Daily Archives: November 12, 2026

Case 001185

Error and/or relief

The court erred in removing a juror during deliberations.

First Holding:

Although we review a trial court’s removal of a juror for abuse of discretion, a somewhat stronger showing than what is ordinarily implied by that standard of review is required. Thus, a juror’s inability to perform as a juror must be shown as a demonstrable reality, which requires a stronger evidentiary showing than mere substantial evidence. Under this standard, the reviewing court must be confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied.

Authority:

People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 821

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1053

Second Holding:

The circumstance that a juror does not deliberate well or relies upon faulty logic or analysis … is not a ground for discharge. Similarly, the circumstance that a juror disagrees with the majority of the jury as to what the evidence shows, or how the law should be applied to the facts is not a ground for discharge.

A juror who has participated in deliberations for a reasonable period of time may not be discharged for refusing to deliberate, simply because the juror expresses the belief that further discussion will not alter his or her views. It is not misconduct for a juror to interpret evidence based on her own life experience.

Authority:

People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 485

People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 830

People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1414 [a juror may rely on his personal experience with firearms to form an opinion about the accuracy of the murder weapon]

Third Holding:

During the give and take of deliberations, it is virtually impossible to divorce completely one’s background from one’s analysis of the evidence. We cannot demand that jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in the subtle distinctions that attorneys draw, never refer to their background during deliberations. Even if the juror misunderstood the defense, incorrectly analyzed the case, or refused to deliberate because she believed further discussion would not change her mind, these are not grounds to dismiss her.

Authority:

People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1266

People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 485

Fourth Holding:

In determining a disqualifying bias, the question of bias turns not on a common understanding of the word but on a more precise definition, which focuses on whether the juror’s judgment or beliefs about an issue are untethered to the facts presented at trial. The question is not simply whether a juror’s view derives from a personal leaning or inclination for or against one side, but rather whether the juror’s view and conclusions are based on specific evidence presented in the case.

Authority:

People v. McGhee (2025) 17 Cal.5th 612, 636

Case 001184

Error and/or relief

Under Mitchell, the defendant is entitled to the retroactive provisions of SB 567 that limits the sentence to the middle term unless factors in aggravation are admitted or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, even though he had stipulated to the upper term at the time of his plea.

First Holding:

SB 567’s amendments to the statute apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea agreements in cases that were not final on appeal. The defendant had stipulated to a suspended upper term in 2020 when he pleaded guilty. He violated probation and appeared for sentencing in 2024. He requested that the court sentence him to no more than the middle term, in light of the subsequent passage of SB 567 (which amended section 1170 to require that the middle term be imposed unless factors in aggravation were admitted or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).

Under Mitchell, the amendments to section 1170(b) also apply retroactively to stipulated upper term sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements in cases not final on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 735

Second Holding:

On remand, the defendant may either waive or invoke section 1170(b)’s requirements. If he reaffirms his acceptance of the plea bargain and waives the rights now conferred under section 1170(b), the court shall reinstate the original sentence as negotiated by the parties. If he declines to enter that waiver, in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify the existing plea bargain then seek the court’s approval of a downward departure.

Absent a modified agreement and approval, defendant’s remedy is to withdraw his assent to the bargain, in which case defendant’s plea will be set aside and the parties returned to a pre-plea posture. At that point they would remain free to renegotiate further if they choose or to proceed to trial.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 735-736

Gary note and musings:

The opinion does not discuss footnote 9 in Mitchell, regarding the possible impact of section 1171, effective January 1, 2025. Here is the footnote:

FOOTNOTE 9. Shortly before oral argument, counsel for Mitchell filed a letter with this court identifying section 1171 as a new authority. Section 1171, effective January 1, 2025 (Stats. 2024, ch. 964, sec. 2) sets forth procedures governing a “ ‘postconviction proceeding,’ ” which the statute defines as “a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.” (sec. 1171, subd. (a).) At oral argument, counsel for Mitchell urged that this statutory definition broadly encompasses a remand to the trial court in the context of a direct appeal under the authority of section 1170(b) and Estrada. We decline to consider this argument because we have concluded that Mitchell is entitled to a remand under our established precedent in Stamps. We express no view on the applicability of section 1171 to this case or how it might affect the options described above. Mitchell may raise this issue in the Court of Appeal or the trial court in the first instance.

Back to Gary: Why might this be significant? Because section 1171, if it applies, states, at subdivision (c)(3), “Any changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” Note that Mitchell involved a direct appeal from the sentencing, as did the case in this summary. Section 1171 may pertain only to postconviction proceedings, which it defines as “a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.”

Mitchell left open the question facing the defendant in this summary–whether 1171 would prohibit requiring the defendant to withdraw his plea if the parties cannot come to agreement. In this case the defendant was sentenced prior to the changes requiring a jury trial on upper term factors in aggravation. Is that ameliorative legislation that comes under section 1171 (which says “include, but are not limited to”)? Or does section 1171 contemplate only the “recalled sentences” under which a new sentence is to be imposed?

When Mitchell went back to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court and indicated the parties could battle it out in the superior court (my characterization, not the court’s) over the impact of section 1171.

 

Case 001183

Error and/or relief:

The trial court erred when it imposed upper term sentences based upon an aggravating factor not proven true beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. This error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, we will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing.

First Holding:

Rule 4.421 of the Rules of Court sets forth aggravating circumstances a court may consider when sentencing a defendant. One such aggravating circumstance is that the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 421(b)(2)

Second Holding:

Section 1170(b)(2) provides that, in selecting a term of imprisonment, a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Notwithstanding this rule, a court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2), (b)(3)

Third Holding:

With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 1170(b), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747, 768

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Fourth Holding:

In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. Rather, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837

Fifth Holding:

The defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the court found that his convictions were numerous and increasingly serious within the meaning of rule 4.421(b)(2). The trial court imposed upper term sentences even though this aggravating factor had not been proven in accordance with section 1170(b)(2), and even though the prior conviction exception would not apply to this aggravating fact.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083-1084, and 1085, fn, 9 [Erlinger requires that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Wiley discussed whether the numerical tally of a defendant’s prior convictions falls within the prior conviction exception but declining to address the issue]

Sixth Holding:

A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with section 1170(b) is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman. The People bear the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 953

Seventh Holding:

Our Supreme Court has cautioned against attempting to determine whether a jury would have found true aggravating circumstances that require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts, such as whether a defendants prior convictions are numerous. To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775-776

Eighth Holding:

As to whether defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing seriousness, the Wiley court explained that the inquiry requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness. A fact finder can assess the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions by comparing the range of punishment or the elements of respective offenses.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082

Case 001182

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing under section 1172.75, the court was required to reexamine the prior conviction that was alleged as a strike, as it was based on criminal gang enhancement allegations as the law stood at the time, prior to the amendments under AB 333. The matter is remanded for further proceedings, which may include retrial of the strike allegation and/or further resentencing consistent with this opinion.

The restitution fine must be vacated, as it is more than 10 years old.

The crime the defendant was convicted of is not one of the crimes enumerated for imposition of a laboratory analysis fee or the drug program fees, and those must be vacated.

There were several errors in the abstract of judgment pertaining to the fines, fees, identity of the victim for direct restitution, and a notation regarding computation of conduct credits to which the defendant is not entitled. While the errors are not moot in light of our remand for resentencing, the court must ensure that the new abstract of judgment accurately reflects the oral pronouncement of judgment.

First Holding:

The defendant’s prior felony conviction was enhanced under section 186.22, which made it a strike. Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 186.22 in significant ways. Among other things, AB 333 changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. AB 333 is ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments under the rule of Estrada.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

Where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. Thus, pursuant to the current law applicable to this nonfinal proceeding includes AB 333’s redefinition of the elements of gang offenses and enhancements under section 186.22.

Nothing in the record suggests defendant’s prior conviction was obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements. Accordingly, the record fails to establish the elements of the alleged prior strike under the current law. The appropriate remedy is vacatur of the true finding on the strike allegation and remand for further proceedings, which may include retrial on the allegation.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583, 607-608

Third Holding:

The restitution fine must be vacated, as it is more than 10 years old. Section 1465.9’s plain language evinces a legislative intent to finally, and conclusively, eliminate restitution fines under section 1202.4(b) after 10 years. Resentencing does not restart section 1465.9’s 10-year clock.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600, review granted on other grounds Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

Fourth Holding:

The fees imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 11372.5 and 11372.7 are unauthorized and must be vacated, because the crimes for which they were imposed are not among those listed for which such fines could be imposed. The only crimes for which they can be imposed are enumerated in those sections.

Authority:

HSC 11372.5

HSC 11372.7

People v. Myles (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1160

Fifth Holding:

There are several errors in the abstract of judgment. However, because we are remanding the matter for resentencing, a new abstract will be prepared, rendering moot the errors in the current abstract of judgment. The trial court is directed to take care to ensure that any abstract of judgment or sentencing minute order entered on remand conforms to the oral pronouncement of judgment, in particular with respect to the disposition of fines and fees.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority, but none is necessary. The court did not correct the abstract of judgment, and it did not order the trial court to correct the existing abstract. It simply recognized that there were errors, and care should be taken to ensure an accurate abstract of judgment following the resentencing. Had the court decided to order correction or to correct the abstract itself, there are many cases it could have cited as authority. I have set forth some that it might have chosen from had there been the need.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case 001181

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court failed to recalculate defendant’s custody credits at resentencing and specify the updated total in the amended abstract of judgment to reflect the period between his original sentencing in 2016 and the resentencing hearing in 2023.

Holding:

Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Saibu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1012

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 41 [trial court must calculate time served and credit against subsequent sentence when remand results in modification of a felony sentence]