Daily Archives: November 17, 2026

Case 001200

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to sentence the defendant to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes Law, because the prosecution did not plead and prove that his current offense was a serious felony.

First Holding:

The jury was not requested to make a finding on whether the defendant was serving a life term when he committed an assault on a nonprisoner. In the absence of that finding, the crime of which he was convicted is not a serious felony, which is required for imposition of a life term under the Three Strikes Law. Because his current conviction was not a serious or violent felony (subject to certain exceptions under section 667(e)(2)(C)(i)-(iv)(VIII) that do not apply here), the court was limited to twice the term for the current offenses.

Authority:

PEN 4501.1(a) (prisoner aggravated assault on a non-inmate)

PEN 667(b)-(j) (Legislature version of Three Strikes Law)

PEN 1170.12(a)-(d) (Initiative version of Three Strikes Law)

PEN 1192.7(c) (Serious felonies)

PEN 667.5(c) (Violent felonies)

In re Cabrera (2023) 14 Cal.5th 476, 482, 489, 492 [where the jury found the defendant inflicted serious bodily injury in the commission of a battery and related offenses, the sentencing court’s finding that the defendant inflicted great bodily injury for purposes of finding the defendant’s current convictions were serious felonies and increasing punishment by five years under section 667(a)(1), the court violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury trial rights) under Apprendi]

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466

Second Holding:

Because the court was not authorized to impose a sentence of 25 years to life on count 1, we vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

Case 001199

Error and/or relief:

The defendant’s convictions for murder and attempted murder must be reversed because of the trial court’s incorrect response to a jury question about the level of provocation required to reduce murder from first to second degree.

First Holding:

During deliberations, the jury inquired about the provocation necessary to reduce murder from first to second degree. The court’s response allowed the jury to use the more stringent objective test for assessing provocation necessary for a voluntary manslaughter conviction rather than the subjective test required for reducing murder from first to second degree.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000

Second Holding:

Courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct juries on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. Instructions must be correct. There is no duty to clarify or amplify adequate instructions absent a request. But courts must provide the jury with accurate information in response to a jury request on a question of law.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1331

People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 369

Third Holding:

We independently review the accuracy of supplemental instructions, examining whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions as asserted by the defendant. We consider the instructions as a whole and assume the jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 369

Fourth Holding:

First degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, premeditation, and deliberation. The defendant must act deliberately, carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice to kill before he or she completes the acts that caused the death. Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice but without premeditation or deliberation.

Heat of passion arising from provocation negates premeditation and deliberation, thus reducing first degree murder to second degree murder. Specifically, if the provocation precludes the defendant from subjectively deliberating or premeditating, the crime is second degree murder. This is a subjective test for assessing provocation as a basis to reduce malice murder from the first to the second degree: it inquires whether the defendant in fact committed the act because he was provoked

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 166

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000

Fifth Holding:

Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder. If the provocation would cause a reasonable person to react with deadly passion, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice so as to further reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter. The provocation must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment.

Thus, determining whether to reduce malice murder to voluntary manslaughter requires applying an objective test and a subjective test. The prosecution must disprove the existence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt to establish malice.

Authority:

PEN 192(a)

People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 642

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 60

People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549 [A heat of passion theory of manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective component]

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000-1001

People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 253

Sixth Holding:

The jury inquired specifically about the test between first degree murder and second degree murder. The court’s response was appropriate had the question asked for the test between murder and manslaughter, but not for the question actually asked.

By so responding, the court authorized the jury to use the objective standard for assessing provocation to determine whether to reduce murder from first to second degree. The court thereby erred. Only a subjective test for provocation is relevant when deciding to reduce murder from first to second degree. The trial court’s response misled the jury to believe that to reduce murder from first to second degree, provocation must meet the same objective test that leads to a reduction to voluntary manslaughter.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000

People v. Ocegueda (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 548, 558-559 [instruction that an objective test applied to reduce murder from first to second degree would result in a reasonable probability jury understood an instruction in a legally impermissible manner]

Seventh Holding:

We review an instructional error that improperly describes or omits an element of an offense under the standard in Chapman. Under that standard, we must reverse a judgment unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error. After examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, we cannot conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 829

People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 615

People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13

(Gary note: At this point, the court analyzed the evidence that supported its conclusion that it could not find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I have omitted its references to various facts specific to this case, but I had decided to list some of the cases the court cited as it identified the various factors. The cases that follow as Authority for the Seventh Holding are merely cases that discuss the question of the subjective aspect of provocation or that support indications that the case was not an open and shut case.)

People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583 [provocative conduct may be physical or verbal]

People v. Dominguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 163, 180 [any intense emotion (except revenge) may suffice to satisfy the subjective provocation component, including fear and panic]

People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 907 [deliberations lasting nearly six hours demonstrates finding of guilt was not open and shut]

People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 385 [request to reread substantial portion of testimony demonstrates closeness of case]

Eighth Holding:

We must reverse his premeditated and deliberate attempted murder conviction for the same reason reversal of the murder conviction is required. Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.

Like murder, an attempted murder that occurs as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse is premeditated and deliberate.

When relying on heat of passion as a partial defense to the crime of attempted murder, both provocation and heat of passion must be demonstrated.

If the prosecution fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the defendant cannot be convicted of attempted murder.

Considering all the instructions provided as a whole, and for the same reasons set forth in our analysis of the previous claim, there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the court’s supplemental instruction — that it could apply the objective standard when assessing whether the defendant was provoked — to preclude it from considering subjective provocation when determining whether the defendant committed attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739

People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543 [same definitions of willful, deliberate and premeditated apply to attempted murder and murder]

People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 704, 709

People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 887–888

People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1332

People v. Doane (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 965, 980

Ninth Holding:

We remand to give the prosecution the opportunity to retry the defendant on his charges or accept modification to the judgment to reflect the defendant’s convictions for second degree murder and attempted murder without the premeditation enhancement. Depending on the outcome, resentencing is warranted to allow the trial court to reconsider the entire sentencing structure.

Authority:

People v. Diaz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 362, 386

People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 647

People v. Bautista (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1438

Case 001198

Error and/or relief:

The court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial because of juror misconduct. It came to light that one juror intentionally concealed during voir dire an important fact that likely would have resulted in the juror’s removal for cause, and the juror spoke to a witness during jury deliberations during a recess.
In exercising its discretion to impose a lesser firearm enhancement, it was error to stay rather than to strike the greater enhancement.

The abstract of judgment needs to be corrected on the description of attempted murder.

First Holding:

A juror who violates his or her oath and the trial court’s instructions is guilty of misconduct. When a person violates his oath as a juror, doubt is cast on that person’s ability to otherwise perform his duties. Accordingly, once a court determines a juror has engaged in misconduct, a defendant is presumed to have suffered prejudice. It is for the prosecutor to rebut the presumption by establishing there is no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant. Unless the prosecutor rebuts that presumption by proof that no prejudice actually resulted, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.

Authority:

People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194

In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 797

Second Holding:

In determining whether juror misconduct occurred, we accept the trial court’s credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct, however, is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court’s independent determination.

If we find a substantial likelihood that a juror was actually biased, we must set aside the verdict, no matter how convinced we might be that an unbiased jury would have reached the same verdict, because a biased adjudicator is one of the few structural trial defects that compel reversal without application of a harmless error standard.

Authority:

People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194

People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 579, 582

People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1263–1265, 1267

Third Holding:

One accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors. The impartiality of prospective jurors is explored during voir dire, which plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.

Voir dire may expose possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror’s being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges.

Authority:

In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110-111

Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 554

Fourth Holding:

The prosecution, the defense and the trial court rely on the voir dire responses in making their respective decisions, and if potential jurors do not respond candidly the jury selection process is rendered meaningless. Falsehood, or deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of facts and attitudes deprives both sides of the right to select an unbiased jury and erodes the basic integrity of the jury trial process.

A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct.

Authority:

In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 111-112

Fifth Holding:

The juror failed to disclose material information that clearly would have been responsive to a direct question that the juror was asked. That failure constitutes misconduct.

Authority:

In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 111

People v. Blackwell (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 925, 929–930 [juror who failed to disclose personal experience with domestic violence and alcoholism in response to specific questions committed misconduct]

Sixth Holding:

In advertent concealment may not constitute juror misconduct, but the juror’s testimony at the hearing disclosed that this concealment was intentional.

Authority:

People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 644–646 [concealment inadvertent where juror believed a drug charge had been dropped and testified a stabbing incident that happened 22 years before never crossed his mind during voir dire]

Seventh Holding:

It is misconduct for a juror to discuss a case with a nonjuror during the course of a trial, to even inadvertently receive information about a party or the case from a nonparty, or to communicate with anyone associated with the case. The juror admitted to at least two interactions with a defendant witness in the case and discussed the case, at least one of which communication was while the jury was deliberating.

Authority:

People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194

People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 333–334 [jurors’ conversation with prosecution expert was misconduct]

People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1082 [jurors’ friendly conversation with prosecution witness was misconduct]

Eighth Holding:

The juror’s misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice. Intentional nondisclosure is strong proof that can sustain the presumption of prejudice raised by juror concealment. In most cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response [to a question on voir dire] is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial.

A juror who intentionally conceals information to secure a place on the jury raises particular concerns: How can someone who herself does not comply with the duty to tell the truth stand in judgment of other people’s veracity?

Authority:

In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 797

In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 119, 120

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 556

Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1998) 151 F.3d 970, 983

Clark v. United States (1933) 289 U.S. 1, 11 [position of juror who secures place by fraud is tainted in its origin]

People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 932 [the juror’s self-serving statement regarding her ability to deliberate impartially was insufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice]

United States v. Olsen (9th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 1172, 1192 [acknowledging application of implied bias doctrine where the juror in question, or a close relative, has had some personal experience that is similar or identical to the fact pattern at issue in the trial]

United States v. Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F.3d 1109, 1113 [court erred by refusing to excuse juror in cocaine trafficking case whose ex-husband’s cocaine trafficking led to breakup of family]

United States v. Eubanks (9th Cir. 1979) 591 F.2d 513, 516–517 [remanding for new trial where juror in heroin trafficking case concealed his sons were heroin users serving prison sentences for crimes they committed in attempt to procure heroin]

People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1083 [presumption of prejudice cannot be overcome by a juror’s affidavit denying that misconduct had any effect on the deliberations]

United States v. Sanchez (9th Cir. 2026) 175 F.4th 1134, 1156 [juror’s good faith belief in his own impartiality is not dispositive]

Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 221–222 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [Determining whether a juror is biased or has prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it]

Ninth Holding:

Evidence Code section 1150 prohibits use of evidence of the jurors’ subjective reasoning processes either to establish misconduct or rebut the presumption of prejudice, meaning the juror’s statements as to the effect of the misconduct on his ability to fairly and impartially decide the case cannot be considered.

Authority:

EVID 1150

People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1082-1083

In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 799-800

In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 651–652

People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 81

Tenth Holding:

In exercising its discretion under section 12022.53(h), a court may strike a section 12022.53(d) enhancement for gun use causing death or serious bodily injury and impose a lesser included, uncharged enhancement when the facts supporting the lesser enhancement were alleged and found true by the jury. When discretion is thus exercised, however, the greater enhancement must be struck, not stayed.

Authority:

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 697–702

Eleventh Holding:

The abstract of judgment characterized the attempted murder with premeditation as attempted first degree murder. Attempted murder is not divided into degrees. If the jury finds true an allegation the defendant attempted murder that was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, the punishment is increased pursuant to section 664(a). But that penalty provision does not create degrees of attempted murder.

In any event, the prosecution withdrew this allegation, so the jury never found it to be true. Accordingly, the abstract’s notation of a conviction for attempted first degree murder was erroneous.

Authority:

People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, 668-669, overruled on another ground in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 550

Case 001197

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the number of custody credits the trial court actually awarded during resentencing.

Holding:

Although the abstract of judgment reflects the correct number of total credits awarded in Item 13, “Other orders,” it does not do so under Item 16, “CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.” Rather, the latter section shows only the credits awarded at the original sentencing. We agree with the defendant that there is very real potential for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to miss the additional credits awarded at resentencing and apply only the credits identified in the credits-specific Item 16.

(Gary note: the credits missing from line 16 was nearly 2,800 days more than reported on line 16, around seven and a half years that the defendant could have been shorted.)

The trial court is directed to amend Item 16 of the abstract of judgment as set forth above and send a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–187

Case 001196

Error and/or relief

Although the court imposed no fines or fees, the clerk’s minutes and the abstract of judgment incorrectly reflect that the trial court imposed and suspended a $300 parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 and lifted the stay on the $300 probation revocation fine under section 1202.44. We order the trial court to correct the minutes and the abstract of judgment.

Holding:

When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment or the clerk’s minutes, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385