Error and/or relief
The trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding specific intent for count 2, and the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the registration requirement, We reverse count 2 and strike the registration requirement, and in all other respects affirm.
First Holding:
Trial courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct on every element of charged offenses. Instructions completely removing the issue of intent from the jury’s consideration may constitute a denial of federal due process principles. We review independently the legal adequacy of a jury instruction.
Authority:
People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409
People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 673,
People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1211
Second Holding:
The court instructed the jury that count 2 required “general criminal intent,” which is established when the defendant intentionally does a prohibited act.
This instruction was erroneous. The crime in count 2 is a specific intent crime because it requires the act to be done with the intent to accomplish a separate objective.
In addition, the instruction given on the crime was incomplete, because it included the statutory language for the prohibited conduct, but it omitted the requirement that the physical act be performed for a separate reason.
Specific intent is not presumed from the doing of the unlawful act.
Authority:
EVID 668
People v. ZarateCastillo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1167 [construing equivalent language of a similar section]
Third Holding:
We assess the prejudicial effect of the failure to instruct regarding the required element of mental state pursuant to Chapman. We must reverse unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.
Instructional error is harmless where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, but not where the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.
In our view, the instructional error is not harmless because the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409
Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19
Fourth Holding:
Substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s order that the defendant register as a sex offender. Section 290.006 requires a defendant to register as a sex offender if the court finds at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification. Section 290.006 does not include sexual abuse as a basis for registration.
Authority:
PEN 290.006
Fifth Holding:
We review imposition of a registration requirement pursuant to section 290.006 for abuse of discretion. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.
A trial court abuses its discretion when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence. Here, there was no evidence that the murder (count 1) was committed for sexual gratification. The registration requirement must be stricken.
If the defendant is retried on the reversed count by a properly instructed jury, the court may reconsider the registration requirement based on the evidence presented at that trial.
Authority:
People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 335
People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433
Sixth Holding:
Because sufficient evidence was presented that could support a guilty verdict if the jury were properly instructed, the People may retry the defendant for count 2 on remand.
Authority:
People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271–272