Error and/or relief
The police violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by announcing an intent to frisk him without reasonable suspicion. The defendant revealed the presence of the weapon he was carrying only when the officer threatened to frisk him. The threatened frisk was unwarranted and required suppressing certain evidence.
First Holding:
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence but independently apply constitutional principles to those findings.
Authority:
People v. Session (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723, 730
Second Holding:
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. An officer may briefly detain a person for investigation based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. If the officer further reasonably suspects that the person is armed and presently dangerous, the officer may also frisk him for weapons. A frisk is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Authority:
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 17, 21, 30
Third Holding:
When the suspected offense is violent or otherwise serious enough, this alone may support a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. But for lesser offenses, like unlawful possession of marijuana, more is needed. Some unusual circumstances—like a suspect’s admission that he is armed, visible signs of a concealed weapon, or suspicious movements—will typically be sufficient even on their own. Knowledge of a suspect’s recent, violent criminal history may also be enough.
Authority:
State v. Valentine (N.J. 1994) 636 A.2d 505, 509
4 LaFave, Search and Seizure (6th ed. 2025) sec. 9.6(a), fns. 57–64 [collecting cases]
People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052
Fourth Holding:
Penal Code section 1538.5(m), allows a defendant who pleaded guilty to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained through an allegedly unlawful search or seizure. This includes defendant’s attempt to exclude a statement, in addition to other kinds of evidence.
Authority:
People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 6
Fifth Holding:
More mundane circumstances—like the time or location of the stop—may be insufficient on their own, or even in combination with other weak indications. For example, a frisk was not justified where the suspect (1) had no identification, (2) did not consent to a search, (3) was nervous and sweating, and (4) possessed baking powder (which could be used to dilute drugs) in a film canister. Nor was it justified during a late-night detention of robbery suspects, where the officers had no information that the robbery involved weapons and the suspects fully cooperated and made no furtive or unusual movements. Nor following a 1:30 a.m. traffic stop where the suspect had an old arrest for weapons possession.
Authority:
People v. Dickey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 956
In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 299, 306–307
People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490–491