Tag Archives: Bail or OR

Duty of the court, Plea bargains, Sentencing

Case 001035

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Following the defendant’s failure to appear for sentencing, the court declined to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor as contemplated by the plea agreement that was accompanied by a Cruz waiver. This was error, as the court did not find that the defendant wilfully failed to appear for sentencing.

First Holding:

In Cruz, our Supreme Court held a defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain that is subsequently disapproved by the trial court for defendant’s failure to appear is entitled to withdraw his or her plea. But if the defendant willfully fails to appear for sentencing the trial court may withdraw its approval of the defendant’s plea and impose a sentence in excess of the bargained for term.

Any such waiver, of course, would have to be obtained at the time of the trial court’s initial acceptance of the plea, and it must be knowing and intelligent.

Authority:

People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1249

People v. Jones (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 261, 265

Second Holding:

Here, the trial court did not advise the defendant of his right to withdraw his plea if the court imposed a more severe sentence. Nor did the court advise him that his conviction would not be reduced to a misdemeanor if he willfully failed to appear for sentencing. But the defendant’s written plea form stated that he would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and that his negotiated disposition would be cancelled if he willfully failed to appear at sentencing.

To deprive him of the benefit of his plea bargain, the trial court must find that the defendant willfully failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. A defendant acts willfully if he knows what he is doing and intends to do it. The term ‘willful’ requires only that the prohibited act occur intentionally.

Authority:

PEN 7(b)(1)

People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 85–86

In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438

Third Holding:

It is the People’s burden to prove a defendant willfully failed to appear for sentencing after being released pursuant to a Cruz waiver. This burden requires the People to present admissible evidence.

The People concede they did not present sufficient evidence to show appellant willfully failed to appear for sentencing. In fact, they presented no evidence. The People relied on the prosecutor’s conclusion that there’s a willful failure to appear because the defendant is responsible for getting to court for sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 261, 265

Fourth Holding:

From our review of the record, it does not appear that the trial court found, explicitly or implicitly, that the defendant’s failure to appear was willful. We presume that a trial court understands and properly carries out its duties. But the trial court’s statements here suggest that it did not consider whether the defendant’s failure to appear was willful. On this record, we must conclude that the trial court imposed the greater term of a felony conviction exclusively on the fact of the defendant’s failure to appear for the hearing, without determining whether the failure to appear was willful.

The matter is remanded to the superior court so that it can give the parties the opportunity to present evidence and to make a finding of whether the defendat’s failure to appear at his sentencing hearing was willful.

Authority:

EVID 664

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114

People v. Jones (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 261, 266

Sentencing

Case 000844

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A portion of the defendant’s presentence custody status was preconviction home detention. That period was sufficiently custodial to entitle the defendant to custody and conduct credits. The matter is remanded for the trial court to determine what portion of the defendant’s preconviction status met the statutory requirements for creditable home detention.

First Holding:

Preconviction custody credits are governed by section 2900.5(a), which provides in relevant part that in all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, all days of custody of the defendant, including days served in home detention pursuant to section 1203.016 or 1203.018, shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a)

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1087– 1088

Second Holding:

Section 1203.018 authorizes a county to offer a program under which inmates being held in lieu of bail in a county jail or other county correctional facility may participate in an electronic monitoring program if certain conditions are met. An electronic monitoring program is defined as including home detention programs. The statute authorizes the board of supervisors to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations under which an electronic monitoring program pursuant to this section may operate.

Authority:

PEN 1203.018

Third Holding:

When a defendant is subject to preconviction electronic monitoring conditions under terms that are as custodial, or restraining as a statutory home detention program pursuant to section 1203.018, equal protection principles entitle that defendant to preconviction custody credits under section 2900.5 and conduct credits under section 4019.

Authority:

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1089

Fourth Holding:

Whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of section 2900.5 is a matter of statutory interpretation, a question of law we review de novo. The burden is on the accused to establish entitlement to presentence custody credit.

Authority:

People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 919

People v. Shabazz (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1258

Duty of the court

Case 000765

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This was a grant of a petition for habeas corpus to compel the trial court to set bail in this murder case. The appellate court granted the petition and directed the court to hold a new bail hearing consistent with the opinion.

First Holding:

Our state constitution entitles arrestees to bail unless one of a limited number of exceptions applies. The exception at issue here provides that a trial judge may deny bail when a defendant is charged with a felony offense involving acts of violence on another person when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the judge finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm to others.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 12

Yedinak v. Superior Court (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 876, 884

In re Kowalczyk (2026) 19 Cal.5th 593, 630 [a court may order the pretrial detention of a noncapital defendant only in the circumstances specified in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 12 of article I of the California Constitution]

Second Holding:

California Supreme Court caselaw imposed two more requirements for the so-called violent felony exception to apply. A trial judge must satisfy four legal requirements before issuing a pretrial detention order under section 12(b).

The judge must: (1) find there is sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict against the arrestee on a qualifying felony; (2) find by clear and convincing evidence a substantial likelihood that the arrestee’s release would result in great bodily harm to others; (3) find by clear and convincing evidence that no less restrictive condition than detention can reasonably protect the interests in public or victim safety, and the arrestee’s appearance in court; and (4) set forth the reasons for their decision on the record and include them in the minute order.

Per our order to show cause, only the third and fourth Yedinak factors are at issue here. We hold the trial court did not adequately satisfy either factor.

Authority:

Yedinak v. Superior Court (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 876, 886

In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455

In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135

Third Holding:

A court entering a pretrial detention order must set forth the reasons for its decision on the record and to include them in the court’s minutes, and the reasons supporting a denial of bail cannot be implied.”

Authority:

In re Harris (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1105, reversed in part on other grounds in In re Harris (2024) 16 Cal.5th 292

Eighth Amendment

Case: 000193

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This petition arises from a matter where the trial court denied bail on appeal without state reasons for the denial. The petition is granted, and the respondent court is ordered to provide a brief written statement of reasons to explain why the defendant’s requests for release pending appeal were denied.

Holding:

This petition arises from a matter where the trial court denied bail on appeal without state reasons for the denial. The petition is granted, and the respondent court is ordered to provide a brief written statement of reasons to explain why the defendant’s requests for release pending appeal were denied.

Authority:

PEN 1272.1

PEN 1272(c) [though referred to in 1272.1 as 1272(3)]

Trivia by Gary:

(Gary note: Section 1272.1 starts out with “Release on bail pending appeal under subdivision (3) of Section 1272 shall be ordered ….” In its final paragraph, it starts out with “In making its decision on whether to grant defendants’ motions for bail under subdivision (3) of Section 1272 ….” If you look at section 1272, however, there is no subdivision (3). Section 1272 does have subdivisions (a), (b), and (c). Here’s the explanation: Prior to January 1, 2024, section 1272 DID have subdivisions by number (1, 2, and 3). Effective that date, however, the section was amended in two respects.

(The substantive change was that it added the language I have bracketed here, which did not exist in previous versions: “After conviction of an offense not punishable with death [or life without the possibility of parole], … In other words, one sentenced to LWOP on or after that date can no longer apply for bail under section 1272 as of that date. The nonsubstantive change was the redesignation of the subdivisions as (a), (b), and (c) in place of the numbers. As of the present date, section 1272.1 has not been “cleaned up,” so to speak, to change its reference to the (a), (b), (c) designated subdivisions of section 1272. The substance of section 1272, subdivision 3 did not change when it was redesignated as subdivision (c). See? We learn something new every day!)