Error and/or relief:
The court tentatively accepted the plea bargain and took the defendant’s plea, which place a limit on the sentence that could be imposed. Afterward, the client sought release from custody pending sentencing. The court agreed provided the defendant enter a “Cruz waiver,” under which the penalty for failure to appear at sentencing would be the removal of the limit on sentence contemplated by the plea agreement.
On sentencing following the defendant failure to appear and subsequent apprehension for sentencing, the court declined to follow the plea agreement and imposed a greater term, relying on the defendant’s post-plea Cruz waiver. This was error, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
First Holding:
Cruz provides a narrow exception where a trial court may withdraw its approval of the defendant’s plea and impose a sentence in excess of the bargained-for term, in cases where a defendant willfully fails to appear for sentencing after having been advised of his rights under section 1192.5 and choosing to expressly waive them.
Authority:
People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1254, fn. 5
Second Holding:
When a guilty plea is tendered under section 1192.5, is accepted by the prosecuting attorney, and is approved by the court, the defendant cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea.
If the court approves of the plea, it must inform the defendant–prior to the making of the plea–that:
(1) its approval is not binding;
(2) it may, at the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in light of further consideration of the matter; and
(3) in that case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea if the defendant desires to do so.
Authority:
PEN 1192.5
Third Holding:
Appellate courts have recognized that, when there is a plea agreement between parties, and the plea is accepted by the court, that due process requires that both the defendant and the prosecution, abide by the terms of the plea agreement and that the punishment imposed not significantly exceed that which the parties agreed upon.
If the trial court disapproves of the negotiated disposition and seeks to modify it, the court must expressly tell the defendant he or she can withdraw the plea if the defendant is unwilling to accept the modified terms.
Authority:
People v. Silva (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 578, 587–588, overruled on different grounds in People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 Cal.4th 177, 183
People v. Woods (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 623, 630 [the accused and the People are entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain]
People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860 [due process applies not only to the procedure of accepting the plea, but also to the implementation of the bargain itself; a violation of the bargain raises a constitutional right to some remedy]
Fourth Holding:
A defendant who fails to appear without justification is subject to punishment upon conviction of the separate offense of a willful failure to appear in an action brought at the discretion of the prosecutor, not by peremptory judicial fiat. A defendant who fails to appear for sentencing does not lose the protections of section 1192.5.
Authority:
People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1253
People v. Masloski (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1212, 1219
Fifth Holding:
A plea agreement may provide for an alternate, increased sentence if the defendant fails to appear for sentencing. However, to do so, a waiver of the defendant’s section 1192.5 rights must be obtained at the time of the court’s initial acceptance of the plea and must have occurred after an advisement under section 1192.5. If a court should fail to inform a defendant of his right to withdraw his guilty plea, even the defendant’s acceptance of the trial court’s terms will not be enough to make them a part of the plea bargain under section 1192.5.
In cases where a defendant has not been fully advised of his rights under section 1192.5 and has not expressly waived those rights, a trial court may still impose a longer term for failure to appear, so long as it does not seek to repudiate the plea bargain or to impose a sentence more onerous than that which defendant had agreed to accept as part of the bargain itself.
Authority:
People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1250-1252
People v. Masloski (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1212, 1219
Sixth Holding:
In reviewing a challenge involving a plea bargain, we apply the standards of review applicable to contracts, generally. The interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the interpretation does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.
Authority:
People v. Woods (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 623, 631
Seventh Holding:
The process of plea bargaining–which has received statutory and judicial authorization as an appropriate method of disposing of criminal prosecutions–contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court. Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged.
Judicial approval is an essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the bargain worked out by the defense and the prosecution. Because the charging function is entrusted to the executive, the court has no authority to substitute itself as the representative of the People in the negotiation process and under the guise of plea bargaining to agree to a disposition of the case over prosecutorial objection.
Authority:
People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 569–570
Eighth Holding:
When a plea bargain is made the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea if the negotiated bargain is incapable of actual fulfillment. Under the provisions of the authorizing statute, once the plea specifying the punishment is accepted by the prosecutor and approved by the court, the defendant cannot be sentenced on such plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to such plea other than as specified in the plea.
Authority:
PEN 1102.5
People v. Morris (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 358, 362
Ninth Holding:
The question when distinguishing between bargained-for provisions and judicially imposed terms will be not whether the bargain occurred in a hermetically sealed environment from which the judge was excluded, but whether the return provision resulted from the give-and-take of plea bargaining or was a judicially imposed afterthought. A trial court must accept the negotiated plea or reject the bargain outright, but it cannot come up with its own number” with regard to sentencing.
Authority:
People v. Casillas (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 445, 452
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 708
Tenth Holding:
The trial court erred in imposing a sentence greater than the sentence agreed upon in the plea bargain without first advising defendant of his section 1192.5 rights or affording him the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Here, whether the proffered plea was acceptable was within the exclusive discretion of the court.
However, the discretion to conditionally approve the negotiated plea bargain did not sanction the wholly unrelated and unbargained condition interjected by the court concerning an increased sentence of six years (the upper term, doubled) for defendant’s failure to appear at sentencing, as the increased sentence was imposed after the plea was accepted as a precondition to the court’s acceptance of the Cruz Waiver, without input from the prosecution, who objected to the waiver. The provision was therefore not a part of the plea agreement, not a valid Cruz waiver, and not enforceable. The Cruz waiver must be obtained at the time of the court’s initial acceptance of the plea and must have occurred after an advisement under section 1192.5.
Authority:
PEN 1192.5
People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 942–943
People v. Smith (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 25, 30
People v. Masloski (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1212, 1217-1219
Eleventh Holding:
When a defendant fails to appear at sentencing after entering a bargained plea with no discussion about a specific sanction for nonappearance, he or she is entitled to withdraw the plea if the court refuses to honor the plea bargain.
The same rule applies when, during the plea proceedings but after the parties have negotiated the basic plea bargain, the court imposes an additional condition providing a sanction for nonappearance. And that is the situation in this case.
It is only when the parties themselves agree as part of the plea bargain to a specific sanction for nonappearance that the court need not permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea but may invoke the bargained-for sanction.
Authority:
People v. Masloski (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1212, 1221-1222
People v. Morris (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 358, 360-361
People v. Murray (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1540-1546
Twelfth Holding:
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter to allow defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. A defendant should not be entitled to enforce an agreement between himself and the prosecutor calling for a particular disposition against the trial court absent very special circumstances. The preferred remedy in that context is to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea and to restore the proceedings to the original status quo.
Authority:
People v. Calloway (1981) 29 Cal.3d 666, 671
Thirteenth Holding:
A certificate of probable cause is not required for the defendant to raise this on appeal following his guilty plea, because this is a postplea claim involving sentencing issues that do not challenge the validity of the plea. Indeed, he seeks to enforce his plea. A certificate of probable cause is not required if the issue on appeal arose after the entry of the plea and does not affect the validity of the plea.
Authority:
People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379
People v. Vargas (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 644, 651