Error and/or relief
The court erred in denying the defendant’s oral motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act (RJA).
First Holding:
It is a violation of the RJA for the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or a juror to exhibit bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin or, during the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, to use racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibit bias or animus toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.
A defendant may file a motion alleging a violation of subdivision (a). If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing, at which the defendant bears the burden of proving an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Subject to exceptions inapplicable in this case, if the court finds an RJA violation by a preponderance of evidence, the court shall impose an enumerated remedy specific to the violation. If judgment has yet to be entered, one remedy is to reduce one or more charges. After judgment has been entered, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).
Authority:
PEN 745
Second Holding:
The defendant argues that the trial court erred to the extent it denied his RJA motion because it was brought orally rather than by written, noticed motion. Addressing this issue of statutory interpretation de novo, we conclude the RJA does not preclude the possibility of making an oral motion. Accordingly, the court erred to the extent it denied the motion for being brought orally.
Authority:
McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 41
Third Holding:
In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent to effectuate the statute’s purpose. We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls. The words, however, must be construed in context, so we look to the entire section as well as the statutory framework as a whole in deciding what a word or provision means, and we attempt to harmonize terms where possible. We may reject a literal construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd results.
Authority:
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961
People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142
Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519
Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230
Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27
Fourth Holding:
The statutory language here is ambiguous. Section 745 does not say a defendant “must file” a motion; instead, it is permissive. But nor does the statute say that a defendant “may make” an oral motion. We therefore look to legislative findings made in support of the RJA to discern the Legislature’s intent.
When statutory language is ambiguous, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and contemporaneous administrative construction. Because uncodified findings of legislative intent are voted upon by the entire legislative body, enrolled and signed by the Governor, they may be entitled to somewhat greater weight than traditional legislative history materials.
(Gary note: Regarding the reference to “uncodified findings” in the last sentence above, Assembly Bill 2542 (2019-2020 legislative session), which enacted the Racial Justice Act, contains a few sections in the bill that were not codified, meaning they do not appear in any of California’s codes, such as the Penal Code.
(Depending on the wording, the uncodified language may or may not have the force of law. For example, section 7 of the bill directs that certain portions of the bill are effective only if a different specified bill is enacted and becomes effective by a specified date. Section 7 thus carries the force of law.
(But section 2 of the bill contains 10 findings made by the Legislature that led to its passage of the RJA. In roughly 1,329 words. Some of the findings relate the existence and effects of racism–intentional or otherwise–and others state something like “It is the intent of the Legislature that ….” Those findings and statements of intent probably do not technically carry the force of law, but may be considered by the courts in interpreting the statutes that were enacted.
(The trial court then discussed the various aspects of the findings that led it to conclude that “Given the expansiveness of the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the RJA, it is appropriate to construe the legislation liberally in favor of affording defendants an opportunity to raise potential RJA violations through an oral motion.” It cautioned, however, that it may not be the best practice to raise the motion orally, as it may create confusion over what, exactly, is being asserted.)
Authority:
People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 157
Fifth Holding:
In the course of the hearing, counsel appeared to concur that the proper standard was proof by preponderance of the evidence, rather than the much lower standard at the prima facie stage. Though it is not clear what standard the court applied, it erred in excluding hearsay evidence. Hearsay is not per se excludable under the RJA. The court should have considered whether the proffered hearsay “trustworthy and reliable” before excluding it.
By concluding the evidence before it was double hearsay, the court failed to consider the totality of the proffered facts in assessing whether the defendant made a prima facie showing. On this record, we conclude the defendant made such a sufficient showing at the prima facie stage. We thus reverse and remand with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing under the RJA.
Authority:
PEN 745(c)(1)
Hernandez v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1130
Sixth Holding:
The people argue that application of the higher standard was invited error, as counsel concurred. The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at defense counsel’s behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal.
But for the doctrine to apply, it also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake. In cases involving an action affirmatively taken by defense counsel, courts have found a clearly implied tactical purpose to be sufficient to invoke the doctrine.
It is not sufficiently clear on this record that counsel had a tactical purpose. It supports the conclusion that counsel simply misunderstood certain details of the RJA when he brought the oral motion. For example, he characterized the motion as a post-judgment motion. But it was prejudgment, though it was presented after the jury verdict. In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence. Here, the sentencing had not yet happened when the RJA motion was made, so no judgment had been entered.
In light of counsel’s apparent misunderstandings, we conclude that the invited error doctrine is inapplicable. In any event, its application is discretionary, not automatic.
Authority:
People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49
People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9
Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) para. 8:248.13
Seventh Holding:
We review de novo a determination that an RJA movant has failed to make a prima facie showing. A defendant makes a prima facie showing if the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that an RJA violation] occurred.
A substantial likelihood requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not. The court should should not make credibility determinations at the prima facie stage. It should accept the truth of the defendant’s allegations unless they are conclusory, unsupported by the evidence presented in support of the claim, or demonstrably contradicted by the court’s own records.
On this record—with these principles in mind and considering the totality of the proffered facts—we conclude that there is more than a mere possibility that an RJA violation occurred. The defendant has therefore made a prima facie showing of one or more RJA violations and is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Authority:
PEN 745(h)(2)
PEN 745(c)
People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 650
Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 23
Hernandez v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1130