Error and/or relief
The trial court erred by discharging Juror No. 1 without good cause in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. Our review of the record does not reveal it was a demonstrable reality that the discharged juror refused to deliberate. Rather, the juror listened to all the evidence, participated to some extent in the discussions in the jury room, and remained willing and able to vote concerning the verdict. The judgment is reversed.
First Holding:
If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged. In most circumstances, section 1089 is applied to remove a juror “who becomes physically or emotionally unable to continue to serve as a juror due to illness or other circumstances. However, section 1089 also has been applied “to permit the removal of a juror who refuses to deliberate, on the theory that such a juror is unable to perform his duty.
Authority:
PEN 1089
People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 474
Second Holding:
The removal of a seated juror for failing to deliberate is a serious matter that implicates a defendant’s state and federal constitutional right to a unanimous decision by the jury. Accordingly, great caution is required when deciding to excuse a sitting juror. The requirement of a unanimous criminal verdict is an important safeguard, long recognized in American jurisprudence. This safeguard rests on the premise that each individual juror must exercise his or her own judgment in evaluating the case. The fact that other jurors may disagree with a panel member’s conclusions, or find disagreement frustrating, does not necessarily establish misconduct.
Authority:
People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432
People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60, 71
Third Holding:
If a juror’s willingness or ability to continue deliberating is unclear, the trial court must take care that its investigation is neither too cursory nor intrudes too deeply into the jury’s deliberative process to avoid invading the sanctity of the deliberations or creating a coercive effect on those deliberations.
The circumstance that a juror does not deliberate well or relies upon faulty logic or analysis does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge. Similarly, the circumstance that a juror disagrees with the majority of the jury as to what the evidence shows, or how the law should be applied to the facts, or the manner in which deliberations should be conducted does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for discharge.
Authority:
People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 485
Fourth Holding:
When reviewing the dismissal of a juror, the California Supreme Court has adopted a heightened standard of review that protects the defendant’s fundamental rights to due process and a fair trial. The juror’s inability to perform his or her duty must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality. This test is more comprehensive and less deferential than the substantial evidence test. Under both tests, the appellate court reviews the entire record and does not reweigh the evidence.
However, under the substantial evidence test, the court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if there is credible evidence that could reasonably support the trial court’s decision to remove a juror. Under the demonstrable reality test, by contrast, we must determine whether the trial court actually did rely on evidence that supports removing the juror.
This heightened and “ore stringent demonstrable reality standard more fully reflects an appellate court’s obligation to protect a defendant’s fundamental rights to due process and to a fair trial by an unbiased jury. Under the more comprehensive and less deferential review applicable here, we consider the reasons that the trial court provided, identify the evidence on which the court actually relied, and determine whether the evidence manifestly supports the court’s conclusion that a juror is refusing to deliberate.
Authority:
People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450-451
People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052, 1053
People v. McGhee (2025) 17 Cal.5th 612, 634 [a juror’s ability to describe to the court the views of the challenged juror showed there was some discussion going on]
People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 446 [Jurors can be expected to disagree, even vehemently, and to attempt to persuade disagreeing fellow jurors by strenuous and sometimes heated means; it is not required that jurors deliberate well or skillfully]
People v. Barton (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 496, 515 [juror’s refusal to change her mind and her decision to no longer attempt to explain that decision to the other jurors did not amount to misconduct]
Fifth Holding:
An abuse of discretion in discharging a juror under section 1089 requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached but for the error.
Authority:
Authority
People v. Bowers (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 722, 736 [applying the Watson standard]
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
People v. Henderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 530, 565 [discussing prejudice requirement]
Sixth Holding:
In some instances, removal of a juror was upheld. In Dixon, the discharged juror was not merely disagreeing with the other jurors. The trial court found that the juror was upset by a relative’s illness or by intimidation by the other jurors, and this emotional state inhibited the juror’s ability to deliberate. Based on its observation of the discharged juror’s demeanor, the court assessed that the juror had not been candid with the court about these effects on her ability to deliberate.
In Lomax, the discharged juror had prejudged the case but refused to share any of his reasoning with the other jurors, and the juror himself had said he was not able to consider the evidence or take part in the deliberations because of his conscientious objection to the death penalty.
In Samuels, discharge of a juror was upheld where the juror was distressed, asked to be removed, and told the court she could not follow her oath and lacked courage to impose the death penalty even if she were convinced the case required it.
Authority:
People v. Diaz (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 695, 705,
People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 591
People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 131–133
Seventh Holding:
While a jury is instructed to try to achieve a unanimous verdict, the possibility of a hung jury is an inevitable by-product of our unanimous verdict requirement.
Authority:
People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683
Eighth Holding:
It cannot be said a juror has refused to deliberate so long as a juror is willing and able to listen to the evidence presented in court, to consider the evidence and the judge’s instructions, and to finally come to a conclusion and vote. This is precisely what Juror No. 1 did.
Applying the heightened standard of review that governs our assessment of a trial court’s decision to discharge a juror, and based on our examination of the record as a whole, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in discharging Juror No. 1 because her inability to perform her duty as a juror does not appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.
Authority:
People v. Barton (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 496, 514
Ninth Holding:
On the facts in this case, there is no double jeopardy bar to retrial of the case.
Authority:
People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 454 1, 9