole.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 393, 399