Tag Archives: Miranda

Case 000858

Error and/or relief

We hold that the officers’ un-Mirandized questioning of the defendant was a custodial interrogation and reverse the judgment.

First Holding:

When reviewing issues under Miranda, we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence but independently determine whether the interrogation was custodial. Where, as here, an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission are undisputed and subject to our independent review.

Authority:

People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1161

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172

Second Holding:

To give force to the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination, a custodial interrogation must be preceded by Miranda warnings and the suspect’s voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights.

Persons in custody thus must be warned that they have the right to remain silent, any statement made may be used as evidence against them, and they have the right to an attorney.

For Miranda purposes, interrogation means express questioning or words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Authority:

Florida v. Powell (2010) 559 U.S. 50, 59

People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 530–531

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 244

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

Third Holding:

The protections provided by Miranda apply only to custodial interrogations. The term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

Volunteered statements, for instance, that were not made in response to police questioning are not the product of an interrogation and thus not inadmissible under Miranda even when the statements were made while in custody.

Where a defendant seeks to exclude statements made in the absence of a Miranda advisement, they must therefore establish both that the police questioning was an interrogation and that it occurred while the individual was in custody.

Authority:

People v. Zapata (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 529, 538

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648

Fourth Holding:

A custodial interrogation occurs when a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would feel that their freedom has been deprived in any significant way; for example, a formal arrest or a restraint of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.

When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have understood their situation. All the circumstances of the interrogation are relevant to this inquiry, including the location, length and form of the interrogation, the degree to which the investigation was focused on the defendant, and whether any indicia of arrest were present.

Whether a person is in custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.

Authority:

California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125

People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491

People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 172

Fifth Holding:

When the court considers whether an individual was in custody during their questioning, it looks at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest. The courts have articulated a number of non-exhaustive factors to consider when conducting this analysis.

The relevant factors include: (1) whether contact was initiated by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; (2) whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect; (3) location of the interview; (4) whether police informed the person they were under arrest or in custody; (5) whether they informed the person they were free to terminate the interview and leave at any time; (6) whether there were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the interview; (7) length of the interrogation; (8) how many police officers participated; (9) whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; (10) whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; (11) whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; (12) whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and 13) whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.

Authority:

People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162

Sixth Holding:

The circumstances are less likely to suggest to an individual that they are unable to leave or end the questioning when they voluntarily subject themselves to such an examination.

Authority:

People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528, 541 [holding that the defendant was not in custody when he voluntarily came to the police station for an interview]

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 173 [defendant’s agreement to be voluntarily interviewed in unmarked police car weighed against a custodial finding]

Seventh Holding:

A custodial interrogation does not occur where an officer detains a suspect for investigation and limits questioning to the purpose of identification or obtaining sufficient information to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions that a crime has occurred.

Authority:

People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180

People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 679–680

Eighth Holding:

The mere fact that an individual is a suspect is not enough to foster a custodial environment; the officers’ suspicion must also be communicated to that person for it to factor into the custody determination.

The awareness of the person being questioned by an officer that the police have ample cause to arrest him, may well lead him to conclude, as a reasonable person, that he is not free to leave, and that he has been significantly deprived of his freedom.

Authority:

People v. Vasquez (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1163—1164

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 176 [holding that officers’ expressed belief that the defendant was culpable and they had evidence to prove it weighed in favor of custody determination]

Ninth Holding:

An interview that takes place in public within view of any passersby reduces the ability of an unscrupulous officer to use illegitimate means to elicit incriminating responses and should lessen a suspect’s fear of abuse should they not cooperate.

Authority:

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 438

Tenth Holding:

The longer the period of questioning, the more likely it will be found to be coercive and custodial, although even one question may be enough in the proper circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Herdan (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 300, 307, fn. 12

Eleventh Holding:

If the court finds that the statement was admitted in violation of Miranda, the court must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not impact the jury’s guilty verdict, such that the jury would not have reached a different result had the trial court excluded the challenged statements.  

The court assesses whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 21–22

People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 495

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Twelfth Holding:

A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. On the record in this case, we cannot find that the admission of the defendant’s statements was harmless error.

Authority:

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296.

People v. Torres (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 162, 181 [finding prejudice where there were no witnesses or physical evidence and defendant’s non-Mirandized statements was primary evidence]

Case 000780

Error and/or relief

We conclude the detectives subjected defendant to a custodial interrogation. Their failure to advise him of his Miranda rights therefore required the suppression of his confession.

First Holding:

Under Miranda, suspects questioned by law enforcement after being taken into custody must first be informed that they have the right to remain silent, that any statements they make may be used against them, and that they have a right to the presence of an attorney. If police interrogate a suspect in custody without providing these advisements, the suspect’s responses cannot be admitted to establish their guilt.

Authority:

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16

Second Holding:

The duty to advise suspects of their Miranda rights applies only if they are in custody. Custody is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In deciding if a person is in custody for Miranda purposes, the question is whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. To answer this question, the court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16

Third Holding:

Relevant considerations include (1) who initiated the contact; (2) whether the person agreed to the interview; (3) whether the person was questioned as a witness or suspect; (4) the interview’s location; (5) whether police said the person was under arrest or in custody (6) conversely, whether they said the person was free to leave at any time; (7) whether the person’s movement was restrained; (7) the length of questioning; (8) the number of officers; (9) the degree of police control over the interrogation; (10) whether officers conveyed a belief in the person’s guilt and suggested they had incriminating evidence; (11) whether the tone was aggressive or accusatory; (12) whether police used interrogation tactics designed to pressure the person; and (13) whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 16-17

Fourth Holding:

The prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant was not in custody. We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence but independently decide if the interrogation was custodial.

(GARY Note: the court then described the events in detail that led the court to declare “Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation long before he received Miranda advisements.” Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not useful to recite the circumstances, because you cannot cite this case as an example of a finding that Miranda rights should have been given earlier. If an attorney wants to read the full opinion, I can provide it on request.)

Authority:

In re Anthony L. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 438, 445

Fifth Holding:

A confession held inadmissible by reason of having been obtained in violation of the prophylactic Miranda requirements is subject to a harmless-error standard of review specified in Chapman. Under that standard, we ask whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question.

Authority:

People v. NavaAdame (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1, 21-22

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Sixth Holding:

The erroneous admission of defendant’s confession cannot be regarded as unimportant. A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. Confessions often operate as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense and are thus much more likely to be prejudicial.

Authority:

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296

People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86

Seventh Holding:

We decline to consider defendant’s testimony at trial in assessing harmlessness. When an illegally obtained confession is erroneously admitted, the defendant’s testimony will not render the error harmless unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not take the stand in an attempt to mitigate the explosive impact of a confession which had left his case in ruin.

Authority:

People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 151

Case 000071

Error and/or relief

The trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his interrogation statements because he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda. His statements were involuntary and coerced. We conclude the admission of the interrogation was prejudicial. We therefore reverse his convictions and remand for retrial.

First Holding:

A custodial interrogation can come in various forms and does not require questions. The term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.

Authority:

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436

Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301

Second Holding:

Miranda’s safeguards do not apply when police ask a suspect routine booking questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services. But there is an exception to that exception: courts have recognized the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under the guise of seeking objective or neutral information, deliberately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.

Authority:

Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601

United States v. Zapien (9th Cir. 2017) 861 F.3d 971, 975

E

Third Holding:

When a police officer has reason to know that a suspect’s answer may incriminate him even routine questioning may amount to interrogation.

Authority:

United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3d 1143, 1147

Fourth Holding:

Once a suspect states he wishes to consult with an attorney, the interrogation must stop until an attorney is present or the suspect reinitiates contact. This is a bright-line rule: it requires all questioning cease after a suspect requests counsel. This is a prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through badgering or overreaching—explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional—might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance. Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, everything changes; that is, the police can no longer engage in efforts to convince the suspect to speak to them.

Authority:

Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484–485

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 580

Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1022

People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 932

Fifth Holding:

The error requires reversal unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

We review Miranda claims under federal constitutional standards. We accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. When an interview is recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply independent review.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 578

People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013, 1023

People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 158