Error and/or relief
The trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm — which was obtained after a warrantless search of his car — because no exception to the warrant requirement justified the search.
(Gary note: As with most search and seizure opinions, the facts are incredibly important to the result of the motion to suppress evidence. Because unpublished cases cannot be cited, they are literally worthless as cases to which you can compare your own client’s situation to demonstrate that your client should have the same result (suppression). So I am not setting forth the extensive set of facts that resulted in the reversal of the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. I have concentrated simply on the applicable law governing how courts are to assess the facts.)
First Holding:
The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant before conducting a search. A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within a specific judicially recognized exception. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally prohibited from being used in criminal trials.
Authority:
People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1213
People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359
People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125
People v. Marquez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 402, 411
Second Holding:
Defendants may move to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a warrantless, unreasonable search or seizure. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing an exception applies.
When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — but exercise our independent judgment to determine whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Having engaged in that review, we conclude none of the People’s proffered exceptions to the warrant requirement apply here.
Authority:
PEN 1538.5(a)(1)(A)
People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 795
People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212
People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937
Third Holding:
Searching the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible, but the officer must possess a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer’s belief that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.
In determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight is given to specific reasonable inferences the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.
Authority:
Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-1050
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30–31
Fourth Holding:
The circumstances here, however, demonstrate the officer improperly acted on his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch to search the car. The officer’s belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous based primarily upon his carrying a crossbody bag was purely speculative.
Authority:
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27,
People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490 [officer’s testimony that defendant was armed and dangerous because he wore baggy clothing that could conceal a weapon even though it naturally had bulges was speculative and lacking in specific, articulable facts]
Fifth Holding:
That the gas station was in a high crime area does not elevate the carrying of a crossbody bag into a reasonable suspicion of criminality, as the People contend. Many citizens of this state are forced to live in areas that have high crime rates or they come to these areas to shop, work, play, transact business, or visit relatives or friends.
Courts are reluctant to conclude that a location’s crime rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual.
There was no testimony regarding any reason to believe the defendant was in a gang. The officer had never met the defendant and had no knowledge of his history.
The defendant’s presence in that area, standing alone, did not support a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.
(Gary note: I have cited a few of the authorities relied on by the court, but there were other purported justifications presented by the prosecution, and the appellate court found simply that they did not justify the search. For a degree of brevity and readability, I have chosen to end the summary with the authorities shown below.)
Authority:
People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 645
In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 897 [high crime area justification is so easily subject to abuse that this fact alone should not be deemed sufficient to support the intrusion], superseded by constitutional amendment on another point in In re Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460, fn. 2.
King v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 286
People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052 [knowledge of person’s history of violence and possession of weapons provided reasonable suspicion suspect was armed and dangerous]
People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, 233