Daily Archives: October 9, 2026

Case 001089

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing the upper term on factors that were not submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the probation report, the court found that the defendant had numerous prior convictions as an adult, had served prior prison terms, and was on postrelease community supervision at the time of the current offenses.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(2) provides that a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

The statute permits a court to consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2)

Second Holding:

Second Holding:
With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 1170(b), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

The prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment does not permit a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. Rather, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

U.S. Const., Sixth Amend.

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747, 768

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

Third Holding:

Wiley applied Erlinger and overruled previous decisions finding it constitutionally permissible for a trial court to determine whether a defendant’s crimes were of increasing seriousness or whether the defendant’s performance on probation was unsatisfactory.

Wiley explained that, under Erlinger, the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury determination before a court may rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term sentence, unless the defendant stipulates to their truth or waives a jury trial.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1084-1085

Fourth Holding:

A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances found in violation of a defendant’s jury trial right is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements.

If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing. When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the question is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.

(Gary note: The court discuss circumstances specific to this defendant and concluded that the error was prejudicial under Chapman.)

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747, 768, 743 [reversal and remand required unless reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified]

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Fifth Holding:

The California Supreme Court has cautioned about the difficulties in ascertaining whether a jury would have found true an aggravating circumstance that calls for an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts. The reviewing court cannot assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented to the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and opportunity at a sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating circumstance.

To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775-776

Sixth Holding:

Though Wiley declined to address whether defendants are entitled to have a jury determine if their prior convictions are numerous, we accept the positions of the People that, under the holdings and logic of Erlinger and Wiley, a jury finding on this aggravating fact is required (absent waiver or stipulation), as the question whether a defendant has suffered “numerous” convictions (rule 4.421(b)(2)) involves something more than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were required to prove them.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084

People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 847 [error to deny trial by jury on whether defendant suffered ‘numerous’ convictions in the past]

Seventh Holding:

Further proceedings on remand are to be conducted in accordance with the current statutory requirements and the defendant given the opportunity for the jury trial, of which he was deprived.

On remand, the parties remain free to introduce at trial all relevant evidence to support or contest the factual support for the aggravating circumstances set out in the California Rules of Court.

The court may rely on any properly proven aggravating facts, including prior convictions or facts necessarily found by the jury to support a verdict on underlying counts and enhancements. The court retains its discretion to impose an upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more properly proved circumstances justify such a sentence.

If it cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle term.

The matter is remanded for a full resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 777

Case 001088

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying at the prima facie stage the defendant’s 1172.6 petition for recall of his sentence.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature amended the law of homicide, eliminating several theories of liability based on imputed malice. It has also offered relief to those convicted under certain homicide theories, such as murder or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, whose convictions are now tainted. Under what is now section 1172.6, it provided a mechanism for individuals previously convicted of murder to show their entitlement to retroactive relief under the legislative changes.

Pertinent to this case, SB 1437 added section 189(e), providing felony-murder liability only if the defendant:

(1) was the actual killer;

(2) was not the actual killer but, with intent to kill, aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder; or

(3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 556

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957

Second Holding:

SB 775 expanded eligibility to individuals convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

Authority:

People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 275

Third Holding:

A section 1172.6 petition may be filed by a person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter when certain specified conditions apply.

An individual convicted under prior law may petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if he or she could not now be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of the changes made by SB 1437.

Upon receipt of a petition containing all required information, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested. The trial court must also set a briefing schedule and hold a prima facie hearing. If the trial court determines that petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, it must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708-709

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960

Fourth Holding:

The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6(c) is limited. The court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause. Acourt should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.

However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

Fifth Holding:

Whether the record of conviction shows that petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law is a legal question we review de novo.

(Gary note: The court then continued by determining that the record the trial court was permitted to review at the prima facie stage did not necessarily reflect that the defendant was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 and remanded to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing.)

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

Case 001087

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the abstract of judgment fails to reflect the credit for time served ordered by the court, and it must be corrected.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect an additional (more than 3400) days of custody credits, as ordered by the trial court. It does not reflect the days ordered by the court for the time since the original sentencing, and it overstates the conduct credit that was originally ordered by 200 days.

In the event of a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and a minute order or an abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. It follows that we must correct the discrepancy by ordering the trial court to modify the minute order. Accordingly, the amended abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the correct number of prior credits and to add the additional (more than 3400) days.

Authority:

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case 001086

Error and/or relief

There is a discrepancy between the trial court’s oral pronouncement and the abstract of judgment. It must be corrected.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment indicates that the trial court imposed a $40 court operations assessment and a $30 criminal conviction assessment. The trial court did not orally impose either assessment. When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. We have inherent authority to correct errors to accurately reflect the “oral judgments of sentencing courts. We order the abstract of judgment corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186

Case 001085

Error and/or relief

The sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment does not reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment and must be corrected.

Holding:

The minute order and the abstract of judgment reflect that the total of the sentence was three years instead of the orally pronounced two years. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. A minute order or abstract of judgment that does not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the trial court may be corrected on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–186