Category Archives: Defenses

Appellate Principles, Defenses

Case 000962

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

One of the defendant’s counts must be vacated because it was time-barred.

First Holding:

There is a three-year statute of limitations for reckless indifference to an animal’s suffering.

Authority:

PEN 597(b) and (d)

PEN 801

Second Holding:

There is a relation-back provision, meaning a prosecutor could file charges late if they involved the same conduct alleged in charges that were timely filed. (Former sec. 803, subd. (b) [eff. Jan. 2018].) The relation-back provision suspends the running of the statute of limitation only for the conduct underlying a charged offense but does not stop the running of the statute of limitation on completely separate instances of criminal conduct.

In other words, the relation-back provision does not function as a categorical exception to the running of the applicable limitation period for the entire class of same or similar criminal acts allegedly committed by a defendant during the same time frame as an offense charged in a pending prosecution.

Authority:

People v. Terry (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 769

Third Holding:

The defendant requests that, on remand, he should be granted leave to file a motion for new trial on the grounds that the jury may have been influenced by the evidence presented on the time-barred-now-vacated count.

A motion for new trial must be made and determined before the making of an order granting probation. The defendant has been granted probation. The trial court lack jurisidiction to rule on a motion for new trial.

Authority:

People v. Martin (1963) 60 Cal.2d 615, 618

Defenses, Jury instructions, Jury trial, Standard of review

Case 000935

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by instructing the jury that a person may lose the right to self-defense if he was the initial aggressor or a mutual combatant (CALCRIM No. 3471), or if he contrived the claim as a pretext to assault the victim (CALCRIM No. 3472). Given the evidence in this case, no reasonable jury could find these instructions applicable.

Although the error was harmless as to the instructions on mutual combat and contrived self-defense—as the jury was readily able to see the irrelevance of these instructions—the record reveals a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled by the initial aggressor instruction. We therefore reverse the defendant’s murder conviction and remand for retrial.

First Holding:

The prosecution argues that the claim was forfeited by lack of objection. The defendant argues the issue is reviewable insofar as the challenged instructions directly undermined his self-defense claim and thus impaired his substantial rights.

Alternatively, he claims defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to fully object to both instructions.

We must address the defendant’s contention on its merits to determine whether there was an impairment of his substantial rights or ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1259

People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927

Second Holding:

It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.

The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.

The corollary to this mandate is equally well-established: a trial court is not obligated to give an instruction if the evidence presented at trial is such as to preclude a reasonable jury from finding the instruction applicable. Indeed, it is error to give a jury instruction that is legally correct but has no application to the facts of the case.

Authority:

People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531

People v. Schultz (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 535, 539

People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129

Third Holding:

Giving an inapplicable instruction is subject to the traditional Watson test for prejudice, under which reversal is required if it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred.

Such an error is generally only a technical error that does not constitute ground for reversal because juries are fully capable of analyzing the evidence, determining the facts, and realizing that an instruction does not apply. Juries are routinely told that some of the instructions may not apply, depending on their findings about the facts of the case and are directed to follow the instructions that do apply to the facts as they find them.

That being said, in some cases, the presence of an extraneous instruction may be confusing enough to become prejudicial.

Authority:

People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67

People v. Schultz (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 535, 539-540

Fourth Holding:

Regarding the instruction on initial aggressor, there are two problems. First, the paragraph the jury received on sudden escalation was written in terms of a defendant initiating an altercation with nondeadly force, the victim responding with deadly force, and then the defendant using deadly force in return.

But the evidence here suggested a different scenario, in which (arguably) the victim initiated with nondeadly force, the defendant responded with deadly force, the victim subsequently used deadly force, and then the defendant used deadly force in return. In other words, the standard language did not quite fit the facts here.

Second, and more to the point, we agree with the defendant that no reasonable jury could find the initial aggressor concept applicable—even with tailored sudden escalation language—given the timelapse between the two encounters. The reason that a defendant forfeits his claim to self-defense when he initiates a deadly attack is because the victim is then legally justified in using deadly force against the defendant. But no one is justified in using deadly force absent fear of imminent death or great bodily injury. 

(Gary note: The appellate court describes the facts as the defendant initially pointing a gun, then the altercation is over, but an hour later the victim shows up and starts throwing rocks at the defendant, who responds with deadly force. “Accordingly, the defendant’s conduct during the first encounter did not limit his self-defense claim; he did not have a duty to withdraw during the second encounter.”)

On this record, we discern a reasonable likelihood that at least one juror would have accepted that the defendant actually believed he needed to defend himself from imminent death or great bodily injury, but was misled into thinking the defendant lost his right to make that claim since he pulled the gun on the victim an hour earlier, and he did not communicate an intent to stop fighting during the second, fatal encounter.

We therefore conclude that giving the initial aggressor instruction was prejudicial, and accordingly reverse the murder conviction.

Authority:

In re Christian S. (2015) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1 [self-defense and imperfect self-defense may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified]

People v. Vasquez (2005) 136 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1179–1180 [imperfect self-defense is available when the victim’s use of force against the defendant is unlawful, even when the defendant set in motion the chain of events that led the victim to attack the defendant]

People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [for either perfect or imperfect self-defense, the fear must be of imminent harm]

Fifth Holding:

To the extent the prosecution contends that any error in instructing the jury on the limits of self-defense was harmless since the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, we note that killing in self-defense is not necessarily inconsistent with premeditation and deliberation.

Authority:

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 265 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)

Abstracts and Minutes, Defenses, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000827

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The Three Strikes sentence is unauthorized because the prior strike allegation was never admitted or found true by the jury or court.

First Holding:

A defendant has a statutory right to a jury trial on the issue of whether he suffered an alleged prior conviction. He may waive that right and submit to a court trial or admit the truth of the prior conviction allegation. Here, there is nothing in the record showing there was any trial on the prior strike. After returning their verdicts on the substantive offenses, the jurors were discharged without considering the strike.

Authority:

PEN 1025(b)

PEN 1158

People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 25

Second Holding:

Had the matter been brought to the attention of the court, the court could have convened a new jury to try the prior conviction allegation.

Authority:

People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 595–596 [when the court improvidently discharged the jurors before they decided prior conviction allegations, and the defense failed to timely object, double jeopardy did not bar trial of the allegations before a new jury]

Third Holding:

There are cases in which the reviewing court has determined the trial court impliedly found true an enhancement allegation by imposing the enhancement at sentencing. But in such cases, the trial court was at least presented evidence supporting the allegation.

The same is not true here. While the prosecutor at one point represented that he had the certified 969b packet for the prior, there is no indication he presented those documents, or any other evidence, to the court.

And although the minute order of sentencing reflects a true finding by the court on the prior strike, we cannot rely on those entries because there is no oral record of the court making those findings.

Authority:

People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 691, fn. 17

People v. Chambers (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1047

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385–386

Fourth Holding:

There is no constitutional or procedural bar precluding the prosecution from retrying a prior strike allegation following appellate reversal for insufficient evidence.

Authority:

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239 [constitutional requirement of fundamental fairness, equitable principles of res judicata and law of the case, and relevant statutory provisions do not bar retrial of prior strike allegation]

People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 829 [state and federal prohibitions against double jeopardy do not bar retrial of a prior conviction allegation in a noncapital case]

Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721

Defenses, Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Jury instructions, Standard of review

Case 000691

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court gave an erroneous instruction on involuntary manslaughter requiring reversal. Based on the findings of the jury that the defendant was not guilty under any valid theory, we do not order retrial on the involuntary manslaughter.

First Holding:

(Gary note: I provide the following as context for the results in this opinion. These summaries are intended and designed to highlight principles of law, not so much the specific factual situation in which the error occurred. In this jury instruction error case, though, a little more factual specificity may aid the reader in understanding the more universal principles.

(In this case, the judge modified the standard instruction on involuntary manslaughter in such a way that the jury first had to find that the defendant acted in complete self-defense, and then had to determine whether he did so in a negligent matter. But that is not the law. Complete self-defense ends the question. Had the defendant acted in any way that was NOT complete self-defense, then he would not have been acting lawfully. And the jury necessarily found that he acted in complete self-defense, so it was misled by the instruction that allowed the jury to find him guilty of involuntary manslaughter.

(The opinion summarizes the context: “Here, the jury found defendant not guilty of first degree and second degree murder based on the finding that defendant acted in lawful self-defense in shooting defendant. It further found defendant not guilty of voluntary manslaughter rejecting that unreasonable self-defense was applicable. It found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, finding, as recognized by the trial court, that defendant, ‘in a lawful act of self-defense, was criminally negligent in how he did it, and in his criminally negligent manner resulting in an involuntary manslaughter.’ As we have concluded, such determination was not a valid theory of involuntary manslaughter. There was no other theory of involuntary manslaughter presented to the jury. Here, the only question for the jury was whether defendant acted in reasonable self-defense in shooting [the victim] one time in the face. Once it concluded that such use of force was reasonable, it found lawful self-defense, which was a complete defense to involuntary manslaughter. The jury necessarily relied on the erroneous instruction to convict defendant of involuntary manslaughter after finding the complete defense of justifiable homicide. The error was prejudicial.”)

It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. It is also well settled that this duty to instruct extends to defenses if it appears … the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.

Authority:

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73

Second Holding:

In reviewing a claim that the court’s instructions were incorrect or misleading, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions as asserted by the defendant. We consider the instructions as a whole and assume the jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions.

Authority:

People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1013

Third Holding:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A defendant lacks malice and is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in limited, explicitly defined circumstances: either when the defendant acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, or when the defendant kills in unreasonable self-defense—the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense.

Authority:

PEN 192

People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 132

People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87-88

Fourth Holding:

A defendant commits involuntary manslaughter by committing a homicide with the mens rea of criminal negligence. The offense must be based on one of three predicate acts: (1) killing in the commission of a misdemeanor ; (2) killing in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection; or (3) killing in the commission of a noninherently dangerous felony committed without due caution and circumspection.

The performance of an act with criminal negligence supplies the criminal intent for involuntary manslaughter, regardless whether the conduct underlying the offense is a misdemeanor, a lawful act, or a noninherently dangerous felony.

Authority:

People v. Sevilla (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 618, 626

Fifth Holding:

A killing in perfect self-defense is justifiable homicide. Perfect self-defense requires that one must actually and reasonably believe in the necessity of defending oneself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. Imperfect self-defense reduces an intentional and unlawful killing to voluntary manslaughter. Imperfect self-defense occurs when defendants act in the actual but unreasonable belief they are in imminent danger of great bodily injury or death.

Authority:

People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 321

People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645

Sixth Holding:

In determining whether error has been committed in giving or not giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions as a whole and assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.

Authority:

People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1172

Defenses, Pleading

Case 000457

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The conviction for making a criminal threat must be reversed because the charge is barred by the statute of limitations.

First Holding:

The defendant did not raise the statute of limitations issue below. However, where the charging document indicates on its face that the action is time-barred, a person convicted of a charged offense may raise the statute of limitations at any time.

Authority:

People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1050–1051

Second Holding:

The applicable statute of limitations is three years. In both the complaint and information, the defendant was charged with making a criminal threat between March 31, 1999, and March 30, 2004. However, the prosecution commenced, at the earliest, on December 2, 2022, when the arrest warrant was issued. There are no facts alleged in the accusatory pleading showing that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, as the statute of limitations ran in 2007 but the prosecution was not commenced until 2022, the criminal threat charge was time-barred and the defendant’s conviction must be reversed.

Authority:

PEN 17

PEN 422

PEN 801

PEN 804

People v. Meza (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 821, 825 [The statute of limitations completely bars prosecution.]

People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1048 [An accusatory pleading must allege facts showing that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations]

Defenses, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000300

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We order the protective order modified to strike [person x] as a protected person. We reject the defendant’s claim that the trial erred in not sua sponte instruction on the defense of unconsciousness.

First Holding:

Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge. For purposes of the defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting. The law presumes that a person who appears to be acting in a state of consciousness is conscious. Accordingly, the burden is on a criminal defendant to produce evidence rebutting this presumption of consciousness. If a defendant produces substantial evidence that he or she was unconscious, the trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on the theory; the failure to do so is error. In this case, the defendant did not rebut the presumption of his consciousness, and it was therefore not error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on unconsciousness sua sponte.

Authority:

PEN 26

People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 417

People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 804

Second Holding:

Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication may negate specific intent, but it is not a defense to a general intent crime. Assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime. Reckless evasion of a peace officer is a specific intent crime.

Authority:

People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 805

People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899

People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 788

People v. Taylor (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1195, 1203-1206

Third Holding:

We review de novo whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury.

Authority:

People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 78

Fourth Holding:

A case is not authority for propositions not considered.

Authority:

People v. Chavez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 477, 480

Fifth Holding:

Where a defendant is convicted of certain defined crimes of domestic violence, the trial may issue a protective order restraining the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. Such orders are limited to defendants convicted of crimes that qualify as domestic violence and where the protected person qualifies as a victim of said crimes. The trial court does not have authority to restrain a defendant from contacting a person who was not present during or otherwise suffered harm from the crime.

For instance, a protective order covering children who were present but asleep during a domestic violence incident was found to be improper in Lopez. With respect to the issuance of a legally authorized criminal protective order, we imply all findings necessary to support the judgment, and our review is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support these implied findings.

The record here contains no substantial evidence from which the trial court reasonably could conclude that [person x] was a victim of the crime subject to protection under section 136.2(i)(1).

Authority:

PEN 136.2,(i)(1)

People v. Lopez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 227, 237

People v. Pena (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 640, 648

People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 211, 217

People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 212 [absent evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude that appellant had harmed or attempted to harm two children, the court lacked authority to issue the no-contact protective order as to the children]

Defenses, Duty of the court, Elements of crime, Jury instructions, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000109

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was charged with first degree murder under two theories–deliberation and premeditation, and lying in wait. The jury was not required to agree unanimously on the theory. He was convicted of first degree murder, along with a count of attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation. We conclude that insufficient evidence supports the finding of lying in wait. One of the elements of lying in wait, namely, “a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act,” is not supported by substantial evidence. That conclusion requires us to reverse the finding on the lying-in-wait special circumstance, but it does not require a reversal of the first degree murder convictions, as they are supported by the alternative theory of premeditation and deliberation.

First Holding:

The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires an intentional murder, committed under circumstances that include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage It includes the elements of first degree lying-in-wait murder but requires the additional element that the killing was intentional, not merely committed with implied malice.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)(15)

People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 74

Second Holding:

To support a finding of concealment of purpose, it is not required that a defendant be literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim. Rather, it is sufficient that a defendant’s true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct. The concealment, in that sense, is that which puts the defendant in a position of advantage, from which the factfinder can infer that lying-in-wait was part of the defendant’s plan to take the victim by surprise. Concealment of purpose inhibits detection, defeats self-defense, and may betray at least some level of trust, making it more blameworthy than premeditated murder that does not involve surprise.

The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires no fixed, quantitative minimum time, but the lying in wait must continue for long enough to premeditate and deliberate, conceal one’s purpose, and wait and watch for an opportune moment to attack. To distinguish the circumstance from ordinary premeditation and deliberation, a distinct period of watchful waiting is required. “Watchful” does not require actual watching; it can include being alert and vigilant in anticipation of the victim’s arrival to take him or her by surprise.

Authority:

People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 966–967

People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 67

People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 204

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 629

People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 551

People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 247

Third Holding:

In assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The same standard applies when examining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a special circumstance finding. “Substantial evidence” includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.

Authority:

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57

Fourth Holding:

A first degree murder verdict will be upheld if there is sufficient evidence as to at least one of the theories on which the jury is instructed, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground. The appellate court should affirm the judgment unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory. In making that determination, we examine the entire record, including the facts and the instructions, the arguments of counsel, any communications from the jury during deliberations, and the entire verdict.

The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Thus, our inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury returned a verdict of first degree murder based solely on lying in wait, rather than also on premeditation and deliberation. The jury’s express findings in connection with the attempted murder in count 2 preclude any reasonable probability the jury relied solely on lying in wait as the theory for first degree murder.

Authority:

People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 552 [affirming first degree murder based on sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation despite insufficient evidence to support lying in wait]

People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130

Fifth Holding:

The court committed harmless error under Chapman in declining the defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the theory of imperfect self-defense. Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. if a person kills in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense, the belief negates what would otherwise be malice, and that person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not murder.

Authority:

People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561

People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Sixth Holding:

The trial court was required to instruct on imperfect self-defense if there was substantial evidence to support the theory. “Substantial evidence” is evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter was committed, but does not include evidence that is speculative, minimal, or insubstantial.

Authority:

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 253

People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132

Seventh Holding:

We review de novo a trial court’s decision not to give an imperfect self-defense instruction. When the record contains substantial evidence of imperfect self-defense, the trial court’s failure to instruct on that theory amounts to constitutional error and is thus subject to review under the federal Chapman standard. Under the Chapman standard, reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Though there was insufficient evidence of the watchful waiting to support a finding of lying in wait, the jury returned a finding that the murder was committed by lying in wait.

There was sufficient evidence of the aspects of lying in wait other than watchful waiting. Because of its true finding on lying in wait, the jury could not have found an imperfect self-defense in which the defendant used deadly force against the victim because he unreasonably believed that doing so was necessary to defend himself.

Authority:

People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 665 [a jury’s true finding on a lying-in-wait special circumstance negated any possibility that defendant was prejudiced from the failure to instruct on unreasonable self-defense theories of manslaughter]

Defenses, Sentencing

Case 000076

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The charge for violating a protective order was barred by the statute of limitations. We therefore vacate defendant’s conviction for violating a criminal protective order but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Holding:

The misdemeanor violating a criminal protective order (sec. 166(c)(1)) must be vacated because it is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

Authority:

PEN 166(c)(1)

PEN 802

People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 338, 341