Error and/or relief
The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing.
First Holding:
Franklin held that youth offenders must have an opportunity to put on the record information relevant to any eventual Penal Code section 3051 youth offender parole hearing.
Authority:
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439
Second Holding:
The defendant committed his crime several decades earlier, when he was 21. After the defendant was sentenced, section 3051 became effective in 2014. Section 3051(b) requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a youth offender parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of a youth offender’s incarceration.
The date of the hearing depends on the youth offender’s controlling offense, defined as the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment. The section applies to offenders like the defendant who committed their controlling offense when they were 25 years old or younger.
Authority:
PEN 3051
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277
Third Holding:
After section 3051’s passage, Franklin held that the section contemplated that information regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate consideration by the board. Under section 3051(f)(2), persons with information about youth offender may submit statements for review by board. Assembling such mitigating information will typically be more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense.
Authority:
PEN 3051(f)(2)
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283
Fourth Holding:
Cook held that youth offenders whose convictions are final may move in the trial court for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. Section 1203.01 provides that postjudgment, a trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Authority:
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439
Fifth Holding:
The trial court erred in concluding it did not have jurisdiction to act because the filing of a notice of appeal on an earlier motion for discovery deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed.
Generally, the filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until it determines the appeal and issues the remittitur, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over anything affecting the judgment.
However, appellate jurisdiction does not divest the trial court of all power to act. Perfection of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court only of matters embraced in the matter being appealed. The trial court otherwise may act on any matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order on appeal.
Authority:
CCP 916
People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1064
Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1089
Sixth Holding:
The Franklin motion was unaffected by and unrelated to the order on appeal. That is, the appeal pending when the defendant filed his Franklin motion concerned a motion for postconviction discovery. In contrast, proceedings under Franklin constitute a remedy of evidence preservation.
Also, Franklin proceedings are unrelated to the validity of the defendant’s sentence. Neither the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation process disturbs the finality of state convictions. Thus, the Franklin hearing the defendant requested was not embraced in the order on appeal and therefore the trial court had jurisdiction to hear his motion.
Authority:
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446-447, 451
People v. Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 201, 207 [Franklin hearing does not expose a defendant to increase or decrease in sentence]
Seventh Holding:
The court erred in denying the motion as not being in compliance with Cook. The defendant’s motion was sufficient to initiate Franklin proceedings. The requirements for a Franklin motion are minimal, and the motion need not describe in detail the evidence the youth offender seeks to preserve. Instead, where a motion includes relevant criminal case information and legal authority and establishes eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing, the motion should be granted.
Here, the defendant’s motion cited section 1203.01 and 3051 and Cook in his motion. He stated his qualifying age, the original case number. He identified the controlling offense of murder, requested counsel, said he had never had a Frankling hearing, and asked for an opportunity to make a record of his characteristics as a youth offender. Based on this information, the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to initiate Franklin proceedings.
We express no opinion on whether the trial court must hold a formal Franklin hearing.
Authority:
People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150, 152 [legally sufficient Franklin motion only requires defendant be given opportunity to place additional evidence in record]
People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 893–894 [trial court erred by denying Franklin motion that identified original case, relevant law, defendant’s age, sentence, and relief requested]
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446-447, 459 [court has discretion to determine how to conduct process efficiently]