Daily Archives: November 9, 2026

Case 001173

Error and/or relief

In light of the recent Supreme Court’s clarification on aiding and abetting,the matter is remanded for reconsideration of the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6.

First Holding:

Morris held that liability under section 189(e)(2) requires that the non-killer aid, abet, or assist the actual killer in the commission of the killing itself, not merely the underlying felony. We now conclude that the record of conviction does not conclusively establish that the defendant aided and abetted the actual killer in the killing itself.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671

Second Holding:

SB 1437 amended the substantive law on accomplice liability for murder by narrowing the felony-murder rule and eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a theory of liability for murder. SB 1437 added section 189(e), providing felony murder liability only if the defendant was the actual killer, was not the actual killer but, with intent to kill, aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder, or was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957

Third Holding:

A defendant convicted under the prior felony murder law can petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts, if he could not now be convicted of murder because of the changes made by SB 1437.

Upon receipt of a petition that contains all required information, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested. The court must also direct the prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit the petitioner to reply. If the court determines the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, it must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing.

The prima facie inquiry is limited. The court takes the petitioner’s factual allegations as true and refrains from factfinding. The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708–709

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960, 971-972

Fourth Holding:

Dismissal at the prima facie showing stage requires that the record of conviction conclusively establish the jury made findings on all elements necessary to convict under the current law. If the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing on his entitlement to relief.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(c)

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450

Fifth Holding:

Whether the record of conviction shows the petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law is a legal question that we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

Sixth Holding:

A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:

(1) The person was the actual killer.

(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.

3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2(d).

Authority:

PEN 189(e)

Seventh Holding:

In Morris, the Supreme Court held that the language in section 189(e)(2) requiring that a defendant who was not the actual killer must have aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder means that he must have aided, abetted, or assisted the killing itself. It was not referring to aiding, abetting, or assisting the qualifying felony during which the murder occurred.

Because of the clarification by Morris, the jury’s true finding on the felony murder special circumstance did not necessarily establish the defendant’s liability under section 189(e)(2). Although we cannot rule out that the defendant was the actual killer, or an aider and abettor under a still valid theory of felony murder, we cannot reach such conclusions without an evidentiary hearing. Thus, it was error to deny the petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678, 681-686

Case 001172

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to deny the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage based on its reliance on the recitations of fact in the appellate opinion on the defendant’s original conviction.

First Holding:

SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

The legislation amended section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986

Second Holding:

SB 1437 also created, in what is now section 1172.6, a mechanism for individuals convicted of qualifying offenses to petition for resentencing. As amended in 2021 by SB 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), 1172.6 makes eligible for resentencing persons convicted of murder pursuant to any theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648

Third Holding:

Under section 1172.6, a defendant must file a petition in the sentencing court claiming that:

(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.

(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960

Fourth Holding:

Where the petition complies with the requirements of section 1172.6(a), and after the parties have had the opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause, and, thereafter, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(c), (d)

Fifth Holding:

While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.

In making this determination, courts may examine portions of the record of conviction but may neither engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion nor make credibility determinations. At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6 petition is proper only if the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 658

Sixth Holding:

We review de novo the denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200

Seventh Holding:

The parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. The record of conviction includes jury instructions, charging documents, and verdict forms. Although the trial court may consider the procedural history of a prior appellate opinion at the evidentiary hearing, it cannot consider the factual summary of a prior appellate opinion at any stage of the section 1172.6 petition process.

Authority:

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731-732

People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1188

People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 929

Eighth Holding:

Section 1172.6(a)(3), does not render categorically ineligible for relief petitioners who could have raised on direct appeal a challenge to imputed malice based on a claim of instructional ambiguity.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 648-649

Case 001171

Error and/or relief

In light of Hernandez, the matter of the defendant’s motion to vacate her conviction under section 1473.7 is remanded to the trial court to conduct a full hearing in accordance with the principles set forth in Hernandez.

Holding:

The Court of Appeal had initially upheld the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate her conviction because she entered her plea without an adequate understanding of the immigration consequences within the meaning of section 1473.7. After the Supreme Court decided Hernandez, it directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to enter an order granting the defendant’s section 1473.7 motion, vacate her convictions, and conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

(Gary note: The opinion was very short, just laying out the appellate procedural history in the case and the order in compliance with the Supreme court’s directive. Other summaries contain aspects of the law in applying section 1473.7, and you may wish to refer to one or more of them.)

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2026) 20 Cal.5th 598, 608, 629

Case 001170

Error and/or relief

It was error for the defendant to be convicted of both felony vehicle theft under Vehicle Code section 10851 and receipt of a stolen vehicle under Penal Code section 496d.

First Holding:

When a defendant is convicted of the taking of a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 10851(a), it is a theft conviction that bars a conviction of the same person for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property. When a defendant is convicted of both offenses, the theft conviction should be upheld and the receiving conviction reversed.

Authority:

People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881

People v. Ceja (2010) 49 Cal.4th 1, 10

Second Holding:

Dual convictions for violating Vehicle Code section 10851(a), and Penal Code section 496d are permissible where there is evidence of complete divorcement between the theft and the subsequent receiving, such as when the thief has disposed of the property and subsequently receives it back in a transaction separate from the original theft. A complete divorcement requires “more than the mere passage of time”; there must be “a significant break in the defendant’s possession and control over the stolen property.

Authority:

People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 875, 879

People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 8

Third Holding:

An offender who obtains a vehicle valued at $950 or less by theft must be charged with petty theft and may not be charged as a felon under any other criminal provision.

Authority:

People v. Jackson (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 371, 377

Fourth Holding:

In determining the value of the property obtained by theft, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test. The fair market value of an item is the highest price obtainable in the market place’ as between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither of whom is forced to act. It is not the value of the property to any particular individual, but it may be established by opinion or circumstantial evidence. Jurors may rely on their common knowledge in determining the value of an item.

Authority:

PEN 484(a)

People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 329

Fifth Holding:

An owner’s valuation of personal property may constitute sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude the property’s fair market value.

Authority:

People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 593, fn. 16 [an owner’s testimony is admissible as evidence of the value of an item]

Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 921 [the opinion of an owner of personal property is in itself competent evidence of the value of that property, and sufficient to support a judgment based on that value.]

People v. Coleman (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 358, 361 [the owner of personal property who is familiar with its original cost and use is qualified to testify regarding its value]

People v. More (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 144, 145 [the owner of property is a competent witness to testify as to its value]

Sixth Holding:

In addition to the owner’s valuation, jurors may also determine the fair market value of a vehicle based on common knowledge.

Authority:

People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1366 [jurors could rely on their common knowledge that late-model BMW’s have a substantial market value]

Case 001169

Error and/or relief

The court erred in discharging a juror during deliberations without conducting an adequate hearing to determine whether the juror could continue to deliberate in a fair and impartial manner.

First Holding:

The right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury is part of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. A sitting juror’s actual bias, which would have supported a challenge for cause, renders the juror unable to perform his or her duty and thus subject to discharge and substitution. Actual bias in this context is defined as the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1312

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 589

People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 581

Second Holding:

Under section 1089, if at any time, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears the court may order the juror discharged. When a court is informed of allegations which, if proven true, would constitute good cause for a juror’s removal, a hearing is required.

Grounds for investigation or discharge of a juror may be established by his or her statements or conduct, including events which occur during jury deliberations and are reported by fellow panelists.

Authority:

PEN 1089

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 588

Third Holding:

A distinction must be made between a juror who cannot fairly deliberate because of bias and one who, in good faith, disagrees with the others and holds his or her ground. A trial court’s inquiry into possible grounds for discharge of a deliberating juror should be as limited in scope as possible, to avoid intruding unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations.

The inquiry should focus upon the conduct of the jurors, rather than upon the content of the deliberations. Additionally, the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an intention to disregard the court’s instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, and that no other proper ground for discharge exists.

Authority:

People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051

Fourth Holding:

We review the trial court’s decision to discharge a juror under section 1089 for an abuse of discretion under the heightened demonstrable reality test, which entails a more comprehensive and less deferential review than the substantial evidence test.

This test requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that [good cause for removing the juror is established. In determining whether the juror’s inability to perform his or her duty appears in the record as a demonstrable reality we do not reweigh the evidence.

Under the demonstrable reality standard, the record must give us confidence that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by the evidence on which it actually relied. In making that determination, we consider both the evidence itself and the reasons the court articulated for its conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450-451

Fifth Holding:

The defendant did not forfeit his claim by failing to request additional inquiry because the court has a duty to investigate when it possesses information that might constitute good cause to remove a juror even if the defendant objects to such an inquiry.

Authority:

People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506

Sixth Holding:

The court did not adequately investigate the reasons for the jurors statements. The information provided by the juror required the judge to conduct further inquiry on the conduct in question. The juror stated that he did not think he could be fair to either side because of the conduct of the jury he described to the judge in general terms, without specifics. The court’s inquiry did not go far enough to determine reliably that the juror was, in fact unable to continue deliberating in a fair and impartial manner. When a juror’s answer is ambivalent, the court is not entitled to presume the worst.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 694, 701

Seventh Holding:

The erroneous discharge of the juror requires reversal. However, this reversal does not create a double jeopardy bar to retrial.

Authority:

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 454