Error and/or relief
The trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process when it denied a continuance to investigate and file a motion for a new trial after granting his motion to represent himself.
First Holding:
We review a trial court’s decision granting or denying a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and prejudice, we will not reverse the trial court’s decision.
Authority:
People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118
People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450
Second Holding:
A trial court’s decision that is deemed an abuse of discretion has been described as a decision that exceeds the bounds of reason or as one that is arbitrary, capricious, patently absurd, or even whimsical. A court’s discretion, however, is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power. T
he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the legal principles governing the subject of the action. The court’s proper exercise of its discretion, therefore, requires knowledge and consideration of the legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent and just decision.
Where a ruling transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law defining the scope of discretion, the court abuses its discretion.
Authority:
People v. Seigler (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 596, 609
People v. Jacobs (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 728, 737
City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297
People v. Lara (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 139, 165
Third Holding:
In deciding whether to grant a continuance, trial courts may not exercise their discretion in such a manner as to deprive the defendant or defendant’s counsel of a reasonable opportunity to prepare.
That counsel for a defendant has a right to reasonable opportunity to prepare for a trial is as fundamental as is the right to counsel. The opportunity to prepare is no less fundamental when a defendant elects to proceed pro se.
While it is true that a defendant, who chooses to conduct his defense in pro. per. does so subject to the disabilities normally attendant upon the status as a prisoner, a pro se defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense.
The denial of a continuance after a trial court grants a defendant’s request for self-representation could deprive a defendant of the opportunity to prepare a defense. To deny him that opportunity would be to render his right to appear in propria persona an empty formality, and in effect deny him the right to counsel.
Therefore, when a trial court grants a defendant’s request to proceed pro se, it has been held an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process to deny a request for a reasonable continuance to allow the in propria persona defendant to prepare a defense.
Authority:
People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646
People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647, 652, 653-655
People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 324
People v. Wilkins (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 299, 304-305
People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 756, 757
Fourth Holding:
Courts have made an exception only where the record demonstrates the trial court expressly conditioned the granting of an untimely Faretta motion on the defendant’s express waiver of a continuance.
Authority:
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806
People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1038 [court warned the defendant that a request for a continuance would be a basis for denying Faretta motion, and the defendant accepted pro se status on the understanding that no additional time would be granted]
People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 110 [court granted Faretta motion only after the defendant “expressly represented he was able to proceed without a continuance], overruled on other grounds in People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462
People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 626 [Faretta motion granted only after the defendant expressly stated he would be able to proceed without a continuance]
Fifth Holding:
The denial of a continuance may be so arbitrary as to deny due process. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. Instead, the answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.
Authority:
People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 921
Sixth Holding:
The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a new trial motion, and its decision will be disturbed only for clear abuse of that discretion. Such an abuse of discretion occurs when the court bases its decision on an incorrect legal standard.
Authority:
People v. Iraheta (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 611, 619
Seventh Holding:
To be sure, the text of section 1181 expressly limits the grant of a motion for new trial to the nine grounds enumerated in the statute. And ineffectiveness of trial counsel is not one of them.
Trial courts, however, have a duty to ensure that a trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused. That includes the right to effective counsel.
The Legislature has no authority to limit by statute a court’s constitutional obligation to ensure that a defendant is accorded due process. Therefore, our Supreme Court has stated that section 1181 should not be read to limit the constitutional duty of trial courts to ensure that defendants be accorded due process of law.
In appropriate circumstances, the trial court should consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for new trial, because justice is expedited when the issue of counsel’s effectiveness can be resolved promptly at the trial level.
Authority:
People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 630
People v. Watts (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 102, 117
Eighth Holding:
We take issue with the trial court’s determination that the defendant could raise the issues of ineffective assistance of counsel and late discovered evidence on appeal. Unless the record on appeal includes an explanation as to why trial counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, or unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, a claim on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective is at risk of being rejected.
Under the circumstances in this case, the trial court abused its discretion and deprived the defendant of his right to due process. We remand the matter and direct the trial court to grant the defendant a reasonable continuance to investigate and file a motion for new trial.
Authority:
People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267 [claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are often more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding]
