Category Archives: Fourth Amendment

Fourth Amendment

Case 000920

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm — which was obtained after a warrantless search of his car — because no exception to the warrant requirement justified the search.

(Gary note: As with most search and seizure opinions, the facts are incredibly important to the result of the motion to suppress evidence. Because unpublished cases cannot be cited, they are literally worthless as cases to which you can compare your own client’s situation to demonstrate that your client should have the same result (suppression). So I am not setting forth the extensive set of facts that resulted in the reversal of the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. I have concentrated simply on the applicable law governing how courts are to assess the facts.)

First Holding:

The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant before conducting a search. A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within a specific judicially recognized exception. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally prohibited from being used in criminal trials.

Authority:

People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1213

People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359

People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125

People v. Marquez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 402, 411

Second Holding:

Defendants may move to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a warrantless, unreasonable search or seizure. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing an exception applies.

When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — but exercise our independent judgment to determine whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Having engaged in that review, we conclude none of the People’s proffered exceptions to the warrant requirement apply here.

Authority:

PEN 1538.5(a)(1)(A)

People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 795

People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212

People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937

Third Holding:

Searching the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible, but the officer must possess a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer’s belief that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.

The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.

In determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight is given to specific reasonable inferences the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

Authority:

Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-1050

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30–31

Fourth Holding:

The circumstances here, however, demonstrate the officer improperly acted on his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch to search the car. The officer’s belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous based primarily upon his carrying a crossbody bag was purely speculative.

Authority:

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27,

People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490 [officer’s testimony that defendant was armed and dangerous because he wore baggy clothing that could conceal a weapon even though it naturally had bulges was speculative and lacking in specific, articulable facts]

Fifth Holding:

That the gas station was in a high crime area does not elevate the carrying of a crossbody bag into a reasonable suspicion of criminality, as the People contend. Many citizens of this state are forced to live in areas that have high crime rates or they come to these areas to shop, work, play, transact business, or visit relatives or friends.

Courts are reluctant to conclude that a location’s crime rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual.

There was no testimony regarding any reason to believe the defendant was in a gang. The officer had never met the defendant and had no knowledge of his history.

The defendant’s presence in that area, standing alone, did not support a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.

(Gary note: I have cited a few of the authorities relied on by the court, but there were other purported justifications presented by the prosecution, and the appellate court found simply that they did not justify the search. For a degree of brevity and readability, I have chosen to end the summary with the authorities shown below.)

Authority:

People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 645

In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 897 [high crime area justification is so easily subject to abuse that this fact alone should not be deemed sufficient to support the intrusion], superseded by constitutional amendment on another point in In re Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460, fn. 2.

King v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 286

People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052 [knowledge of person’s history of violence and possession of weapons provided reasonable suspicion suspect was armed and dangerous]

People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, 233

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000781

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because the police improperly prolonged his detention to conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the purpose of the initial traffic stop.

First Holding:

Section 1538.5 affords criminal defendants a procedure by which they may seek suppression of illegally seized evidence. Section 1538.5 provides a comprehensive and exclusive procedure for the final determination of search and seizure issues prior to trial. A motion to suppress may be filed independently or at the preliminary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 940

Second Holding:

When a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing, as in this case, the magistrate tries the facts, resolving credibility issues and conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing appropriate inferences.

If the magistrate denies the motion and holds the defendant to answer, the defendant must, as a prerequisite to appellate review, renew his challenge before the trial court by motion to dismiss under section 995 or in a special hearing.

At that stage, the evidence is generally limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing, testimony by witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing (who may be recalled by the prosecution), and evidence that could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941

Third Holding:

Where a suppression motion is made before a magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing and no new evidence is presented in superior court, we are concerned solely with the findings of the magistrate. After submission on the transcript at the special hearing, the appellate court, like the superior court, is bound by the magistrate’s factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

On review of the superior court ruling by appeal or writ, a two-step standard of review applies. In the first step of our review, we in effect disregard the ruling of the superior court and directly review the determination of the magistrate.

At this stage, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the People since all factual conflicts must be resolved in the manner most favorable to the superior court’s disposition on the suppression motion.

Authority:

People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941

Fourth Holding:

In the second step, accepting as established all implied or express factual findings by the magistrate as are supported by substantial evidence, we then proceed to measure those findings against Fourth Amendment standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court. At this stage, we independently apply the law to the factual findings, determining de novo whether the factual record supports the magistrate’s conclusion that the challenged search met the constitutional standard of reasonableness.

Authority:

People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 941-942

People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212 [In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards.]

Fifth Holding:

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a seizure of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. But where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, the seizure is constitutionally reasonable.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 4th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 13

Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 574 U.S. 54, 60

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669

Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809–810

Sixth Holding:

A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a relatively brief encounter for police investigation of the traffic violation. The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.

The United States Supreme Court has identified tasks that are part of an officer’s mission during a stop for a traffic violation: Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.  A temporary detention may sometimes also include a criminal history check, which is done by consulting an incar computer terminal or radioing dispatch.

These tasks are included within the officer’s mission during a traffic stop because they ‘serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. An officer may also require a lawfully stopped driver to exit the vehicle for officer safety to complete his traffic stop mission.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669-670

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354, 355-356

People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 363, fn. 4

Seventh Holding:

On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from the traffic stop’s mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. Thus, while an officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 670

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355

Eighth Holding:

An investigative stop can grow out of a traffic stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the investigation, even if those suspicions were unrelated to the underlying traffic offense. Therefore, a stop may be prolonged if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable suspicion.

Authority:

People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756–757

People v. Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1088

Ninth Holding:

Under the totality of circumstances, we conclude the detention was unjustifiably prolonged beyond the time reasonably needed to write the defendant a traffic ticket. Nor was the prolonged detention independently justified by reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity apart from the broken taillight. The traffic stop occurred mid-morning in broad daylight. There was no evidence that it occurred in a high-crime area; indeed, the magistrate was not sure about [the location] and how tough an area that is. And the defendant complied with all officer commands.

On this record, we conclude that although reasonable suspicion justified the initial traffic stop and removal of the defendant from his vehicle for a weapons pat-down, no reasonable suspicion justified prolonging the detention beyond the time necessary to write a traffic ticket so that the officers could further investigate the defendant for drug offenses unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop.

Authority:

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354 [Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.]

People v. Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1088 [a stop may be prolonged if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable suspicion]

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1038–1039, 1045–1046 [no reasonable suspicion where the defendant ducked behind a car to hide from police in a high-crime area at night]

People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 487, 490–491 [no reasonable suspicion for a pat-down where a nervous but cooperative person with a history of weapons arrests was detained on vehicle infractions in a high crime area while wearing baggy clothing]

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 357 [Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular.]

Fourth Amendment

Case 000738

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence. A security guard noticed that car in the parking lot had shooting targets and loose ammunition–both legal–in the car, and the car’s trunk was open. No one was inside or near the car, which was locked. The guard called the police. The officer saw what appeared to be a tactical vest in the partly opened trunk. The officer then fully opened the trunk and could then see the butt of a pistol in the vest.

Because the officer could not see the gun and magazines until after he had seized the tactical vest, he had no probable cause to open the trunk further to conduct the search the trunk or of the vest he removed from the trunk.

First Holding:

In reviewing an order on a suppression motion, we rely on the trial court’s express and implied factual findings, provided they are supported by substantial evidence, to independently determine whether the search was constitutional.

Thus, while we ultimately exercise our independent judgment to determine the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the context of historical facts determined by the trial court construed in the light most favorable to the court’s order. It is the trial court’s role to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences.

Authority:

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860-861

Second Holding:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of private property. A defendant challenging the lawfulness of a warrantless search must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the things seized. A successful showing requires the government to respond by identifying an applicable exception to the warrant requirement.

If the government fails to do so, the court must apply an exclusionary rule that forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial and must also preclude the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of the illegal search.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1469

People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 960

People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 115

People v. Golden (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 905, 911

Third Holding:

A defendant’s expectation of privacy must be both subjective and objectively reasonable. To meet this second prong of the test, the expectation must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.

Authority:

People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 960

Byrd v. United States (2018) 584 U.S. 395, 405

Fourth Holding:

The court’s determination that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trunk of his car is supported by substantial evidence. At the time of the search, the doors to his car were locked and the key was in his pocket. These facts are highly relevant to our inquiry because one of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.

Accordingly, one who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns and possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The facts indicate that the defendant took precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.

Authority:

Byrd v. United States (2018) 584 U.S. 395, 405

Fifth Holding:

It does not violate the Fourth Amendment for an officer to make a warrantless seizure of an incriminating object in plain view if (1) the officer was lawfully in a place where the object could be viewed; (2) the officer had a lawful right of access to the seized item; and (3) the item’s evidentiary value was immediately apparent. This third element requires that there be probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or contraband before it was seized.

Authority:

People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 489

People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719

Sixth Holding:

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we defer to a trial court’s credibility finding that is supported by substantial evidence. Generally, this is evidence that, when viewed in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been justly determined.

Under this standard, we may reject testimony accepted as credible by the trial court only if it is wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds or unbelievable per se such that no reasonable person could believe the testimony Credibility findings that fail to survive this scrutiny are rare indeed. There must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or the statements falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.

This case presents one of these rare occurrences. (The opinion then details the problems it perceived with trial courts conclusions drawn from the officer’s testimony.)

Authority:

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860-861

People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149

In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149

DiQuisto v. County of Santa Clara (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 236, 261

Seventh Holding:

Under the plain view doctrine, probable cause that an item of interest to law enforcement is incriminating must exist before the object is seized. The trial court’s logic, by contrast, suggests that this standard can be met by a mere hunch that happens to pan out. That is not how the Fourth Amendment works.

Authority:

People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719

People v. Pitts (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881, 889 [A hunch may provide the basis for solid police work. A hunch, however, is not a substitute for the necessary specific, articulable facts required to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion]

Eighth Holding:

A law enforcement officer often performs functions that are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. As these so-called community caretaking functions relate to vehicles, they include impounding them if they pose threats to public safety—for example, because they are disabled, parked illegally, or blocking traffic or a sidewalk—or stand at risk of theft or vandalism.

When vehicles are impounded, that is, seized, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These inventory searches are “a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Accordingly, under what is sometimes referred to as the vehicle community caretaking exception, the government may introduce evidence obtained from an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle.

But controlling precedent recognizes the vehicle community caretaking exception applies only in the context of impound procedures, which undisputedly were not used here. No published California case has applied the concept of community caretaking outside the context of a vehicle inventory.

Even assuming that the community caretaking function might in some circumstances permit a warrantless search for suspected firearms in the unsecured trunk of an unoccupied car in a public place, the search here was unreasonable because sheriff’s deputies made no attempt to first locate the driver of the vehicle before opening the trunk

Authority:

Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441

People v. Vodak (1980) 105 Cal.App.3rd 1014

People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 52

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 867

People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1048, 1053

Fourth Amendment

Case 000721

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A police officer’s observation of a driver’s red, glossy eyes and strong odor of cologne, without more, did not provide a reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation after instigating a traffic stop. We affirm the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

(Gary note: This is a long summary. In short, the defendant showed no signs of driving under the influence, and the only reason the officer conducted a search was he perceived the defendant’s eyes as red and glossy and he smelled cologne. I have chosen to set forth the main principles relied on by the Court of Appeal in affirming the trial court’s grant of the suppression motion, which had been overturned by the appellate division of the superior court before the Court of Appeal transferred the matter to itself on the defendant’s petition.)

First Holding:

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, a defendant may move to suppress evidence on the grounds that the search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable. The burden to show proper justification for a warrantless search and seizure] rests on the prosecution.

Authority:

U.S. Const. 4th Amend.

PEN 1538.5(a)(1)(A)

People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 795

Second Holding:

A seizure occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restricts a person’s liberty. A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.

Authority:

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16

People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231

Third Holding:

A reasonable suspicion to detain requires a lesser showing than probable cause to arrest. Not only can reasonable suspicion be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.

Authority:

People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230-231,

Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330

Fourth Holding:

Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for which the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed. Thus, a seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.

The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.

Authority:

People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053–1054

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354

Fifth Holding:

An officer’s mission during a traffic stop includes addressing the traffic violation; checking the driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance; and determining whether the driver has outstanding warrants—all of which serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

Authority:

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355

Sixth Holding:

Under certain circumstances, an officer conducting a traffic stop may also investigate a suspected crime unrelated to the infraction that initially prompted the stop. However, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. An articulable and reasonable suspicion that a person is driving while impaired is required to extend a routine traffic stop to involve a more intrusive DUI investigation requiring the driver to exit his or her vehicle to perform field sobriety tests [FSTs].

Authority:

Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355

People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 940-941 [the Fourth Amendment requires officers to diligently pursue a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly]

People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 742 [an officer’s subjective beliefs are generally irrelevant to the lawfulness of a search and seizure]

Seventh Holding:

Here, the trial court found that the officer’s prolonging the traffic stop in order to investigate defendant for a DUI by having him exit the vehicle to undergo field sobriety tests was not independently supported by individualized, reasonable suspicion. We agree with this conclusion.

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, we draw all inferences from the record in favor of the trial court’s ruling and defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.

We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.

Authority:

People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043

People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362

People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 56 [when a misdemeanor appeal is certified for transfer to the appellate court, the Court of Appeal’s review is as if the parties directly appealed from the trial court ruling on defendant’s suppression motion]

Eighth Holding:

The officer testified that he suspected defendant may have been intoxicated and, therefore, decided to conduct a DUI investigation based on two factors: defendant had red, glossy eyes and smelled strongly of cologne. These factors are not enough to provide reasonable suspicion of a DUI crime.

Authority:

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1045 [mere presence in a known narcotics area is not enough to warrant suspicion]

People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 940 [finding no substantial evidence to support the officer’s claim that the defendant appeared intoxicated when the defendant did not display any conduct demonstrating insobriety, such as slurred or irregular speech, an inability to walk or stand normally, confusion, or any other mental incapacity, and he was not acting any more nervously than a typical person in a traffic stop]

Ninth Holding:

A mere deviation from perceived social convention does not automatically signal criminal behavior. The particular conduct relied upon must, when considered in the totality of circumstances, support a reasonable suspicion that the person to be detained is, or is about to be, engaged in activity ‘relating to crime.

Authority:

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1045

In re L.G. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 818, 822 [Nervousness, an unrelated arrest, and a gang companion did not create reasonable suspicion L.G. was at that moment committing a crime]

Tenth Holding:

While officers may draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences, they cannot rely on mere hunches.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000712

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This was an appeal by the prosecutor from the grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. It is considered a victory here because the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the motion to suppress.

First Holding:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Unlike detentions, they require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.

Authority:

People v. McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 437

In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821

Second Holding:

Consensual encounters are those police-individual interactions that result in no restraint of an individual’s liberty whatsoever—i.e., no seizure, however minimal—and which may properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any objective justification. The Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies and other public places to ask them questions, so long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.

The citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions or decline to act in the manner requested by the authorities. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty, does a seizure occur.

Authority:

People v. Paul (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 832, 838

Third Holding:

In order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. This test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation.

Authority:

People v. Paul (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 832, 838

Fourth Holding:

The test for the existence of a show of authority is an objective one and does not take into account the perceptions of the particular person involved. The test is not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person. This includes an examination of both an officer’s verbal and nonverbal actions in order to assess the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation.

Authority:

People v. Paul (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 832, 838–839

Fifth Holding:

In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review.

Authority:

People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505

Sixth Holding:

Given that the officer had just woken defendant from his slumber in his legally parked vehicle, and that defendant did not place the call for service the the officer testified he told the defendant he was responding to, the officer’s statement would have placed an objectively reasonable person on alert that the officer might be investigating him specifically, which would lead that reasonable person to conclude that the officer required his attention and he could not simply depart.

Given the deferential standard of review we apply to the trial court’s factual findings, that the officer woke defendant from his slumber while he was legally parked with his window up, that the officer was blocking the vehicle’s door when he woke defendant, and that the officer’s statement would have placed an objectively reasonable person on alert that the officer might be investigating him specifically, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Authority:

Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790–791

People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 58, 65

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000455

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The motion to suppress evidence under should have been granted. The juvenile court’s denial of the minor’s motion to suppress is reversed. His admission to the offense is vacated. The juvenile court is directed to enter an order granting the minor’s motion to suppress the evidence found inside the vehicle, and we remand the matter for further proceedings.

[GARY NOTE: This was a very fact-intensive ruling on who knew what what and why. Essentially, an officer followed the minor’s vehicle after noticing the registration tag had expired. Through a series of events, the minor left his vehicle legally parked on the street, walked a few blocks away, was found by the officer, was asked questions that he answered truthfully, and in response to a request for the detaining officer, other officers searched the locked car that was a few blocks away (ostensibly to look for registration and identification–after identification had been already been confirmed), revealing contraband.]

First Holding:

In ruling upon a motion to suppress, the trial court judges the credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws factual inferences. The appellate court will uphold the court’s express and/or implied findings on such matters if they are supported by substantial evidence, but it independently review the application of the relevant law to the facts.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761

Second Holding:

Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside. Probable cause means that, under the known facts and circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside the vehicle.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359, 372

Ornelas v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696

Third Holding:

The accepted practice of modern law enforcement is that an officer often conducts searches at the direction of another law enforcement officer even though the searching officer himself lacks actual, personal knowledge of the facts supporting probable cause. When that occurs, the collective knowledge doctrine applies and the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all. The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the searching officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to search is based on facts known only to his superior or associates. The focus is on knowledge of the person who was the source of the information the searching officers relied on.

Authority:

U.S. v. Jensen (2005 9th Cir.) 425 F.3d 698, 704

Fourth Holding:

Once the officer confirmed the identity of the minor, there was no cause to believe the minor was lying and therefore no probably cause to search. Because officers should not have been inside the vehicle to see the firearm magazine, they could not rely on the magazine to supply probable cause for continuing to search the vehicle.

Authority:

United States v. Ngumezi (2020 9th Cir.) 980 F.3d 1285, 1290 [Because the opening of the car door and leaning into the car constituted an unlawful search, we must consider what remedy is appropriate. The exclusionary rule generally applied in Fourth Amendment cases requires courts to suppress any evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, as well as evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree]

Fifth Holding:

Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place where he is arrested. The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things that might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control.

But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. When the officer searched the vehicle, the minor was over a block away from the vehicle, in handcuffs. Additionally, the minor had locked the vehicle, and one officer had taken the key away from the minor. Given the foregoing facts, the vehicle was not under the minor’s control at the time of his arrest. Therefore, there was no basis to search the vehicle incident to minor’s arrest.

Authority:

Preston v. U.S. (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367

Sixth Holding:

When examining the propriety of an inventory search, we focus on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory. An inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable. Under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. Once a vehicle has been legally impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search, as long as it conforms to the standard procedures of the local police department. However, an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 786-787

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141

Seventh Holding:

The reasonableness of the impoundment depended on whether the impoundment fits within the authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience. In other words, a valid caretaking purpose is required. The minor left the vehicle locked and parallel parked on a quiet residential street where other vehicles were parked. The vehicle was not blocking a driveway or impeding traffic. The People failed to introduce evidence as to why the vehicle could not remain parked on the street until retrieved by Mother.

A vehicle with a registration that has been expired for less than six months can remain parked on a public street. The People failed to introduce evidence of when the vehicle’s registration expired. Thus, the People did not demonstrate that the vehicle could be seized due to the registration being expired for more than six months. Given the evidence, there was no reason the police could not have locked the vehicle and left it parked on the street. There is no evidence of a community caretaking function to impounding the vehicle.

Authority:

VEH 22651(o)(1)(A)(i)

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141

Eighth Holding:

We are not examining whether the seizure of the vehicle was authorized by state law. Rather, we are examining whether the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The statutory authorization to impound a vehicle does not, in and of itself, determine the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure. It is evidence of a community caretaking need to impound the vehicle that causes the seizure of a vehicle to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, i.e., where the impound process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents.

Thus, we are not persuaded by the People’s assertion that the seizure of the vehicle was constitutionally reasonable because it was authorized by the Vehicle Code.

Authority:

Miranda v. City of Cornelius (2005 9th Cir.) 429 F.3d 858, 864-865

South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373

People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246

People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 762

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 869

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1142

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000364

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The police violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by announcing an intent to frisk him without reasonable suspicion. The defendant revealed the presence of the weapon he was carrying only when the officer threatened to frisk him. The threatened frisk was unwarranted and required suppressing certain evidence.

First Holding:

On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence but independently apply constitutional principles to those findings.

Authority:

People v. Session (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723, 730

Second Holding:

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. An officer may briefly detain a person for investigation based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. If the officer further reasonably suspects that the person is armed and presently dangerous, the officer may also frisk him for weapons. A frisk is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

Authority:

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 17, 21, 30

Third Holding:

When the suspected offense is violent or otherwise serious enough, this alone may support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. But for lesser offenses, like unlawful possession of marijuana, more is needed. Some unusual circumstances—like a suspect’s admission that he is armed, visible signs of a concealed weapon, or suspicious movements—will typically be sufficient even on their own. Knowledge of a suspect’s recent, violent criminal history may also be enough.

Authority:

State v. Valentine (N.J. 1994) 636 A.2d 505, 509

4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (6th ed. 2025) sec. 9.6(a), fns. 57–64 [collecting cases]

People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052

Fourth Holding:

Penal Code section 1538.5(m), allows a defendant who pleaded guilty to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained through an allegedly unlawful search or seizure. This includes defendant’s attempt to exclude a statement, in addition to other kinds of evidence.

Authority:

People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 6

Fifth Holding:

More mundane circumstances—like the time or location of the stop—may be insufficient on their own, or even in combination with other weak indications. For example, a frisk was not justified where the suspect (1) had no identification, (2) did not consent to a search, (3) was nervous and sweating, and (4) possessed baking powder (which could be used to dilute drugs) in a film canister. Nor was it justified during a late-night detention of robbery suspects, where the officers had no information that the robbery involved weapons and the suspects fully cooperated and made no furtive or unusual movements. Nor following a 1:30 a.m. traffic stop where the suspect had an old arrest for weapons possession.

Authority:

People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956

In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 299, 306–307

People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490–491

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000241

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for having a nonfunctioning rear license plate light. The detaining officer prolonged the stop without the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify detouring from the traffic stop’s mission. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment, and we remand the matter to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and with directions to the trial court to enter a new order granting his suppression motion.

First Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.

Authority:

PEN 1538.5

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043

Second Holding:

A traffic stop that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a relatively brief encounter for police investigation of the traffic violation.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Third Holding:

The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Fourth Holding:

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. The temporary detention may also include a criminal history check, which is done by consulting an in-car computer terminal or radioing dispatch. And although not specifically compelled by law, certain other steps customarily taken as matters of good police practice are no less intimately related to the citation process: for example, the officer will usually discuss the violation with the motorist and listen to any explanation the latter may wish to offer. These tasks are included within the officer’s mission during a traffic stop because they serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Fifth Holding:

An officer may also require a lawfully stopped driver to exit the vehicle for officer safety to complete his traffic stop mission. On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from the traffic stop’s mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours. While an officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Authority:

People v. Gyorgy (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 659, 669–670

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000086

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence, contending the court erred when it found police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him. Because we have concluded there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s conduct, when considered in the totality of circumstances, supported a reasonable suspicion that he was, or was about to be, engaged in activity relating to crime, we agree with defendant that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Accordingly, the subsequent recovery of the handgun was the product of an illegal detention and arrest and evidence related to the recovery was subject to exclusion.

[GARY NOTE: The facts relied on by the court are too extensive to adequately summarize. Essentially, the officer saw a group of people milling about. When some appeared to notice him, they ran off, though the defendant and one other did not run off. The officer described various body movements and claimed to have seen something that was not borne out by the appellate court’s review of the body cam video.]

First Holding:

The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative stop when the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. [Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause. Because it is a less demanding standard, reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause. The standard depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Courts cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty where none exists. Rather, they must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.

Authority:

Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380–381

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041

Second Holding:

The officer’s subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, and an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.

Authority:

People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083

Third Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.

Authority:

People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043