Daily Archives: November 13, 2026

Case 001190

Error and/or relief

The court erred in concluding that, because the defendant had been released on parole, he was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.

First Holding:

In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the Legislature passed SB 136, which amended section 667.5(b) to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

In 2021, SB 483 made this change retroactive. It enacted was is now section 1172.75, which declares that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.

(Gary Musings, nearly a verbatim copy and paste from my summary of Case 001135: The above language “to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” is a bit looser maybe than it should be. Subdivision (b) was indeed amended, and the subdivision (b) now applies only if the offense was a sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b).

(Keep your eyes on the prize here, though. SB 136 did not eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for “all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” as stated in the opinion. It eliminated only those specified in subdivision (b), except for the specified sexually violent offenses.

(But SB 136 did NOT eliminate the three-year enhancement specified in section 667.5(a) for any qualifying prior prison terms served for the violent felonies listed in subdivision (c), which itemizes at least 24 crimes and circumstances that give rise to the status as “violent felony.”

(I have seen that “to eliminate” (or “by eliminating”) “prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” language in other unpublished opinions, and it is a direct quotation from Rhodius itself, at p. 1054. I understand the context because section 1172.75 pertains only to enhancements under subdivision (b). But I fear that maybe an attorney new to the field might read too much into that phrase. Hence, this Gary Musings to help such quick readers from straying. Though Rhodius does use the phrase “all prior crimes” in its fourth paragraph, it more specifically describes the effect of SB 136 in its first paragraph, where it says, “Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated these one-year prior-prison-term enhancements except in cases involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses.” (I.e., referring only to the 667.5(b) enhancements.)

(The Legislative Counsel’s Digest characterizes the amendment as follows:

(“Existing law imposes an additional 3-year sentence for each prior separate prison term served by a defendant where the prior and current offense was a violent felony, as defined. For other felonies, existing law imposes an additional one-year term for each prior separate prison term or county jail felony term, except under specified circumstances.

(“This bill would instead impose that additional one-year term served for each prior separate prison term served for a conviction of a sexually violent offense, as defined.”

(The second paragraph of the Leg Counsel’s digest makes it clear by using “that additional one-year term served ….” From its “Existing law” paragraph, in which it describes both the 3-year sentence and the one-year term, the “This bill” paragraph pertains only to the “one-year term” portion of section 667.5. The phrase “all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses” appears nowhere in SB 136.

(So with eyes wide open, recognize that enhancements for prior prison terms for violent felonies described in section 667.5(c) are alive and well.)

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Second Holding:

A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing. To facilitate the process, the statute directs the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).

Upon receiving that information, the sentencing court must review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. The statute provides separate deadlines for identification, review, and resentencing of individuals currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement and all other individuals.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1055

Third Holding:

Section 1172.75(d) sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing once a sentence has been recalled. It specifies that resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. The resentencing shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.

The trial court must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council as well as any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

In addition, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1055

Fourth Holding:

Section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Fifth Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires that the defendant be incarcerated at the beginning of the process, when correctional officials identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes’ a one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). It does not require the defendant thereafter remain incarcerated until the time of resentencing to maintain his or her eligibility for relief. Nor is resentencing such a subsequently released defendant an empty exercise, as it can afford practical relief that includes shortening the applicable parole term.

Thus, a person who has been released on parole prior to the resentencing hearing remains eligible and should still be resentenced.

Authority:

People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1061

Sixth Holding:

Here, defendant’s judgment included a prior prison term enhancement that was imposed and executed before January 1, 2020. The prior prison term enhancement was not for a sexually violent offense. Defendant was still incarcerated on July 31, 2023, when CDCR identified him as a person eligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.75.

However, he had been released on parole in the two plus years in which his resentencing hearing was pending. Thus, the matter must be reversed and remanded, the court to recall defendant’s sentence and conduct a full resentencing hearing.

Authority:

People v. Washington (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1057

Case 001189

Error and/or relief

The court erred in conducting the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6(d) without the defendant’s presence and without a valid waiver of his presence.

First Holding:

Section 1172.6(a) permits resentencing for a person convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime. If a prima facie case for relief is made, the statute requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing where the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner” is guilty under current law. At the evidentiary hearing, the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing, and the prosecutor and the petitioner may offer new or additional evidence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

Second Holding:

A defendant has the constitutional right to be personally present in court where necessary to protect the defendant’s opportunity for effective cross-examination, or to allow the defendant to participate at a critical stage and enhance the fairness of the proceeding. This right is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well as article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution.

Because a section 1172.6 hearing allows the court to potentially vacate a murder conviction through the admission of new evidence and/or by reweighing prior evidence, it is a critical stage and, as such, requires either a defendant’s personal presence or a valid waiver.

Authority:

U.S. Const., Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

Cal. Const., art. 1, sec. 15

People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 532-533

People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57-58

People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, 150–151

Third Holding:

Because defendant’s absence from this critical stage in criminal proceedings is constitutional error, the Attorney General must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s absence did not affect the outcome of the proceedings. We are unable to conclude that the error did not affect the outcome of the proceedings.

The matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing during which defendant shall either be present or provide a valid waiver.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 461

People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 902

Case 001188

Error and/or relief

The trial court gave two conflicting instructions on unlawfully taking or deriving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851. One of the instructions omitted an element of the crime. We reverse the conviction on that count and remand for retrial.

First Holding:

Vehicle Code section 10851 can be violated in two general ways, by taking the vehicle (driving theft) or by driving the stolen vehicle after the theft is complete (posttheft driving). The theft of the vehicle may be considered complete when the driving is not part of the original taking; when the driving is an act distinct from the taking; when the driving is for purposes unconnected with the original taking; when the driving is no longer part of a continuous journey away from the locus of the theft; or when the driving is not part of the escape from the scene of the theft.

Authority:

People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 394–395

People v. Van Orden (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1285

Second Holding:

Posttheft driving consists of driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent after the vehicle has been stolen, with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of title or possession. Where the evidence shows a substantial break between the taking and the driving, posttheft driving may give rise to a conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 distinct from any liability for vehicle theft.

Authority:

People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1188

People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1136

Third Holding:

Stealing a vehicle and continuing to drive it after the theft is complete are separate and distinct violations of Vehicle Code section 10851(a). Driving theft is a theft conviction; posttheft driving is not. While a theft-based violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 may be punished as a felony only if the vehicle is shown to have been worth over $950, a violation committed by posttheft driving may be charged and sentenced as a felony regardless of value.

Authority:

People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 395

People v. Van Orden (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1285-1286

People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1136

Fourth Holding:

There are alternative versions of the CALCRIM No. 1820 jury instruction pertaining to section 10851. The first version indicates that the People must prove; 1 The defendant took someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent; 2. When the defendant took the vehicle, the defendant intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time; AND 3. The vehicle was worth more than $950.

The second alternative differs as to only the third element, requiring that the driving occurred after a substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.

After telling the jury that the defendant was charged with unlawfully driving [sic] a vehicle in violation of section 10851, the court instructed only as to the first alternative, except that instead of “The defendant took someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent,” it stated “The defendant drove [sic] someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent.” Neither the written nor the oral instruction contained the third element for posttheft driving, that the driving occurred after a substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.

Authority:

CALCRIM No. 1820

Fifth Holding:

We review instructional error de novo, assessing whether the instruction accurately states the law. Further, we review a challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner. The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense. All criminal defendants have the right to a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which the defendant is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824

Sixth Holding:

A trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of an offense is reviewed under the standard in Chapman. Under Chapman, we must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances,” we determine the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Merely showing the evidence presented at trial could support a conviction, however, is not sufficient. Instructional error is harmless where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. The Attorney General bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Gary note: The court then discussed aspects of the case that caused it to conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts of this case.)

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 838-839

People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1138

People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13

Case 001187

Error and/or relief

After initially stating that it would impose a firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53(d), on the defendant’s sentence on count 1, the trial court later struck the punishment on that enhancement. The abstract of judgment in this case fails to accurately reflect this aspect of the defendant’s sentence, listing the enhancement and time imposed of “25 years” without any indication that punishment was stricken. As a result, we will order the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect the trial court’s actual pronouncement of sentence in this case.

(Gary musing: On my soapbox again–the abstract of judgment indicates that an enhancement was imposed to add 25 years to the defendant’s sentence. Yet the trial court actually struck that enhancement. How lucky is it that the defendant filed a notice of appeal and that appellate counsel or the appellate court noticed the error? Would the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation have discovered the error? Would it have discovered the error and sought correction in time to determine the nature of housing the defendant was to be assigned (assuming that length of sentence is a criterion)? Yet one more example in support of my quest to encourage trial counsel to obtain and review abstracts of judgment.

(As I pointed out recently in an earlier post–my statistics over the past year reflect that roughly 1 in 14 criminal appeals has an error in the abstract of judgment or sentencing minute order that paints a plight worse than imposed on the defendant. Roughly 7%. Dismounting the soapbox now.)

Holding:

Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts … that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts. Where there is an evident discrepancy between the abstract of judgment and the judgment that the reporter’s transcript reflect, the appellate court itself should order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185, 188

Case 001186

Error and/or relief

Remanded for the trial court to state on the record the fines and assessments imposed and for the preparation of an amended abstract of judgment that reflects the oral judgment.

First Holding:

Our review of the record disclosed that the trial court’s imposition of fines and assessments is unclear. A trial court must include a detailed recitation of all the fines and assessments imposed at sentencing. The trial court orally imposed a $7,200 restitution fine under section 1202.4, but then stated: “The court will stay any mandatory fines and fees and … the court will impose that which are mandatory.” We are unable to determine what specific financial obligations the court intended to impose.

Authority:

People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment lists a $7,200 parole revocation fine, a $360 court operations assessment, a $270 criminal conviction assessment, and a $300 sex offender’s fine, but it is not clear from the record which of those amounts, if any, the trial court orally imposed. An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction. It does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.

The sentence is reversed and the matter is remanded for the trial court to impose sentence and to clarify on the record the fines and assessments imposed. The court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 [Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.]