Daily Archives: October 6, 2026

Case 001075

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing and staying enhancements under section 12022.7(e) on counts 2, 3, and 4, and under section 12022.7(a) on count 2, because the jury did not find those allegations true.

Holding:

In their appellate briefing, the parties agree that the trial court erred in imposing and staying enhancements under section 12022.7, subdivision (e) on counts 2, 3, and 4, and under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) on count 2, because the jury did not find those allegations true. In keeping with the parties’ concessions, we strike these four enhancements.

Authority:

Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 674 [An express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently treated as an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in the disposition of the case.]

Case 001074

Error and/or relief

The trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion when it considered the defendant’s request for resentencing under section 1172.1. It believed that it was bound by the decision affirming his conviction at his original appeal and by the later decision denying his motion to have his conviction vacated under section 1172.6.

The evidence on which the defendant relied in requesting resentencing under section 1172.1, however, was not available at the time of his first appeal, and the issue under section 1172.6 dealt solely with liability under the felony murder theory or the natural and probable consequences theory of murder. Neither dealt with the constitutional issues regarding the failure of the prosecution to provide potentially exculpatory evidence or information in the first place.

The comments of the court in the course of considering the request under section 1172.1 suggest that the court did believe that there were constitutional issues with the conviction, and might have been willing to grant additional relief had it understood that section 1172.1 does, indeed, give it the authority to revisit the conviction. Therefore, we remand for the court to reconsider whether the defendant’s sentence should be recalled and reexamined under section 1172.1.

Further, the restitution fine must be stricken as more than 10 years old, and the court must recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

Section 1172.1 is a statutory exception to the general rule that once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence. As amended effective January 1, 2024, section 1172.1(a) authorizes the court to recall a sentence and resentence the defendant on its own motion at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.

Section 1172.1 does not authorize the defendant to initiate the recall and resentencing process. The statute states: ‘A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.”

Authority:

People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1170-1171

Second Holding:

Section 1172.1(a)(2) instructs a trial court, when recalling and resentencing a defendant, to apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Trial courts may modify a defendant’s sentence to reduce the term of imprisonment. They may also vacate a defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading, with the concurrence of the defendant, and then resentence the defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment.

The statute lists various postconviction factors trial courts must consider when recalling and resentencing a defendant. Those factors include the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Evidence that the defendant’s incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated in the proceedings related to the conviction or sentence at issue, and any other evidence that undermines the integrity of the underlying conviction or sentence.

A trial court shall state on the record the reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Third Holding:

We review the superior court’s decision whether to recall a defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion. To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant must establish the court acted while unaware of the scope of its discretion, considered impermissible factors, or made a choice so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.

Authority:

People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1175

People v. Olea (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 889, 902–903

Fourth Holding:

The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute. Section 1237(b) allows a defendant to appeal from any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.

Authority:

People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1171

Fifth Holding:

Section 1172.1 does not give a defendant the right to make a motion or to appeal if the trial ignores the request or summarily denies it without taking action.

Craig held that a trial court’s order denying a request for resentencing under section 1172.1 was appealable after the trial court reviewed moving and opposition papers; looked at documents and case history, including letters of support, evidence of rehabilitation, and prison disciplinary records; heard argument from counsel at a hearing at which the defendant appeared remotely; and addressed the merits of the petition instead of denying it as unauthorized.

Olea held that a denial was appealable after the trial court followed similar steps, including appointing counsel for the defendant, ordering the release of subpoenaed records concerning the defendant’s behavior and activities in prison, and setting a contested hearing at which the defendant appeared remotely, the court heard argument, indicated it reviewed the record, and stated it believed the original sentence was just.

The situation before us is similar to that encountered in Craig and Olea, not to that in Hodge, and we hold that the decision to deny resentencing under section 1172.1 is appealable under these circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 991, 996, 999 [a trial court’s order declining to exercise its discretion to recall a defendant’s sentence was not appealable]

People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1171-1175

People v. Olea (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 889, 901-902

Sixth Holding:

The trial court’s reasons for rejecting evidence that seriously undermined the conviction were impermissible. The court stated it was not its place to revisit the jury’s determination, even though section 1172.1 empowers the court to do just that. Under section 1172.1(a)(3)(B), when resentencing, a trial court may cacate the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, with the consent of the defendant. The court’s comments during the hearing very clearly indicated that it acknowledged the problems with the convictions as the defendant and his counsel described. The court did reduce the sentence substantially to the minimum for second degree murder.

When a trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper.

There is such a reasonable probability here, since the trial court seemed to feel constrained by the verdict and prior appeals, and never appeared to grapple with the gravity of the constitutional violations the defendant alleged, simply referring to them as a number of things that happened. We therefore agree with the defendant that a remand is warranted so that the trial court can exercise its discretion again. The trial court should explain its rationale regarding the defendant’s claims of violations of his constitutional rights and whether or not those claims justify a further reduction in the defendant’s sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(a)(3)(B)

People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 856

Seventh Holding:

The restitution fine was imposed more than 10 years ago and must be vacated under section 1465.9(d), which states that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 11465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601, review granted on another issue and further action deferred Mar. 11, 2026, S289903

Eighth Holding:

The court did not recalculate the defendant’s time served, and the abstract still reflects the same number of days as awarded at his original sentence more than 15 years ago. The court should have recalculated the credit for time served.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [when resentencing a defendant, trial court must update the calculation of actual time served, whether before or after sentencing and in jail or prison]

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397 [Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not trial court, is responsible for calculating post-sentence credits other than actual time served]

Case 001073

Error and/or relief

The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying relief on the defendant’s petition for relief under section 1203.4. We remand to enable the trial court to determine whether defendant is still on probation for another offense, which would affect her present eligibility for relief

First Holding:

The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of her conviction under section 1203.4, having previously successfully been discharged from probation early (she had completed all of the terms of her probation, which the trial court at the hearing on her motion for early discharge from probation expressly found to be very commendable). The trial court denied the petition for relief under 1203.4 on the basis that it was too soon after her probation was terminated.

A person is eligible for section 1203.4 relief if she proves that (1) (a) she has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, (b) she has been discharged prior to the termination of probation, or (c) it is otherwise in the interest of justice to grant relief, and (2) she is not then serving a sentence for an offense, on probation for an offense, or charged with the commission of an offense.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(a)

People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1459

People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 263 [burden of proof on applicant for relief]

Second Holding:

Although a court retains discretion whether to grant relief in the third, interests of justice scenario, relief is mandatory and must be granted in either of the first two scenarios—assuming the defendant meets the additional requirement that she is not serving a sentence, on probation, or charged with an offense at the time of her petition.

Because relief in this scenario is mandatory, the trial court’s stated concerns about defendant having only been off probation slightly over a year and relief being not in the interest of justice have no bearing on the propriety of relief.

Authority:

People v. Butler (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 585, 587

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 1001

People v. E.B. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 47, 54

Third Holding:

Early termination of probation for reasons other than good conduct does not qualify as a discharge from probation

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 262-263

Fourth Holding:

The record is unclear whether the defendant was on probation for a different offense at the time she submitted her petition for relief under section 1203.4. Thus, we must remand for the court to make that determination.

Authority:

People v. Wilkinson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1574 [remanding to trial court to finish the analysis it would have performed if the court had not made error]

Fifth Holding:

Section 1203.4 is a rehabilitative provision that rewards a person who has successfully completed probation. It authorizes a person who previously entered a guilty or no contest plea to withdraw the plea (or, if convicted by other than plea, to have the verdict of guilty set aside), have the charges underlying the conviction dismissed, and thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense.

This dismissal does not, strictly speaking, expunge the conviction, because charges dismissed under section 1203.4 may be treated as convictions for some purposes.

(Gary note: Read section 1203.4 carefully with regard to that preceding statement. While it’s certainly a nice closure, and maybe more than a simple pat on the back, it does not give the person a completely clean slate.)

Authority:

People v. Woodward (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 379, 398,

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 803

People v. Seymour (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1429

Case 001072

Error and/or relief

This is an appeal following a resentencing under section 1172.75. The restitution fine must be vacated because it is more than 10 years old. The trial court erred in failing to calculate the credit for time served and leaving it up to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to correct. The court did not err in selecting the triad 16 months, 2 years, or 3 years for attempted robbery.

First Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) provides for the elimination of any unpaid balance of a restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4 once 10 years has elapsed from the date it was initially ordered.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 24 [vacating unpaid balance of the restitution fine as required by Penal Code section 1465.9(d)]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600, review granted March 11, 2026, S295038 on a different issue

Second Holding:

When a prison term already in progress is modified as the result of an appellate sentence remand or resentencing, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673

People v. Morgain (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 454, 469 [a defendant is entitled to custody credit that includes the date of sentencing]

Third Holding:

While section 664 states that, in general, the punishment for an attempted crime is half that prescribed for the completed crime, that only applies where no other provision is made. Section 213(b) provides that the punishment for attempted robbery is punishable “by imprisonment in state prison.”

Under section 18, except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this state, every offense declared to be a felony is punishable by imprisonment for 16 months, or two or three years in the state prison.

Because section 213(b) specifically provides for the punishment of attempted second degree robbery, the appropriate triad terms for attempted second degree robbery offense are 16 months, two years, or three years.

Authority:

PEN 664

PEN 213(b)

PEN 18

People v. Moody (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 987, 990

People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 797 [Section 213(b), when combined with section 18, provides that attempted second degree robbery is punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years in state prison.]

Case 001071

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment incorrectly lists “2001” as the year the defendant committed the murder underlying the judgment. In fact, the shooting occurred in 2021. The abstract must be corrected.

Holding:

This date is a clerical error and we instruct the court to correct it.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185, 188 [when there is a clerical error in the abstract of judgment, the appellate court itself should order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment]